











Japan’s Instrumentalisation of Taiwan for Its 
Security and Power-Political Relations vis-à-vis the 





A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Sheffield 
Faculty of Social Sciences 







This thesis investigates Japan’s utilisation of Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for 
its security vis-à-vis the PRC. It considers the non-recognition and sanctioning of 
Taiwan within international society and examines how Japan incrementally treats 
Taiwan as if it is a part of international security efforts despite its non-recognition of 
the latter in its efforts to navigate its One-China policy. Therefore, Japan–Taiwan 
relations can be regarded as largely hierarchical. Chapter 1 discusses Japan One China 
policy and Taiwan, and how these frameworks condition Japan’s engagement with 
Taiwan in the context of the former’s One China policy. This relationship requires the 
innovative theoretical approach that turns to the English School of International 
Relations, wherein Japan is the central protagonist in the grand narrative, which gives 
Japan an opportunity to be the regional accommodator of the marginal entity like 
Taiwan in international society. Chapter 2 then focuses on the English School of 
International Relations and discusses how Japan has been narrated as a good student of 
Eurocentric international society, while also examining how the non-sovereign political 
communities have been engaged by the great Eurocentric great powers. These attempts 
elucidate how Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan into international society has not 
received the scholastic attention it deserves. Chapter 3 then engages with the literature 
on Japan–Taiwan relations, focusing on Japan’s foreign policy instruments to elucidate 
how the nation determines the boundaries of an acceptable Japan–Taiwan security 
cooperation while pacifying the PRC. Here, we conceptualise how Japan socialises 
Taiwan through international security norms as if it is a member of the multilateral 
security forums without affording it formal membership. Chapter 4 then examines how 
Taiwan fits into the Japanese concept of CSD and assesses what Japan is willing to do 
 
in terms of the Japan–Taiwan security cooperation while providing Taiwan with 
deterrence against the PRC. Chapter 5 focuses on the ICAO to assess what Japan can 
do to ensure Taiwan behaves as if it is a member of the ICAO in view of Japan’s security. 
Chapter 6 then uses the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement to examine how Japan made 
Taiwan a quasi-equal stakeholder on a par with both Japan and the PRC while dividing 
the potential cross-strait united front against Japan. It also examines the normative 
dynamics behind the enhancement of conflict alleviation despite the tensions between 
the nations with reference to the ESIR perspectives. Taking these empirical 
investigations into account, the conclusion considers the importance of further research 
on Japan’s accommodation of ‘internationally ostracised entities’ within international 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Questions 
In the post-Cold War era, despite the non-visibility of Taiwan as a regional security 
actor, cross-strait tensions have significantly affected Japan’s national security strategy, 
albeit with a comparative lack of domestic and international attention. In fact, from this 
period on, the presence of Taiwan has been a recurrent issue for Japan in terms of Sino-
Japanese relations, creating certain tensions that are, in turn, affecting Japan’s security.1 
Furthermore, if Taiwan remains an internationally isolated entity, a ‘missing linkage’ 
could emerge within the international security efforts that require ‘statehood’ to be a 
member. However, if Japan’s security experts give serious thought to how to socialise 
Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for regional peace and stability, Taiwan could 
contribute to Japan’s security – especially in terms of the rising threat of the PRC – 
albeit while remaining largely underappreciated by Japan. In other words, Taiwan, 
which behaves in accordance with international security norms by Japan’s support, 
helps consolidate the normative developments for peace and stability in the regional 
order amid the rising threat of the PRC.  
 
1.1.1 Research questions 
This study attempts to answer the following questions. How does the de facto state of 
Taiwan fit into Japan’s regional security strategy vis-a-vis the PRC? Specifically, if 
Japan and Taiwan cannot openly engage in security relations in high-profile manners 
 
1 During the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s, Japan was reminded of the 
geopolitical implications of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which is geographically 
located next to Japan’s southern flank. During the Chen administration from 2000–2008, the Taiwan 
Strait was often considered a significant source of geopolitical tensions in both Sino-US relations and 
Sino-Japanese relations. Currently, under the Trump administration, the issue of Taiwan has returned to 
the geopolitical frontline of the Sino-US tensions, which may affect Japan’s security again. 
 
in the absence of a Japanese recognition of Taiwan due to Japan’s One-China policy 
and the PRC’s political sanctions directed at Taiwan, how can Japan engage Taiwan in 
terms of security? Given Japan-Taiwan security relations inevitably cause geopolitical 
risk of tension with  the PRC, what can Japan do to make it difficult for the PRC to 
sanction this Japan-Taiwan security ties despite Japan’s One China policy? Why is 
Taiwan important for Japan’s security in managing its competitive relations with the 
PRC? Given that Taiwan has geographical advantages and abundant security resources 
that are underutilised and underappreciated internationally due to the nation’s 
unrecognised status within international society, how can Japan maximise these 
advantages and resources for its own security without causing excessive tensions with 
the PRC? As with other de facto states in the international community, if Taiwan is 
regarded as a loophole in regional security affairs, how can Japan socialise Taiwan in 
terms of international security norms to alleviate the issue? Finally, can Taiwan increase 
its contributions to Japan’s regional security strategy? Through addressing these 
questions, this thesis attempts to shed some light on Japan’s underappreciated but 
unique international security behaviours, which are demonstrated through its 
engagement with an unrecognised Taiwan amid the rise of the PRC.  
1.2 Japan’s One-China Policy and an Unrecognised Taiwan 
In the field of studies on Japan’s security policy, one of the least scrutinised aspects of 
the nation’s changing international security role in the post-Cold War era is how it 
engages in its security policy on Taiwan. This is largely due to the fact that Taiwan’s 
status remains disputed. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s unrecognised status creates space for 
Japan to use it as part of its unique security contributions, as will be examined. In this 
section, we examine how Japan–Taiwan relations function at an informal level within 
the framework created through Japan’s One-China policy. Within this framework, 
 
Japan socialises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument in accordance with international 
security norms vis-à-vis the PRC. Here, Japan influences Taiwan’s ‘state behaviour’ by 
socialising Taiwan through international security norms generated based on state-
centric international law and international institutions for the former’s security. Japan 
also induces Taiwan’s voluntary compliance with international rules and norms for 
peace and stability for the latter’s security contributions to Japan via signing the 
relevant agreements as rewards. This Japanese utilisation of Taiwan as a foreign policy 
instrument plays out without the recognition of the latter’s statehood, despite the 
enhancement of Japan’s power-political relations vis-à-vis the PRC. Thus, Japan has 
tacitly and informally included Taiwan in its regional strategy. Provided one of 
Taiwan’s national security agendas remains the expansion of its international space, the 
nation can receive rewards from Japan via the signing of agreements if its state 
behaviour is deemed as beneficial to Japan’s security. However, in view of its One-
China policy, Japan continues to deny the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood. In fact, in 
order to avoid excessively breaching this policy, Japan enhances its informal security 
ties with Taiwan in purely incremental terms. Clearly then, Japan’s insistence that it 
follows a non-strategic Taiwan policy needs to be reconsidered. 
1.2.1 Taiwan’s unrecognised status 
According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention (1933), the criteria regarding 
what qualifies a political entity as a state are as follows. First, the entity must have a 
permanent population; second, it must have a defined territory; third, a centralised 
government must be in control; and fourth, the entity must have the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states. However, the fourth criterion is somewhat ambiguous 
since what constitutes the capacity to enter into relations with other states is difficult to 
define. As such, since Japan does not recognise Taiwan as a state and all the legal and 
 
political engagements between the nations are conducted on informal or quasi-official 
levels, the fourth criterion here remains contested. Furthermore, the PRC’s White Paper 
(2004) states that there is only one China and that the PRC represents all China and 
does not allow ‘One China, One Taiwan’ or ‘Two-China’ concepts. While the PRC is 
ready to engage with the Taiwan authorities led by the KMT on an equal footing in the 
cross-strait talks, the government in Beijing is the central government, while the 
authority in Taiwan remains a purely local government. According to the White Paper, 
the ROC ceased to exist when the PRC was established in 1949, and the ROC 
government that fled to Taiwan remains an illegitimate government. In addition, since 
the PRC does not allow the recognition of the Two-Chinas concept, and given the 
emergence of the so-called ‘Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan’, Taiwan’s 
international relations with other states are strictly limited to the informal level.  
Japan also essentially follows this formula through its One-China policy established in 
1972, which restricts it interactions with Taiwan to economic and cultural dimensions 
in order to appease the PRC. Upon Japan’s normalisation of the diplomatic ties with the 
PRC in 1972, the Joint Communique stated the following:  
[t]he Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an 
inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The 
Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand 
under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation (Joint Communique of the 
Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 
MOFA, 29 September 1972). 
Given that the Japanese government ‘fully understands and respects’ the PRC’s position 
on Taiwan, Taiwan’s status remains ambiguous within the framework of Japan’s One-
 
China policy while rendering Japan–Taiwan relations unofficial in nature. As such, 
Japan can continue to regard its relations with Taiwan as informal, while Taiwan has 
no authority to challenge this. Clearly then, Japan–Taiwan relations are largely 
hierarchical in nature.  
Meanwhile, Cohen (1971) argued that given the US’s normalisation of the ties with the 
PRC, the most difficult issue remained how to handle the status of Taiwan without 
completely disregarding US–Taiwan ties. Cohen (1971) also pointed out that Japan 
faced the same issue, noting that with its One-China policy, the nation simultaneously 
benefits from its official ties with the PRC while maintaining informal ties with Taiwan. 
However, on closer examination, it is clear that Japan is incrementally navigating the 
complexity of its One-China policy to enhance the nation’s security by utilising Taiwan 
in acceptable ways while simultaneously appeasing the PRC. Elsewhere, Chen (2014) 
used the constructivist theory of argumentative persuasion to theorise how the PRC’s 
interpretation of the One-China principle has evolved over the years along with the 
PRC’s understanding of the Taiwan Strait issues and the evolution of identities and 
interests in Taiwan. Here, Chen (2014) argued that the PRC came to more tacitly accept 
the existence of the ROC since it has some Chinese roots, which may indicate some 
equality between the mainland and Taiwan and suggests a shift from the relationship 
between the central government that represents the whole of China and the Chiang 
Clique. While the PRC is highly unlikely to recognise the ROC, it continues to have 
international sovereignty over Taiwan while not having the capacity to exert control 
over Taiwan’s domestic Westphalian sovereignty. Thus, there would appear to be some 
flexibility on the part of the PRC regarding how they are re-conceptualising the One-
China principle. It would also appear that Japan has gradually increased its flexibility 
in navigating how it approaches its One-China policy to ensure more comprehensive 
 
ties with Taiwan, which includes low-key yet comprehensive informal security 
interactions between the two nations. 
 
If Japan frames Japan–Taiwan relations according to its One-China policy, its political 
decisions will advance the nations’ bilateral political and security ties rather than those 
of Taiwan. In other words, the Taiwanese political input into Japan’s security policy on 
Taiwan has a minimal influence, if any. In short, Japan does not treat Taiwan as an 
equal partner in its international security efforts within international society. Precisely 
because Taiwan is a non-recognised entity that has no independent foreign policy 
leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan’s relations with Japan, Japan holds unique opportunities to 
exploit Taiwan by using it as a foreign policy instrument for its own security. Regarding 
this point, Wilkins (2012) argued that the combination of Taiwan’s anomalous status 
and Sino-US relations restricts Japan–Taiwan relations to informal ties that are 
conducted within the framework of economic and cultural ties. Here, Wilkins (2012) 
advocated for low-key security relations between Japan and Taiwan in the non-
traditional security sphere. Nonetheless, while Taiwan does not enjoy international 
recognition, meaning it is often neglected and forgotten, it remains a regional economic 
and military power and is a stable democratic entity to be reckoned with. Indeed, the 
sheer amount of security resources Taiwan offers are deemed to be beneficial for 
Japan’s security – provided the nation is appropriately accommodated – especially vis-
à-vis Japan’s complicated relations with the PRC. 
 
However, Taiwan is not a state since it lacks international recognition, and the nation 
continues to suffer from the PRC’s political sanctions. Indeed, the nation has long been 
expelled by the UN and the relevant agencies as well as by any official multilateral 
 
security forums that require ‘statehood’ for membership. Here, Munro (1994) argued 
that Taiwan’s aspiration for some form of representation in the UN in the early 1990s 
was a product of the nation’s democratic development. However, the PRC increasingly 
gained a geopolitical advantage to block Taiwan’s formal international activities. 
Eventually, it is up to Beijing to decide if Taiwan can be represented in the UN at any 
level other than under the One-China policy, effectively subordinating the nation to the 
PRC. Thus, even an incremental inclusion of Taiwan within the UN is not realistically 
achievable. This aspect of the One-China policy, which relates to Taiwan’s international 
status vis-à-vis the international organisations that require its members to be nation 
states, is the most relevant aspect for this research since it is pertinent to how Japan 
socialises Taiwan through international security norms in the international security 
efforts that lie outside of the international organisations. For his part, Chen (2017) 
pointed out Taiwan’s adherence to the One-China principle, which satisfies the PRC’s 
requirement for Taiwan’s membership within the WHA and other international 
organisations. In fact, Chen (2017) argued that under the Tsai administration – which, 
unlike the Ma administration, does not follow the 92 consensus that claimed that One 
China means the ROC – Taiwan is unlikely to be able to satisfy the PRC’s preconditions 
for representation in the WHA or other similar organisations. Meanwhile, the former 
president, Lee Teng-hui (1999), argued that while the relationship between Taiwan and 
mainland China has always been a divided nation, Taiwan has a right to be part of 
international society as a democratic member and is willing to play a role in contributing 
to global peace despite the intimidations imposed by the PRC. In fact, Taiwan is willing 
to contribute to peace and stability if the surrounding international security environment 
allows it to do so, which points to the restricted international space afforded to Taiwan 
due to the PRC’s sanctions and the absence of international recognition. 
 
 
1.2.2 Japan’s utilisation of Taiwan for its security and power politics 
 
How then does Japan specifically influence Taiwan’s state behaviour in ways that are 
beneficial to its own security? In reality, even though Japan does not recognise Taiwan, 
the two nations can still informally discuss regional security or strategic issues in one 
form or another albeit in low-key manners. In addition, Japan’s non-recognition of 
Taiwan’s statehood – which renders Taiwan a ‘non-state actor’ – does not mean the 
former does not consider the latter in terms of its regional balance of power. For 
example, as Thomas and Williams (2017) pointed out, both Japan and Taiwan often 
invite MOFA or MOI officials or other proxies to engage in non-state-centric low-
political diplomatic discussions to influence high-political diplomacy, including 
through the de facto embassies that are deployed in both Tokyo and Taipei.2 Notably, 
the fisheries negotiation also took place through such informal communication channels 
in the presence of MOFA and coastguard officials (Thomas and Williams, 2017). 
Clearly then, Taiwan deploys significant, high-profile figures who represent the central 
government via informal channels to communicate with Japan, which means that Japan 
can engage in ‘unofficial’ political dialogues with Taiwan provided it invests some 
political capital, even given its One-China policy. Certainly, as Kawashima (2013) 
pointed out, the signing of the fisheries agreement between Japan and Taiwan had huge 
strategic implications and reduced Japan’s concerns over the cross-strait united front, 
albeit that it may have provoked the PRC. Here, it should be noted that the fisheries 
agreement was also signed with reference to state-centric international law, namely, 
 
2 Thomas and Williams (2017) argued that precisely because Japan appeases the PRC through its One-
China policy, Taiwan must resort to informal diplomacy or para-diplomacy, which seemingly is non-
state-centric in that MOFA-led non-state actors such as municipal or local entities are unimportant in its 
exchanges with Japan. 
 
UNCLOS legislation, meaning Japan can indeed influence Taiwan’s state behaviour in 
certain ways, which will be further explored in a later chapter. In other words, Japan 
can use state-centric international law to influence Taiwan’s state behaviour in ways 
that are deemed beneficial to its own security, acting in accordance with international 
security norms without having to officially recognise Taiwan.  
 
Furthermore, Japan has a significant influence in deciding whether or not Taiwan is 
indeed a tacit and informal stakeholder in the former’s regional or transregional security 
strategy. For example, as Scott (2019) pointed out, Taiwan considers its Indo-Pacific 
strategy as a way to consolidate its identity as a maritime member of the Indo-Pacific 
region and to redirect its geopolitical focus away from the PRC. However, the nation 
requires support from both the US and Japan if its Indo-Pacific strategy is to be 
successful (Scott, 2019). Indeed, during his inauguration speech of 20 May 2020, the 
Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen (2020), expressed the nation’s strategic intensions 
to enhance its ties with the US, Japan and Europe, as well as with other like-minded 
countries, in view of increasing the nation’s international space, and indicated how the 
nation is willing to cooperate with the regional states to enhance prosperity, peace and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific region. For certain, depending on who is in power, Taiwan’s 
domestic policy vis-a-vis Japan may change; however, it is worth noting that even 
under the Ma administration, Japan and Taiwan signed the fisheries agreement, which 
again demonstrates Japan’s significant influence in shaping Taiwan’s regional security 
role, even within the constraints of its One-China policy. 
 
Meanwhile, Samuels and Heginbotham (2018) argued that the long-held Japanese 
military strategy of forward defence – which involves keeping the adversaries at the 
 
Japanese borders at bay – no longer makes strategic sense due to the rapid increase of 
the Chinese offensive capabilities. In fact, they argued the case for Japan’s active denial 
to engage in protracted warfare against the Chinese military, which will likely incur 
unacceptable damage and prevent the adversary from gaining the decisive victory. Here, 
the authors note that Japan will gain resiliency by dispersion, deception and 
concealment by diversifying the targets the PLA must attack and through a greater use 
of more multiplied infrastructures, especially in terms of protracted aerial and naval 
warfare against the Chinese offensive. However, the authors failed to address the notion 
that the mere existence of Taiwan, which functions as a military buffer for Japan vis-à-
vis the PLA, diverts the significant Chinese military resources away from Japan to 
Taiwan. In fact, the White Paper published in 2020 by the Ministry of Defence in Tokyo 
provided an analysis dedicated to Taiwan’s military capabilities and the cross-strait 
military balance of power, including within the context of the US’s Indo-Pacific 
strategy (MOD White Paper 2020, pp. 86–89). While the White Paper does admit that 
the military balance of power is heavily tilted in favour of the PRC to the detriment of 
Taiwan, the MOD discusses Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities, while the attendant 
cross-strait power politics indicate Japan’s significant interest in the military role of 
Taiwan. Thus, the quiet alignment of Taiwan with Japan’s security strategy is 
mitigating the crisis of the latter’s vulnerability and enhancing its resiliency. Therefore, 
while Japan is reluctant to acknowledge Taiwan’s indirect defence role due to the One-
China policy, this ‘non-state actor’ is undoubtedly supplementing Japan’s power-
political relations with the PRC, as will be further examined in a later chapter.  
 
Nonetheless, Soeya (2001) argued that Japan maintained a de facto ‘Two-China’ policy 
by default in the post-war period and insisted that the nation lost any legitimate claim 
 
to be a strategic actor, including on the issue of China–Taiwan relations, due to its 
history of imperialism. In fact, the author even argued that the Taiwan factor has not 
convinced Japan about the explicit function of the Japan–US alliance in relation to 
China. However, as will be demonstrated in this dissertation, Japan is clearly 
instrumentalising Taiwan for its power relations with the PRC within the context of the 
One-China policy, regardless of the historical origins of its policy on its relationships 
with China and Taiwan. Furthermore, Japan’s incremental and somewhat surreptitious 
accommodation of Taiwan within the regional security environment differs from how 
the US utilises Taiwan as a diplomatic card in a more high-profile manner in Sino-US 
confrontations. As such, Soeya’s (2001, 2011) insistence on Japan’s non-strategic 
Taiwan policy and his view that Japan continues to follow the Japan–US alliance as a 
middle power requires more nuanced analysis. 
 
1.2.3 Taiwan as a regional tension-generator  
 
Meanwhile, it is true to say that Taiwan’s disputed status generates tensions within the 
context of the Sino-US rivalry and Sino-Japanese relations. Swine (2004) pointed out 
that the Chen administration’s actions – which included holding the defensive 
referendum in 2004, where the Taiwanese people were asked how they viewed the 
PRC’s missiles and the use of force against Taiwan – triggered significant anxiety 
within the PRC over Taiwan’s status. The US is obliged to provide sufficient support to 
Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC while simultaneously reassuring the PRC that it does not 
support Taiwan’s independence (Swine, 2004). Thus, the One-China policy does not 
contradict the US’s moral and strategic obligation regarding Taiwan since the cross-
strait war is causing devastation to the Taiwanese people that far outweighs the 
 
importance of maintaining the status quo (Swine, 2004). Furthermore, as Lieberthal 
(2005) noted, while the fundamental baseline for Taiwan is to ensure that the PRC does 
not use force, for the PRC, the priority is to make sure that Taiwan is not recognised as 
a sovereign state, while for the US, it remains maintaining the peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. In fact, Lieberthal (2005) goes as far as suggesting that, for the PRC, the 
existence of the Anti-Secession Law correlates with how the US considers the Taiwan 
Relations Act as a geopolitical means of reducing the risk of Taiwan independence, with 
the law largely aimed at increasing the PRC’s capacity to manage the Taiwan Issue. In 
short, the PRC would never accept the international recognition of Taiwan nor the 
latter’s sense of a separate ‘statehood’ or its declaration of independence. Here, Ross 
(2006) argued that Taiwan’s diminishing independence movement reduced the 
unnecessary risk of a major war between the US and the PRC and noted that while the 
way that the PRC treats Taiwan in military terms is an important indicator of how the 
nation treats other states in the region, there is little regional sympathy for Taiwan 
independence. In fact, in various nations, including Australia and South Korea, the US’s 
commitment to the security of Taiwan is a significantly divisive political issue in 
alliance politics (Ross, 2006).  
 
1.2.4 Japan’s cautious approach toward Taiwan in One China Policy 
 Elsewhere, Hara (2015) argued that the issue of legal status vis-à-vis the Senkaku 
Islands, Taiwan and Okinawa is conceptualised through the shared historical context of 
the geopolitical tensions and the rapprochement of the US’s allies and adversaries 
during the Cold War era. Given these geopolitical concerns, Japan cannot completely 
ignore the Taiwan issue and lay all the responsibility of the security of Taiwan on the 
US alone, however much it would like to do so. Meanwhile, in terms of Japan’s 
relations with Taiwan, this requires an especially cautious stance by the Japanese 
 
government due to the PRC’s sensitivity regarding Japan’s historical relations with 
Taiwan and its imperial history in China. Here, Johnson (1972) argued that the mutual 
negative perceptions of Japan and China in both nations are largely structural and 
grounded in historical events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that were fuelled 
by imperial expansion. Meanwhile, the two nations also tend to harbour mutual 
misunderstandings, including in terms of Japan’s revived defence security and its 
relations with Taiwan (Johnson, 1972). While the two nations may see the short-term 
rapprochement, they are perhaps destined for long-term rivalry. Thus, the US–Japan 
approach to the Taiwan issue is conducted within the context of the One-China policy 
in view of minimising the risk of unnecessary conflict. This is why Japan must 
cautiously navigate its One-China policy, framing what the nation is willing to do and 
what it is not willing to do in terms of its informal security ties with Taiwan without 
unnecessarily antagonising the PRC. In fact, as Scott (2019) noted, Taiwan’s direct 
involvement in the Quad3, which involves Japan, Australia, India and the US, is deemed 
as crossing the red line by the PRC. 
  
1.2.5 Taiwan as an unrecognised state: A question of diplomatic limbo 
 
Fewer and fewer countries in the world are recognising Taiwan in diplomatic terms, 
with only 17 states affording the nation full international status (The New York Times, 
2019). In fact, this geopolitical context surrounding Taiwan gives it a unique status as 
a de facto state within international society. In other words, this status of an 
unrecognised actor is keeping Taiwan in a state of diplomatic limbo, a nation deprived 
of the privileges afforded to recognised sovereign states. Japan’s position is stronger, 
 
3 The emerging informal Indo-Pacific security groups that consists of Japan, Australia, India and 
the US.  
 
and its One-China policy means that Taiwan’s interactions with Japan are determined 
under the politico-legal framework set out by the latter. In short, Japan’s political 
interest lies in balancing its ties with both the PRC and Taiwan, and within this context, 
Japan can semi-legitimise or even delegitimise Taiwan if it wishes to do so.  
 
As such, a realist approach does not apply since Taiwan is not a state, while it is an 
entity that enhances the balance of power in Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, a social 
constructivist approach cannot be applied since the existing identity-based research 
does not sufficiently explain how Japan utilises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument 
for Japan’s security vis-à-vis the PRC. Therefore, the research must turn to an 
alternative theoretical framework that allows for a conceptualisation of Japan’s 
instrumentalisation of Taiwan as such an instrument. This will be examined in the next 
section.  
 
1.3 Rejecting Social Constructivism and Neorealism in Favour of the 
English School of International Relations 
 
This section attempts to elucidate why this study rejected a constructivist and Neorealist 
approaches in favour of the approach devised by the English School of International 
Relations (ESIR). As noted above, identity-based research cannot effectively 
conceptualise how and why Japan instrumentalises Taiwan as a foreign policy tool for 
its security vis-à-vis the PRC. Also, since Neorealism understates the roles of 
international norms and non-state actors like Taiwan, and because of the excessive 
emphasis on the role of the military in Neorealist debates on Taiwan, a Neorealist 
 
approach is not applicable in this research. In addition, since an unrecognised Taiwan 
lacks ‘membership’ in international security efforts that require statehood, we must 
conceptualise how Taiwan’s membership can be accommodated within the 
international society of states. This aspect can be more appropriately theorised using 
the ESIR approach, which will be examined in Chapter 2. First, we must examine the 
constructivist approach more closely in relation to Taiwan’s identity and Japan’s re-
conceptualisation of the former’s place in international security efforts. In the process, 
we look at the two major strands in the constructivist literature related to Japan: the 
norm constructivist approach and the approach that focuses on Japan’s identity and its 
so-called ‘otherings’. The general discussion of constructivist literature effectively 
renders Taiwan’s norms and perspectives non-applicable for scholastic examinations 
related to Japan’s foreign policy. Reviewing the constructivist literature on Japan will 
help to elucidate how the nation’s norms of domestic pacifism continue to define the 
acceptable behaviours for its defence security policy and allow the nation to evolve in 
an incrementalistic manner. This school of thought also argues that Japan would not 
dramatically shift its defence security policy without significant material changes in the 
international system surrounding the nation. Meanwhile, investigating the other 
constructivism-based school of thought regarding Japan – which is exemplified in the 
notions of Japanese identity and its ‘otherings’ – helps to illuminate how Japan 
conceptualises the ‘othering’ of its regional neighbours, with this ‘otherness’ 
significantly contributing to any changes to Japan’s defence security policy. The review 
of the two major schools of constructivist thought generates the argument that such 
approaches do not allow for effectively conceptualising how Japan socialises Taiwan 
as if it is a member of the regional security environment vis-à-vis the threat of the PRC. 
 
Also, it will elucidate how the Neorealist approach, which restricts debates on Taiwan 
in the context of binary understandings between whether Taiwan will be abandoned or 
engaged, thus conceptualising Taiwan merely as a geopolitical pawn, is not 
conceptually appropriate for Japan’s instrumentalization of Taiwan in international 
society.  
Therefore, based on these above-discussed concepts, we consider a research approach 
involving qualitative methods, specifically case studies, for this thesis on why and how 
Japan utilises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument in international society while 
navigating the ambiguities of its One-China policy. This thesis  also discusses how the 
politico-legal tensions resulting from the formal/informal contradiction in Japan–
Taiwan relations marked by Japan’s non-recognition of Taiwan have certain 
implications for this research methodology. The tension related to the 
officiality/informality nature of Japan–Taiwan relations is blurring the line between 
official and informal sources, which means this research requires the extensive use of 
multiple sources.  
 
1.3.1 Constructivism  
 
Constructivists such as Wendt (1995) have argued that social factors are pertinent to 
international relations and that international relations are not determined by material 
factors alone. As Wendt (1992, 391) famously stated, ‘[a]narchy is what states make of 
it’, meaning that the international structure is not given; rather, it is socially constructed. 
As such, the mechanistic understanding of the international system that forces state 
actors to behave in deterministic ways as espoused by neorealists such as Waltz (1979) 
is questionable. In fact, the social structure within international politics, be it 
 
cooperative or conflictual, comprises the shared knowledge that each state possesses. 
In other words, for Wendt (1999), constructivism is an approach that broadly 
encompasses the ideational factors and the conventional methodological and 
epistemological study of international relations. Meanwhile, for the constructivists, the 
concept of security is negotiated and re-negotiated by domestic actors in the state until 
they determine what constitutes the most serious threat to their security. 
 
For Wendt (1999), the state’s security and identity are negotiated and renegotiated in 
terms of international relations. As Zalewski and Enloe stated (1995, pp. 282–283), 
‘identity determines how you are treated, what is expected of you, what you expect of 
yourself’. Therefore, constructivists such as Macdonald (2013) have argued that the 
function of the relationship between security and identity is to investigate why state 
actors act the way they do. For example, Dobson (1998) discussed Japan’s UN-led 
peace-keeping operations (PKO) to examine the constitutive norms and regulative 
norms that facilitated and restrained Japan’s PKO contribution to international and 
national security. McDonald (2013) went on to ask why the possession of nuclear 
weapons by the P5 states, as well as Israel, India, and Pakistan, is not regarded as a 
threat to international security while North Korea and Iran are regarded as grave threats 
to international security in terms of the role of norms, identity, and representation. 
Another important concept of constructivism that relates to the current research is the 
concept of ‘othering’. The concept of securitisation requires the social construction of 
a specific threat that justifies ‘actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ 
(Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). Based on the above review of constructivism, we can 
now examine why we rejected a constructivist approach in favour of the ESIR approach. 
 
 
1.3.2 Taiwan’s identity and Japan’s re-conceptualisation of Taiwan’s membership 
in international security efforts 
 
As discussed above, the central points in constructivism are the role of identity and the 
ideational factors of the state actors within international society. Simply put, the role of 
Taiwan’s national identity and the development of ideational factors in the nation are 
largely nonrelevant to Japan’s defence security policy, as will be examined below. Thus, 
the constructivist approach is not applicable to the study of Japan’s utilisation of Taiwan 
as a foreign policy instrument vis-à-vis the PRC in international society. While the role 
of national identity is central in a constructivist-based analysis of international relations, 
the ESIR regards the role of international society as the central force. For example, 
Lebow (2016) argued that since the regional and international societies are ‘thinner’, 
they have less effect on the development of the multiple identifications of the state, 
while national identities affect the norms of regional and international society to a far 
greater extent. However, this constructivist conception of the role of national identities 
within the regional and international societies fails to take into account that the 
existence of an anomalous state such as Taiwan has no influence in terms of shaping 
the norms of international society. However, in the ESIR approach, the role of 
international society is more significant in affecting the role of the member states, as 
will be examined in the Chapter 2. If Japan has a regionally privileged status in 
determining which nation has the right to membership of international society within a 




hierarchical relationship can be more appropriately conceptualised using the ESIR 
approach than using the constructivist approach. 
  
Furthermore, as Reus-Smit (2009, p. 70) noted, one of the foundations of international 
society is mutual recognition; thus, what is essential is who is afforded legitimate 
statehood and full sovereignty. While Japan has full membership within international 
society due to its recognised statehood and regional status of a great power, 
unrecognised Taiwan enjoys no such privileges. Here, Rich (2020) examined 
Taiwanese public perceptions of the nation’s diplomatic ties with the recognised states 
and argued that Taiwan can provide alternative ‘creative unofficial relations’ for the 
other non-recognised states within the international community while enhancing its 
more important informal ties with the US and other major actors. Nonetheless, it should 
be stated that, realistically speaking, Taiwan’s ‘creative unofficial relations’ cannot 
function without substantial political backing from major powers such as Japan. In other 
words, Taiwan requires the support of a regional great power such as Japan to fully 
realise its diplomatic endeavours within international society of states if it acts like a 
state-actor (Wendt, 1995).  
 
Thus, this dissertation will examine Japan’s approach to the re-conceptualisation of 
Taiwan’s non-official membership within international security through the lens of the 
ESIR approach. With regard to Japan’s approach to membership in terms of regional 
multilateralism, Hamanaka (2010) observed how the nation has considered arguably 
the world’s most powerful state, the US, in terms of when, why and how Japan 
concludes that it is in its own interests to include the US in any Japan-initiated regional 
frameworks, or in regional frameworks initiated by other regional states. Hamanaka 
 
(2010) used potential regional leader state theory to conceptualise how a potentially 
powerful state such as Japan is incentivised to include or exclude the world’s most 
powerful state, the US. Nonetheless, Hamanaka’s (2010) study fails to address how and 
why Japan proceeds with Taiwan’s pseudo membership in the regional environment 
within the context of balancing its relations with the PRC and Taiwan by inducing the 
latter to incrementally contribute to Japan’s security while continuing to appease the 
former in terms of the Taiwan issue. In other words, if Japan affords Taiwan explicit 
membership to a multilateral security forum that requires statehood for membership, 
this will likely be regarded as the former’s recognition of the latter’s statehood, which 
will cause tensions and potential conflict with the PRC, especially given the Anti-
Secession Law (2005) that clearly runs against Japan’s security enhancement. However, 
since Taiwan does exist as an informal state-like entity, neglecting the nation 
completely – especially its competent capability of contributing to Japan’s physical 
security – amounts to a geopolitical waste and may result in Taiwan threatening Japan’s 
physical security if it feels excessively isolated or abandoned within the context of 
international security efforts related to Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
Taiwan’s exclusion in terms of membership within the international society of states 
makes it a unique case in the international security efforts. While there is ongoing 
debate over why North Korea and Iran are considered to be grave threats to international 
security given their potential for possessing nuclear weapons while others are not 
(McDonald, 2013), both nations continue to be recognised as members of international 
society, or at least their statehood is not denied. Indeed, both North Korea and Iran are 
members of the UN, while Taiwan does not even have a seat, despite the fact that the 
nation is a liberal democratic regime based on human rights and the rule of law, 
 
possesses a highly developed economy with its own competitive currency, and has its 
own substantial military. Therefore, Taiwan’s social actors and norm entrepreneurs – 
and even the ‘state behaviour based on Taiwan’s domestic norms’ – have minimal, if 
any, influence on the nation’s international security efforts. Indeed, Taiwan’s 
admiration for Japan may entertain the conservative revisionists’ desire to beautify 
Japan’s past intra-regional imperialism and colonialism since it provides an idealistic 
alternative to the PRC’s (and South Korea’s) historical demonisation of Japan.  
 
Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to find any linkage between how Japan develops 
its security policy and the evolution of Taiwan’s national identity, even if the debate on 
Taiwan’s national identity may incorporate the nation’s preference for having ties with 
Japan rather than China, which is largely due to Taiwan’s identity (He, 2014) and its 
admiration for the ‘already modernised Japan’ (Serjrup, 2012a). Meanwhile, Li and 
Zhang (2017) agreed with Yang’s (2016) argument that Taiwanese people have not yet 
abandoned the ethno-cultural Chinese identity, in addition to adding that the identity 
convergence between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is, if difficult, still possible if 
China embraces the concept of a democratic regime. Nonetheless, regardless of whether 
Taiwan is Taiwanese or Chinese, policymakers in Tokyo are highly unlikely to consider 
Taiwan’s national identity in terms of its foreign policymaking, except perhaps to 
confirm the degree of the Taiwan–China separation. This is especially pertinent given 
that Taiwan remains materially powerless in the face of the regional great power rivalry 
between Japan and China (He, 2014). Furthermore, the PRC is unlikely to embrace the 
liberal democratic values and norms that are embraced by the Taiwanese (Hsueh, 2014; 
Link, 2015; Li and Zhang, 2017; Krejsa and Cho, 2017). Meanwhile, as He (2014) 
noted, Taiwan’s identity politics are grounded in the concept of democracy, which 
 
means the Taiwanese government cannot drastically transform the nation’s foreign 
policy in a way that may contradict the mainstream self-image of Taiwan. Thus, the 
strong Taiwanese identity based on liberal democratic values is reinforcing the cross-
strait political separation. This benefits Japan’s regional maritime balance of power in 
Japan–China–Taiwan relations. However, merely studying Taiwan’s national identity 
cannot help us elucidate why and how Japan has been instrumentalising Taiwan as a 
foreign policy instrument to enhance its security vis-à-vis the rise of China since 
Japan’s foreign policy decision-making process is completely out of the control of 
Taiwan, irrespective of the national identity Taiwan adopts. Taiwan is indeed a 
component of the regional power balance for Japan vis-à-vis the PRC in terms of the 
issue of the East China Sea. Nonetheless, the more Japan engages with Taiwan as an 
independent actor, the more it damages the legitimate narrative of the CCP regarding 
Taiwan being a sacred part of China. As such, the legitimacy of the CCP is questioned, 
which requires a careful handling on Japan’s part of its engagement with Taiwan if the 
nation intends to manoeuvre the ambiguity of its One-China policy.  
 
If Japan’s national security interests regarding Taiwan relate to maintaining the political 
separation between the PRC and Taiwan in view of the regional maritime balance of 
power, Taiwan’s debates on national identity and security do appear to have some 
scholastic value for the examination of Japan’s security. Wan (2007) argued that while 
Japan’s understanding of the Taiwan issue from the 1980s to the Missile Crisis of the 
mid-1990s was largely political, it gradually incorporated the security dimension of its 
understanding of China–Taiwan tensions between the late 1990s and the 2000s. This 
was due to the change in the international security environment surrounding Japan, 
which included the change in the dynamics within the triangular relationship involving 
 
normalising Japan, non-democratic China, and democratising Taiwan. Here, Wan 
(2007) pointed out that Japan has significant interest in the future cross-strait relations 
due to its geopolitical linkage with the East and South China Sea issues, including in 
terms of securing the Japanese sea lines of communication. Nonetheless, as Wan (2007) 
suggested, even the president of Taiwan does not have political leverage to influence 
Japan’s Taiwan policy since Japan’s realpolitik interest regarding the latter is linked to 
its alliance with the US, while the Japanese people remain content with the constraints 
imposed on Japan’s foreign policy, which merely evolves incrementally. While Japan 
will likely continue to balance its relations with China and Taiwan, Taiwan cannot 
affect Japan’s Taiwan policy in any sense, despite the fact that Japanese public opinion 
may increasingly express some enthusiasm for a more democratic and Japan-friendly 
Taiwan as well as some resentment toward a repressive and hostile China (Wan, 2007). 
In addition, the former Japanese de facto ambassador in Taiwan, Uchida Yoshihisa 
(2006), noted that Taiwan wants Japan to recognise its role as a military buffer for its 
neighbour, especially given that the missiles directed at Taiwan from southern China 
can easily be redeployed against Japan and that Taiwan’s defence airspace management 
is linked to Japan’s air security.  
 
In other words, while Japan reiterates the ‘non-solution’ to the issue of the Taiwan–
China separation for political reasons, it has been instrumentalising Taiwan as a security 
maximisation asset via imparting international security norms generated in international 
society in which Taiwan does not have a membership in order to manipulate Taiwan’s 
normative behaviours for its own physical security. Thus, Japan can enable Taiwan to 
behave as if it is, in fact, a member of international society within the regional setting. 
For these reasons, given that the ESIR places an emphasis on who has the privilege to 
 
be a member of international society based on legitimate statehood, it holds a theoretical 
advantage in conceptualising how Japan utilises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument 
for its own security. As will be further explained in Chapter 3, Japan, as a regional great 
power, has the power to grant Taiwan semi-membership to international society.  
 
Nonetheless, a number of analysts continue to focus on the debate over domestic 
politics related to Taiwan’s national security under the assumption that such internal 
debates can enhance Taiwan’s future membership within multilateral security forums 
that require statehood for membership. For example, Babones (2016) argued that 
Taiwan should seek behavioural change rather than political change and should 
normalise its status as a de facto state without declaring its independence if it wishes to 
be taken more seriously within the international community. Elsewhere, Greer (2019) 
claimed that there are reasons why Taiwan prioritises the purchase of high-end military 
assets from the US and attempts to develop high-profile indigenous defence equipment 
rather than use cheap, expendable and mass-producible anti-access assets. This includes 
the fact that Taiwan believes there is greater political value in its military relations with 
the US and the fact that raising the morale among the Taiwanese population in terms of 
its military power is more politically important in symbolic terms within the context of 
hyper-partisan Taiwanese domestic politics than the nation’s actual defence needs 
(Greer, 2019). As such, Greer (2019) suggested that Taiwan must be invited into high-
profile US-led multinational military exercises to raise the nation’s morale and increase 
its defence capabilities. However, neither Taiwan’s attempt at behavioural change nor 
its domestic political interest in how to construct its geopolitical role as a de facto buffer 
for Japan against the PRC’s military pressure (Uchida, 2006) can, in any sense, affect 
the Japanese elites’ debate over Japan’s security policy, including in terms of its 
 
conception of the CSD. Furthermore, Japan will never allow Taiwan to play an ‘official’ 
role in the US-led mini-lateralism, in which Japan is undoubtedly the linchpin. Clearly, 
it is up to Japan’s political decision-makers to define the acceptable boundaries of 
Japan–Taiwan security ties within the context of its One-China policy. In short, what is 
debated in Taiwan has no place in Japan’s security policy on Taiwan.  
 
1.3.3 Norm constructivism in relation to Japan 
 
Here, we must clarify why norm constructivism does not allow for theorising how Japan 
utilises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its security vis-à-vis the PRC. First, 
in the norm constructivist school of thought, Japan is largely described as having strong 
pacifist domestic norms that strictly regulate the nation’s evolution of its strategic 
security policy in an incrementalistic manner. Regarding this point, Berger (2011) 
argued that the military-political culture is influenced by the domestic norms, values 
and beliefs, and that each country has a different reaction to the same event due to its 
specific military political culture, which is manifested in varying degrees of military 
power and the use of force. From a constructivist point of view, all the states seek 
legitimation from both domestic and international audiences in order to mobilise 
support for the policy in question (Goddard and Krebs, 2018). State behaviour that does 
not resonate with the dominant domestic norms soon loses its domestic support, while 
even if the behaviour does resonate with the domestic norm, if it deviates from the 
international norm, it is rendered illegitimate within international society. Norm 
constructivists generally agree that Japan has been and will continue to be normalising, 
even though the resiliency of Japan’s pacifist identity restricts, conditions and retains 
the evolution of the nation’s defence security policy on an incremental basis. However, 
 
Kallender and Hughes (2019) argued that Japan is heading toward a radical shift in its 
defence security policy, while also conceding that the nation has undergone some 
normalisation in recent years in terms of having more self-defence capabilities and 
accepting a greater defence security role both independently and within the context of 
the Japan–US alliance. Therefore, it can be argued that the domestic pacifist norms in 
Japan are no longer considered as a constraint on Japan’s defence security policy. 
Nonetheless, this remains largely nonrelevant to Japan’s security policy on Taiwan 
since, even if it has the capability, it simply wants to use Taiwan as a non-traditional 
security instrument and as a more useful geopolitical buffer against the PRC within the 
context of the One-China policy.  
 
On reviewing the literature on norm constructivism in relation to Japan, it is clear that 
the nation seeks the legitimation of the evolution of its security policy by way of 
adjusting its defence policy within the boundaries of the legal constraints and its 
domestic norm of pacifism. As both Hagström and Gustafsson (2015) and Oros (2015) 
noted, even a conservative revisionist leader such as Abe, who wishes to radically 
change the pacifist constitution, must adjust the evolution of Japan’s defence security 
within an acceptable framework of Japan’s pacifist identity. Within the international 
arena, Funabashi (1991/1992) advocated for Japan’s identity transformation into a 
‘global civilian power’ following the nation’s traumatic experience of the Gulf War. 
Elsewhere, Easley (2017) argued that the future trajectory of Japan is “Normal Japan” 
which may attempt to incrementally maximise its material power, reputational status, 
and political influence in line with its national strength, economic scale, and the 
compliance with international norms within the context of the current international 
system. Nonetheless, Japan will likely adhere to its pacifist identity, with the pacifist 
 
nature of its institutional and domestic constraints continuing to restrain the evolution 
of its security policy within the parameters of the pacifist regime (Easley, 2017). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that many norm constructivists (e.g. Gady, 2015b; Oros, 
2015; Hornung, 2016; Easley, 2017) have agreed that, without significant material 
changes in the international system that will affect Japan’s security, the nation is 
unlikely to deviate from the incrementalistic development of its defence security policy 
due to the constraints of the nation’s pacifist identity. 
 
Kersten (2016) argued that the inherent tension between pacifist and democratic legal 
norms, Japan’s strategic autonomy and its dependency on its alliance with the US may 
cause Japan’s new security identity to fluctuate. Meanwhile, Greenstein and Tensley 
(2016) pointed out that the major reason why the US and Japan find it difficult to 
construct a shared collective memory of the atrocities both nations committed during 
WWII – including the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima – relates to the fact that both have 
dual identities as victim and victimiser. Nonetheless, historical impunity generally 
comes at the expense of reconciliation (Greenstein and Tensley, 2016). Kersten (2016) 
concluded that this is where the normative role of Australia comes into play as an 
alleviator of the aforementioned tensions. Alongside the US, Australia is a major 
security partner for Japan and the historical fact that Australia was a victim of WWII 
gives credence to Japan’s new security identity as a future-oriented nation focused on 
historical reconciliation and shared democratic values (Kersten, 2016). Elsewhere, Lind 
(2009) pointed out that both the international community and Japan should ask why 
Germany was able to engage in more dedicated self-reflections and sincere apologies 
than Japan. Here, Lind (2009) argued that Japan should seek the middle-ground, which 
lies in acknowledging its imperial misdeeds and the subsequent suffering of its 
 
neighbours as victims of Japanese aggression while giving the Japanese youth ample 
opportunity to be proud of post-war accomplishments such as economic success, 
cultural creativity and the forging of a liberal democratic path, which are ensuring Japan 
is more future-oriented based on Adenauer’s model of 1950s West Germany. This 
would help Japan achieve some reconciliation with its neighbours while containing the 
political backlash from the Japanese conservatives (Lind, 2009). 
 
However, the following question remains: If the resilience of Japan’s domestic norms 
of pacifism is tangible, how does this affect the nation’s security policy on Taiwan? 
Japan is a regional great power, one that does not formally recognise Taiwan, a nation 
that has, at best, a minimal influence on the development of Japan’s pacifist-based 
national identity. Furthermore, it is argued that Japan’s legitimation of its security 
policy through harmonising its defence policy development with its domestic norms of 
pacifism and legal constraints cannot help us theorise Japan’s incremental 
instrumentalisation of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC. This is because Japan’s unofficial ties 
with Taiwan are rooted in the former’s One-China policy, and the PRC considers 
Japan’s adherence to the One-China principle to be an essential premise of the healthy 
development of Sino-Japanese relations. There is always the risk of Taiwan 
emboldening the Japanese conservatives’ historical revisionism (He, 2014; Serjrup, 
2012b), which would be detrimental to Japan’s physical security if it leads to historical 
tensions with its neighbours. Certainly, Japan and Taiwan share certain democratic 
norms, and their historical ties continue to bind the two actors. However, unlike 
Australia, which has an unquestionable role in facilitating Japan’s new future-oriented 
security identity (Kersten, 2016), it is unclear whether Taiwan has such a role in 
alleviating the aforementioned tensions, especially in terms of the Japan-led debate over 
 
CSD. It is pointed out here that while Japan and Taiwan indeed share historical tensions, 
including the issue of ‘comfort women’, the Taiwanese authority tends to keep these 
non-high-profile issues out of the strategic considerations for Taiwan–Japan relations 
for its own survival. Furthermore, as will be examined in Chapter 3, Japan–Taiwan 
relations benefit from the nations’ historical ties, which includes Taiwan’s more unique 
interpretation of the Japanese colonial rule. Therefore, it remains unclear as to whether 
either Japan or Taiwan are interested in enhancing a high-profile historical 
acknowledgement of the former’s aggression within the context of the bilateral Japan–
Taiwan relations to push Japan forward as a future-oriented country, an approach 
espoused by Lind (2009). Overall then, norm constructivism does not present an 
appropriate theory for conceptualising how Japan utilises Taiwan as a foreign policy 
instrument.  
 
1.3.4 Japanese identity and its othering  
 
In this section, we engage with the literature related to the concept of Japanese identity 
and ‘othering’. Here, it is argued that the identity-based research grounded in 
constructivism is ineffective for theorising Japan’s instrumentalisation of Taiwan vis-
à-vis the PRC, largely because we cannot find a linkage between Japanese identity and 
the othering of Taiwan and Japan’s physical security. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) defined 
securitisation as ‘constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat 
with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’. As pointed out by 
Hagström and Gustafsson (2015), it would appear that numerous authors (e.g. 
Gustafsson, 2015; Suzuki, 2015; Hagström and Hanssen, 2015; Tamaki, 2015, Bukh, 
2015; Suzuki, 2019) engage in identity-based research on Japan and its othering of its 
 
neighbours to counter the argument that Japan’s pacifist identity is fragile in the face of 
the material changes within the international system surrounding Japan. They clearly 
observed that Japan is in a normatively higher position in international society vis-à-vis 
Japan’s Northeast Asian ‘inferior others’ such as China, South Korea and North Korea, 
while Southeast Asia is defined more as an opportunity and is thus more positively 
identified. In these studies, China and North and South Korea are largely depicted as 
‘securitised others’ that demonise Japan as a historical aggressor while denying its post-
war pacifist national identity. Meanwhile, Japan’s othering of its neighbours as ‘inferior 
and immoral entities’ may amplify the nation’s normalisation of its defence security 
policy even further while eroding the nation’s pacifist constraints. Nonetheless, simply 
put, these debates cannot help us to conceptualise how Japan utilises Taiwan for its own 
physical security.  
 
Jamieson (2018, p. 157) argued that in order to measure whether or not the securitisation 
of others is successful, the following four criteria must be met: (i) identification of the 
security threat; (ii) articulation of the security threat; (iii) an intersubjective agreement 
about the security threat; and (iv) demonstrated political effects that cannot be easily 
reversed. Elsewhere, Arrington and Yeo (2019) pointed out that despite the numerous 
pledges made by Japan and South Korea to enhance their future-oriented ties, a 
resurgence of the domestic norms of historical resentment toward Japan has emerged 
in Korea, exacerbated by Japan’s mishandling of its historical contrition towards its 
imperial history, including the instrumentalisation of economic embargo. Here, Japan’s 
historical tensions with its neighbours may derail the development of its new security 
identity as a future-oriented nation. Meanwhile, the most complex case is Taiwan (He, 
2014; Serjrup, 2012b), which is othered by Japan as an inferior but positive entity and 
 
may thus provide an alternative conception of Japan’s imperial history to the 
demonisation presented by China and Korea. Taiwan also often ‘others’ Japan, albeit 
as a ‘positive other’, in ways that suit its own political needs. This bilateral Japan–
Taiwan relationship reinforces Japan’s position as the more civilised state while 
subordinating Taiwan to a position of learning from Japan’s past within the hierarchical 
order. Furthermore, Japan requires the decision-making of strong statesmanship if it is 
to enhance its historical reconciliations with South Korea and China while persuading 
the Japanese public that these reconciliations are important to the issue of historical 
memory. Meanwhile, Japan’s historical reconciliation with Taiwan is arguably less 
crucial to enhancing stable political ties. Certainly, Japan–Taiwan relations involve 
some degree of historical contention, but this does not affect the bilateral relations as 
much as in the case of South Korea and China. Nonetheless, Japan does require a 
different form of political decision-making to enhance its strategic ties with Taiwan, 
which strongly relates to manoeuvring the ambiguity of its One-China policy. 
 
Meanwhile, as will be examined in Chapter 3, Taiwan can provide an alternative 
historical view of Japanese intra-regional imperialism to that offered by China and 
North and South Korea. Thus, the existence of Taiwan may reinforce the ontological 
security of the conservative revisionists in Japan. Nonetheless, it needs to be stated here 
that the Japanese conservative revisionist sympathy or the othering of Taiwan as an 
‘inferior’ but ‘benign’ entity within Asia’s hierarchical order will not, in any sense, help 
shape Japan’s security policy on Taiwan. Here, the answer is straightforward. In short, 
Japan engages with Taiwan only under its One-China policy and will not enhance its 
defence ties with Taiwan to appease the PRC for its own security. As such, Japan-
related identity-based research, including that related to the nation’s othering, is not 
 
applicable to how it instrumentalises Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC. Thus, defining Taiwan 
as a modernising other in contrast to the already modernised Japan cannot help us to 
theorise how the former contributes to the latter’s physical security. Furthermore, since 
Taiwan is an unrecognised state, this severely limits its foreign policy leverage vis-à-
vis Japan. In short, Taiwan cannot be a security asset for Japan if it is not incrementally 
accommodated into the regional security environment by Japan while manoeuvring its 
One-China policy. Therefore, it is difficult to find a connection between notionally 
defining Taiwan as a ‘positive other’ for Japan and affording Taiwan membership to 
the regional security environment. Thus, the identity-based research grounded in 
constructivism can be rejected as an approach to theorising Japan’s instrumentalisation 
of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC for its own physical security.  
 
1.3.5 Rejection of Neorealism  
 
Waltz (Waltz 1979, 113) argued that ‘in international politics [military] force serves 
not only as the ultimate ratio, but also as the first and constant one.’ Antunes and 
Camisão (2018) pointed out while defensive realists such as Waltz (1979) perceives 
states to be security maximising-oriented. In their view, states try to seek sufficient 
power to maintain security. Meanwhile, offensive realists such as Mearsheimer (2001) 
advocates for power maximising-oriented state behaviour among great powers in order 
to ensure their survival in anarchic system. Both defensive and offensive realists 
consider states to be unitary actors and give little credits to non-state actors, which is 
not suitable for state-like non-state actors such as Taiwan. Furthermore, as noted above, 
both defensive and offensive realists give excessive credits to military security, while 
ignoring the role of international norms based on international law, which inevitably 
 
militarises the debates on Taiwan’s international security utility. This has had outsized 
implications for debates on US-Taiwan relations. Certainly, Taiwan does play a role in 
Japan’s considerations in the regional geopolitical balance of power as a de facto 
defence buffer for Japan against the PRC (Uchida 2006), yet Japan’s security interests 
regarding Taiwan is not just merely limited to military security but also reaches into 
non-military security spheres based on international security norms, as will be 
examined in Chapter 3 and the three case study chapters. Then, if debates on regional 
security issues involving Taiwan in the field of neorealism is excessively relying upon 
military security, this is not conceptually appropriate for theorizing Japan-Taiwan 
security interactions.  
 
For example, one factor that Japan cannot ignore is the argument for the eventual 
abandonment of Taiwan in the US’s grand strategy debates. For examples, Gries and 
Wang (2019) argued that all three sides in the US–China–Taiwan relations are mired in 
wishful thinking. Under the Trump administration, the US prioritises America first, 
while China believes the US can use Taiwan as a bargaining chip and is largely 
unwilling to defend Taiwan, and Taiwan has convinced itself that the PRC will not 
attack its shores. Elsewhere, Lynch (2018) argued that, with the advent of the Taiwan 
Travel Act, the Trump administration may use the ‘Taiwan card’ as a bargaining chip 
in its confrontation with the PRC and urged Taiwan not to be a pawn for the Trump 
administration amid Sino-US tensions, especially given that Trump’s domestic political 
base is unlikely to support Taiwan if cross-strait military conflict arises. Meanwhile, 
realists such as Mearsheimer (2014) posited that as the PRC becomes ever more 
powerful in the future, it will become increasingly more difficult for the US to commit 
to the security of Taiwan. Furthermore, Tang (2014) argued that the multiple factors 
 
including the rapid military build-up of the PLA, Taiwan’s domestic political wrangling 
that delayed the purchase of the US defence assets and reduced the US’s trust on 
Taiwan’s eagerness to defend itself, and the US’s unwillingness to antagonize the PRC 
over the Taiwan question all contributed to the change of the cross-strait military 
balance of power in favour of the PRC. In addition, Taiwan’s international isolation 
and the lack of Taiwan’s strategic importance for the US make Taiwan a strategic 
liability (Tang 2014). Even Gilley (2010), maintained that Taiwan’s ‘Finlandisation’ 
vis-à-vis the PRC would both secure Taiwan’s autonomy and help the US’s grand 
strategy. Here, Gilley (2010) argued for the gradual reduction of the US’s security 
commitment to Taiwan amid the cross-strait détente under the former Ma 
administration, stating that ‘Taiwan's Finlandisation should be seen not as a necessary 
sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China’.  
Some others advocate for US’s greater engagement with Taiwan including military ties. 
For examples, Tucker and Glaser (2011) argued the US should not abandon Taiwan but 
instead should strengthen ties with Taiwan including the continuous arm sales to 
Taiwan in order to make sure Taiwan can confidently negotiate with the Mainland 
China, retain the regional trust of the US among the US allies in Asia, seek for US’s 
expanded economic ties with Taiwan, and utilize Taiwan’s democratic model for the 
region including the PRC’s autocracy. Tucker and Glaser (2011) pointed out that if 
Taiwan is captured by the PRC and is used as a military springboard for the PLA, the 
PLA can prevent Japan from securing the sea lanes of communication that connects the 
East and South China Seas. Meanwhile, Haass and Sacks (2020) questioned the wisdom 
of “strategic ambiguity” for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait via the Taiwan 
Relations Act and instead argued for “strategic clarity” without the change of the US’s 
stance on Taiwan’s status. In their view (2020), US’s such a move will make the PRC 
 
think twice about resorting to the use of force against Taiwan, deters the cross-strait 
kinetic conflict and signals the US’s credibility to defend its “regional allies” other than 
Taiwan.  
Clearly, abandonment/engagement debates on Taiwan in neorealism neglect 
international security norms that Japan utilises to socialise Taiwan in international 
society. As will be examined in literatures on de facto states and international society 
in chapter 2 and literature on Japan-Taiwan relations in chapter 3, non-recognised states 
including Taiwan is vulnerable to international recognition/derecognition. This binary 
understanding leads to abandonment/engagement debates on Taiwan, which 
conceptualise Taiwan as a geopolitical pawn. This is especially the case if the debates 
on Taiwan are militarised like neorealism. Thus, this research requires an alternative 
theory, which can socialise Taiwan through international security norms for Japan’s 
security as a foreign policy instrument vis-à-vis the PRC.  
 
1.4 Sources: Tensions between Formal and Informal Sources  
 
According to Navari (2009, p. 12), students of ESIR ‘spend their time in archives 
getting their hands dirty’, are ‘immersed in diplomatic archives, memoires, and 
newspapers’, and ‘spend time in international institutions, listening to what 
international civil servants say and observing what they are doing’. However, while the 
first point raised by Navari (2009) is highly relevant to this research, his allusion to 
‘immersion’ in certain areas does not necessarily apply to the data gathering and 
substantiation of the present research. Matsuda (2013) noted the opaque nature of the 
Japanese government’s decision-making process related to the policy on Taiwan and 
the subsequent inaccessibility. In addition, the tension between the officiality and the 
 
informality of sources complicate the corroboration of the findings within the context 
of research on relations between the sovereign state of Japan and unrecognised Taiwan 
(Matsuda, 2013). Certainly, merely investigating archives and surfing the internet will 
not enable us to verify the validity of the gathered data. However, what is unique about 
Japan–Taiwan relations is that Japan’s official Taiwan policies often do not surface 
from governmental sources but from more informal ones. Grix (2019) pointed out that 
the over-reliance on media sources may indicate a lack of sources to back up the 
dissertation’s scholastic argument. However, this is precisely the reason why the 
importance of informal sources needs to be elucidated within the context of informal 
Japan–Taiwan relations. As noted by Deans (2001), informal Japan–Taiwan relations 
are supported by informal channels formed to enhance the informal political ties 
between the two actors. On this point, Wilkins (2012, p. 115) pointed out that ‘[d]ue to 
the sensitivities attending Taiwan's anomalous diplomatic status’ both ‘official 
documentation of and scholarly inquiries into the bilateral relationship are relatively 
limited’. Indeed, this lack of official documentation and scholarly inquiries also had 
implications for the methodology utilised in this research. Furthermore, from this 
research, we can observe how informal sources are documenting, depicting, and 
promoting Japan’s informal security engagement with Taiwan within the context of 
Japan’s One-China policy. Thus, what appears to be informal sources and what appears 
to be secondary sources – such as academic sources, Japanese newspaper interviews 
with Taiwan’s high-profile figures (e.g. the current and past presidents of Taiwan, and 
Taiwanese ambassadors in Tokyo), think tank reports, comments made by Japanese 
elite figures in the unofficial think tank diplomacy involving Taiwan – can be 
considered as ‘official messages’ in the form of ‘unofficial sources’. Therefore, the fact 
that Japan is socialising Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its own security vis-
 
a-vis the PRC creates a novel situation, where what appears to be secondary informal 
sources may actually turn out to be ‘semi-official’. This complicated tension between 
official and unofficial relations creates the unique difficulty of confirming the official 
attitude of the government of Japan, which in turn makes corroborating the evidence 
somewhat problematic. 
 
Thus, multiple sources were combined to create an overall picture of what is happening 
in Japan’s security interactions with Taiwan. Due to the nature of the informal relations 
between Japan and Taiwan, the governmental security agencies in Japan are not willing 
to publish official data, reports, or other documents that are considered outside of what 
is acceptable in Japan’s One-China policy. Here, how the current author engaged in 
data gathering to substantiate the creation of knowledge both in empirical and 
theoretical terms needs to be clarified in order to illuminate how the main argument of 
this study was initially enhanced before overall claims, evidence, and conclusions were 
formulated. The unique point in Japan–Taiwan relations relates to the absence of 
Japan’s recognition of Taiwan’s statehood, and it is often difficult for readers to discern 
‘official’ sources from ‘non-official’ sources. For example, when the National Institute 
for Defence Studies (NIDS) published a large report on the security situation 
surrounding Taiwan in 2017, it raised tensions between Japan and China, and the PRC 
government subsequently admonished Japan; however, in the words of Monma (2017a), 
the report is ‘academic’ in nature, which indicates ‘informality’. Two anonymous 
officials at the Ministry of Defence in Tokyo (who do not want to be identified due to 
the sensitive nature of the issue) ‘informally’ reiterated how the unofficial report of 
2017 published by NIDS caused significant tensions with the PRC. Furthermore, even 
the high-profile fisheries agreement signed between Japan and Taiwan (2013) is 
 
officially a ‘torikime’, meaning it is a private-based pact as opposed to a ‘kyoutei’ or 
‘jyouyaku’ (an international agreement or treaty), thus blurring the demarcation of what 
is considered as official or informal.  
 
Furthermore, the UN-based agencies do not provide official statistics on Taiwan. One 
may be reminded of the fact that the US State Department (2020) even made an ‘official’ 
press statement denouncing the ICAO for blocking Twitter users merely for referencing 
Taiwan in order to silence the ‘informal’ Twitter debates over Taiwan’s exclusion, 
especially in relation to the outbreak of COVID-19. During a private interview with the 
right-wing Sankei Shimbun on 26 February 2020, the current deputy president of 
Taiwan, Chen Jianren, subsequently expressed his gratitude for Japan’s political 
support in affording Taiwan semi-representation in WHO’s technical meeting related 
to COVID-19 despite the PRC’s ostracisation and Taiwan’s lack of recognised 
statehood (Sankei Shimbun, 2020). Thus, it is clear that Taiwan’s informal grassroots 
debates on Twitter can be a source of official geopolitical debate, and that the informal 
Japanese sources such as Sankei Shimbun can be an essential avenue for Taiwan to 
express its official diplomatic message to the Government of Japan. Moreover, due to 
the nature of the non-official bilateral relationship between Japan and Taiwan, the two 
actors cannot engage in the official security dialogue that may involve military affairs. 
Therefore, in terms of Taiwan’s informal relations with Japan in the absence of the 
Japanese government’s recognition of Taiwan’s statehood, the recourse to informal 
avenues such as think tank diplomacy also functions as a ‘quasi-official’ replacement 
for security-based dialogue with Japan. For example, the Security and Strategy 
Research Institute of Japan and the Taiwan Strategy Research Association, both of 
which are private and informal institutes, signed the MOU cooperation agreement to 
 
enhance the institutionalised security dialogue (Security and Strategy Institute, 2019), 
which is unprecedented. Clearly, the conceptual demarcation between what constitutes 
‘official’ sources and what constitutes ‘informal’ sources is highly ambiguous when it 
comes to Japan–Taiwan security relations. Therefore, we must extensively utilise both 
to better elucidate the Japanese elites’ perspectives of Taiwan. 
 
Both primary and non-official sources, and a variety of other sources, were extensively 
used to improve the validity of the narrative on Taiwan’s position as Japan’s foreign 
policy instrument for improving its security within the context of its One-China policy. 
Secondary sources were also crucial to enhancing the validity of the findings since 
Japan’s ties with Taiwan remain unofficial, meaning that official documents are not as 
readily available as in the case of Japan’s other security partner states. However, the de 
facto Japanese embassy in Taipei, the former interchange association (now the Japan–
Taiwan Exchange Association), publishes monthly reports and writings on various 
topics related to Taiwan – including culture, history, foreign policy, domestic politics, 
security affairs, economy and Taiwan–Japan relations – as ‘non-official’ texts. In 
addition, non-official Japanese academic sources like Toua5 are often used as an avenue 
for the former high-profile Japanese figures that were deployed in Japan-Taiwan 
Exchange Association to express their views on Taiwan, including Japan-Taiwan 
security ties. This includes the former director; whose previous role was the director of 
the Joint Staff Office in the MOD. The use of these sources can enhance the validity of 
the findings. Furthermore, the unofficial memoir of the former ambassador, Uchida 
(2006), was helpful in confirming the existence of intelligence-sharing in terms of 
situational analysis and intelligence analysis cooperation between Japan and Taiwan. 
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Nonetheless, the extensive use of non-official texts does not mean official texts related 
to a Japan–Taiwan security cooperation do not exist. Indeed, records of parliamentary 
debates on how Taiwan fits into the Japanese concept of CSD, agreements between 
Japan and Taiwan in the field of non-traditional aviation and maritime security, and the 
high-profile quasi-official fisheries agreement do exist. These were also extensively 
utilised in this research for data gathering and enhancing the validity of the findings. In 
addition, the ICAO’s official documents helped conceptualise Taiwan’s ‘as if 
membership’ of the ICAO that Japan was seeking to achieve based on international 
aviation security norms generated in the ICAO. Both formal and informal texts on 
bilateral Japan–Taiwan aviation security cooperation helped confirm the validity of 
these concepts.  
 
1.4.1 Japanese language  
A number of officials in Taiwan, including the former Japanese de facto ambassador, 
Ikeda Tadashi, and several academics (e.g. Ikeda, 2010; Fukuda, 2018) have expressed 
their concerns regarding the lack of knowledge about Japan, including the limited 
linguistic abilities in Japanese among the Taiwanese elites. Due to Japanese colonial 
rule, the elderly generations of Taiwan may have spoken Japanese, but these 
generations have since passed away or are no longer active in the policy-making bodies 
or academia in Taiwan. When the Japanese language is lost, so is the access to broader 
knowledge on Japan within Taiwan. This gave the author, a native Japanese speaker, a 
significant advantage in accessing the broader scope of knowledge contained in the 
Japanese primary and secondary sources, which is simply not available to Taiwanese 
researchers. In addition, the author can read Chinese text, which helped in 
supplementing data gathering. 
 
 
1.4.2 Rejection of the statistical data as an information source 
 
The prominent international surveys conducted by UN-based security agencies do not 
include Taiwan due to the political consideration of the PRC’s sensitivity and Taiwan’s 
lack of internationally recognised statehood. Furthermore, due to the political 
inaccessibility of the Japanese government’s decision-making body responsible for its 
Taiwan policy (Matsuda, 2013), creating a statistical survey is virtually impossible. 
Thus, using a quantitative method for this research was not considered. While Taiwan’s 
governmental and private entities may conduct many interesting quantitative surveys 
on Taiwan’s domestic political affairs, the nation’s statistical input has no influence on 
Japan’s Taiwan policy. As discussed above, Taiwan’s domestic norms or identity-based 
debate simply do not matter to Japan’s security policy on its neighbour. Meanwhile, 
while Taiwan’s surveys on the PLA’s movements around the East China Sea and the 
Bashi Channel may be of interest to Japan’s defence establishments, they are 
conceptually closer to the intelligence analysis and defence analysis of situational 
awareness (which are herein discussed in the case studies related to CSD and the ICAO). 
Nonetheless, this intelligence sharing between Japan and Taiwan does not equate to a 
quantitative-type methodology. Therefore, a qualitative-type method was deemed to be 
the better option.  
 
1.4.3 Limited use of interviews and extensive use of elite debates  
 
Interviews can be essential to complimenting archival and less-official sources. 
Nonetheless, in this research, interviews were kept to minimum and were used only as 
 
part of a supplementary method for extracting the data or confirming the validity of the 
evidence. The difficulty of accessing the non-transparent decision-making body 
responsible for Japan’s Taiwan policy (Matsuda, 2013) became a significant barrier to 
engaging in interview-based research. Therefore, only interviews via written 
correspondence with a very limited number of high-profile figures were possible. 
Specifically, interviews with a high-profile Japanese politician (2019) and a high-
profile Japanese participant of the track 2 security dialogue between Japan and Taiwan 
(2019) were conducted through written correspondence to supplement the argument, if 
not to corroborate the detailed points raised in the case study chapters. However, as a 
limitation, politicians may often produce a somewhat biased account of events. 
Nonetheless, non-politicians, such as the former vice admiral, provided the author with 
a detailed account of how Taiwan cancelled the track 2 security dialogue between the 
Okazaki Research Centre and the representative of the Ma administration to refocus on 
a track 2 Japan–US–Taiwan security dialogue. He added that the security dialogue 
between his organisation and the counterpart in Taiwan was reconvened under the Tsai 
administration. This somewhat helped supplement this study’s argument that, 
regardless of who is in power in Taiwan, Japan–Taiwan security relations continue to 
improve incrementally since it is up to Japan’s political decision-makers to determine 
the boundaries of the overall bilateral security interactions, while simultaneously 
refuting Kawashima’s argument (2016) that if the cross-strait relations are stable, 
Japan–Taiwan relations are more likely to improve.  
 
Since government-to-government interactions are restricted in Japan–Taiwan relations, 
especially in the field of security, informal exchanges and the subsequently produced 
informal sources play an important role in elucidating how Japan’s security engagement 
 
with Taiwan is conducted. As will be examined in Chapter 3, Taiwan extensively 
instrumentalises track 2 security dialogues via think tank diplomacy to supplement its 
diplomacy in the absence of robust official communication channels due to the 
international non-recognition of Taiwan. Thus, the current author visited numerous 
think tanks, including Chatham House, the Royal United Service Institute in London, 
the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo, and the Legislative Yuan in Taipei, for 
relevant data gathering and deeper insight. As for the US-based think tanks – which 
include the CSIS, the Brooking Institute, and Project 2049 – due to the issue of physical 
inaccessibility, YouTube was utilised to observe the recorded elite political debates. In 
addition, YouTube channels dedicated to the Tokyo Foreign Press Club and the Japan 
National Press Club were examined, when high-profile political figures such as former 
president Lee Teng-Hui (2015) and Premier William Lai (2017) from Taiwan 
conducted press conferences on Japan–Taiwan relations in Tokyo. Also, the recorded 
official comments made by high-profile UN figures such as Ban Ki Moon were utilised 
from the ICAO’s official channel in YouTube.  
 
1.4.4 Secondary sources 
 
Finally, while the extensive use of documentary evidence proves the existence of 
debates among Taiwanese intellectuals, academics, policy-makers and journalists 
related to Taiwan–Japan relations, the case studies confirm the minimal influence that 
Taiwan has on its security relations with Japan within the hierarchical order. Again, this 
documentary evidence supports the argument that it is up to Japan’s political decision-
makers to determine the acceptable boundaries of the security interactions between 
Japan and Taiwan within the context of Japan’s One-China policy. According to Ziyou 
 
Shibao (2019), the previous de facto Japanese ambassador, Numata Mikio, stated that 
upon his first meeting with the former president, Lee, the latter characterised Japan–
Taiwan Relations as ‘單相思’ three times, which literally means ‘one-sided love’. In other 
words, while there are many things that Taiwan wants Japan to do, Japan has no 
intension to respond to their wishes. Certainly, it is erroneous to assume that the 
extensive data gathering from multiple textual sources and open debates is accurate or 
valid, especially within the context of the unique tension between what is considered as 
official and what is considered as informal in Japan’s security engagement with Taiwan 
as well as the difficulty in accessing the opaque decision-making body responsible for 
Japan’s Taiwan Policy. However, this does help to better consolidate the argument on 
how Japan instrumentalises Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its own security 
within the context of its One-China policy while ignoring what Taiwan wants Japan to 
do in return, except when Japan chooses to accommodate Taiwan for its own benefit.  
 
1.5 Multiple case studies 
 
Regarding the debate on what is considered a case study, Robson (1993, p. 146) stated 
that it is ‘[a] strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources 
of evidence’. Here, the case study method is used to examine how Japan is utilising 
Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its security vis-à-vis the PRC, with the case 
studies designed to demonstrate the validity of this narrative. Maoz (2002) pointed out 
that when a researcher adopts the case study method, the theory needs to be 
generalisable in accordance with theoretical consistency to better justify it and to delve 
deeper into the details of the phenomenon. Therefore, theory-testing, theory-building 
and theory-refuting approaches are required. For this purpose, it was important to 
 
triangulate the findings on Japan’s state behaviour vis-à-vis Taiwan. Regarding this 
triangulation, Eisenhardt (1989, p. 538) pointed out that a ‘triangulation made possible 
by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of the constructs 
and hypotheses’. Thus, this dissertation adopts three case studies. The major advantage 
of using multiple case studies lies in the capacity for comparing different sets of data, 
which can lead to a more established cause and effect mechanism and a better 
theorisation of the social phenomenon this research is attempting to elucidate.  
 
Certainly, in the case study selection, a researcher needs to recognise the selection bias, 
and some theoretical inconsistency (Maoz, 2002). This dissertation also has a minor 
theoretical anomaly, which we discuss in the section 1.4.8 on case study on maritime 
security. Nonetheless, the advantages that stems from conducting case studies are quite 
significant in terms of delving deeper into the cause and effect mechanism in broader 
and more explicit fashion and testing the validity of the theory in question. With three 
sets of case studies from the domains of defence, aviation, and maritime security, we 
can establish a more consolidated theoretical framework for the social phenomenon in 
international society in the regional setting, where Japan accommodates Taiwan and 
induces or rewards Taiwan’s specific state behaviours in relation to Japan’s security 
vis-à-vis the threat of the PRC via state-centric international agreements based on 
international law. Furthermore, given that Taiwan is important for Japan’s security due 
to its role as a military buffer and Japan’s secured access to sea and air lines of 
communications, the case studies could be easily identified within the military, aerial, 
and maritime security domains. In addition, the three domains of national security can 
be explained through reference to the state-centric international agreements that Japan 
signed with Taiwan (or aim to sign) to induce or reward Taiwan’s specific state 
 
behaviours in relation to Japan’s security. These amount to defence security actions that 
are debated within the context of the CSD issue in the UN Charter, aviation security 
within the context of the Chicago Convention of the ICAO, and the fisheries agreement 
within the context of UNCLOS. If the research can elucidate on how and why Japan 
socialises Taiwan with international security norms in the three dimensions of defence 
and aerial and maritime security, it can make a convincing case for the conceptual and 
empirical validity of the narrative. Furthermore, precisely because this research relies 
heavily on informal sources due to the informal nature of the relations between Japan 
and Taiwan, the use of multiple case studies will increase the validity of the narrative. 
In short, using multiple case studies allows us to better elucidate the low-key but 
comprehensive nature of Japan’s security engagement with unrecognised Taiwan, even 
within the context of Japan’s navigation of its One-China policy. 
 
1.5.1 Case study on defence security  
 
In terms of the issue of CSD, Taiwan can never play an official part in Japan’s CSD 
actions in the absence of the latter’s recognition of the former and its One-China policy. 
It is essential to state here that the very concept of Japanese CSD is disputed, and while 
Taiwan remains a contested entity. Therefore, the status of Taiwan in terms of whether 
the Japanese CSD applies to it remains ambiguous at best. Nonetheless, Japan can 
indirectly encourage Taiwan to voluntarily align its defence policy with Japan’s defence 
security policy to supplement its defence strategy as if Taiwan is indeed a member while 
increasing the defence role of Taiwan as a military buffer for Japan. Thus, this amounts 
to an extensive case study aimed at elucidating how Taiwan’s ‘as if membership’ is 
conceptualised in Japan’s interpretation of the tensions between its domestic pacifist 
 
constitution and international law on CSD, and how this legal debate affects Japan’s 
defence security policy on Taiwan. It will allow us to observe how unrecognised 
Taiwan cannot attain official membership to Japanese domestic debates over the tension 
between the domestic and international law related to the Japanese concept of CSD, 
where Japan utilises Taiwan as a defence buffer while incrementally enhancing the 
latter’s contribution to Japan’s security via the non-traditional security cooperation 
within the context of Japan’s One-China policy. 
 
Thus, the more Japan increases its defence capabilities around the southeast Western 
Islands near Taiwan, the more Taiwan’s independent defence capabilities become 
important as a military buffer for Japan’s military security vis-à-vis the PRC in the East 
China Sea. Nonetheless, Japan has no intension of officially committing to Taiwan’s 
physical security vis-à-vis the PRC’s aggression, regardless of the fact that Japan’s CSD 
and improved defence security capabilities increase deterrence for Taiwan in the face 
of the threat of the PRC. In short, Japan is maintaining the ambiguity of its security 
commitment to Taiwan while it continues to encourage Taiwan to improve its 
contribution to Japan’s security via the enhancement of non-traditional security 
cooperation through Japan–Taiwan non-military HADR and coastguard cooperation. 
The case study will also reveal how Taiwan’s quiet defence alignment with Japan’s 
defence security through this non-traditional security cooperation with Japan also 
improves both nations’ crisis management capabilities.  
 
1.5.2 Case study on aviation security  
 
 
In terms of the chapter on the ICAO, this involves a case study aimed at examining the 
civil aviation security agency in the UN, of which Taiwan is not a member in the 
absence of recognised statehood and due to the PRC’s sanctions. Nonetheless, Japan 
socialises Taiwan with international aviation security norms created in the ICAO as a 
foreign policy instrument to better handle the threat of the PRC in terms of air security. 
Japan has signed numerous aviation-related agreements with Taiwan or has encouraged 
Taiwan to take specific actions in terms of aviation security in accordance with the 
security rules and norms based on the Chicago Convention of the ICAO. As such, the 
case study engages in an extensive empirical investigation on the social phenomenon 
of how internationally excluded Taiwan has been accommodated into international 
aviation security efforts by Japan even though it does not officially grant Taiwan 
explicit membership. Clearly, Taiwan has enjoyed no membership of the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation in the absence of recognised statehood and the PRC’s 
political sanctions, with the exception of a brief period under the Ma administration. 
However, the nation’s airspace management is closely linked to the stable management 
of Japan’s air lines of communication in the region due to the airspace connectivity 
between the two nations. While Taiwan is excluded from the ICAO, since its air security 
is linked with Japan’s, the enhanced Taiwanese air security management improves 
Japan’s, provided the former behaves as if it is a member of the ICAO and acts in 
compliance with the international norms of civil and defence aviation security. Thus, 
this case study will reveal how Japan has been filling the void resulting from Taiwan’s 
exclusion in the international aviation security efforts. This ICAO-related chapter 
suggests an alternative membership for an unrecognised state such as Taiwan in 
multilateral security forums including the UN-related agencies. An ‘as if membership’ 
of Taiwan in international security efforts granted through Japan’s political power is 
 
conceptualised here, which requires Taiwan to behave according to international 
security norms as Japan’s foreign policy instrument.  
 
1.5.3 Case study on maritime security 
 
Maoz (2002) pointed out that the researcher needs to recognise that each theory has 
some inconsistency and various anomalies. The current researcher admits that the 
chapter on the fisheries agreement involves a minor theoretical inconsistency in relation 
to how it heeded various Taiwanese perspectives. Nonetheless, that is because Japan 
semi-officially recognised Taiwan as a semi-independent political actor via the signing 
of the fisheries agreement with Taiwan based on the UNCLOS, which ensured that 
Taiwan was a semi-equal actor with Japan and China in the East China Sea issue. This 
meant the third case study involved an anomaly since Japan and Taiwan signed the 
fisheries agreement, meaning that while it was signed ‘informally’, it was clearly a de 
facto ‘semi-official’ acknowledgement of Taiwan as a stakeholder. As such, Taiwan 
was granted semi-legitimate membership by Japan. Therefore, this case study is 
different in nature to the other two case studies, wherein “as if” membership was 
conceptualised as opposed to a semi-legitimate membership in the marine issues related 
to the East China Sea. Accordingly, this presents an extensive investigation into the 
major maritime security crisis on how Japan enhanced peace and stability by granting 
Taiwan a near equal membership in the East China Sea issue by sharing the marine 
resources via the fisheries agreement. This phenomenon also removed the possibility 
of the Taiwan–PRC united front against Japan. As will be examined in the chapter on 
the fisheries agreement, Japan acknowledged Taiwan as a de facto autonomous political 
actor that operated independently from the PRC in the marine-related East China Sea 
 
issue. This created the need to examine Taiwanese perspectives since Japan 
acknowledged Taiwan’s semi-legitimate membership alongside Japan and China. As 
such, from the PRC’s perspective, Japan violated its One-China policy in the context 
of Sino-Japanese regional great power management. Thus, the PRC retaliated against 
Japan, as was manifested in China’s informal refutation of Japan’s sovereignty over 
Okinawa (The New York Times, 2013). As was argued earlier in our rejection of a 
constructivist approach for this research, the more Japan engages with Taiwan as a 
semi-independent actor that is almost equal to Japan and the PRC, the more it affects 
the PRC’s ontological insecurity and the legitimacy issue of the CCP. 
 
Nonetheless, since Japan treated Taiwan as a semi-equal participant in the maritime 
issue related to the East China Sea, Taiwan was accorded semi-official membership. 
This made Taiwan a ‘semi-official member’ whose perspectives are worthy of attention, 
as a negotiating partner in regional security issues for Japan as opposed to merely being 
Japan’s foreign policy instrument. It is because the bilateral fisheries agreement signed 
between the two nations is ‘Japan-Taiwan bilateral relations’ based on understanding 
the two nations are semi-equal only on this particular marine issue in the East China 
Sea. This runs contrary to the CSD and the ICAO, where Japanese policymakers deal 
with Taiwan as ‘a foreign policy issue’ in Sino-Japanese relations, wherein Taiwan has 
no political power in influencing Japan’s foreign policy. Thus, the need to examine 
bilateral Japan–Taiwan relations in terms of Taiwanese perspectives surfaced. 
Therefore, unlike the chapters on CSD and the ICAO, which did not regard Taiwan as 
a ‘legitimate actor’ that is equal to Japan or the PRC, the chapter on the fisheries 
agreement includes a discussion on the dynamics of how Japan–Taiwan relations 
affected Japan’s decision to sign the agreement with Taiwan despite the fact that this 
 
was considered a violation of Japan’s One-China policy and the PRC’s claim of 
sovereignty over Taiwan.  
 
Nonetheless, as will be explained, the hierarchical relations between a regional great 
power that is Japan and an unrecognised Taiwan remain solid within the regional setting. 
Therefore, Japan’s socialisation of Taiwan as if it is a member of international society 
has theoretical consistency, regularity, and continuity. Thus, the case study on the 
fisheries agreement, while somewhat inconsistent, sharpens and reinforces the 
theoretical validity of the proposed theory in this research. Japan’s accommodation of 
the internationally isolated entity, Taiwan, is theoretically generalisable to how Japan 
accommodates other internationally isolated actors, such as the Philippines under the 
Duterte administration, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter.  
 
1.4.9 Summary  
The constructivist-based literature on Taiwan, the norm constructivism related to Japan, 
and the work related to Japan’s identity and othering cannot allow us to conceptualise 
why and how Japan accommodates Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument via 
socialising it as a part of the international security efforts vis-à-vis the threat of the PRC. 
In addition, Japan’s non-recognition of Taiwan also creates a unique situation where 
there is an inherent tension between Japan’s ‘formal’ engagement with Taiwan and its 
‘informal’ engagement, which has certain implications for this research. Thus, this 
study is aimed at reconceptualising how Japan accommodates Taiwan’s membership to 
the international society of states via a different theoretical approach. The next chapter 
presents a literature review related to the ESIR and to de facto states in general. This 
 
will help elucidate how existing studies have conceptualised the way in which the 
Eurocentric powers of the West have been accommodating the non-sovereign political 
communities, including non-recognised states. The review will also address whether 
the ESIR has examined Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan into international society 
for its own regional security in terms of whether or not this presents a weakness. For 
certain, this perspective deserves more scholastic attention from the ESIR.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
The PRC has been pressuring Japan not to engage in any military or strategic 
relationship with Taiwan in the context of Japan–China–Taiwan relations. However, as 
will be explained, Japan has not been meekly following its One-China policy. Indeed, 
this study will outline how Japan has gradually improved its indirect security ties with 
Taiwan even within the context of its One-China policy, a point that is highly significant. 
Despite the prevalent characterisation of Japan as a reactive state (Funabashi, 
1991/1992; Calder 1988, 2003), the nation has been playing an under-appreciated 
security role through its engagement with Taiwan in view of managing its relationship 
with the PRC. First, Japan has been incrementally accommodating the non-state entity 
Taiwan in the regional setting by affording it quasi-membership despite the absence of 
statehood. Therefore, Japan’s incremental accommodation of Taiwan functions to 
create new international security norms and rules within international society in the 
regional setting. Second, Japan has been incrementally instrumentalising unrecognised 
Taiwan as an international security asset for its own security, despite its One-China 
policy. Third, if Taiwan presents a loophole in the regional security environment (which 
 
dictates that it has no access to the multilateral international security efforts that require 
statehood for membership), Japan has been accommodating Taiwan to mitigate such a 
missing linkage in non-traditional international security efforts through its unique 
security behaviour. That is, it has enabled Taiwan to behave as if it is a part of the non-
traditional security efforts. As such, Japan has been innovating the new international 
security norms related to how to engage with de facto states within international society. 
If it can be demonstrated that Japan is indeed utilising Taiwan as a foreign policy 
instrument, this will highlight Japan’s underappreciated but unique security role within 
international society in the regional setting. This will, in turn, contribute to our 
understanding of Japan’s unique conception of security, which is different from that of 
the US.  
 
If, despite the geographical proximity (and the obvious importance of the sea and air as 
lines of communication for Japan’s security due to Taiwan’s strategic location), Japan 
is less committed to the security of Taiwan, a number of questions emerge. First, if 
Japan has kept the Taiwan issue low-key in Sino-Japanese relations – which is in direct 
contrast to the way the Taiwan issue occupies a central position in US–China relations 
– why is Japan incrementally accommodating Taiwan for security purposes vis-à-vis 
the PRC? Second, what kind of security gains has Japan received by accommodating 
Taiwan? Third, how has Japan exploited Taiwan for its own security while not treating 
the latter as an equal security partner in the absence of recognition? Within this context, 
Japan can be a provider of diplomatic space to enable Taiwan to behave as if it is a part 
of the international security efforts, even if it cannot officially participate in the 
attendant multilateral forums given its lack of statehood.  
 
 
1.6 The Relevance of Japan 
 
The primary locus of this study in terms of inclusion/exclusion is Japan. There exist a 
vast number of studies on how the West has been including or excluding the non-
Western powers, including the works of Bull and Buzan (1979, 2014), while there are 
numerous works related to how the non-Western powers have been responding to the 
expansion of international society. However, studies on how Japan has been 
accommodating an excluded member of international society (Taiwan) are virtually 
non-existent.  
 
Understanding the role of Japan’s accommodation of a non-sovereign political 
community such as Taiwan within the regional security environment is essential. Japan 
assumes a security leadership role as the most important ally of the US in the region, 
while, until fairly recently, it was the second largest economic superpower in the world. 
Taiwan is certainly a less visible issue in Japan’s foreign policy due to the former’s 
unique status. However, Taiwan remains an important neighbour for Japan due to its 
geopolitical importance. The informal nature of the virtual diplomacy conducted within 
Japan–Taiwan relations is neglected in studies in the field of international relations, 
despite its significance to the East Asian region (Deans, 2001). Japan remains the 
second largest democratic economic entity in the world, and its role as a regional 
security provider is emerging as it continues to normalise its international security role. 
Therefore, Japan’s engagement with Taiwan is crucial to understanding the regional 
security environment. If Japan has been accommodating the de facto state of Taiwan 
within international society, this will shed new light on the underappreciated security 
 
role of Japan within the context of the nexus of inclusion/exclusion in regional security 
studies and in the ESIR.   
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review on the English School and De 
Facto States 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on the ESIR and de facto states in general 
to answer the following questions:  
• What is the current state of the English School of International Relations? 
• How does the English School accommodate excluded outsiders in international 
society? 
• What is a de facto state, and why is international society in favour of territorial 
integrity and biased against de facto states?  
• How has international society engaged with de facto states without recognition?  
These questions will be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
literature to generate a new question: How can a regional great power Japan 
accommodate the de facto state of Taiwan in international society in terms of its security 
while balancing its ties both with Taiwan and the PRC? In other words, this review 
considers how the existing literature on the ESIR and the de facto states has not 
considered the perspective of how the non-European regional great power Japan has 
been engaged in the inclusion of Taiwan in the international society of states in order 
to enhance the regional order. 
 
2.2 What is the English School of International Relations? 
 
 
Early contributors to the ESIR, such as Hedley Bull (1977), argued that the international 
system is simply a component of international society, that is, the states, sovereignties, 
political communities, and even human elements that constitute the rules and norms 
that determine order. Bull (1977) conceptualised such an international society in terms 
of the need to understand the sociology of European history to understand international 
society, which has spread throughout the globe. Here, Bull (1977) argued that even 
under conditions of disorderly anarchy, this does not mean chaos ensues, as was argued 
by the Hobbesian view of the world, and that the political communities that exist still 
constitute the basic rules and norms of stable order. For this order to exist, rules and 
norms are essential, even if they are subject to normative changes. Bull (1977) 
identified international relations as social relationships and argued that the three pillars 
of social functions – security against violence, observance of agreements, and property 
rights – are essential to forming a society. As such, early English School contributors, 
such as Bull (1977), focused on how to maintain order rather than the enhancement of 
justice within international society. In other words, the early English School 
emphasised the coexistence of a society of states. Meanwhile, modern English School 
theorists such as like Buzan (2014) went further in maintaining that the society of states 
is essential while focusing more on the rules and norms involved in state-centric 
solidarism. 
 
Early prominent English School scholars, such as Watson (1984) and Bull (1977), 
emphasised the importance of the primary institutions that constitute the essential 
components of international society, such as the balance of power, international law, 
diplomacy, war, and the great power management. Their grand narrative appears to 
follow the primary line that the rules and norms that regulate the contrived power 
 
balance, the use of international law to regulate relations among states, the diplomatic 
missions to communicate with each other, the control of damage through the rules of 
just war, and the privileged positions of the great powers. Therefore, according to 
Brown (2009), international society is a norm-governed society wherein at least the 
minimum rules are followed, and wherein the member states of the society accept 
certain responsibilities in view of forming a society of states. Regarding the importance 
of the primary institutions, Buzan (2014, p. 17) pointed out that social changes to such 
institutions occur and stated that the primary institutions are 
constitutive of both states and international society in that they define not only 
the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in 
relations to each other, as well as the criteria for membership of international 
society. 
For example, regarding the changing nature of the balance of power and the great power 
management, Bull (1977) highlighted that while the balance of power in nineteenth-
century Europe was based on the concept of the ‘Concert of Europe’, the balance of 
power during the Cold War involved two superpowers with different ideologies that 
also had nuclear weapons. It can be stated that the role of the great powers that make 
the rules for lesser states has not changed in terms of being constitutive elements of the 
primary institutions. As such, Buzan (2014) argued that the social forms of the balance 
of power are conceptually different from the Hobbesian worldview of anarchy or the 
neorealist understanding of the balance of power (Waltz, 1979). In short, the 
mechanistic understanding of the balance of power does not have prominent status in 
the English School. However, Buzan (2014) pointed out that the English School 
considers the socially constructed balance of power to be both contrived and accidental. 
 
Meanwhile, other ESIR scholars, such as Wilson (2016), have questioned when the 
concepts of the institutions became primary institutions. 
 
Elsewhere, Schouenborg (2012) argued that the primary core institutions that constitute 
international society are socially constructed entities and are thus malleable. While 
many of the examples listed in this study are often considered to be revolutionary events 
– such as the French Revolution, international fascism, international communism, and 
the EU supranational state – alternative historical narratives of these events can recount 
the distinct possibilities of creating unique core institutions that may challenge the 
supremacy of the international society of the Westphalian sovereign states. Some of the 
core institutions originate from the regionally differentiated conditions in regional 
international society, but legacies can still exist beyond the transregional outreach in a 
regionally unrestrained manner. The French Revolution inspired a concept known as 
‘popular will’ or ‘popular sovereignty’, which is necessary for the legitimacy of a 
sovereign state. Meanwhile, international fascism discredited the legitimacy of 
colonialism, international communism discredited the Soviet Union as an empire of 
sorts, and the EU created new conditions for the legitimacy of internal structures, such 
as the abolishment of warfare inside the EU. 
 
2.2.1 The pluralist and solidarist debate 
 
One of the debates related to pluralism and solidarism can essentially be identified as 
the tensions between human rights and sovereign equality. Bull (1977) preferred 
pluralism and order over justice based on positivist law and mutual respect of 
 
sovereignty in international society, at least within a European context, while he 
acknowledged the importance of a shared culture to bind states. Within the 
contemporary context, one of the most controversial debates related to pluralism and 
solidarism is identified as relating to humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), and sovereign equality. Therefore, international society has a moral 
obligation to intervene and violate the sovereignty of a state if the state in question is 
violating the human rights of its citizens or the state authority cannot stop a massacre. 
Buzan (2014) argued that the pluralist/solidarist debate is not mutually exclusive but 
mutually complementary, describing it as yin and yang. Meanwhile, Buzan (2014), Bull 
(1977), and Watson (1984) denied the possibility of the creation of a world society 
based on human elements as it is unrealistic, while Buzan (2014) argued for the 
emerging convergence of more interests and values among states to form more state-
centric solidarist societies of states. Elsewhere, Knudsen (2016) appeared to support the 
idea of a normalised R2P and humanitarian intervention as a fact of life within the 
contemporary setting.  
 
2.2.2 Membership of non-European entities in international society 
 
The English School is often criticised as being Eurocentric, and rightly so. In the 
English School grand narrative (Wight, 1977, 1952; Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 
1992, 1990), when the expansion of the European international society began, there 
were many regional societies that were separated from each other, with each regional 
society having its own distinct civilisation-specific rules and norms for mutual 
interaction. Any contact between the civilised European states and the non-European 
political communities in different civilisations could not be conducted based on similar 
 
rights and equality, which were accorded to sovereign states with similar civilisational 
traits in Europe. In the absence of the shared rules and norms between the civilised 
European states in the West and the barbarians and savages in the rest of the world, 
equality did not apply. Thus, the civilised Europeans engaged on equal terms with like-
minded states in Europe while enhancing the civilisation mission elsewhere. The 
civilised peoples in Europe needed to define the standard of civilisation to 
accommodate non-European uncivilised peoples if the West was to enhance its contact 
with the barbarians and savages in the rest of the non-European uncivilised world. 
 
It is important to note that traditional ESIR theorists such as Bull (1977) considered the 
expansion of international society as corrosive since non-Western societies bring more 
cultural diversity and undermine the rules and norms of the Eurocentric international 
society. The civilised peoples in European states constructed the shared rules and norms 
of respecting each other as equals based on the practice of recognition, reciprocity, and 
respecting mutual sovereignty, which enhanced international law, diplomacy, and trade 
in the society of states in Europe, while the barbarians and savages among the non-
European peoples were excluded from such fair treatment (Ringmar, 2014, pp. 448–
452). Ringmar (2014) argued that the primary reason why Europeans engaged in brutal 
acts against non-Europeans in the non-Western world (while paying close attention to 
conforming to the rules and norms in diplomacy, trade, and warfare in the European 
society of states) was because the former were able to confirm their identity as civilised 
Europeans. Therefore, the brutal treatment of uncivilised non-Europeans, who were 
incapable of following international norms, elevated the higher social status of the 
Europeans. The only way for the inferior non-Europeans to be treated as equals by the 
superior Europeans was to behave like accultured Europeans within global international 
 
society. Therefore, the European recognition for equal treatment was essential for the 
admittance of non-Europeans into European international society and for their survival. 
 
For Bull (1977) and Watson (1984), international society expanded to the rest of the 
world from Europe through global decolonisation and the creation of newly 
independent states, whose local elites were immersed in European cultures. Elsewhere, 
Keene (2002) pointed out that the early English School theorists ended up being 
accused of sanitising its accounts both by eliding the coercive nature of Eurocentric 
expansion of international society and defining the ‘civilisation standard’ to legitimise 
the subordinate positions of the non-European peoples below the civilised peoples in 
Europe within the framework of the expansion of international society. In criticising 
such a Eurocentric account, Little (2015) argued that while both the early English 
School theorists, Bull and Watson, and the modern English School theorist, Buzan, 
emphasised the creation of a European society of states, upon historical examination, it 
is clear that international societies existed elsewhere before they emerged in nineteenth-
century Europe, and that these non-European societies talk about ‘re-admission into the 
international society’.  
 
So much of the literature on the English School has not changed its Eurocentric attitude 
in defining the West as a metropolitan core and the rest of the world as periphery. Here, 
Stivachtis (2015) argued that the Eurocentric civilisation standard for inclusion in and 
exclusion from international society observed historical continuities, even though the 
criteria for the forms of civilisation standard may have changed. Stivachtis (2015) also 
observed that only the civilised states were admitted into international society, which 
required the members of international society to engage in external relations that were 
 
based not only on the proper codes of conduct but also on civilised domestic norms, 
such as good compliance with the norms of human rights and democracy based on 
international law. Furthermore, Buzan (2014) argued that even after decolonisation, the 
concept of the civilisation standard is well and alive and still practised in international 
society in the form of conditionality and human rights. From Buzan’s (2014) 
perspective, while economic aid is considered normative practice for first-world 
countries in the contemporary context, the concept of the standard of civilisation is still 
used in practice, if not in rhetoric, in terms of exercising moral authority and power 
over third-world countries. In fact, Buzan (2014) noted that membership of certain clubs 
of international organisations and in society retain Eurocentric standards of 
measurement, such as human rights, democracy, capitalism, development, and 
ecologism. Indeed, Buzan (2014) argued that as the diffusion of international society 
was facilitated, the tension between universal sovereign equality, non-intervention, and 
the Eurocentric global order may take shape, but the West still has the upper hand in 
determining who is civilised or uncivilised within the context of broader international 
society if the insider/outsider of the Western civilisation applies.  
 
While international society has conceptual flexibility to accommodate non-European 
entities as members of international society if they meet the standards of civilisation, 
these international bodies are not generally recognised as equal. For example, Suzuki 
(2005) observed how Japan, as a semi-civilised state, had to encounter the Janus-faced 
European international society. Furthermore, while agreeing with Buzan’s insistence 
on the English School’s theoretical flexibility, Englehart (2010) discussed how Siam 
used British high culture and class-based elitism to downplay the Eurocentric racial 
prejudice against the people of Siam by establishing stronger personal ties with British 
 
elites and royalty to maintain the sovereign independence of Siam and to avoid Western 
colonisation. The non-European entities had to internalise their humiliation in view of 
being treated as equals if they were to be admitted into the Eurocentric international 
society. 
 
Meanwhile, in the English School accounts, many of the ‘non-civilised peoples’ that 
were excluded from international society attempted to upgrade their international status 
by conforming to the institutions discussed earlier, while others did not. For example, 
Zielonka (2013) argued that while the EU could be regarded as a normative power that 
shapes the external environment through the promotion of liberal democratic values, 
human rights, good governance, and the rule of law, the core normative components 
generated are Western European values. Here, Zielonka (2013) noted that a close 
examination of the EU’s core values through discursive analysis reveals the imperial 
nature of dictating ‘outsiders’ through the normative impositions that resemble the 
mission of civilisation. Central and Eastern European states were accommodated into 
the club if they embraced the EU’s core values, while Arab states are unlikely to accept 
such imperial values for religious reasons and due to the experience of European 
colonialism (Zielonka, 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, it is also undeniable that the non-Western states that avoided direct Western 
colonisation had to accommodate Western superiority to seek equality and respect from 
the Western core. The most successful case is arguably Japan, which defeated two 
regional empires – China and Russia – and became the first non-European empire in its 
own right. For example, Lai (2014) argued that in nineteenth-century power politics, 
the vague concept of civilisation using positivist international law became a vital 
 
instrument to measure the compliance of outsiders with civilisation. Here, Lai (2014) 
observed that Japan fully grasped the importance of international law and enhanced its 
reforms and improved the European narratives of Japan’s foreign policy behaviours. 
Meanwhile, the author also noted that China proved itself to be incapable of 
comprehending concepts, such as international law, during the first Sino-Japanese War, 
and that Japan was accommodated in the elite club of international society, while China 
was defined as barbarous after the war. Furthermore, Wirth (2015) argued that the 
significant reason why Japan enhanced its alliance with the US, even after the demise 
of the Soviet Union, is that the former instrumentalised its alliance with the latter as a 
normative link to define itself as a member of Western international society. As such, 
Japan was able to maintain a superior civilisational position in ideational and social 
terms regarding the rise of China and the Asian Century (Wirth, 2015). After the Meiji 
restoration, Japan attempted to become a member of the Eurocentric international 
society while placing Asia in a subordinate position. 
 
It is entirely possible that the conception of great power is malleable within the 
framework of the English School. In fact, Zhang (2011) argued that the concept of 
China was invented and reinvented in the English School’s concepts of international 
society from the early stages of the theory’s academic development. In Zhang’s (2011) 
view, China was first conceptualised as having a similar society of states or entities in 
the pre-modern ‘Warring States’ era that resembled Western international society. 
However, China was subsequently regarded as an uncivilised or barbarous state 
following the Opium Wars, revolutionary China was essentially seen as a self-imposed 
outsider during the Cultural Revolution while leading the third-world’s revolt against 
the West before it was transformed into one of the would-be great powers as 
 
conceptualised by Bull (1977) following its reform and opening-up policy. According 
to Zhang (2011), China is now regarded as both a facilitator and a challenger of the 
Western-dominated world order, concluding that pluralists tend to emphasise cultural 
diversity – including in terms of non-intervention and regime diversity – and thus retain 
more favourable views of China, while the solidarists – who assert that human rights 
and democracy are the new standards of civilisation – tend to view China as a challenger 
to the Eurocentric international society. 
 
Elsewhere, Suzuki (2008) described Japan and China as ‘frustrated great powers’ 
suffering from ontological insecurities because of ‘recognition games’ aimed at gaining 
entry to the elite club of international society. Importantly, Suzuki (2008) observed that 
both nations appear to be interested in impressing the privileged and established 
Western elite states, which means the traditional Western privileged great powers’ 
standing can be consolidated. As such, as Suzuki (2008) noted that the privileged 
Western great powers are able to consolidate their standing if frustrated great powers 
such as Japan and China attempt to conform to the norms created by the West in the 
process of attaining the same privileges. In other words, in Suzuki’s view (2008), Japan 
and China are inadvertently reproducing the normative structures of the current 
international society, which is led by the West, as opposed to overthrowing it. Here, it 
is essential to note that if non-Europeans attempt to conform to Western standards of 
civilisation, non-European states can also inadvertently further consolidate the West’s 
global rule-making authority and normative power in the process of acculturing 
Western rules and norms. 
 
 
Upon examination, both Japan and China try to shoulder international responsibility 
and comply with international norms while continuing to respect their historical norms. 
In the English School’s understanding of Japan and China, both would-be great powers 
attempt to use their normative self-identifications to enhance their international 
standing within the modern context. For example, Black and Hwang (2012) argued that 
both nations tackled the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden based on their respective 
self-identification through the culturalist and post-colonialist approaches. According to 
these authors, China’s foreign policy elites based their state behaviour regarding the 
issue of piracy on its self-identification of Tianxia and considered the Somali pirates to 
be inferior, while they also noted that China also gave the role of Tianxia to the UN for 
China’s legitimacy and authority and acted based on its own non-interference policy 
following the Somalis’ call for help. Meanwhile, Japan enhanced its anti-piracy 
operations in Somalia based on its self-identification as a cultural marker lying 
somewhere between the members of international society and those of the non-
international society, where Japan’s domestic anti-militarist norms – such as 
dispatching the crews of the JCG along with the MSDF – and the normative sensitivity 
of respecting local cultures – which stemmed from its successful anti-piracy policy in 
Southeast Asia – proved to be transferable to the Gulf of Aden (Black and Hwang, 2012). 
 
Elsewhere, Zarakol (2010) argued that the outsiders of the Eurocentric international 
society that suffered from the imposed ontological insecurities had to be incorporated 
into the European elite club of international society, but that these outsiders were forced 
to internalise their identities of inferiority and subordination and were defined as 
barbarous, uncivilised, less human and less enlightened than their European 
counterparts. Here, Zarakol (2010) pointed out that these oppressions contributed to the 
 
hardened stance toward the acceptance of past crimes committed by non-European 
states such as Japan and Turkey. By accepting the international historical narratives of 
their past wrongdoings, non-European countries are admitting their morally inferior 
positions regarding Europeans within the hierarchical international society. 
 
Following this logic, the existing literature has focused on how semi-civilised states, 
including Japan, are accommodated in the elite club of Eurocentric international society. 
In other words, the Eurocentric international society in the West accommodates non-
Western entities, such as Japan, in paternalistic-like narratives. The exception here is 
Black (2012, 2014), who, in challenging such a Eurocentric narrative, argued that 
through a non-military maritime security policy, Japan has also become a regional and 
global norm entrepreneur in Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Aden. Zhang (2015) argued 
that while the globalisation of international society penetrated the regional society of 
East Asia, the localisation of the primary institutions, such as sovereignty and the 
developmental states, needs to be recognised while the regional differentiation of 
international society in the region also affects the configuration of the global 
international society. However, Zhang (2015) concluded that whether the existence of 
regional international society in East Asia can be proved is, at best, debatable. 
 
Interestingly, what has not been discussed at all in the existing English School literature 
is how Japan’s accommodation of regional outsiders such as Taiwan relates to the grand 
regional narrative. In other words, Japan has been treated and researched as an outsider 
itself and as a latecomer to global international society and has received little academic 
attention in the existing literature of the English School. In fact, Japan is largely treated 
as a non-European recipient or a good student of Western civilisation and is rarely 
 
regarded in terms of being a regional early comer that accommodates regional outsiders 
such as internationally unrecognised Taiwan. One critique the current author would like 
to direct to the current international society theory is that while this theory is flexible 
enough to accommodate all political communities, including non-sovereignty-based 
entities, there are hardly any studies on how the regional great power of Japan can 
accommodate de facto state entities such as Taiwan. This critique entails how such an 
accommodation shapes new rules and norms for primary institutions in the evolution of 
international society. Therefore, the grand narrative of this research on the ESIR is how 
Japan has been expanding international society to accommodate a non-sovereign 
political community, Taiwan, for its security in regional settings. Japan’s relations with 
Taiwan affects Japan’s contrived balance of power with China, its diplomacy with 
China and Taiwan, its use of international law in relation to Taiwan, its potential 
involvement in a war with China over Taiwan, and its great power management with 
China. Therefore, there is room for studying the use of international society theory to 
elucidate Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan while maintaining a relationship with 
China in view of securing the regional order. 
 
2.3 De Facto States in International Society 
Now we can move onto the discussion related to how international society’s 
engagement with the de facto states has been understood in the existing literature.  
 
2.3.1 The issue of legitimacy and illegitimacy of de facto states in international 
society 
 
If the politico-legal conditions discussed in the previous chapter qualifies an entity in 
question as a state, what makes other political communities de facto states in 
international society? It is commonly agreed that a de facto state is a political reality in 
which a state-like entity functions quite well as a domestic sovereign entity but suffers 
from a lack of international recognition of statehood within international society and 
from the prominent international institutions (Pegg, 1998; Harvey, 2010). While there 
is a dearth of in-depth literature on de facto states, Scott Pegg is a pioneer on the studies 
of unrecognised states, and his paper ‘International Society and the De Facto State’ 
(1998b) can be seen as one of the most influential works on the issue. Unlike Robert 
Jackson’s work entitled ‘Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World’ (1993), which used the term ‘quasi-state’ to categorise a non-recognised 
state-like entity, Pegg uses the term ‘de facto state’ to distinguish unrecognised state-
like entities from quasi-states that may be internationally recognised but do not have an 
effective domestic governance. On this point, Pegg (2000, p. 91) stated the following: 
[n]o matter how long or how effective its territorial control of a given area has 
been, that control is neither recognised nor is it considered legitimate. The quasi-
state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state 
is illegitimate no matter how effective it is. 
 
Meanwhile, Fabry (2010) argued that without state recognition by the international 
society of states, a political community in question – such as a de facto state – cannot 
join the society of states and insisted that recognition and self-determination are two 
sides of the same coin. Furthermore, which de facto states have the right to obtain an 
international legal personality remains highly contested within international society. 
For example, Jeffrey’s (2016) observation on Somaliland enhances Pegg’s (1998a) 
 
conceptualisation of a de facto state. Here, Jeffrey (2016) argued that despite the 
presence of relatively good governance, democracy, and a nascent economy that 
requires no international aid, in the absence of international recognition of statehood, 
Somaliland remains illegitimate in the eyes of the international community as a de facto 
state. The African Union is also reluctant to afford Somaliland recognition due to the 
potential rise in demand from other breakaway or independent movements (Jeffrey, 
2016). This lack of international recognition also subsequently galvanised the internal 
coherence between the different sectarian clans in Somaliland under the common goal 
of achieving international recognition, and if this is indeed achieved, this may have 
huge regional repercussions (Jeffrey, 2016). It is fair to say that however well 
Somaliland is functioning domestically, it continues to be treated as a de facto state 
without international recognition and is regarded as illegitimate on the international 
stage. 
 
Furthermore, Pegg and Kolstø (2015) argued that while the internationally illegitimate 
Somaliland enjoys a high degree of internal legitimacy among its population, the 
internationally recognised Somalia functions as a failed state. According to the authors, 
the people of Somaliland most desire security and peace from its government, which 
the internationally illegitimate authority in Somaliland has been able to deliver since 
internationally legitimate Somalia committed brutality against its people. Here, Pegg 
and Kolstø (2015) pointed out that the parent state of Somalia has no such capabilities 
at all to deliver this to people in Somaliland, while the people of Somaliland have no 
desire for unification with such a failed parent state. However, the authors concluded 
that the lack of international aid for Somaliland (due to of its non-international 
recognition) hampered its economic growth, while the strong internal legitimacy has 
 
not brought about international recognition for the nation, adding that this situation will 
likely continue for many years to come. It is fair to say that while the international 
recognition gave the failed state of Somalia a legitimacy in international society, the de 
facto state of Somaliland is unwilling to be associated with the de jure state of Somalia 
even at the expense of potential material benefits, such as international aid, that comes 
from state recognition via unification. 
 
Meanwhile, to classify the state-like entity as a de facto state, the entity must have the 
capability to establish ties with other countries (Bartmann, 2008). However, this 
remains a grey area. Indeed, the capability to enter into a relationship with other 
countries remains a contentious issue in international relations since there are no clearly 
defined rules and regulations in international law regarding the number of recognised 
states that are legally required to gain the necessary capacity for entering into relations 
with other states (James, 1986). There is also no substantive evidence to demonstrate 
that a de facto state needs to obtain a recognition of statehood from any major global 
powers, including from the five privileged permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. For example, while South Ossetia is recognised and is militarily, 
economically, and politically protected by Russia, it is still regarded internationally as 
a de facto state. Therefore, what constitutes the capacity for entering into relations with 
other countries is ambiguous. Furthermore, as Harvey (2010, p. 19) stated, 
[the] lack of agreement among scholars over how best to represent unrecognised 
entities as an analytical concept, and the contentious issue of which examples 
should and should not be included as case studies, has become a defining feature 
of literature and debate on this subject. 
 
On this point, Berg and Toomla (2009, p. x) argued that it is wrong to regard the de 
facto states universally as ‘internationally unrecognised territories’ since the level of 
recognition of these entities in international society varies significantly, and the 
normalisation of the relations with these entities is a better option than encouraging the 
re-integration of these entities into the parent states or encouraging a form of power-
sharing. Furthermore, Berg and Kuusk (2010) argued that sovereignty is an ambiguous 
concept and whether the entity in question has control over its external and internal 
sovereignty is more of a political question, even though the legal debate on sovereignty 
is always prioritised in international society, including within the context of the English 
School. Regarding this point, Berg and Kuusk (2010, p. 47) stated the following: 
[n]eedless to say, this society was made up of countries which were ready to 
recognise each other’s sovereignty on the condition of reciprocity. But while 
having that sovereignty, legal power for mutual recognition does not necessarily 
mean that authorities are able to exercise full control over their jurisdictions in 
one or the other way.  
However, it is essential to point out that such a debate may contribute to solidifying 
unequal relationships in the hierarchical nature of international society between the 
sovereign states – especially the great powers – and the de facto states. Such an unequal 
relationship gives great powers unilateral authority to recognise or even further 
delegitimise the de facto states according to the former’s national interests, while the 
opposite does not apply for the de facto states. In short, reciprocity does not exist in the 
relations between the great powers and the de facto states, and the former’s privileged 
status places the latter in a subordinate and politically inferior position within 
international society. In critiquing this unequal relationship, both Berg and Kuusk (2010) 
and Pegg (1998) pointed out that it is time to admit that sovereignty is simply an 
 
artificial concept. For certain, a de facto state’s undetermined status does significantly 
reduce its foreign policy leverage regarding its relations with great powers in an unequal 
manner. Therefore, as noted above, which political unit has the international legal 
personality depends on the will of international society, especially among the great 
powers.  
 
2.3.2 Preference for territorial integrity and a bias against de facto states in 
international society 
 
Why does international society have to keep de facto states illegitimate? Here, it can be 
argued that there is a strong tendency to maintain the territorial and sovereign status 
quo and that there exists a strong bias against the secessionist entities in international 
society following global decolonisation. This means that after independence from the 
former colonial powers was achieved by the newly established states, their defined 
sovereign territories became somewhat sacrosanct. For this reason, it is challenging for 
the aspiring states to achieve independence, and such bias against de facto states has 
become one of the significant constraints that inhibit such entities’ potential for external 
behaviours. 
 
Caspersen (2018) argued that when the de facto state attempts to engage with the 
broader world, it always creates a tension between self-determination and territorial 
integrity in varying degrees, and that when the engagement is conceived, both the parent 
state and the de facto state have very different concepts of what constitutes engagement. 
Here, Caspersen (2018) held that, for the parent state, the engagement means re-
 
integration of the breakaway territories or the hierarchical relationship that defines the 
parent state as a gatekeeper from which the de facto state must gain the approval to 
engage with recognised states or international institutions. Meanwhile, for the de facto 
state, it means engagement with the broader world to consolidate its de facto separation 
or hope for eventual recognition (Caspersen, 2018). For example, Dalay (2017) 
observed that the global powers – the USA, Russia, and the UK – and the regional actors 
– Turkey, Iraq, and Iran – all disagreed with the Kurdish aspiration for statehood in a 
referendum in 2017 and instead recommended that Kurdistan compromised by 
obtaining more constitutional rights within the context of the Iraqi federation or the 
confederation. 
 
2.3.3 Engagement without recognition 
 
The preference for territorial integrity and the bias against de facto states within the 
international society of states creates the need for international society to engage with 
de facto states in ways that have little effect on the status quo. Engagement without 
recognition (of statehood) is becoming an increasingly important topic in international 
relations. Here, Ker-Lindsay (2013) was probably the first to conceptualise engagement 
without recognition for third-party states to interact with the contested state bilaterally, 
with the author noting that the international community has a high degree of latitude in 
terms of direct engagement with an unrecognised entity (with implicit recognition) in 
question while maintaining the explicit intention of not recognising it as a sovereign de 
jure state. The author then argued that engagement with non-recognition takes multiple 
forms, ranging from participation in less formal conferences, establishing a non-official 
quasi-embassy, and making a less clear-cut declaration of non-recognition, while if the 
 
recognising state wants to have extensive relationships with the contested state, it can 
do so as much as it wants provided it maintains the position of non-recognition. In other 
words, as Ker-Lindsay (2015) explained, this can constitute a non-recognition in all but 
name, in that the explicit and implicit recognition exists in a political sense with such 
intentions. Both bilateral and multilateral engagements with the contested state are 
possible but always create confusion and misinterpretations (Ker-Lindsay, 2015). 
Furthermore, while the bilateral interactions between the recognising state and the 
contested state create confusion, the multilateral engagements require even greater 
caution due to the higher collective authority and the legitimacy accorded (Ker-Lindsay, 
2015). 
 
Meanwhile, Ker-Lindsay and Berg (2018) argued that as the international 
understanding on engagement without recognition with the contested states grows 
among the policymakers and academics within the international community, there are 
two patterns among the conceptions of what constitutes engagement without 
recognition, the first of which relates to the levels of willingness on the part of 
international society to engage with the contested states, while the second relates to the 
role of the engagement of supranational actors such as the EU with the contested states. 
Here, Ker-Lindsay and Berg (2018) claimed that a better understanding of the concept 
of engagement without recognition would help mitigate the stigmatisation of the 
contested states for conflict management and settlement mechanisms in international 
society. However, the academic strand that focuses on the de facto states does not 
appear to agree on how international society should engage with the de facto states. On 
this point, Pegg and Berg (2016) maintained that the traditional narrative on how the 
sovereign states deal with de facto states needs to be revisited, with the authors 
 
observing that the international environment surrounding the de facto states is not as 
hostile as has been said, calling into question the claim that the international community 
has no principled method of engagement with de facto states. Here, Pegg and Berg 
(2016) confirmed the existing literature’s validity of the critical emphasis on great 
power politics using the de facto states and international society’s liberal bias toward 
more democratised de facto states in their preference for engagements, while the 
authors also found the method of how to address the linguistic representations of the 
officials in the de facto states as irrelevant and rejected the importance of foreign 
diaspora’s domestic political influence on the great powers’ foreign policy on the de 
facto states in question. 
 
2.4 How to Engage with the De Facto States 
Here, we move on to the analysis of the literature related to the engagement with the de 
facto states in general. 
2.4.1 Overview: Engagement with the de facto states – three approaches 
 
Previous studies on international engagement with de facto states highlight that there 
are different conventional approaches to this aspect within international society, which 
include the active containment of the de facto state, ignoring or having a limited 
engagement with the de facto state and the imposition of constraints on de facto states 
in reaching out to others, and the EU’s attempt to engage with its regional de facto states 
in a low-key manner. The existing literature largely addresses the promotion of 
democracy and human rights due to the bias towards addressing selections between 
Western states in the context of EU policy (e.g. Popescu, 2007; Hock, 2011; McNamara, 
2014). This approach may appear to have some degree of academic validity in terms of 
 
assessing the strategic intentions of Western powers. However, Ker-Lindsay (2013) 
argued that while engagement without recognition is becoming increasingly important 
in international politics, there is a wide variety of international engagement with 
unrecognised states due to concerns over how much the state can engage with de facto 
states. 
 
These three approaches have been considered depending on the strategic calculations 
of the members of international society. In fact, it is clear that the existing literature 
tends to regard the de facto states as the generators of regional insecurities and turmoil 
within the existing international system. These three main approaches are discussed in 
detail below.  
 
2.4.2 Active containment of the de facto states 
 
This containment strategy, which involves the active opposition of de facto states 
through embargoes and sanctions, is made possible when the third-party states consider 
de facto states to present a grave threat to their national security. The concerned third-
party states are compelled to mobilise the political and economic measures at their 
disposal to contain the perceived threat posed by the de facto states. The continuation 
of this containment strategy may potentially backfire in the mid- to long-term future in 
two ways: the increase of international criminal activities from and in the de facto states 
and the increasing sense of diplomatic and political isolation, which will lead to 
potentially more aggressive behaviours by the contained de facto states. 
 
 
In terms of international criminal activities, Northern Cyprus and the Republic of 
Dniester were examined by Scott Pegg, Pal Kolstø, Charles King, and Julian Duplain. 
During the 1990s, Northern Cyprus turned into an active loophole for international 
criminal gangs exploiting the gross lack of extradition and taxation agreements (Pegg, 
1998a). In another example, Kolstø (2006), King (2001), and Duplain (1995) examined 
the case of the Dniester Republic, with Kolstø (2006, p. 728) stating that ‘[t]he Dniester 
Republic has a thoroughly criminalised economy, based on smuggling and the fake 
brand industry’ and that ‘[t]he Republic has also been accused of being a free haven for 
fugitive gangsters and former KGB officials in hiding’. Elsewhere, King (2001) asked 
the pertinent question of why these de facto states could rationalise the use of the 
criminalised economy based on patronage, corruption, and illegal trades. Meanwhile, 
Kolosove and O’Loughlin (1998, p. 1) pointed out that, in the post-Soviet space, ‘the 
elites of de facto states have strong criminal backgrounds and specialise in the illegal 
transit of weapons, drugs and money laundering’. 
 
It could be argued that such a containment policy may be one of the most effective 
strategies if the strategic intention of external powers is to substantially undermine the 
very existence of the targeted de facto state. However, it can also create unintentional 
negative repercussions for international society, also having substantial negative 
implications for international and regional security, especially if they block the targeted 
de facto state entirely. 
 
For example, Heydarian (2017a) pointed out that Marawi, a Muslim majority region in 
Southern Mindanao with a specific independence movement, attracted ISIS fighters 
from the Middle East and Caucasus regions and engaged in urban warfare that 
 
prolonged the internal war in Mindanao, which also has numerous porous borders that 
allow easy access for the Jihadists into Malaysia and Indonesia. According to Heydarian 
(2017a), the US, to which Duterte is said to express frequent hostility, pledged counter-
terrorism support, specifically for urban warfare, where the armed forces of the 
Philippines lack experience, while Australia dispatched two AP-3C Orion surveillance 
aircraft for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. In another 
example, Heydarian (2017b) argued that there is a significant need for reconstruction 
and re-integration of the 600,000 displaced residents in post-conflict Marawi, lest the 
discontent and radicalisation of the Muslim population may follow. 
 
One crucial aspect of King’s 2001 article ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding 
Eurasia’s Unrecognised States’ is the author’s rationale behind why these international 
criminal gangs have succeeded in developing state-like entities with some effective 
governance, even if they are gross violators of human rights or are entirely against the 
international norms of democracy upheld in these Caucasus and Eurasian regions. The 
connection between organised criminal gangs and domestic political leaders was also 
noted by both Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Hock (2011). What these four authors 
have in common is that they attribute the theory of greed and grievance in civil wars to 
this connection between organised crime and domestic politics in these de facto states. 
According to this theory, domestic leaders in politically fragile states often preserve 
such organised crime deliberately in the absence of effective internal control 
mechanisms and attempt to maximise the economic benefits of the criminalised 
economy (Hock, 2011). 
 
 
2.4.3 Ignoring or having a limited engagement with the de facto state: Can de facto 
states reach out to international society? 
 
In terms of generally ignoring the de facto states and having limited dealings with them, 
this often takes the form of strict non-access to economic aid from the international 
organisations or existing states. For the impoverished de facto states, not being able to 
obtain external aid to build the economy is harmful. James (1986) critiqued this non-
access to approach by arguing that the sovereignty of a nation-state should amount to 
the right to deliver material benefits to the de facto state in economic terms, not merely 
in terms of providing territorial or geographical border definitions. 
 
As Pegg (1998a, p. 6) stated, ‘[m]ore costly to the de facto state is the general inability 
of most intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental aid agencies to deal 
with non-sovereign entities’ while in examining the case of Eritrea, Pool (1993, p. 402) 
stated that ‘[a]t independence, Eritrea carries with it a heavy burden of prolonged 
warfare and famine, enters a world economy in great difficulty and at a time when the 
guiding orthodoxy of lending is highly restrictive’. 
 
It must be noted here that behind this economic neglect of the de facto states by the 
international organisations or recognised states, there exists a strategic trade-off by the 
third-party states regarding the parent state as patronage for these unrecognised entities. 
In exchange for undermining the de jure independence movements in the de facto states, 
the recognised states provide the de facto states with economic rewards by granting 
them access to economic aid from the international organisations, and therefore the 
 
foreign direct investment toward the de facto states is enhanced. However, Hock (2011) 
argued that the reluctance on the part of the recognised states and the international 
organisations in terms of enhancing their engagement with the de facto states derives 
from the long-standing importance attached to the territorial integrity and inviolability 
of state borders. Regarding this point, Jackson (1987, p. 531) stated the following:  
[o]nce sovereignty is acquired by virtue of independence from colonial rule, 
then extensive civil strife or breakdown of order or governmental immobility or 
any other failures are not considered to detract from it. 
However, some proactive and creative economic initiatives commenced by certain de 
facto states must be scrutinised. For example, despite the trade embargoes and the travel 
sanctions imposed on it, Northern Cyprus has made its higher education industry into a 
lucrative international business that generates handsome economic benefits. This 
presents a viable alternative economic activity that attracts international students from 
across the world into the reputable local universities (The New York Times, 2014). 
 
Regarding this new development, Koldas et al. (2018) argued that the case of Near East 
University in Northern Cyprus could be a unique case in terms of how a private non-
state actor in a de facto state can reach out to international society. Here, the authors 
discussed the benefits of internationalisation and branding without established state 
support even in the absence of international recognition of Northern Cyprus, 
emphasising the use of the women’s sports teams to enhance the international reputation 
of the university by attracting more international students and enhancing the 
community-building. This is most notably because universities in Northern Cyprus are 




The problem is that for certain extremely impoverished de facto states, such as Eritrea, 
it is fair to say that it is virtually impossible to expect these entities to produce creative 
economic measures such as those adopted by Northern Cyprus for economic self-
sufficiency and survival. In short, internal conflicts, the interplay of criminality and 
domestic leaders, and economic weakness in these vulnerable de facto states make 
legitimate economic activity extremely difficult. In addition, for international society, 
the political- and security-related costs of ignoring and having limited dealings with the 
de facto states are only recognised in the long term. Realistically speaking, international 
society does not appear to be required to pay significant political or economic prices by 
neglecting the small, impoverished de facto states of today. After all, Eritrea, 
Somaliland, Chechnya, or the Islamic areas in the Mindanao island of the Philippines 
are often considered to be of minimum economic and political importance for 
international society. However, it must be noted that this non-access to international aid 
for de facto states (due to the limited damage inflicted on regional and international 
security) is overly simplistic. Granted, it may be possible to ignore the problem in the 
short term, but it may create a significant problem in the long term. 
 
Fazal (2018) argued that the secessionists tend to be more attuned to international 
humanitarian law to gain more international recognition, which was the case in the 
Catalan independence movement as well as in Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan. 
However, Fazal (2018) also pointed out that these secessionists may also conclude that, 
if their good behaviour in the international society of states is not adequately rewarded, 
they may turn to further violence to gain their independence. Here, the authors noted 
the case of South Sudan, which ignored international law and the norms of non-violence 
 
against civilians and still achieved legitimate independence. In fact, Fazal (2018) 
suggested that an alternative way to alleviate the problem is giving these secessionists 
access to soft recognition from international economic or financial organisations in the 
wider world. 
 
Therefore, in the long term, this approach may be counterproductive to the geopolitical 
stability of the region and, potentially, the globe. In addition, as Pegg (2000) argued, 
for small, impoverished de facto states, having access to outside help when developing 
economic activities may make a huge difference to their long-term ‘national’ security 
and survival. Furthermore, the recent brutal internal military conflict that occurred in 
the de facto state of Marawi in Mindanao and which devastated the whole city in 2017 
should not be ignored, given that this was due to the general neglect of this de facto 
state. In fact, Mindanao, including Marawi, is now regarded as having the potential to 
be transformed into another transregional base for radicalised religious-based terrorism. 
In the Philippines, under the Duterte administration that began in 2016, one of the 
security cooperation agendas between the nation and Japan has revolved around the 
counterterrorism related to the issue of Mindanao (Parameswaran, 2017), which 
indicates that Japan cannot afford to ignore the de facto state in its region. However, 
Iwami (2018) argued that the human securitisation of the ODA under the legal reforms 
of the Japanese security policy is observable and that, in theory, the geographical scope 
of the Japanese PKOs has been expanded, including in terms of the participation of the 
non-UN authorised missions and in the more flexible use of force in certain limited 
conditions. Nonetheless, Iwami (2018) concluded that Japan remains reluctant to 
instrumentalise the SDF for peacebuilding operations, including in terms of the 
Mindanao issue, with the nation likely to continue to instrumentalise the ODA to 
 
contribute to peace and stability in the post-conflict resolutions in Marawi (Iwami, 
2018). 
 
The de facto states have very limited capabilities to reach out to international society 
unless others accommodate them within this context. However, with the exception of 
Northern Cyprus, which, as noted above, demonstrated various unique ways to reach 
out to the international society in a low-key manner, international society is unwilling 
to give much diplomatic space to the de facto states. 
 
2.4.4 The EU’s low-key engagement with de facto states 
 
The current literature on the EU’s engagement with de facto states suggests that the EU 
is employing soft power approaches within its geographical periphery surrounding the 
former Soviet Union. ‘Soft power’ means making others do what we want through the 
attractiveness of the actor (Nye, 2004; Hock, 2011). In other words, the soft power 
approach of a state actor involves the use of cultural, social, diplomatic, political, 
educational, or ideational instruments in a non-coercive manner to encourage other 
countries to behave in a way that resonates with its national interests. 
 
International society’s limited engagement generally takes place in the low-key form of 
humanitarian support, financial support, or the enhancement of democracy or civil 
society in these unrecognised states to avoid the sensitive issue of secession. Popescu 
(2007, p. 14) defined the EU’s engagements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
follows: 
 
(i) to decrease the (financial) dependence of the secessionist entities on Russia 
and to give them an opportunity to diversify their options, ii) to create links 
between the secessionists and Tbilisi and promote reconciliation, and iii) to 
promote knowledge about Europe and its values. 
Whether or not these approaches are regarded as non-political, they can certainly be 
questionable. Indeed, it is essential to note that the very existence of an unrecognised 
state is disputed, which means that any engagement with the disputed entity, such as a 
de facto state, will inevitably be contested or politicised. 
 
Behind this limited engagement, there lies the intention to depoliticise the engagement 
as far as possible. Regarding this point, Pegg (1998, p. 8) stated: ‘[f]or international 
society, the greatest potential cost to this approach is angering the sovereign state on 
whose territory the de facto leadership operates’. Meanwhile, Hock (2011) studied the 
case of the EU’s limited engagement with Abkhazia and suggested that while the EU 
began to provide a humanitarian form of financial aid in 1997 to this war-torn de facto 
state, the support undoubtedly lacked an organised and coordinated plan and sufficient 
financial aid was not delivered due to the lack of strategic importance, the geographic 
distance, and the highly dangerous situation of Abkhazia for the EU. The soft power 
approach may appear to assist the grassroots development of Abkhazia in terms of, for 
example, increasing employment and job opportunities for the locals, providing 
financial and humanitarian assistance for refugees and nutrition programmes for the 
locals and diaspora groups (Hock, 2011). However, it is clear that the EU does not want 
to raise political tensions by touching upon such sensitive issues. Nonetheless, it needs 
to be stated here that the problem is that engagement with any entity can be politically 
disputed even if the EU intends to keep it apolitical. 
 
 
In fact, Hock (2011) argued that soft power approaches are only successful in gaining 
some support from politically active civil society and democratic activists in these de 
facto states; however, these democratic values, based on the Lisbon treaty, have not 
necessarily received the wider support of the general population in Abkhazia. If soft 
power is defined as persuasive power (Nye, 2004), this limited engagement by the EU 
with Abkhazia requires re-adjustments to encourage the latter to behave in a way that 
aligns with the former’s interests. According to Popescu (2007), the opposition party in 
Abkhazia often claims that the NGOs dispatched from the EU are often associated with 
spies and agents working for the Western powers, and that these Western NGOs carry 
out espionage operations for the Georgian government in Abkhazia. It would appear 
that regardless of what the EU’s intention may be, a degree of politicisation is inevitable 
in its dealings with Abkhazia. 
 
It is clear that the EU is undertaking a rather low-profile engagement with the de facto 
states located on its geographical periphery. Since these de facto states still heavily rely 
on Russia for their strategic survival (Toal and O’Loughlin, 2014), the limited 
acceptance and acknowledgement of de facto states does not appear to incentivise these 
states to behave in accordance with the EU’s interests. It is highly unlikely that the EU’s 
low-key soft power approaches in engaging with unrecognised states will transform 
these entities within the EU’s periphery into international and regional security assets 




This literature review highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature 
related to the ESIR and to de facto states in general. The strength of the current literature 
lies in how it has proven the flexibility of its theoretical structure in terms of how 
international society can accommodate non-sovereign political communities, including 
de facto states, within its grand narrative, despite its Eurocentric nature. 
Meanwhile, relevant studies share the common perspective that de facto states are 
singularly regarded as regional security issues or the generators of problems within 
international society. Furthermore, since the recognition of de facto states is likely to 
create more problems, engagement without recognition is becoming a topic of 
increasing interest in the current literature on de facto states in international society. 
However, none of the relevant studies consider de facto states as potential peacemakers, 
if they are given opportunities to contribute to regional peace and stability by others. A 
further weakness relates to the fact that Japan, a non-European regional great power 
that accommodates outsiders such as Taiwan within international society, has not been 
addressed by the existing studies in the body of literature related to the ESIR and de 
facto states. 
Therefore, the contribution of the current thesis will be to construct a grand narrative 
on how Japan has been the main protagonist in expanding international society to 
incrementally include an excluded entity (Taiwan) in a non-Eurocentric manner. As 
such, the study will treat Japan as a core member of the institutions in international 
society, one that regards Taiwan as a subordinate peripheral outsider in a paternalistic 
way. This new grand narrative is conceptually different to how Japan is included in the 
Eurocentric international society as a non-European outsider by the Western powers 
within the context of conventional non-Western approaches to the English School. In 
fact, as yet, there has not emerged a grand narrative that regards Japan as an essential 
 
insider of the core institutions of international society, one that creates the rules and 
norms for the regional order through its engagement with an outsider of the society of 
states (Taiwan). 
As will be examined in the next chapter, Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan is unique 
in the sense that it contributes to shaping the rules and norms for the regional order. It 
will be argued that Japan is socialising Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument to enhance 
its own regional security interests in accordance with its own standards of civilisation 
for international society without fully recognising Taiwan and while still officially 
following the One-China policy within the context of the regional security environment. 
  
 
Chapter 3. Japan–Taiwan Relations, Japan’s Foreign Policy 
Instruments, and Japan’s Socialisation of Taiwan through 
International Security Norms 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter elucidated on how the ESIR is theoretically flexible enough to 
deal with the accommodation of non-sovereign political entities into international 
society, including de facto states, by the European great powers, even though the 
entities in question cannot attain fully-fledged membership. This chapter builds on this 
by explicating how the non-European regional great power Japan accommodates 
Taiwan into the international society of states for the sake of its own security, without 
recognising Taiwan within the context of its One-China policy.  
 
First, we review the literature related to Japan–Taiwan relations to build the argument 
that it is up to Japan to decide what kind of security interactions the two nations will 
engage in within the hierarchical relations in the absence of Japan’s recognition of 
Taiwan in international society, and that Japan navigates the ambiguities of its One-
China policy to incrementally utilise Taiwan as a security asset in ways that do not 
destabilise Japan–China–Taiwan relations. Second, we review the literature related to 
Japanese foreign policy instruments to ascertain the security contribution Japan has 
made to international society, and to elucidate on what the nation is willing to do and 
what it is unwilling to do in its security engagements with Taiwan in the context of its 
One-China policy. In addition, we attempt to clarify how Japan’s security interactions 
with Taiwan will remain incremental, regardless of whether it adheres to the Yoshida 
Doctrine or shifts toward the more radical Abe Doctrine. Third, we conceptualise how 
Japan has been encouraging Taiwan to behave as if it is a member of international 
 
security efforts based on international security norms for Japan’s security, – despite 
Taiwan’s non-access to the multilateral security forums in the absence of any statehood 
– while pacifying its One-China policy. 
 
3.2 The Hierarchical Relationship Between Japan and Taiwan 
 
In the words of Morris (2017, p.3), ‘this is a compelling association in today’s Taiwan, 
where real and imagined traces of “Japaneseness” are treasured for their making Taiwan 
as separate from “China” proper’. 
However, it may be favourable for the ontological security of the Taiwanese identity 
for the nation’s people to regard themselves as at least partially Japanese, albeit that 
such an incorporation of ‘Japaneseness’ into what defines Taiwanese identity further 
reinforces the Taiwanese geopolitical subordination to Japan within international 
society. As noted in the previous chapter, if accommodated actors such as Japan, China 
or Turkey – which have historically been incorporated by the Eurocentric great powers 
into international society – attempt to demonstrate normative compliance with the 
Western norms, this inadvertently consolidates the Western unilateral moral authority 
of defining who is civilised and who is not. The same social structure applies to the 
contemporary relations between the non-European regional great power Japan and 
subordinated Taiwan. Therefore, since Japan engaged in the civilising mission of the 
‘barbarians’ in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period, the social structure within 
which Japan is currently civilising Taiwan in a unilateral manner has changed little. As 
such, Japan continues to hold the moral authority to judge whether Taiwan is behaving 
in accordance with the Japanese concept of the standards of modern civilisation for 
 
Japan’s security within the context of its One-China policy in the regional security 
environment. Following this logic, for Japan, Taiwan’s interpretation of its history 
under Japan’s colonial rule also functions as a foreign policy instrument.  
 
On this point, Sejrup (2012) argued that Taiwan is always regarded as a pupil of Japan’s 
historical modernity and progress as a metropolitan core, positioning Taiwan as a 
subordinate periphery in the former Japanese empire. This defines Japan as progressive 
and modern while defining Taiwan as progressing and modernising. Here, Sejrup (2012) 
pointed out that Taiwan attempts to learn from Taiwanese essentialised and simplified 
interpretations of its Japanese past to overcome the present socio-political problems in 
the nation, and added that when Taiwan finds Japan committing transgressions in its 
territory – such as exploiting the impoverished local women for prostitution tourism – 
it simply attempts to justify it by attributing it to the transregional hierarchical economic 
order and conceding that Taiwan also exploits local women for prostitution in the 
lesser-developed Southeast Asian region and in China, thus rendering the controversy 
non-problematic. Sejrup (2012) went on to point out that Japan also notes its colonial 
accomplishments in Taiwan to highlight the contemporary improvements there in order 
to raise its status vis-à-vis Taiwan. Clearly, the social structure wherein Taiwan learns 
from Japan’s past to improve its own ongoing progress inadvertently consolidates the 
normative superiority of Japan over Taiwan in a hierarchical manner. Meanwhile, 
Japan’s misconduct is justified by subordinated Taiwan, which attempts to imagine the 
transregional hierarchical society by placing Japan at the top of the ladder as the most 
civilised while conceptualising Taiwan as currently progressing in the middle of the 
hierarchy and placing the rest of the region as more normatively inferior (Sejrup, 2012). 
In addition, as Sejrup (2012) stated, conservative politicians in Japan utilise this 
 
Taiwanese imagination of the hierarchical society of states as an instrument to justify 
the conservative or right-wing interpretations of Japan’s past imperial history.  
 
Furthermore, Lim (2018) argued that there exist two major dimensional reconciliations 
because of the selective remembering and forgetting in Taiwan in terms of its historical 
reconciliations with Japan. Here, Lim (2018) observed that, on an external level, 
Taiwan largely achieved reconciliation with Japan even under the KMT regime, and 
that while Japan and Taiwan have also had various historical disputes, the government 
in Taiwan is unwilling to jeopardise its relations with Japan for political reasons, unlike 
with the Koreas and the PRC. Meanwhile, at a domestic level, things are more 
complicated, and the two different historical memories of the Taiwanese who lived 
under Japanese colonial rule as Japanese imperial subjects and those who fought the 
war of resistance against the Japanese in mainland China still foster lingering tensions 
(Lim, 2018). However, the cultural affinity toward Japan is observable in 
transgenerational manners, including among those who experienced anti-Japanese 
education in Taiwan during the KMT authoritarian era, with Taiwanese people 
becoming fonder of Japanese culture, which demonstrates the Taiwanese flexibility vis-
à-vis Japan. Lim (2018) concluded that the simplistic and binary classifications of the 
perpetrators and victims should be avoided in the historical reconciliation. It is 
important to state here that even the KMT under Chiang-Kai-Shek established 
traditional ties with the LDP under pro-Taiwan figures such as Kishi Nobusuke in the 
post-war period for the ROC’s political survival as a small country, and that Taiwan’s 
political leverage vis-à-vis Japan became even more weakened and limited after the 
Japanese de-recognition of the ROC in favour of the PRC. Therefore, whether Taiwan 
likes it or not, it needs to engage with Japan in a peaceful manner for its own survival 
 
in the absence of Japanese recognition. It can be argued that one of the reasons why 
Taiwan is not interested in bringing up the historical disputes with Japan for political 
reasons is that, unlike with South Korea and the PRC – which are recognised as 
sovereign states by Japan – Taiwan remains a de facto state and its subordinate position 
below Japan significantly reduces its foreign policy leverage vis-à-vis Japan, while a 
reciprocity of recognition exists between Japan, South Korea and the PRC in a legally 
equal sense. Given this regional political environment, Taiwan functions merely as an 
object to be accommodated by Japan in the context of its One-China policy. 
 
3.2.1 Japan–US alliance and Taiwan 
 
Security-related studies on Japan have frequently discussed Taiwan within the context 
of how it is embraced in the Japan–US alliance as a consumer of extended security 
deterrence (Kotani and Auer, 2005; McDevitte, 2005; Yang, 2005). Japan is 
traditionally believed to have taken a low-key approach to the issue of the Taiwan Strait. 
Matsuda (2018) discussed the implication of the issue of the Taiwan Strait for the 
Japan–US alliance, including from the perspective of CSD, and argued that while Japan 
takes lesser roles and missions in relation to the US, it continues to play a substantial 
role in the security of Taiwan in the context of the Japan–US alliance. Meanwhile, those 
who argued for Japan’s middle power status tend to downplay the nation’s role in 
providing security for Taiwan, even in the context of the Japan–US alliance. For 
example, Soeya (2011) argued that the Japan–US alliance guideline of the 1990s was 
meant to deter North Korea, despite Chinese suspicions of Japanese involvement in the 
issue of the Taiwan Strait. 
 
 
Due to the lack of international recognition of Taiwan, Japan cannot address its 
relationship with Taiwan in the same way as it does with the ‘official’ sovereign states 
that stand on an equal footing in international society. Moreover, Japan’s official 
adherence to its One-China policy is premised on the government’s acceptance of 
engaging with Taiwan in only socio-economic and civilian terms, not in strategic 
security terms, let alone in terms of defence ties. Regarding this point, Soeya (2005) 
argued that unlike the widely held belief that Japan–China–Taiwan relations are 
becoming more pro-Taiwan and more anti-China, Japan’s policy toward Taiwan 
remains pro-China, while the issue of the Taiwan Strait remains deeply embedded in 
the Japan–US alliance, meaning Japan is unable to create its own independent strategy 
on Taiwan (Soeya, 2005). Matsuda (2012, 2013) provided a more nuanced analysis of 
the security role of Japan as a ‘minor’ and a ‘passive balancer’. Overall, the existing 
security-related studies involving Japan tend to regard Taiwan’s existence as a low-key 
issue despite Taiwan’s geostrategic importance for Japan. 
 
3.2.2 Taiwan’s attempt to upgrade its place in Japan’s foreign policy initiatives 
 
Lin (2014) rightly pointed out the geostrategic importance for Japan as a trading nation 
of securing the sea lanes of communication by leaving Taiwan in friendly hands, 
geographically connecting Taiwan with strategic chokepoints between the East and 
South China Seas in the first island chains. However, Lin (2014) also non-critically 
introduced Richard Samuel’s argument that while the Japan-US alliance is important 
for Taiwan’s security, Taiwan is more important for the structure of the Japan–US 
alliance due to the potential risk of ‘alliance collapse’ without Japanese assistance 
during the cross-strait conflict due to the strategic linkages between the US’s 
 
commitment to the defence of Taiwan and the Japan–US alliance. However, it must be 
stated here that the Japan–US relationship functions as a global security provider, as 
exemplified by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, while the issue of the Taiwan 
Strait is a region-specific issue. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that Taiwan is more 
important for the Japan–US alliance than the other way round. However, this does not 
mean Taiwan has no place in Japan’s transregional strategies such as the Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific strategy. On this point, Matsuda (2019) argued that while Japan is unlikely 
to mention Taiwan explicitly in its Indo-Pacific strategy, this does not mean that Taiwan 
has no role, with Japan more likely to utilise Taiwan as a ‘hidden asset’ in the initiative. 
 
Furthermore, the hierarchical bilateral relations between Japan and Taiwan also help to 
create diplomatic environments wherein Taiwan’s political input into Japan’s security 
policy on Taiwan has a minimum influence, if any. One symbolic example that 
substantiates this point relates to Taiwan’s lively debates on Japan’s potential creation 
of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Here, it is essential to note that the potential 
enactment of the Japanese version of the TRA is a domestic Japanese law, over which 
Taiwan has zero control in terms of any final decisions, even though it can be surmised 
that Taiwan can at least engage in informal or ‘behind-the-scenes’ lobbying activities. 
On this point, Taiwan’s current de facto ambassador in Tokyo, Frank Hsieh, admitted 
at the legislative Yuan that it is very difficult for Taiwan to convince Japan to adopt the 
Japanese version of the TRA since the latter abruptly terminated diplomatic ties with 
the former in 1972 without creating such a legal document (Taipei Times, 2017). 
Furthermore, in an interview conducted by Tzou Jiing-wen, Kishi Nobuo, the then 
minister for foreign affairs and the brother of Prime Minister Abe, stated that ‘Japan is 
not currently making any moves toward implementation of a TRA-like policy, but the 
 
National Diet has done research in this area’ (Taipei Times, 2016). Meanwhile, 
according to Rira Monma (2018), the head of China Research at the Ministry of 
Defence in Tokyo, as the current deputy foreign minister, Kishi Nobuo stated that there 
is the possibility that the Japanese version of the TRA may see progress in the next two 
to three years, without stipulating a clause for Japanese security involvement in Taiwan, 
such as the provision of weapons, at the trilateral security convention involving the US, 
Japan and Taiwan that was held in Taipei in December 2017, where Taiwan was 
described as an ‘important partner’. Therefore, while Taiwan may wish to secure 
Japan’s more reliable security commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, 
it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will be able to obtain such a security commitment from 
the government of Japan. Overall then, the hierarchical nature of Japan–Taiwan 
relations is clear, and it is up to Japan to lead the relations in strategic security terms 
given that it can exercise important political authority to incrementally accommodate 
Taiwan in the international society of states. 
3.2.3 Taiwan’s domestic policy analysis of its relationship with Japan 
 
From this perspective, even though scholars working in the field of Taiwan studies 
analyse the nation’s relations with Japan through the perspective of domestic policy 
analysis, their understanding of Japan is unlikely to be heeded by the government of 
Japan. For example, the English-language literature on Japan–China–Taiwan relations, 
such as the work of He (2014), has discussed Taiwan’s ‘national’ historiography vis-à-
vis its self-image in relation to Japan and China as historical ‘significant others’ in the 
context of identity politics in Taiwan. Here, He (2014) argued that such identity politics 
vis-a-vis the Japanese–Chinese nexus affects Taiwan’s foreign policy preference in 
terms of its relationships with Japan and China. Elsewhere, Chen and Hwang (2015) 
 
analysed the sentiments of Taiwan’s younger generations toward Japan and China in 
relation to the issue of the Senkaku Islands through examining online debates, 
concluding that even though Taiwan has incorporated Japan largely positively and 
China somewhat negatively into its national identity construction, this does not 
necessarily mean that Taiwanese netizens would side with Japan against China in the 
issue of maritime sovereignty over the East China Sea. 
 
However, as examined earlier, without official recognition of Taiwan by the 
government of Japan, it remains questionable as to whether Taiwanese identity politics 
would afford the nation any foreign policy leverage to affect Japan’s security policy on 
Taiwan. Meanwhile, Dreyer (2016) elaborated on the Japan-related policy of each of 
the Taiwan administrations in chronological order, with reactions from both Japan and 
China. Here, the author briefly illuminated the Tokyo–Taipei relations under the 
authoritarian KMT era as an analytical template, specifically elucidating on Japan–
Taiwan relations after Taiwan’s democratisation, from Lee Teng Hui to the last Ma 
administration. Dreyer (2016) rightly concluded that Japan–Taiwan relations are likely 
to improve under the current Tsai administration and that Japan is unlikely to concede 
to the PRC’s demands over Taiwan.  
 
Meanwhile, Deans (2000) examined how the opposition political forces and nationalists 
in the PRC, Japan and Taiwan exploit the issue of the Senkaku Islands to embarrass the 
legitimacy of the ruling elites while the ruling elites attempt to downplay this issue. 
Therefore, for Deans (2000), the symbolic importance of the islands in question within 
the context of internal politics among these three actors is more important than how the 
three nationalisms affect the regional political environment. 
 
 
However, the studies based on Taiwan’s domestic policy analysis vis-à-vis its relations 
with Japan would be unlikely to illuminate ‘Japan’s security policy’ on Taiwan, largely 
due to Taiwan’s unrecognised status, which significantly reduces its diplomatic 
influence on its more powerful neighbour. Taiwan’s ‘domestic sovereignty’ may grant 
itself an internal space for lively democratic discussions on its domestic policy on Japan 
within the context of internal politics, but it must be stated here that such internal 
debates in the de facto state are not the solution to the nation’s international predicament 
of being in diplomatic limbo, including in terms of its subordinate relations with Japan 
in international society. 
 
3.2.4 Vulnerable Taiwan within the context of Sino-Japanese relations 
 
Taiwan appears to be concerned about the potential enhancement of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship and the attendant strategic implications for Japan–Taiwan relations. This 
was especially true in 2017, since that year marked the 45th anniversary of the 
normalisation of official Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties, as expressed by the chief 
secretary, Zhang Shuling, at the Taiwan–Japan Relations Association. As Shuling 
stated, Taiwan hopes it does not become a ‘zero sum game’ (Radio Taiwan International 
Japanese, 6 June 2017). Certainly, Japan’s strategic understanding of Taiwan also 
includes the realist understanding of the balance of power. For example, regarding 
Japan’s strategic thinking on power politics vis-à-vis its relationship with Taiwan and 
the PRC, Hornung stated the following: 
 
[p]oor relations between Beijing and Tokyo provide Japan with the latitude to 
seek improved ties with Taipei to hit back on Beijing. In other words, Japan can 
play a ‘Taiwan card’ against the PRC. It is not a coincidence that most of the 
improvements in Japan–Taiwan ties since Abe came into office came against a 
backdrop of spiralling Beijing-Tokyo relations (Brookings Institute Homepage, 
2018). 
As examined, Japan has a far greater influence in this bilateral relationship. Notably, 
this was the case even under the tenure of President Ma Ying Jeou, who has a reputation 
for being anti-Japanese, when Taiwan signed the fisheries agreement with Japan 
(Ogasawara, 2015). Here, Takeuchi Takayuki (2012) questioned the political sincerity 
of the Ma administration’s East China Sea Peace Initiative by pointing out that Ma had 
used provocative language such as the ‘non-removal of the use of force’ (against Japan) 
when he was mayor of Taipei. Regarding Ma’s record of anti-Japanese activism during 
his early tenure in 2008, the then chief executive of the Ma administration, Liu Chao-
shiuan, even cited ‘the use of force [against Japan] if necessary’ when referring to the 
maritime tensions with Japan over the East China Sea that ensued following the 
collision between the Japanese coastguard patrol ship and the Taiwanese fisheries boat 
near the Senkaku Islands (Kiyomizu, 2010). Meanwhile, Matsuda (2013) elaborated on 
how Ma expended significant political effort to negate the Japanese image of Ma as an 
anti-Japanese figure following this maritime incident, since it was not in Taiwan’s 
national interests to have Ma labelled as anti-Japanese. In other words, there is an 
established mechanism in Taiwan, which functions to enhance ties with Japan for its 
own strategic survival within the context of the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations, 
regardless of how the domestic political debates on Japan evolve in Taiwan. 
 
 
Furthermore, it is essential to state here that Taiwan can maintain its de facto 
independence only by securing Japan and the US as strategic supporters vis-à-vis its 
relationship with China. On this point, Leng and Liao (2016) analysed the hedging 
strategy of the Ma administration in the context of Sino-Japanese relations and argued 
that the administration tried to maximise Taiwan’s autonomy and security interests by 
enhancing its relations with the US, Japan and China at the same time. However, the 
point that is not adequately discussed in this study is that despite the suggestion that 
Taiwan’s hedging strategy can be a model for other small and middle-sized regional 
powers in the face of emerging China, Taiwan will remain a de facto state given the 
absence of international recognition and the existence of the PRC’s One-China 
principle. As such, Taiwan lacks the foreign policy leverage to influence the dynamics 
of the Japan–US–China great power relations in any meaningful way and continues to 
be on the receiving end of this triangulated power relationship. Finally, unlike this 
study’s suggestion of Taiwan potentially being a model for the other small and medium-
sized regional powers in terms of its hedging strategy, we must address the fact that 
since it is an unrecognised state, Taiwan cannot be compared with Japan’s other 
regional security partners. As Leng and Liao (2016) also confirmed, Japan is now a 
major lynchpin in the regional hedging strategy within the context of Sino-US relations. 
However, Japan has no intention at all to recognise Taiwan, which is a necessary 
process if Japan were to upgrade its security ties with Taiwan in a high-profile manner. 
In fact, Japan will likely continue to improve these ties in an incremental and low-key 
manner in the absence of recognition of Taiwan, which would ensure that Taiwan does 
not significantly disrupt Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
 
3.2.5 The Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese relations 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the de facto states are often regarded as issues to be managed, 
diffused, and ultimately solved as if these unrecognised entities were regional 
troublemakers. However, if Taiwan is a source of tension in Sino-Japanese relations, 
there is a clear strategic need for Japan to discipline the state behaviours of Taiwan to 
ensure the nation contributes to regional peace and stability. Bush (2019) cautioned the 
potentially more liberalised use of Taiwan’s domestic referendum, including in terms 
of the issue of Taiwan’s legal status, since the PRC might interpret such a development 
as an act of secession and consequently trigger the use of force. Bush (2019) further 
questioned whether the US’s security commitment to Taiwan was solid enough under 
the Trump administration in the case of an outbreak of war, alluding to the 
developments of domestic politics in Taiwan, especially pertinent if Taiwan does not 
obtain prior approval for such acts from the US. As conceptualised in the ESIR, if the 
great powers can unilaterally impose the rules and norms on the small states (Bull, 
1977; Buzan, 2014), it is possible that Japan would also interfere, disagree, or at least 
express non-agreeable views regarding the developments in Taiwan. This would be 
especially pertinent if Japan incrementally expands the use of Taiwan as a foreign 
policy instrument vis-à-vis the PRC. One needs to be reminded of the fact that the 
former de facto Japanese ambassador in Taiwan, Uchida Katsuhisa, expressed some 
political disagreement regarding Taiwan’s domestic referendum of 2004, which led to 
Japan’s concern over the potential increase in cross-strait tensions and the subsequent 
adverse effects on Japan’s security and national interests (Uchida, 2006, pp.186–194).  
 
 
Elsewhere, Wang (2000) argued that while Japan enormously benefitted from the 1972 
system, where it simultaneously enhanced its economic and political relationships with 
China and its economic relationship with Taiwan, this geopolitical arrangement has 
subsequently eroded, largely due to the Taiwan factor in the revised Japan–US alliance 
guidelines of 1997. Wang (2000) concluded that while Japan’s strategic preference 
remains a peaceful solution of the cross-strait issue involving China and Taiwan, the 
strengthened Japan–US alliance locked Japan further into the possible future cross-
strait military contingency, albeit reluctantly. Therefore, from this geopolitical 
perspective, the Taiwan issue is a major cause for concern in terms of Sino-Japanese 
relations. While Wang (2000) appeared to erroneously believe that Japan recognised 
China’s claim over Taiwan, he also wrongly suggested that this interpretation means 
Japan’s Taiwan policy differs from that of the US. Here, it is important to stress that 
while Wang’s misinterpretation of Japan’s position on Taiwan must be corrected, this 
study focuses on advancing the view that Japan’s Taiwan policy is indeed unique and 
creative in terms of its security measures, as will be examined later. 
 
Meanwhile, other analysts approached the Taiwan issue from the perspective of Japan’s 
past imperial history. For example, Zha (2001) argued that while Taiwan’s inclusion in 
the Japan–US alliance is troublesome for the PRC, the Beijing government tends to 
hold that the Taiwan issue is, in strategic terms, more of an issue that must be dealt 
within the context of Sino-US relations. Here, Zha (2001) suggested that the greater 
concern regarding the Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese relations is how the Taiwan-
independence advocates in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing 
disagree in terms of their respective interpretations of the historical legacy of the 
Japanese Empire, while the two sides remain sensitive to the Japanese governmental 
 
stance on Japanese imperial history, albeit in different terms. As Zha (2001) noted, this 
has created both historical and cultural divisions on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, 
even though the Taiwan issue is more of an ‘irritant’ than a ‘destroyer’ in Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
 
It is noteworthy that analysts such as Lynch (2018) are expressing their concerns 
regarding the Trump administration’s use of the Taiwan card vis-à-vis China, while 
other analysts, such as Mazza (2018), are more concerned with the Taiwan–China 
tensions, with their views seemingly favouring President Tsai’s more restrained 
approach to the cross-strait tension over President Xi’s more nationalistic approach, be 
it real or perceived. Meanwhile, Gries and Wang (2019) argued that Taiwan’s 
underestimation of the PRC’s resolve to wage the cross-strait war and the Taiwanese 
distrust of its military’s self-defence capabilities, the PRC’s underestimation of the 
US’s political will to defend Taiwan, and the unreliability of the Trump administration 
may all contribute to miscalculations within the potential cross-strait conflict. If this 
hypothesis is true, Japan’s prudent behaviour vis-à-vis Taiwan is, in conjunction with 
the Japan–US alliance, even more critical for the regional order. In fact, as Kawashima 
(2019) pointed out, the Sino-US confrontation, and the US's more visible treatment of 
Taiwan under the Trump administration in relation to the PRC, have not had a direct 
impact on Japan's relations with Taiwan. 
 
3.2.6 Taiwan as a security asset for Japan 
 
 
As examined earlier, Taiwan has no foreign policy leverage to influence Japan’s 
Taiwan-related policy. However, this does not mean that Taiwan cannot be a security 
asset for Japan. In fact, as Chow (2016) noted, while Taiwan may have only limited 
access to international economic forums such as the WTO, the APEC, and the Asian 
Development Bank, it remains a developed economic entity to be reckoned with and is 
still a crucial global supply chain. Furthermore, Taiwan aspires to being a member of 
the TPP and the RCEP in the future, despite the PRC’s political obstruction. In fact, in 
this sense, Taiwan needs to work on its internal reforms regarding its regulatory regimes 
if it is to substantially improve its economic efficiency and transparency in compliance 
with global standards. Here, Chow (2016) pointed out that even though Taiwan’s 
participation in the TPP may have limited economic dividends for both Japan and the 
US, the positive net effects for the social well-being in these two countries are 
potentially huge. It is essential to state here that this means Japan is a significant player 
given its significant economic status (the largest) in the TPP and the RCEP (the second 
largest after China), especially after the withdrawal of the US from the TPP’s 
negotiations under the Trump administration. Taiwan is a regional medium-sized 
developed economic power, and economic power remains an important component in 
the balance of power for the ESIR (Bull, 1977). Therefore, if Japan invests political 
capital in its relationship with Taiwan, the latter can still be a security asset for the 
former, provided Japan can assist in granting Taiwan membership to the trans-regional 
economic blocks. 
 
Nevertheless, deLisle (2016) argued that Taiwan must adopt more creative approaches 
if it is to meaningfully participate in international organisations or become a stakeholder 
in the regional security affairs, such as the issues surrounding the East and South China 
 
Seas. Here, deLisle (2016) largely discussed the role of US–Taiwan relations in 
improving Taiwan’s international space in addition to the role of Taiwan’s relationship 
with Japan as a supplementary instrument for enhancing the former’s presence in the 
diplomatic endeavours. However, if Taiwan wishes to be recognised as a military buffer 
for Japan, as the former Japanese diplomat in Taiwan Uchida Katsuhisa (2006) noted, 
deeper investigations into how Taiwan can be a security asset for Japan are required. 
Furthermore, if Taiwan is regarded merely as a military buffer for Japan, Japan does 
not need to creatively reconceptualise how Taiwan can be a security asset beyond the 
military defence of its southern flank. To maximise Taiwan’s underappreciated security 
resources as well as its economic and technological power, democratic norms, and 
geographical importance for Japan’s security – even in the absence of international 
recognition – Japan’s engagement with Taiwan requires more nuanced investigations, 
as will be undertaken herein. 
 
Meanwhile, other academics, such as Fukuda (2018), have noted the importance of 
Japan simultaneously balancing its relationships with both China and Taiwan such that 
it can gain maximum benefits from both sides. Here, Fukuda (2018) argued that while 
maintaining peace and stability is the most important factor for Japan’s national 
interests regarding the issue of the Taiwan Strait, given the PRC’s more active security 
policy vis-à-vis the East and South China Seas, Japan’s relationship with Taiwan is 
essential  due to Taiwan’s geostrategic position, even though the complex dynamics of 
Japan–China–Taiwan relations render Japan–Taiwan security cooperation highly 
problematic. However, even Fukuda (2018) admitted the existence of military 
information sharing between Japan and Taiwan through the deployment of the retired 
SDF officials and the active officials of the Japanese coastguard in the Japan–Taiwan 
 
Exchange Association in Taipei, the track 2 and track 1.5 security talks between Japan 
and Taiwan, and so on. This means that Japan has been navigating the complexity of 
the One-China policy to incrementally improve its security cooperation with Taiwan in 
ways that would not destabilise Japan–China–Taiwan relations. In other words, if Japan 
uses its security relationship with Taiwan more creatively, it can utilise Taiwan as a 
security asset for its own regional security interests. Overall then, low-key but creative 
security interactions between Japan and Taiwan are essential.  
 
3.2.7 Japan’s quiet and creative diplomacy vis-à-vis its relationship with Taiwan 
 
The hierarchical relations between Japan and Taiwan, and the existence of the China 
factor, result in the political need for Japan to resort to creative diplomacy to navigate 
the ambiguities of the One-China policy. The positive aspect of creative diplomacy is 
that it helps conceptualise Taiwan as a quasi-dialogue partner or even as a low-key and 
hidden but cooperative partner for regional security affairs, albeit incrementally. 
 
Kawashima (2016) argued that the stable cross-strait relations between China and 
Taiwan under the Ma administration led to the PRC taking a non-interference stance 
vis-à-vis Japan–Taiwan relations, and advanced the argument that Japan and Taiwan 
were able to sign high-profile agreements, including the fisheries agreement, without a 
significant negative reaction from the PRC. Furthermore, Kawashima (2016) concluded 
that Japan–Taiwan relations are closely structured in relation to the 1972 system and 
the Japan–US alliance. Certainly, as was discussed above, the China factor continues 
to affect the development of Japan–Taiwan relations, and Japan’s security policy 
 
remains centred on the Japan–US alliance. However, such a mechanistic understanding 
understates the nuances of Japan’s creative diplomacy, which incrementally expands 
Japan’s security engagement with Taiwan, even under the framework of the 1972 
system and the Japan-US alliance. Despite the recent cross-strait tensions under the Abe 
and Tsai administrations, it is noteworthy that Japan and Taiwan enhanced their law 
enforcement cooperation in the form of the anti-smuggling agreement, the expansion 
of intelligence sharing, and the coastguard exchanges, including the conclusion of the 
bilateral maritime rescue and search agreement, as will be examined in the chapters on 
the ICAO and CSD. 
 
Meanwhile, Thomas and Williams (2017) argued that in terms of Japan–Taiwan 
relations, Taiwan’s para-diplomacy conducted via subnational interactions with its 
counterparts in Japan enhances the attendant relations, and the hybridity of high-politics 
and low-politics can be blurred in this context since the low-politics in Taiwan often 
affect the enhancement of the high-politics. This development was manifested in how 
Taiwan’s massive civilian financial donations provided to Japan further improved the 
Japanese people’s positive sentiments toward Taiwan, and in how, as a window for 
negotiations, the Japanese non-official proxy authority also responded to Taiwan’s 
overtures for the conclusion of the fisheries agreement, as will be examined in the 
chapter on this agreement. Elsewhere, Thomas and Williams (2017) analysed how 
certain subnational actors in Taiwan often play the proxy role of the central authority, 
including in the negotiations over the fisheries agreement with Japan, and discussed 
how the central authority in China is sensitive toward the subnational ties among local 
authorities in Japan and Taiwan that bypass the bilateral government-to-government 
ties in the context of the One-China principle. It is certainly true to say that Taiwan is 
 
fairly adept at creatively enhancing its ties with Japan – perhaps with the exception of 
the MOFA-based central authority diplomacy – in the absence of Japan’s governmental 
recognition, and there is certainly room for further expansion of such subnational ties 
between the non-state actors from Japan and Taiwan in economic, cultural, social or 
even occasional political terms. Meanwhile, as argued by Deans (2001), while there are 
a number of de facto institutionalised bilateral channels between Japan and Taiwan 
regarding routine tasks such as issuing visas – which may function in the role of de 
facto embassies due to the nature of informal politics – Taiwan has to rely on informal 
channels to enhance its ties with Japan, channels that present clear limits to what is 
possible, especially in terms of high-politics. Specifically, Deans (2001) focused on the 
role of Nikkakon, the group of Japanese lawmakers that engages in informal 
parliamentary diplomacy with Taiwan in the absence of official ties. However, as Deans 
(2001) pointed out, such informal ties are somewhat fragile since they are significantly 
influenced by the overall directions of Japanese domestic politics, and the Taiwanese 
reliance on Japanese individual politicians can be personality-based. 
 
However, these studies failed to address how, in terms of security and military ties, the 
role of the Japanese state is essential since the Japanese central authority maintains a 
grip on the SDF, the coastguard, and the national police agency for national security, 
while it also failed to address how it is up to the government of Japan to decide whether 
Japan is interested in enhancing its security ties with Taiwan. As will be examined later, 
Japanese informal diplomacy does play a role in enhancing the security ties with 
Taiwan, especially since Japan’s One-China policy is premised on non-military, non-
security and/or non-political interactions with its neighbour. In other words, it must be 
pointed out that the government of Japan uses proxy diplomacy in creative ways to 
 
communicate regarding the strategic, military, and security issues with Taiwan through 
the track 2 and track 1.5 security dialogues via the retired officials and active academics 
operating as proxies, including the participation of former prime ministers such as Abe 
(before he became the prime minister again), the parliamentary diplomacy, or the 
informal window of the communication channels with Taiwan in the absence of official 
ties, as will be elaborated on in the three case study chapters. 
 
Importantly, in contrast to the times within which Deans (2001) discussed the limited 
roles of the institutionalised informal communication channels that were not capable of 
handling the high-politics in 2001, it would appear that Japan has incrementally 
expanded the roles of such informal communication channels with Taiwan, including 
within the security dimension. Yeh et al. (2015) argued that Japan and Taiwan 
concluded the fisheries agreement by shelving the issue of sovereign ownership of the 
Senkaku Islands and by allowing the fishing vessels of both sides to fish without being 
interfered with by the respective maritime law enforcements within the de facto EEZs 
through the non-official (yet officially empowered) proxy agencies in 2013. 
Nevertheless, Japan continues to consider the China factor due to the PRC’s claim over 
Taiwan, and this special treatment only applies to Japan and Taiwan within the context 
of the fisheries agreement over the East China Sea. Importantly, Yeh et al. (2015) 
pointed out that, in fact, Japan considered Taiwan to be a claimant separate from the 
PRC in relation to the issue of the East China Sea, and effectively eliminated its 
strategic concerns over the cross-strait united front, which could have placed Japan 
under significant geopolitical pressure regarding the defence of the East China Sea. In 
fact, the two sides utilised an amicable bilateral relationship that differs in nature to 
Japan’s other bilateral ties in Northeast Asia. Yeh et al.’s (2015) collaborative work on 
 
the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement helps to illuminate Japan’s strategic calculation 
that resulted in this creative diplomacy, that is, Japan’s utilisation of the aforementioned 
semi-official proxy agencies such as the former Interchange Association, which 
engaged in negotiations with Taiwan, albeit with the attendance of officials from 
governmental agencies from both sides. Here, even in the absence of the Japanese 
government’s lack of recognition of Taiwan, Taiwan was tacitly recognised as an ‘semi-
official actor’ in the issue of the East China Sea, while the bilateral fisheries committee 
was established such that the follow-up issues could be handled in a bilateral context. 
While Yeh et al.’s (2015) assertation that the creation of a regional fisheries 
management organisation that includes Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan in the 
East China Sea will not be seriously considered due to Taiwan’s lack of international 
recognition and its lack of foreign policy leverage, it can be stated here that this does 
indicate that a relatively low-key and minor issue, such as the conclusion of the fisheries 
agreement with Taiwan, represents significant geopolitical behaviour in terms of 
Japan’s creative diplomacy, while utilising Taiwan as a security asset, as will be 
elaborated in the chapter dedicated to the fisheries agreement. 
 
3.2.8 Semi-institutionalised Japan–Taiwan proxy communication channels and 
Sino-Japanese great power management 
 
If Japan is to utilise Taiwan as a security asset, the former must communicate with the 
latter regarding security issues while navigating the ambiguities of the One-China 
policy. Here, Japan must engage through creative means. In other words, it is clear that 
the incremental semi-institutionalisation of the informal communication channels 
between Japan and Taiwan that define the latter as ‘a dialogue partner’ or ‘a de facto 
 
stakeholder’ are gradually becoming semi-normalised, which is helping to encourage 
Taiwan to behave in accordance with Japan’s security preference or its standard of 
civilisation within the international liberal order, while not excessively disrupting 
Japan’s relations with the PRC in the context of its One-China policy  for regional great 
power management.. Therefore, while Taiwan suffers from its international exclusion, 
Japan has been providing help to allow its neighbour to enhance its links with 
international society through the alternative means of quasi-formal communication 
channels to incrementally accommodate Taiwan into the regional security environment 
in ways that do not require Taiwan’s statehood for membership. 
 
Specifically, for the case of Taiwan, Bartmann (2008, pp.117–118) stated that 
‘Taiwan’s unique position in the international system is that it is able to follow 
established diplomatic protocols in some situations’, adding that it ‘must resort to 
paradiplomacy in most of its critical relationships with other states’. Elsewhere, Abb 
and Yang (2018) argued that while Taiwan gives greater autonomy to the smaller and 
medium-sized think tanks in terms of creating ideational diversity under the democratic 
regime, in comparison with the highly centralised think tanks that are politically loyal 
to the CCP in the PRC, Taiwan has skilfully used the established major think tanks for 
the track 2 diplomacy and has nurtured personal ties with its counterparts in the region 
amid its international isolation and the PRC’s sanctions. Furthermore, as Abb and Yang 
(2018) noted, Taiwan’s major think tanks are coordinating with the Kyoto University’s 
prestigious Southeast Asian Studies programme to enhance President Tsai’s top foreign 
policies, such as the New Southbound Policy, to explore collaborations with their 
counterparts in Southeast Asia. Regarding this point, the former de facto Japanese 
director in Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Ogata Makoto (2016, p. 20) pointed 
 
out that while the PRC is indicating its stance in attempting to constrain the Tsai 
administration’s foreign policy behaviour, Japan and Taiwan need to strengthen the 
track 2 diplomacy and the civilian exchanges between the two nations, especially since 
Taiwan has numerous potential high-profile officials in waiting in Taiwanese think 
tanks, who may play a central role in the decision-making body of the government if 
there is a change of administration in Taiwan. 
 
Here, it is essential to point out that Japan’s dual relations with Taiwan and the PRC 
still operate under the framework of its One-China policy, and that Japan will not 
destabilise the triangulated relations for the sake of enhancing its ties with Taiwan, even 
though the nation is utilising Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its own security 
and that of the region in general. In this process, while Japan may incrementally semi-
officialise its informal communication channels with Taiwan, the management of the 
inevitable tensions between Japan’s One-China policy and the skilful use of semi-
institutionalised informal communication channels in a way that does not incur the 
wrath of the PRC are essential for Sino-Japanese regional great power management. 
Regarding this point, President Tsai (Office of the President ROC, 2 March 2019) asked 
Japan to begin bilateral security talks through the respective communication channels 
in ways that respect Japan’s preferred form and prioritise the substance of security 
communication, while she also expressed her understanding of the legal difficulty that 
stems from the absence of Japan’s legal recognition of Taiwan, subsequently requesting 
Japan to overcome such obstacles in an interview with Sankei Shimbun. However, it is 
clear that Japan is not interested in Taiwan’s plea. Meanwhile, Kingston (2018) argued 
that Japan has become more resolute in enhancing its ties with Taiwan in a way that is 
less attentive to the PRC’s sensitivity on Taiwan in recent years, especially under Abe. 
 
In the light of this regional strategic environment described by Kingston (2018), the 
current research will observe how Japan has incrementally expanded the scope of such 
informal proxy communication channels with Taiwan. If Japan concludes that Taiwan 
is improving the former’s security, it may reward Taiwan by widening the opportunities 
for a greater range of foreign policy exchanges in semi-official communication 
channels. Furthermore, as was discussed above, the role of Nikkakon in the political 
communication with Taiwan is becoming ever more critical in Japan–Taiwan relations, 
and other forms of ‘quasi-official’ informal communication channels are emerging to 
facilitate the bilateral discussions and negotiations of the relevant regional security 
issues, as will be examined in the case study chapters. 
 
3.3 Literature on Japan’s Foreign Policy Instruments 
 
This section reviews the literature on the recent developments surrounding Japan’s 
foreign policy instruments to elucidate what the nation is willing to do and what it is 
not willing to do in terms of its security relationship with Taiwan within the context of 
its One-China policy. As noted in the introductory chapter, it is up to Japan’s political 
decision-makers to determine the acceptable framework, meaning Japan has the 
overwhelming authority to decide what is possible and what is not possible in its 
security interactions with Taiwan in view of appeasing the PRC. Here, Japan carefully 
manoeuvres the ambiguity of its One-China policy so as not to breach the framework 
too much while incrementally maximising Taiwan’s potential for enhancing Japan’s 
security in the region. The section also aims to elucidate on how Japan’s utilisation of 
Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument for its own security remains more 
incrementalistic in comparison with Japan’s other security partners vis-à-vis its 
 
complicated relationship with the PRC, regardless of whether Japan adheres to the 
Yoshida Doctrine or shifts to the more radical Abe Doctrine. Importantly, if Japan’s 
security interactions with Taiwan are deemed to enhance normative regional order via 
non-kinetic and non-traditional security cooperation, Japan will be more willing to 
utilise Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument within the context of its One-China policy. 
It is noted here that Japan’s non-traditional security cooperation with Taiwan must not 
involve high-profile kinetic military components, and must be regarded as normative, 
humanitarian and non-coercive from the perspective of international security norms and 
Japan’s domestic pacifism. Thus, Japan-Taiwan non-traditional security ties will not 
breach its One China policy.  
 
3.3.1 Yoshida Doctrine or Abe Doctrine? 
 
Singh (2016) argued that Japan’s security identity that was shared among the Japanese 
institutions during the Cold War, was the peace-state security identity that shaped and 
constrained Japan into being a minimalist, economic-based, and reactive state in terms 
of its security, which favoured its subordinate position in the Japan–US alliance that 
was built on the Yoshida Doctrine. In the post-Cold War period, this was replaced by 
the internationalist identity that shaped Japan’s security policy into being more 
internationalist and more proactive in giving Japan a more balanced role both within 
the context of the Japan–US alliance and outside of it. Furthermore, as Singh (2016) 
noted, Japan’s peace-state identity was built on the civilian bureaucrats who prioritised 
the MOFA and the MOIT in Japan’s security policy-making body, reducing the MOD 
to a weaker position in the process, while the change in the balance of power during the 
post-Cold War period in Japanese domestic institutional politics allowed the 
 
internationalist security identity to flourish, which increased the role of the SDF and 
the MOD in the framework of the Japanese security policy-making body. Meanwhile, 
the ‘presidentialisation’ that afforded the prime ministers a greater role allowed for 
swifter and more powerful security decision-making actions, which was manifested in 
the refuelling missions in the Indian Ocean and the dispatch of the SDF in Iraq. 
 
Meanwhile, Pehlivantürk (2016) argued that Japan has been shifting from being a 
pacifist or peace state, wherein the concept of the national role stemmed from the 
Yoshida Doctrine, to an international peacekeeping state, utilising human security and 
comprehensive security in greater degrees through the more active use of the PKO for 
international security in the post-Cold War era. This is largely due to international 
pressure, the changes in domestic leadership and the social norms, and Japan’s stronger 
desire for international prestige, which includes its aspirations to be a permanent 
member of the UNSC. As such, Japan’s national conception role expanded the 
territorial conception of its national security from one of homeland defence to one of 
world security through peacekeeping. Here, it is clear that the evolution of Japan’s 
security identity in the post-Cold War era also enhanced its more proactive stance in its 
engagements with Taiwan while being less attentive to the PRC’s hypersensitivity on 
Taiwan, as will be discussed in the chapter on the fisheries agreement. 
 
Meanwhile, Lande (2018) claimed that in examining the reassurance, arms, and alliance 
building, Japan’s security policy vis-à-vis China continues to be explained in terms of 
defensive realism. In Lande’s view (2018), even under Abe, Japan has not deviated 
from the Yoshida Doctrine, and insists that Japan has certainly increased its capabilities 
both independently and in its role in the Japan–US alliance, while it continues to focus 
 
on homeland defence. It is essential to state here that Taiwan is Japan’s de facto defence 
proxy or at least a less-recognised military buffer. In short, Taiwan functions as a 
deflective barrier in the face of the PLA’s significant military resources, which could 
otherwise be directed at Japan. Indeed, the mere existence of Taiwan as a separate entity 
to the PRC reduces the Chinese military pressure on Japan’s southern flank. 
Furthermore, Japan’s recent increased military presence in the East China Sea is 
encouraging Taiwan to accept its neighbour’s defence strategy, albeit indirectly, which 
is exemplified by the way that Taiwan has been paying close attention to Japanese 
deployments of land-based anti-ship missiles in the Nansei Islands, as will be examined 
in the chapter on CSD.  
 
Meanwhile, other authors, including Hughes (2017), have asserted that Japan is shifting 
to the Abe Doctrine, which means it is more likely to resort to the use of force in order 
to assist the US’s war efforts due to international structures such as the Japan–US 
alliance, the indivisibility of the US’s national security interests with those of Japan, 
and the weakened domestic hurdles for restraining Japan’s domestic decision-making 
bodies. However, it is clear that regardless of whether Japan adheres to the Yoshida 
Doctrine and continues to pursue international security incrementally or whether it 
shifts to the Abe Doctrine and seeks a more a radical shift in national security policy, 
its security interactions with Taiwan remain unquestionably incremental. As will be 
examined in the chapter on CSD, Taiwan’s ambiguous status in the Japanese conception 
of CSD in the absence of international recognition, Taiwan’s role in the Sino-Japanese 
regional great power management issue, and the absence of Japan’s recognition of 
Taiwan’s statehood render Japan’s security interactions with Taiwan gradualist at best. 
Therefore, Japan’s security interactions with Taiwan offer the least researched case to 
 
demonstrate how the former’s foreign policy is not determined by foreign pressures 
alone. Precisely because Japan’s security interactions with Taiwan face numerous 
hurdles, this offers a unique case study for elucidating on how Japan creatively utilises 
Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument to enhance its own security vis-à-vis the PRC in 
ways that will not excessively antagonise its powerful neighbour. 
 
3.3.2 Japan’s utilisation of international norms and rules as foreign policy 
instruments 
 
The current  foreign minister, Kono (2018), emphasised that the key aspect for the Indo-
Pacific strategy is Japan’s strength in enhancing the ‘rule of law’ and its ‘high-quality 
agreements’ while cooperating with the various stakeholders, including the PRC, and 
stated that Japan’s strategic vision does not go against the PRC’s One Belt One Road; 
rather, it aims to ensure Japan’s contribution will complement the PRC’s vision. 
Therefore, it must be stated here that Japan is not necessarily interested in confronting 
the PRC. 
 
Nonetheless, Asplund (2018) argued that Japan is only interested in linking the 
provision of the ODA to the ASEAN states as a collective unit as a way of ‘othering’ 
China to enhance the strategic upper hand in the context of Sino-Japanese competition 
in the region. Here, Asplund (2018) pointed out that Japan is not interested in bringing 
up the issue of universal values such as human rights or democracy in providing the 
ODA in the context of bilateral ties with the individual ASEAN member states for 
political reasons, such as Japan’s history of regional imperialism, the risks of pushing 
the ASEAN member states further into the geopolitical orbit of China, and the non-
 
subscribing attitudes of the illiberal regimes among the ASEAN member states, except 
for the enhancement of the maritime rule of law through the capacity building of the 
maritime law enforcements for the littoral states in the South China Sea. For these 
reasons, Asplund (2018) argued that Japan is probably not interested in being a 
normative power in the region, except for the relatively successful case of Japanese 
normative diffusions of enhancing the maritime rule of law as a foreign policy 
instrument to achieve the upper hand over China in the region. Meanwhile, Dreyer 
(2019) claimed that Japan and Taiwan will resort to their mutual geostrategic 
importance, their shared democratic values, and the generally positive perceptions of 
the Japanese colonial era in Taiwan to improve the bilateral ties, while neither side is 
interested in antagonising the PRC, even under Abe and Tsai.  
 
As such, it can be stated here that it would appear that Japan is utilising additional 
foreign policy instruments when it comes to Japan–Taiwan relations, such as the shared 
democratic values and its colonial ties with Taiwan, as opposed to its individual 
bilateral ties with the ASEAN member states, where these normative and ideational 
factors are retained as marginal priorities on bilateral levels, despite the geopolitical 
fact that Japan utilises its strategic ties with both Taiwan and the ASEAN member states 
to enhance its power balance in relation to the PRC. In other words, Japan can utilise 
universal values such as human rights and democracy and its past imperial history to 
enhance its ties with Taiwan in positive ways, which is not the case for its relationships 
with its individual partners in South East Asia. 
 
Elsewhere, Foot (2017) stated that contrary to the power transition theory, the US has 
used great power management techniques as a foreign policy approach to stabilise its 
 
power relationships with Japan and the PRC. According to Foot (2017), the US 
instrumentalised its alliance with Japan from the 1990s on to encourage the latter to 
increase its security role within the Japan–US alliance for regional and global security 
purposes. As such, Japan would not be an independent strategic power capable of 
challenging the US’s primacy. In addition, the US initially considered the PRC to 
present a weak counterbalance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and encouraged the 
normative alignment by helping the PRC to join the WTO with the caveat that it would 
encourage the PRC to liberalise its political regime in the future, such that the PRC and 
the US would converge in mutual national interests. Here, Foot (2017) pointed out that 
the problem is that while the US and the PRC achieved a degree of convergence in their 
shared understanding of global governance, the PRC ended up being a military 
challenger to US dominance in the region while Japan did not develop into such a 
comprehensive challenger due to the Japan–US alliance. Foot (2017) went on to 
highlight that in terms of Sino-Japanese relations, while the PRC is unwilling to give 
Japan the great power status that Japan feels it deserves, Japan is enhancing its internal 
balancing and external balancing, including in terms of the capacity building of the 
Philippines and Vietnam and forging greater political and strategic ties with India and 
Australia. It is important to state here that, at present, Japan is not showing any 
significant sign of potentially violating its One-China policy in its relations with Taiwan, 
with the exception of the case of the fisheries agreement, which can be interpreted as a 
sign of the violation of great power management if adherence to the One-China policy 
is defined as a rule and the code of conduct in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
3.3.3 Japan’s non-kinetic use of the SDF for peace diplomacy 
 
 
Patalano (2015) argued that while the coercive nature of the naval forces and the 
attendant regional developments may lead to regional security competition, in terms of 
Japan, the nation has also instrumentalised the MSDF for trust-building through the 
HADR for Japan’s foreign policy. Specifically, Patalano (2015) pointed out that natural 
disasters are becoming increasingly significant regional risks to human security, 
particularly in the Asia Pacific region, and since Japan has a complex military history 
in view of its past imperialism, the existence of Japanese domestic pacifist norms – and 
the fact that Japan is a maritime state itself – the role of naval diplomacy for peaceful 
purposes in the context of the HADR will continue to be essential for Japan’s regional 
security initiatives. It is essential to state here that Japan’s peaceful utilisation of its 
MSDF is manifested through the enhancement of security relations with other security 
partners. 
 
For example, as Patalano (2016) argued, despite the fact that Japan–NATO security 
relations have undergone gradual improvements, it was the anti-piracy operations by 
the navies of Japan and NATO that enhanced the naval cooperation, interoperability, 
and operational coordination. As such, Japan uses its MSDF as a foreign policy 
instrument for naval cooperation to enhance global common interests, such as the sea 
lines of communication, maritime governance and stability, and to combat any 
international non-traditional security threats (Patalano, 2016). Meanwhile, Patalano 
(2016) admitted that the return of sea control and traditional naval deterrence cannot be 
dismissed due to the rise of China and a resurgent Russia. However, Patalano (2016) 
also pointed out that even China and Russia joined the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden, which means the era of global naval cooperation continues to hold sway, 
including in terms of Japan’s instrumentalisation of its MSDF for peaceful purposes. 
 
 
Clearly, since Japan’s One-China policy disallows it from engaging in explicit defence 
ties with Taiwan, a high-profile defence diplomacy with Taiwan is not an option, except 
in terms of some form of ad hoc intelligence sharing. However, Taiwan’s autonomous 
self-defence capability would help to contribute to the stable development of the crucial 
sea lines of communication around Japan’s southern flank, albeit indirectly, provided 
Taiwan remains a de facto state. In addition, Japan has been indirectly involved in the 
defence of the sea lines of communication near Taiwan since the later part of the Cold 
War, as exemplified in the 1,000 nautical miles of defence, as will be examined in the 
chapter on CSD. 
 
3.3.4 Japan’s instrumentalisation of the security partnership to enhance defence 
interoperability and normative power 
 
Bacon and Burton (2018) argued that although it was NATO that initiated the concept 
of natural partnerships and strategic parallelism as strategic narratives, Japan was a 
good recipient of such strategic narratives, and Abe instrumentalised such strategic 
narratives to enhance the security and political relations with NATO by conceptually 
linking the instability of Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Ukraine) and the issues of the 
East and South China Seas for Japan. Furthermore, NATO’s concept of collective 
security was also instrumentalised by Japan to enhance military interoperability, 
including in terms of the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the horn of Africa. 
While Japan does not regard NATO as a major participant in the hard security issues of 
the Asia Pacific region, especially in terms of the issue of the East China Sea, it still 
views it as a normative and political power, one that shares the norms of rules-based 
 
order and the rule of law in the international liberal order. For certain, Japan is still 
somewhat displeased with how NATO mishandled the issue of Crimea, and with the 
general expansion of NATO and the EU. Japan made an overture to Russia, and both 
sides are still committed to the development of these strategic narratives in enhancing 
ties between the nations.  
 
Similarly, it can be stated here that Japan also uses shared liberal democracy, human 
rights, and the notion of an ‘important partnership’ as strategic narratives vis-à-vis its 
relationship with Taiwan. Much like how Japan and NATO diverge in terms of their 
respective interests with Russia, Japan is not necessarily willing to commit itself to 
Taiwan’s security explicitly due to the concerns over antagonising the PRC. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of Japan as a regional power does provide the 
geostrategic balancing effects for the survival of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC. 
 
Vosse (2018) argued that Japan instrumentalised its anti-piracy operations to enhance 
its naval cooperation with international actors such as NATO, the EU, and other 
independent deployers in the Gulf of Aden. Here, in obtaining significant operational 
experience from working with non-US partners, Japan proved to both its own people 
and the international community that it has the capabilities to deploy its naval and aerial 
forces in the distant military bases in Djibouti, utilising its own successful regional anti-
piracy contributions in Southeast Asia – such as ReCAAP and the Information Sharing 
Centre – to diffuse such international security norms in the Gulf of Aden. The nation 
thus gained an opportunity to contribute a Japanese commander to the multinational 
force, and somewhat influenced its own international security policies, such as Abe’s 
CSD policy. Furthermore, as Vosse (2018) concluded, in terms of de-centring from the 
 
US, Japan indeed increased its own foreign policy leverage and independent 
international security contributions from this experience. It is essential to state here that 
as Japan gains more independent international security instruments besides the Japan–
US alliance, this also influences its autonomous foreign policy leverages vis-à-vis the 
cross-strait issues. However, Japan will not engage in high-profile security partnerships 
with Taiwan akin to Japan’s security ties with NATO, the EU, and other international 
actors due to its One-China policy. Elsewhere, Wu (2018) pointed out that Taiwan 
cannot even participate in multilateral security forums, including ReCAAP. 
 
3.3.5 Japan’s utilisation of non-traditional security efforts in accordance with 
international norms 
 
Ishizuka (2013) argued that Japan’s instrumentalisation of the PKO, the anti-terrorism 
units, and the HADR for international security would raise its status and prestige in 
international society, would improve its security vis-à-vis non-traditional security 
threats and would enhance its prospects of being a permanent member of the UNSC. 
However, Japan still needs to improve its overall crisis management capabilities 
including in terms of its rapid deployments, logistical capabilities, and a more flexible 
use of force by amending its constitutional restraints (Ishizuka, 2013). In addition, 
Ishizuka (2013) pointed out that while Japan’s instrumentalisation of the PKO and the 
anti-terrorism units is political, the HADR is more normative, which means the latter is 
the least controversial approach, while the capabilities required for non-traditional 
security issues are all interconnected and cannot be developed independently. 
 
 
Elsewhere, Iwami (2018) argued that contrary to the realist arguments made by Hughes 
(2015), which overstate the security reform initiated by Abe as revolutionary and 
radical, Japan’s security reform appears to be more incremental, as is argued by 
constructivists such as Oros (2015, 2017a, 2017b) and Singh (2013a). Here, Iwami 
(2018) claimed that even though the human securitisation of the ODA under the legal 
reforms of the Japanese security policy is observable and, in theory, the geographical 
scope of the Japanese PKOs has been expanded, including in terms of the participation 
of the non-UN authorised missions and the more flexible use of force in certain 
conditions, Japan remains reluctant to instrumentalise the SDF for peacebuilding 
operations, including in the issue of Mindanao. Iwami (2018) concluded that Japan is 
likely to continue to instrumentalise the ODA to contribute to peace and stability in the 
post-conflict resolutions in Marawi. 
 
Meanwhile, Matsuda (2012) pointed out Japan would not yield to its One China policy 
if Japan’s cooperation with Taiwan in global security is humanitarian in nature or may 
affect Japan’s public health issues without Taiwan’s participation. Japan has enhanced 
the bilateral non-traditional security cooperation with Taiwan by increasing the bilateral 
coastguard search and rescue cooperation, as well as by increasing its anti-terrorism 
activities, its anti-transnational organised crime cooperation, and its economic security 
cooperation with airspace and aviation security implications – such as the bilateral Open 
Skies Agreement, and the civilian HADR cooperation – in ways that do not conflict 
with its One-China policy in view of enhancing its security, as will be examined in the 
chapters of CSD and the ICAO. Since Taiwan is geographically located in a 
geostrategic chokepoint that connects Japan, South East Asia and the PRC via the 
interconnected seas and airspace, the role of non-traditional security in enhancing the 
 
stable border security between Japan and Taiwan is crucial to minimising the risks of 
maritime, aerial, and transnational organised crime as well as terrorism. These non-
traditional security threats may originate from Japan’s southern neighbours, including 
both Taiwan and South East Asia, and there is a lesser-known non-traditional security 
role of Taiwan in law enforcement that contributes to Japan’s security, as will be 
examined in the ICAO chapter. 
 
Meanwhile, Heng (2015) argued that Japan has been utilising its smart power, which 
involves integrating the hard and soft powers of the military and civilian assets such as 
JICA, JCG, and NGOs in the arenas of the Gulf of Aden, Iraq and the South Pacific in 
terms of anti-piracy operations, humanitarian reconstruction efforts, and HADR for its 
international security efforts. While the military may be threatening and coercive in 
nature, depending on how it is utilised, it can also generate the combination of hard and 
soft power, which amounts to smart power for Japan, which is essential if the SDF is to 
establish some legitimacy, trust and coordination among the target countries and 
international society in general. Finally, Heng (2015) pointed out that although the use 
of smart power may be regarded as taking away the necessary resources from the SDF 
for traditional tasks such as countering the threat of North Korea and China, the use of 
smart power through the SDF for international security will increase Japan’s allies and 
friends within international society. It can be stated here that Japan similarly utilises 
Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument to expand its regional security contribution by 
utilising the latter’s relatively affluent security resources, especially in Southeast Asia 
and in South Pacific Region, in the field of non-traditional security in ways that do not 
violate Japan’s One-China policy. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Cohen (2018) argued that the current US foreign policy that appears to 
reduce its internationalist security commitment is not of Trump’s making but signals a 
more foundational shift in the US, which was mainstream prior to WW2, especially 
among the older generation of the Americans including the elites that understood 
America’s importance as a vanguard of international security vis-à-vis the rise of 
fascism. With the disappearance of Communism, the US is likely to be more 
transactional in its approach to international security. Arguably, the government of 
Japan is concerned about the absence of US leadership in global security and 
governance. Therefore, if the US’s general willingness to provide for global security 
turns out to be uncertain in the long term, including in the Asia Pacific region, it is 
possible that Japan will have no choice but to shoulder more responsibility, albeit 
unwillingly, for the stable development of the regional order, including in terms of the 
security of the sea lines of communication in the East and South China Seas. Within 
this geopolitical context, Japan may become incrementally more interested in utilising 
Taiwan’s security resources indirectly for its own security in the context of its One-
China policy. 
3.3.6 Japan’s diversification of security partners 
 
Fatton (2018) argued that the main reason why Japan is enhancing its strategic 
autonomy from the US and is increasing its hard balancing actions against the PRC 
relates to how it perceives the growing unreliability of the US as a security guarantor 
for Japan’s national security and the PRC’s increasingly coercive behaviour vis-à-vis 
the issues of the East and South China Seas. Japan is using internal balancing and a 
diversification of its security partners in the region as instruments to bolster its 
autonomy as a hedge in the context of the Japan–US alliance and to counterbalance the 
 
rise of China. Meanwhile, Hughes (2018) examined the Japanese diversifications of 
arms transfers and arms exports and imports as part of a case study and concluded that 
Japan has been hedging against abandonment and entrapment in the context of the 
Japan–US alliance ‘within’ this bilateral alliance, not ‘outside’ of the alliance, which is 
central to Japan’s security policy. Here, Hughes (2018) pointed out that Japan may also 
attempt to reduce the expensive arms costs by joining an international collaboration in 
terms of arms developments, while all the security partners that Japan is pursing to 
enhance its security ties for the arms transfer strategy are also allies or partners of the 
US. 
 
In contrast, Auslin (2016) argued that Japan is attempting to increase its security 
contributions through a more robust security policy, that is, a strengthened alliance with 
the US and the security partnerships with like-minded countries such as India, Australia, 
and the ASEAN states, commensurate with its economic power to ensure that the 
international liberal order in the Asia Pacific is maintained, and that no single power – 
especially the authoritarian state of China – dominates the region. As such, Japan is 
embracing realism in its foreign policy while the population remains pacifist.  
Gronning (2017) claimed that the fact that Japan has been enhancing its bilateral 
security ties with the Philippines and Vietnam at the expense of the Cold War-style 
security dependence on the US can be explained by multiple factors, both domestic and 
international. These include the sudden shift in the geopolitical balance of power in the 
region with the rise of China, and the existential challenge to Japan’s national security 
interests in the maritime domain, the domestic reforms of the security policy and the 
attendant stance in Japan, Japanese nationalism, and the nation’s attempt to mitigate its 
concern about the uncertainty of the Japan–US alliance, developing its own foreign 
 
policy leverage to keep the US committed to the security of Japan within the context of 
the Japan–US alliance. However, Gronning (2017) also pointed out that Japanese 
security ties with the Philippines and Vietnam have domestic and international 
constraints that keep the development of the bilateral security relations incremental, 
namely, the latent power disparity between Japan and China, Japan’s significant edge 
in terms of the overall power disparity between the two regional security partners, 
Japanese domestic norms of pacifism, and Japan’s preoccupation with the security of 
the East China Sea in relation to the South China Sea.  
 
It can be stated here that Japan cannot explicitly engage in a security partnership with 
Taiwan in the absence of Japan’s recognition of Taiwan, as it does with other security 
partners such as India, Australia, and the ASEAN member states. The reason for this is 
straightforward: if Japan enhances its military ties with Taiwan, this will breach its One-
China policy and will induce the risk of destroying the relationship with the PRC. Thus, 
Taiwan may declare itself an important partner for Japan, while this creates a strategic 
need for Taiwan to demonstrate its worth as a valuable partner and to regularly remind 
Japan of its often-forgotten existence in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations in 
international society. Nonetheless, Taiwan will never be officially designated as 
Japan’s defence partner and Japan will not officially express its commitment to the 
defence of Taiwan. However, Taiwan may still be useful for Japan in terms of its power 
politics with the PRC even if Taiwan remains a non-state actor, provided Japan utilises 
Taiwan strategically as a foreign policy instrument in the context of its One-China 
policy.  
3.3.7 Japan’s pacifist identity 
 
 
Gibson (2016) argued that although Japan’s pacifism remains tentative, and there is a 
disturbing trend of a nationalistic shift in Japanese society, the significant number of 
peace actors in Japanese domestic politics continue to push for peace education. In his 
words, ‘[c]onflict, as peace education teaches, is inevitable; the means to resolve 
conflict need not be, however, a default setting of violence’ (Gibson, 2016, p.106). In 
contrast, Patey (2017) maintained that the pacifist national identity in Japan remains 
highly robust, to the point, in fact, that even a minor global security contribution – such 
as that of the PKO in South Sudan – may trigger a large backlash at home if handled 
inappropriately and may potentially result in the downfall of the Abe administration, 
given the former defence minister Inada’s resignation over the issue of the cover-up of 
the military log in the MOD. 
 
Other scholars of Japanese pacifism have analysed Japan’s pacifist norms within a 
historical context. Here, Anno (2018) observed that there have always been some 
tensions between Japan’s national identity and the notion of democracy, noting that in 
the later part of the Edo period, with the arrival of the black ships, as the shogunate was 
regarded as incapable of achieving modernisation, the larger political actors were 
invited into the creation of the political community in Japan, which led to the nascent 
form of political liberalisation. In Anno’s (2018) view, during the Meiji period in Japan, 
as the sovereign ruler, the emperor allowed Japan to adopt Western modernisation and 
various domestic political reforms in the context of imperial rule to join the elite 
Eurocentric international society. Meanwhile, Japan responded to the nascent form of 
domestic democratic experiments and attempted to enhance its more liberal 
international norms in international society in accordance with the Wilsonian ideals 
(Anno, 2018). In the post-war period, Japan’s national identity was firmly rooted in the 
 
domestic pacifist norms, which infused the Japanese with a unilateral pacifist narrative 
as opposed to making democratic development a key component of its national identity. 
Therefore, as Anno (2018) argued, Japan has been more interested in peace diplomacy 
than democracy promotion in its foreign policy agenda. Even in the contemporary 
context, Japan has not yet found a way to reconcile the tension between its unilateral 
pacifism – which also involves somewhat revisionist historical narratives – and its 
democratic development that has some elements of parochialism – all of which 
complicate Japan’s relationships with its immediate neighbours. Meanwhile, Curtis 
(2013) argued that Japan’s foreign policy since the Meiji Restoration has maximised its 
standing in the prevalent international system as opposed to making it in its own image, 
and stated that Japan is likely to adhere to the Yoshida Doctrine even under Abe. Curtis 
(2013) concluded that despite Abe’s nationalist tendency, the radical departure from the 
previous foreign policy – manifested in its autonomous foreign policy with the fully-
fledged military – is unlikely, if Japan continues to believe that the security relationship 
with the US in the context of the US’s regional dominance is maintained and that the 
economic relationship with China benefits Japan.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there exists a general bias against the secession 
movements, with unrecognised entities labelled as troublemakers in international 
society, and the PRC is obliged to resort to non-peaceful means including the use of 
force by the anti-secession law if Taiwan becomes a de jure state. Therefore, Japan must 
consider its domestic pacifism with reference to these geopolitical factors. Some may 
argue that such a domestic pacifist norm has been weakened, but are the Japanese 
people willing to be involved in a cross-strait kinetic conflict? Whether Japan remains 
pacifist or not, if the Taiwan Strait is a regional flashpoint, Japan is likely to utilise 
 
Taiwan in ways that contribute to the alleviation of regional security issues. Thus, Japan 
will utilise Taiwan to enhance the stable development of the regional order based on 
Japan’s pacifist norms in ways that would not provoke the PRC excessively in the 
context of Japan’s One-China policy, even though it will continue to provide deterrence 
for Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC through the Japan–US alliance and through its own unique 
initiative. Therefore, in order to make Japan-Taiwan security interactions normative, 
humanitarian and less coercive, they will be kept low-key but comprehensive non-
traditional security cooperation in ways that do not violate Japan’s One China policy 
excessively. All these factors will likely ensure Japan’s security interactions with 
Taiwan remain incrementalistic, regardless of whether Japan adheres to the Yoshida 
Doctrine or shifts to the more radical Abe Doctrine, while utilising Taiwan to enhance 
normative developments in the region.  
 
3.4 Taiwan’s Diplomatic Exclusion and Japan’s Socialisation of 
Taiwan through International Security Norms 
 
This section reviews the existing literature on Taiwan’s diplomatic handicap, which 
conceptualises how Taiwan cannot participate in the multilateral security forums that 
require ‘statehood’ for membership. It can be stated here that precisely because Japan 
is restricted in its hard security relationship with Taiwan by its own One-China policy, 
it needs to instrumentalise Taiwan as a quasi-autonomous non-traditional security actor 
for Japan’s security and the wider region, in contrast to the PRC, which has, allegedly, 
been causing tensions in the East and South China Seas in recent years. It is essential 
to note that, as a de facto state, Taiwan is isolated from international non-traditional 
security efforts, including anti-terrorism, anti-transnational organised crime in the 
 
maritime, aerial, and cyber domains, international law enforcement, and even medical 
security operations such as the global fight against epidemics. However, this means 
Taiwan’s under-utilised security resources and roles should be better-utilised such that 
it is not be a generator of international security issues and contributes to the stable 
development of regional order. The argument here is that Japan has a unique role to 
play in terms of improving Taiwan’s voluntary compliance with international security 
norms to mitigate the regional security loophole that stems from Taiwan’s non-access 
to the multilateral security efforts. The discussion here will help illuminate how Japan 
aims to enhance Taiwan’s voluntary alignment with its own national security interests 
and its voluntary compliance with international security norms.  
 
3.4.1 Taiwan’s diplomatic limbo: its under-utilised security resources and non-
accessibility to updated information on international security  
 
The existing literature on the international utility of Taiwan focuses on its diplomatic 
efforts in expanding international space after effectively losing an official seat in the 
UN (Wang and Ching-Hsin, 2001). Glaser (2015) discussed Taiwan’s limited 
international security roles, specifically in terms of the field of non-traditional security 
and the role of the US in helping Taiwan to expand its international security 
contributions and quasi-representations in the international organisations amid its 
exclusion from the international organisations that require ‘statehood’. Glaser’s work 
(2015) rightly considered Taiwan’s non-representation in international organisations to 
be a loophole in international security bodies since, by preventing Taiwan from 
accessing updated knowledge on international security and from making its own 
international security contributions, it prevents the nation from utilising its own 
 
knowledge and experiences. However, Glaser’s work does not specifically address how 
Taiwan can be an international or regional security asset for regional great powers such 
as Japan. In other words, if Japan can connect Taiwan with the updated knowledge on 
the international security regulations and rules that are produced in multilateral security 
forums and is able to provide Taiwan with avenues to contribute its own knowledge 
and experiences to manage the international security risks to Japan and others, this 
would serve Japan in terms of its security and that of the region in general. Therefore, 
it is noted here that Japan’s security engagement with Taiwan offers the former an 
opportunity to develop its creative bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through its 
engagements with the latter. 
3.4.2 Japan can enhance Taiwan’s voluntary compliance with international 
security norms 
 
Since Taiwan is an immediate neighbour, Japan’s security is affected if Taiwan remains 
a loophole or a missing link in international non-traditional security in terms of the 
efforts against international terrorism, transnational organised crime, or even in the 
fight against epidemics, since these non-traditional security issues know no borders. On 
this point, the current de facto Taiwanese ambassador in Tokyo, Frank Hsieh (2018a), 
argued that Taiwan’s security is directly linked to Japan’s security, and as a stakeholder, 
Taiwan must not be ignored for the peaceful solution of the ongoing airspace and 
aviation security issue in the Taiwan Strait. Here, the ambassador called on Japan’s 
various sectors to help Taiwan in mitigating the civilian aviation tensions with the PRC. 
As will be discussed in the ICAO chapter, Japan’s approach to engaging with Taiwan 
will socialise Taiwan in accordance with international security norms, which include 
the enhancement of the stable management of air security in the East China Sea and 
 
Taiwan’s neighbouring seas and airspaces for Japan’s security. Certainly, since the 
Koizumi administration, while Japan has continued to officially follow the One-China 
policy, its engagements with Taiwan have gradually started to take form in terms of a 
de facto ‘One China, One Taiwan policy’ (Yang, 2009). 
 
3.4.3 Japan’s higher position to reward Taiwan for normative security behaviours 
in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations 
 
In addition to this geopolitical development, as discussed earlier, Taiwan may not be 
able to formally participate in the multilateral security frameworks, including the 
UNCLOS, in the absence of ‘statehood’. However, if Japan invests significant political 
capital here, it can still instrumentalise Taiwan for international security, and can still 
enhance Taiwan’s regional security profile to strengthen its own standing in the region 
despite its One-China policy and Taiwan’s international isolation. Furthermore, as 
deLisle (2011) argued, while although Taiwan is not a member of the UN or the UN-
related security agencies where membership requires statehood, Japan can still enhance 
Taiwan’s pseudo participation ‘as if’ it is a member of such international organisations. 
Here, deLisle (2011) pointed out that Taiwan’s unilateral compliance may increase its 
hope for future entry into international organisations by enhancing its compliance with 
international law, thus increasing its benefits from international society. In other words, 
it needs to be stated here that even though the international organisations and 
institutions may ignore unrecognised states and may reject their membership, this does 
not mean Taiwan is prohibited from enhancing its voluntary compliance with the 
international regulations and agreements made in such international organisations. 
Furthermore, it also needs to be stated here that Japan is free to help Taiwan behave in 
 
accordance with international law to enhance the international normative order for 
Japan’s regional security interests. Finally, since Taiwan’s ontological security relies 
on Japan as a positive other as discussed earlier, the latter functions as a normatively 
higher entity in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations, which gives Japan an 
influential authority to grant semi-recognition to Taiwan as reward for Taiwan’s good 
security behaviour, including by way of signing bilateral security-relevant agreements 
to elevate Taiwan’s prestige in international society, even within the context of Japan’s 
One-China policy. Japan’s security behaviour vis-à-vis Taiwan is in sharp contrast to 
how the PRC has been sanctioning Taiwan’s aspiration to be represented in 
international security bodies that require ‘statehood’ for membership, as will be 
examined in the ICAO chapter. Therefore, Japan could aim to make Taiwan a normative 
asset in multinational security efforts even though Taiwan is internationally excluded 
through the PRC’s sanctions. 
 
As such, it needs to be stated here that if Taiwan can participate in Japan-led 
international and regional security efforts, despite the international exclusion, this 
would incrementally fill the void in regional security efforts. On this point, the current 
de facto Taiwanese ambassador in Tokyo, Frank Hsieh (2018b), argued that Japan and 
Taiwan can still cooperate with each other even though Taiwan suffers from various 
harassments from the PRC in the form of diplomatic sanctions, the cross-strait aviation 
tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the economic sanctions against Taiwanese business in the 
PRC, and the exclusion of Taiwan from the WHO. The ambassador then went on to 
argue that this is especially the case considering both actors have already established 
bilateral non-traditional security cooperation, such as the bilateral anti-natural disaster 
efforts, and can work together to mitigate the ongoing Sino-US trade tensions, including 
 
Taiwan’s aspiration to be a member of the Japan-led TPP. Thus, if Japan incrementally 
uses Taiwan’s security contributions to fill the power vacuum that stems from Taiwan’s 
absence in multilateral security efforts, it can turn Taiwan into an instrument for its 
power politics with the PRC. Certainly, Taiwan may resist some of the political 
demands from Japan in the context of Taiwan’s domestic politics, but it will ultimately 
have to gradually satisfy Japan’s strategic needs in the context of hierarchical Japan–
Taiwan relations due to the absence of Japan’s recognition and the PRC’s threat of 
using force against the nation. Here, it is essential to state that it is ultimately up to 
Japan to decide whether it is willing to push the boundaries of what is possible in the 
Japan–Taiwan security relationship if it adheres to its One-China policy. 
 
3.4.4 Engagement with Taiwan is a litmus test for Japan’s creative diplomacy 
 
Meanwhile, Drifte (1998) argued that Japan’s commitment to bilateralism, especially 
within the context of its alliance relationship with the US and others, has rendered its 
multilateral diplomacy less effective and less imaginative, including in terms of its 
aspiration to become a permanent member of the UNSC. Taiwan is not a member of 
the UN, and its non-participation in the UN-relevant security agencies could affect 
Japan’s security interests. Therefore, it can be argued that Japan could renegotiate the 
membership of Taiwan in international security efforts in informal terms, meaning 
Taiwan can be a security asset ‘as if’ it were a member of the UN, while Japan could 
prove its creative diplomacy on a global level. Similarly, Babones (2016) argued for a 
normalisation of the de facto state of Taiwan as opposed to making it a de jure state, 
which would ensure it is taken seriously in international society. In Babones’ (2016) 
view, a behavioural change rather than a political change in Taiwan is essential to 
 
ensuring the world prevents the PRC from dictating to Taiwan on the PRC’s terms. In 
other words, it can be stated here that Japan’s socialisation of Taiwan in terms of 
improved compliance with international norms would help Taiwan to be more of an 
autonomous security actor while pacifying the PRC’s sensitivity on the Taiwan issue in 
the context of Japan’s One-China policy. Meanwhile, Drifte (1998) argued that Japan 
lacks debates on why it has to be a permanent member of the UNSC and what it plans 
to do if this were the case, other than budgetary and procedural contributions, while its 
permanent membership in the UNSC may increase the fear of inequality among the UN 
members in the developing countries due to the global perception of Japan siding with 
the US too closely. If Drifte’s view (1998) is correct, it can be stated here that Japan’s 
re-conceptualisation of the membership in multilateral diplomacy operations, including 
the UN, through its informal engagements with Taiwan in international security efforts 
may provide an alternative view of Japan’s creative diplomacy in international society 
and may stimulate more discussions about what kind of international security 
contribution it will provide as a normalised great power. 
3.5 Summary 
 
Reviewing the literature related to Japan–Taiwan relations has demonstrated that Japan 
has an influential authority to accommodate Taiwan into the international society of 
states for its own security. The analysis of Japan’s foreign policy instruments elucidated 
what Japan is willing to do and what it is unwilling to do in its security relationships 
with Taiwan within the context of its One-China policy. Japan is willing to enhance 
non-traditional security cooperation with Taiwan for the former’s security if this 
bilateral cooperation is normative, humanitarian and non-coercive in nature without 
breaching its One China policy. In addition, regardless of whether Japan adheres to the 
 
Yoshida Doctrine or shifts toward the Abe Doctrine, its security interactions with 
Taiwan remain, at best, incremental. Meanwhile, the assessment of the literature on 
Taiwan’s diplomatic exclusion has explicated how Japan has a significant role to play 
in encouraging Taiwan to voluntarily behave in accordance with international security 
norms in the multilateral security forums that require statehood for membership, despite 
Taiwan’s non-access to multilateral security efforts. With all these points in mind, the 
following case study chapters will elucidate how Japan can accommodate Taiwan into 
the international society of states for Japan’s security within the context of its One-
China policy in empirical terms.  
 
Chapter 4. Collective Self-Defence  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter is dedicated to the concept of CSD and elucidates, with reference to ESIR 
theory, how Japan has incrementally accommodated Taiwan in the areas of indirect 
defence and non-traditional security. As was argued in the previous chapters, it is up to 
Japan’s political decision-makers to decide what the nation is willing to do and what it 
is unwilling to do in terms of Japan–Taiwan security interactions. As such, how Taiwan 
fits into the Japanese concept of CSD also reflects Japan’s decision-making, while 
Taiwan’s political input regarding Japan’s security policy has no place in Japanese 
debates on its CSD due to the hierarchical relations. In short, Japan uses Taiwan as a 
foreign policy instrument to maintain the regional balance of power with the PRC, but 
Japan also navigates its One-China policy in its security engagement with Taiwan to 
pacify the PRC for regional great power management. Furthermore, Japan’s 
socialisation of Taiwan through international security norms indicates how Japan 
incrementally instrumentalises Taiwan as a normative security asset for its own security 
as well as that of the region, while Taiwan cannot be a full member or earn full status 
in Japan’s concept of CSD in relation to pacifying the PRC. Therefore, Taiwan needs 
to demonstrate its worth as a security asset in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations 
in international society, with this mechanism consolidating Japan’s strong position 
against Taiwan in normative terms. Also, if Japan-Taiwan security cooperation were to 
progress, it would be conducted in the field of non-traditional security, which is 
regarded as normative and less-coercive in international society, since the bilateral 
normative security cooperation will make it difficult for the PRC to sanction it despite 
Japan’s One China policy. Finally, this chapter clarifies how Japan’s security 
interactions with Taiwan remain incrementalistic, regardless of whether the nation 
 
sticks to the Yoshida Doctrine or shifts toward the Abe Doctrine, since Japan continues 
to navigate the ambiguities of its One-China policy to seek acceptable boundaries 
regarding how far the nation is willing to enhance its security cooperation with Taiwan.  
First, the Japanese concept of CSD is addressed before we discuss Taiwan’s ambiguous 
status within this concept to elucidate how Taiwan cannot be a full-fledged member 
here in the absence of Japan’s official recognition in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan 
relations, albeit that Taiwan continues to benefit from the greater deterrence Japan 
offers through CSD policies. Following this, we examine how Taiwan regularly reminds 
Japan of its security contribution to Japan, and how it consolidates Japan’s power 
politics with the PRC, even in the context of its One-China policy. In short, Taiwan’s 
indirect defence alignment with Japan supplements Japan’s defence security against the 
PRC. Due to its One-China policy, Japan does not engage in kinetic military ties with 
Taiwan, while it does engage in ad hoc intelligence exchanges, especially those related 
to the development of the PLA, and the two actors continue to engage in semi-
institutionalised security talks while Japan navigates its One-China policy. Next, we 
examine Japan–Taiwan coastguard relations to illuminate the extent to which the 
bilateral constabulary cooperation is acceptable to Japan within the context of its One-
China policy, demonstrating what Japan is willing to do and what it is not willing to do 
in its security interactions with Taiwan in relation to the Japanese concept of CSD. We 
also examine Japan–Taiwan humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation to 
illuminate how acceptable the bilateral HADR is to Japan within the context of its One-
China policy and how it remains difficult for the PRC to oppose this since it is more 
normative than political. This demonstrates how the low-key HADR cooperation is 
incrementally indicating what Japan is willing to do in its security interactions with 
Taiwan in relation to the Japanese concept of CSD.   
 
4.2 What is Collective Self-Defence in the Japanese Context? Political Tensions 
between Domestic Law and International Law 
First, we examine the political tension between the evolution of the Japanese 
government’s interpretations of its domestic pacifist constitution and international law 
to elucidate the concept of CSD within the Japanese context. In the case of Japan, the 
contradictions in its post-war pacifist constitution and the UN Charter have resulted in 
tensions in Japan’s domestic political context regarding the rights of the use of force as 
a sovereign state. Discussing these tensions between domestic law and international law 
is essential to explaining why Japan was legally able to defend only itself, despite the 
international legal permissibility provided by the UN Charter. It is also essential to 
discuss the evolution of Japan’s defence policy, which has incrementally allowed the 
nation to engage in self-defence despite its pacifist constitution. This discussion is 
essential since, even after the reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution, Japan’s CSD 
is severely constrained in terms of its international and regional security contributions 
due to the lingering tensions between domestic and international law in Japan. 
 
In early post-war Japan, amid strong anti-militarist sentiment, Japan enacted a pacifist 
constitution that renounced war ‘and the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes’ (The Constitution of Japan, 3 November 1946). In fact, Japan, 
as a sovereign state, literally renounced the use of force or any kind of war potential by 
stating the following: 
[a]spiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order 
 
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognised (Article 9, The Constitution of Japan, 3 
November 1946). 
However, on 20 May 1957, the National Defense Council and the cabinet initiated the 
Basic Policy on National Defense (Ministry of Defense [MOD], 1957). According to 
this policy, the government of Japan’s interpretation of the renunciation of war 
potentially referred to military aggression, and it did not deny Japan’s right to defend 
itself against threats to its own existence (MOD, 1957). In addition, Japan’s 
interpretation of its pacifist constitution allowed it to possess the minimum required 
defence capabilities (MOD, 1957), with the government of Japan allowing an 
exclusively defence-oriented policy with the minimum necessary level of self-defence 
(MOD, 1957). In other words, Japan unilaterally regarded its right to self-defence as 
permissible in the domestic legal context, but voluntarily considered the use of force to 
settle international disputes as unconstitutional while embracing such domestic legal 
arrangements.  
International law does not prohibit the use of force by sovereign states as a means of 
individual defence or CSD. Regarding the permissibility of these actions, Article 51 of 
the UN Charter (1945) states the following:  
[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Therefore, UN member states have the inherent right to possess the military means to 
defend themselves or to conduct CSD. In accordance with this right, using the 1957 
National Defence Policy, Japan internalised the international legal norms regarding 
individual defence despite the explicit prohibition of war potential and the use of the 
rights of belligerency by its pacifist constitution. As noted above, nation states are 
legally allowed to cooperate to counter threats posed by a foreign country through CSD 
according to Article 51 of the UN charter. However, under its exclusively defence-
oriented policy, Japan did not internalise its international legal norms on CSD and 
officially decided to maintain a self-imposed prohibition on its use. Regarding the 
Japanese government’s stance here, the Annual White Paper on the Defence of Japan 
(2013) stated the following:  
[i]nternational law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, 
which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with 
which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct 
attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective 
self-defence under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government 
believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defence exceeds the 
minimum necessary level of self-defence authorised under Article 9 of the 
Constitution and is not permissible (Section 2 in the Constitution and the Right 
of Self-Defence in the defence of Japan Annual White Paper, 2013). 
 
Under its exclusively defence-oriented policy, Japan voluntarily relinquished its 
international legal right to defend other countries. The Japanese government considered 
CSD to be beyond the minimum necessary level of self-defence allowed by its pacifist 
constitution. However, regional security mechanisms such as NATO require member 
states to be able to exercise CSD to gain membership according to Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949). In principle, Japan considered CSD to be beyond its 
constitutional limits until the reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution under the Abe 
administration in 2014, which, in theory, enabled Japan to engage in such activity 
(MOD, 2013). Before this reinterpretation, CSD was officially regarded as 
unconstitutional since the CLB’s definition of the minimum-required defence regarded 
CSD to go beyond this in military terms (Green and Hornung, 2014). Regarding Japan’s 
long-held interpretation of its pacifist constitution and the highly restrictive defence 
behaviours that stemmed from it, Singh (2013c, p. 79) stated the following:  
[s]uch an interpretation overshadowed the legal provisions of UN Charter 
accrued to Japan as a member of the organisation, namely Article 51 that permits 
all member states to carry out individual defence activities and participate in 
collective security and collective self-defence activities that involve military 
action.  
Even though international law applies to all sovereign member states equally regardless 
of their might, size, and wealth, it by no means implies that every sovereign state must 
accept it. For example, according to Wakefield (2016), nations can always waive their 
rights even if these rights are defined by international law. According to this legal logic, 
while international law permits nation states such as Japan to resort to CSD, this does 
not mean that Japan is obliged to internalise such an international legal norm. As such, 
 
Japan is allowed to abandon such rights voluntarily if deemed to be in the interests of 
the nation. Accordingly, domestic law and international law often conflict in terms of 
how international law is understood within the domestic legal-political context.  
4.2.1 Japanese pacifism 
Mori (2015) stated that Japan internalised a unilateral pacifist mindset in the post-war 
period. Behind the Japanese people’s strong resistance to the reinterpretation of Japan’s 
pacifist constitution lies widespread unilateral pacifist norms. The Japanese believe that 
Japan alone can maintain regional peace as long as the nation adheres to the pacifist 
constitution. In relation to this, Patey (2017) argued that if Japanese people do indeed 
adhere to their pacifist identity, even minor global security issues such as Japan’s 
contribution to the UNPKO in South Sudan may endanger the security reforms initiated 
under Abe. Furthermore, Japan has long used its domestic pacifism, including its 
pacifist constitution, as a shield to deflect political demand from the US that Japan 
shoulders more security responsibility in the post-war period and thereafter. Finally, 
Japan’s main goal in facilitating CSD is to uphold the liberal regional order in 
international society for its own security through its contribution to regional peace and 
stability, including in terms of the Taiwan Strait. Here, Japan’s national interest lies in 
not becoming involved in the cross-strait war. Therefore, calls from Chen Shui-bian and 
Lee Teng-hui for Japan’s greater regional security leadership, and Ma Ying-Jeou’s 
endorsement of the Japan–US alliance have no effect on Japan’s regional security policy 
in the face of its domestic pacifist norms and its lack of recognition of Taiwan. 
The people of Japan continue to strongly resist the amendment of the pacifist clause of 
Article 9 of the constitution. For example, according to a public opinion survey on 
public attitudes toward the constitution conducted by the NHK in April 2016, support 
 
for the amendment of Article 9 is relatively low, with only 22.15% of those surveyed 
stating that the amendment was necessary, while 39.2% stated the opposite (NHK, 
2016). In addition, even the LDP and the Koumei Party’s recommended constitutional 
scholars argued that CSD would be unconstitutional without amending the pacifist 
clause of Article 9 (Nikkei Shimbun, 2015).  
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe argued that an overly strict reading of the 
pacifist constitution would inhibit the effective deterrence of a Japan–US alliance at a 
critical juncture in matters of regional security issues if Japan did not contribute more 
to the alliance (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2014). At the same time, what 
actually constitutes a minimum use of force remains a controversial subject since the 
advancements in military technology and various other aspects have drastically 
changed this concept. However, the Japanese government still clearly maintains that the 
defence capabilities that the constitution allows Japan to possess must be within the 
scope of minimum defence. In this sense, weapons that are regarded as violating the 
Japanese pacifist constitution, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range 
bombers, or attack aircraft carriers, are considered to be strictly unconstitutional (MOD, 
2014). Even the largest helicopter carriers constructed in the post-war period, which 
include Izumo and Kaga, were designed for anti-submarine warfare to ensure they 
remain defensive in nature (Reuters, 2017). In short, in line with Japan’s defensive 
capabilities as a whole, such military resources remained within the legal boundary of 
the pacifist constitution, as interpreted by respective LDP governments. Furthermore, a 
helicopter carrier used its airlift capabilities to enhance search-and-rescue operations 
and to provide food and medical support in remote regions during HADR missions in 
the Philippines for peaceful and humanitarian purposes (Miller, 2014).  
 
4.2.2 Consequence of the tensions between domestic law and international law 
The tension between domestic law and international law has manifested itself in terms 
of obstacles to Japan’s execution of CSD. In fact, among the world’s primary state 
actors, Japan’s military power is the most legally constrained (Institute for International 
Policy Studies [IIPS] 2017). For example, according to the International Peace 
Cooperation Act of 1992, Japan needs to adhere to the five following principles to 
participate in international peacekeeping operations:  
1. The parties to the conflict must have reached a ceasefire agreement. 
2. The parties to the conflict must consent to Japan’s participation. 
3. Operations must maintain strict neutrality. 
4. Japan can withdraw its troops if any of the basic requirements are not met. 
5. The use of force must be limited to the minimum needed to protect the lives and 
safety of personnel. 
However, the Japanese concept of CSD does test situational constraints by allowing 
previously banned missions such as police-like missions (Kaketsuke keigo). However, 
these missions continue to face severe legal constraints. Since Japan’s international 
security contributions are still severely restricted by its domestic legal constraints, its 
SDF personnel face more severe risks in any given conflict. In South Sudan, for 
example, even though the Japanese SDF personnel in the Peacekeeping Operation Unit 
were engineering soldiers and were not specially trained for battlefield situations, they 
were given police-like missions, including rescuing its own nationals or defending other 
peacekeeping personnel from other countries (Isezaki, 2016). Regarding how the 
 
domestic legal constraints impeded Japan’s international security efforts in South Sudan 
in operational terms, Isezaki (2016) stated the following: 
[t]he UN force’s senior officers are well aware that the SDF are not a 
constitutionally sanctioned military organisation, and that Japan is not 
equipped with a legal system that allows it to pursue criminal responsibility 
for military transgressions overseas. This is precisely the kind of scenario the 
United Nations is most anxious to avoid. Nor is the UN force’s top command 
likely to assign an engineering unit to engage in armed rescue operations. 
In addition, Tatsumi (2017) noted Japan’s strong domestic aversion to the SDF 
engaging in any situation resembling actual combat in South Sudan. For example, 
according to Mainichi Shimbun, approximately 300 local soldiers were killed in combat 
by either government forces or the rebels in Juba in South Sudan in July 2016. In fact, 
SDF engineering units had been operating there even though the UN had issued a 
warning regarding the potential breakout of genocide (Mainichi Shimbun Editorial, 
2017). Furthermore, many UNPKO activities are conducted in the most high-risk 
regions of the world. Here, referring to the United Kingdom’s international 
peacekeeping efforts, a high-profile panellist stated at RUSI’s conference on the United 
Kingdom’s PKO that ‘more than 45%–55% of PKO activities are classified as high risk’ 
(RUSI, 2015). Despite the Japanese government’s insistence that the SDF engineering 
units have ‘reached a juncture’ in their decision to withdraw from South Sudan, it is 
clear that the strongly pacifist streak in Japanese public opinion has influenced the 
Japanese government’s decision to withdraw its SDF from South Sudan (Tatsumi, 2017).  
Certainly, if the logic discussed above is strictly followed, it could be rightly reasoned 
that the strategic interests of Japan, such as the enhancement of the Japan–US alliance, 
 
trump the importance of domestic law. However, this would have a significantly 
negative effect on the rule of law and the division of powers, which are essential for the 
development of liberal democracy in Japan. Therefore, even after the reinterpretation 
of its pacifist constitution, Japan needs to develop its own defence and security policy 
in accordance with the strict restrictions. For example, while a pre-emptive strike by 
cruise missiles launched by the SDF to minimise the risk of North Korean missile 
launches against Japan is not necessarily unconstitutional according to the traditional 
interpretation of the constitution, Japan does not currently have such offensive 
capabilities (Miller, 2017). Despite Japan’s reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution, 
the nation’s defence and security policy remains defensive in nature due to the domestic 
legal constraints imposed by the country’s minimum defence capabilities. Nevertheless, 
the debate on pre-emptive strikes is intensifying, as manifested in the LDP’s policy 
proposal, which explicitly calls for the possession of independent pre-emptive strike 
capabilities (LDP, 30 March 2017). In addition, Japan decided to acquire joint strike 
missiles from Norway in 2019 (Defense News, 2019), while the date of delivery remains 
unknown.  
With the international security environment deteriorating for Japan due to the military 
rise of China, the instability in the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of 
international terrorism, the nation does need to shoulder its share of regional security 
responsibility commensurate with its own national strength, albeit incrementally. Japan 
also needs to enhance the international liberal order, which has benefited the country in 
the post-war era. Elsewhere, the US and the UK would appear to be gradually shifting 
their central focus away from the traditional foreign and security policies of the post-
war international liberal order, as indicated by the election of US President Donald 
Trump, the decision on Brexit, and Trump’s virtual lack of concern for universal 
 
concepts such as human rights. Therefore, Japan must determine what kind of security 
and foreign policy it views as appropriate in the context of the Japan–US alliance and 
the enhancement of its own defence and security capabilities for regional peace and 
stability in the Asia Pacific region and beyond (IIPS, 2017).  
4.3. Taiwan’s Ambiguous Status in the Japanese Concept of CSD 
As discussed in the previous chapters, Taiwan cannot attain full membership status in 
international society even though Japan accommodates it for its own security. It is up 
to Japan to decide what the nation is willing to do and what it is unwilling to do 
regarding Japan–Taiwan security interactions within the hierarchical order, including 
how Taiwan fits into the Japanese concept of CSD. To understand how this plays out, 
we must first examine the ambiguous status of Taiwan in relation to this concept. In 
fact, Taiwan’s unrecognised status in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations means its 
explicit membership in the Japanese concept of CSD is not part of the equation. For 
example, regarding the government-to-government Japan–Taiwan security talks that 
President Tsai requested in 2019, the incumbent foreign minister, Kono Taro, stated 
‘Japan has been maintaining non-governmental substantive relations with Taiwan, so 
our government will respond to the statements properly based on the above-mentioned 
foundation’ (MOFA, 2019).  
However, to enhance Japan’s security, it remains possible to partially renegotiate 
Taiwan’s position in CSD operations in legal terms. Neither the tension between 
domestic law and international law in Japan’s legalistic politics nor Taiwan’s unique 
status in international law can help us to clarify how Taiwan is conceptualised within 
the Japanese concept of CSD. However, Japan can still instrumentalise Taiwan for its 
own security within the context of Japanese CSD, while Taiwan’s security can still be 
enhanced through the country’s nebulous status in the Japanese CSD operations. For 
 
certain Taiwan cannot influence Japan’s approach to CSD; however, the nation will 
have opportunities to remind Japan of its standing within the Japanese concept of CSD 
if it contributes to Japan’s security and regional security in general.  
Abe argued that a more proactive stance by Japan on regional and global security would 
enhance the Japan–US alliance. However, while the alliance is bound by international 
treaty and the concept of CSD is legally permissible under the UN Charter, neither is 
necessarily above Japan’s domestic law, as was discussed earlier. This fact complicates 
Japan’s potential utilisation of CSD. Furthermore, an entity that is unrecognised by 
international law, as is the case with Taiwan, will potentially complicate Japan’s concept 
of CSD. Taiwan does not have a defined status in international law, and, unlike the US, 
Japan is not legally bound to commit to Taiwan’s security in the absence of a domestic 
law such as a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan’s atypical status 
raises one crucial question: is it legally permissible for Japan to defend Taiwan by 
activating the Japanese concept of CSD? Clearly, to resolve the issue of defending 
Taiwan in military terms within the context of both international law and domestic law, 
the Japanese government will need to further debate the legality of defending its 
neighbour via CSD.  
The former foreign minister, Kishida Fumio, stated during the parliamentary debate of 
15 June 2015 at the House of Representatives that Japan’s concept of CSD includes 
‘divided’ and ‘unrecognised’ states. However, Japan has relinquished all rights, titles, 
and claims to Taiwan, which means it is not in a position to determine the legal status 
of Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty (House of Representatives, 2015).  
Even after the security bill was passed in 2015, Japan did not engage in high-profile 
global military support. This involves maintaining collective security by providing 
 
logistical or indirect military support, including refuelling, missile and air defence, or 
sea mine disposals in multinational military operations against ISIS in the Middle East. 
Oros (2017a) pointed out that despite the concept of global security responsibility 
espoused by former prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro, with Japan’s regional security 
situation severely deteriorating in recent years, Japan’s top national security priorities 
are now related to its immediate neighbours. This means that Japan can choose when 
to exercise CSD and how it engages in military action within the context of a Japan–
US alliance and its relations with other security partners during a regional or global 
security crisis, especially if the crisis does not directly threaten Japan’s national security.  
If Japan’s provision of security and deterrence for Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC through 
the application of the concept of CSD encourages Taiwan to seek de jure independence, 
this will be detrimental to Japan’s security. Japan’s interests vis-à-vis Taiwan are to 
incrementally integrate Taiwan into international society in view of allowing the latter 
to contribute to the former’s security and that of the region as a foreign policy 
instrument. However, regionally specific security issues such as the Senkaku Islands 
issue have, to some extent, complicated the development of stronger Japan–Taiwan 
relations and have obscured the ‘Taiwan factor’ within the context of the Japan–US 
alliance, as will be discussed in the chapter on the fisheries agreement.  
To determine the potential applicability of CSD vis-à-vis Taiwan, the conditions 
imposed by the Government of Japan regarding the use of CSD must be examined. The 
security bill provides ‘three new conditions’ for the use of force: (i) when an armed 
attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country 
that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival 
and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty, and 
 
pursuit of happiness; (ii) when there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack 
and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (iii) the use of force limited to the 
minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution 
as measures for self-defence in accordance with the basic logic of the government’s 
view to date (The Guideline on Peace and Security Legislation, 2015). While the 
reinterpretation of the constitution did expand Japan’s international security 
contributions in geographical, situational, and operational terms, the scope of the SDF’s 
military activities continues to be strictly restricted.  
Japan’s defence and security policy must be exclusively defence oriented, and the 
primary role of the SDF remains to consolidate Japan’s alliance with the US (Green and 
Hornung, 2014). In theory, Japan’s operational and situational scope for providing 
logistical support and conducting defensive operations, such as providing missile 
defence or conducting anti-submarine warfare, has increased following the 
reinterpretation (Green and Hornung, 2014). However, Japan’s current defence system 
is restricted by the Japan–US alliance. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Japan will 
conduct independent military intervention on behalf of Taiwan. At the same time, if the 
US decides to conduct military intervention in Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression, 
Japan may be able to provide support. At present, Japan is maintaining some strategic 
ambiguity regarding this matter (Matsuda, 2017).  
Japan’s CSD has, in theory, increased its deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis the PRC’s 
potential invasion of Taiwan and can provide greater naval warfare support, including 
in terms of the previously banned missile defence. It has also comparatively enhanced 
the MSDF’s anti-submarine and anti-sea mine warfare capabilities to better defend a 
US Navy intervention during any Taiwan contingency. In addition, Japan has the third 
 
largest global economy and highly robust defensive military capabilities, and it is the 
only regional security actor with ample strategic clout in the Asia Pacific region that is 
willing to forge stronger ties with Taiwan in any meaningful way, regardless of PRC 
opposition. Meanwhile, Watanabe (2015) pointed out that the US’s more high-profile 
treatment of Taiwan was also facilitated by Japan’s CSD since the aforementioned 
security bill strengthened the Japan–US alliance and reduced the security burden 
imposed on the US in the Asia Pacific region. Here, it can be inferred that these 
developments mitigate the political constraints imposed on Japan’s engagement with 
Taiwan.  
Nonetheless, Japan must meet the above three conditions and must convince its general 
population that Taiwan warrants the activation of CSD operations. Furthermore, the 
former foreign minister, Kishida, has avoided explicitly answering the question of 
whether Taiwan meets the following criterion: ‘an armed attack against a foreign 
country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's 
survival’. During a debate on the security bill, Kishida further stated that unrecognised 
or divided states are included in the Japanese concept of CSD, but the Government of 
Japan is not in a position to determine Taiwan’s status (House of Representatives, 2015). 
Japan probably has arguments to ensure Taiwan meets the criteria for the potential 
applicability of CSD in order to defend it. For example, Beijing’s One-China principle 
– which proposes the ‘one country, two systems’ method as an ultimate resolution of 
Taiwan’s status – would negatively affect Taiwan’s ‘internal popular sovereignty’, 
which stems from Taiwan’s vibrant democracy (Stokes, 2017).  
Taiwan’s belief in the universal values of human rights, democracy, and popular 
sovereignty may help justify Japan’s use of CSD as a deterrent vis-à-vis the autocratic 
 
PRC. Indeed, the nation as whole has favourable sentiments toward Taiwan due to the 
latter’s vibrant liberal democracy and good record on human rights, while a coercive 
China is seen as posing a threat to both countries’ regional maritime security 
environments and the maintenance of the inclusive and liberal regional security order. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan has been contributing to Japan’s human security in a broader sense, 
as indicated by the massive donations it made to Japan during the triple disasters in 
Tohoku in 2011, while the nation has also been contributing to regional soft security, 
such as in the case of the non-military HADR.  
It is open to debate which country meets the criteria for the potential applicability of 
Japanese CSD. Even South Korea, which will be a frontline state actor in the occurrence 
of any contingency on the Korean Peninsula, requires Japan to obtain consent from the 
ROK government for the SDF to land in ROK territory (National Diet Library Research 
and Rippou KousaKyoku, 2016 Kikuchi). Furthermore, the Japanese Diet needs to 
approve the use of CSD. However, Taiwan has made huge Japanese investments and 
enjoys significant trade ties with its neighbour, while it remains an essential choke point 
for both air and sea lines of communication. If Taiwan is left unattended and falls into 
the hands of the PRC, this will pose a major military threat to the southern flank of 
Japan, and the military takeover of the Senkaku Islands will be a realistic possibility.  
While Japan is not powerful enough to unilaterally shape the future course of the issue 
of the Taiwan Strait, it can prevent China from dominating Taiwan and making 
unreasonable unilateral changes to the status quo without the US’s participation. In fact, 
Japan is the only significant regional military and security actor that can allow the 
incremental inclusion of Taiwan into the regional security environment. In addition, if 
the US refuses to be bound by the One-China policy and seeks to reinterpret its own 
 
national interests under the Trump administration (Stokes, 2017), Japan’s security 
contribution in terms of deterrence for Taiwan against the PRC’s potential aggression 
will be even more crucial for achieving stable regional security. From this perspective, 
it is telling that the former secretary general of the National Security Council under the 
Ma administration, Su Chi, suspected Japan’s intentions in deploying the SDF on 
Yonaguni Island – a non-disputed Japanese island that is geographically close to Taiwan 
– when a cross-strait rapprochement was ongoing.  
Japan engages with Taiwan by partially accommodating the nation into its non-kinetic 
military cooperation strategy (e.g. through intelligence sharing) or into its non-military 
maritime security alignment through the concept of CSD. Japan’s regional security 
efforts with Taiwan also help to create a stable and peaceful external environment for 
the latter, despite the military and non-military threats from the PRC. This, in turn, is 
strategically beneficial for the defence of Japan’s southern flank given Taiwan’s role as 
a military buffer. 
Furthermore, Japan has taken symbolic political actions with strategic implications, 
including partaking in the bilateral fisheries agreement with Taiwan. This is especially 
pertinent if Japan’s security interests are perceived to be violated within the context of 
China–Taiwan relations. Taiwan has been perceived by various international observers 
to be behaving, at least to some extent, in concert with the PRC against Japan vis-à-vis 
the issue of the East China Sea or the Japan–US alliance following the nationalisation 
of the Senkaku Islands by the Government of Japan in 2012. Meanwhile, Japan has 
made a political move that is considered favourable for the strategic alignment of 
Taiwan in accordance with the Japan–US alliance, as will be elaborated in the chapter 
on the fisheries agreement. In addition, the recent official change in the name of the de 
 
facto Japanese embassy in Taiwan from the Interchange Association to the Japan–
Taiwan Exchange Association in 2016 is an indication of Japan’s interest in 
strengthening its ties with Taiwan. In fact, this change in name was the first since 
Japan’s derecognition of the ROC. Moreover, according to Ishihara (2013), an expert 
investigator (Senmon Chousain) was deployed in Japan’s de facto embassy in Taipei 
when former president, Lee, was given the opportunity to conduct a high-profile press 
conference during his visit to Tokyo in 2015 while Japan was debating the security bill. 
Here, a number of individuals in the ‘green camps’ in Taiwan argued that this 
constituted a recognition of the importance Japan attached to its relationship with 
Taiwan (Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association, 2015). In addition, as a political morale 
booster for Taiwan, Prime Minister Abe listed Taiwan as an independent actor along 
with South Korea and China during a speech he made on the 70th anniversary of WWII 
(Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association, 2015).  
Japan is not obligated to defend Taiwan since, unlike the US, it is not bound by the TRA. 
While Japan is not taking concrete action to enact such a law, Kishi Nobuo, the state 
minister for foreign affairs, stated in an interview with the Taipei Times (2016) that the 
Diet has studied the issue. However, this point constitutes a unique development in 
Japan–Taiwan relations. As was discussed in Chapter 3, grassroots people-to-people 
ties are vital for enhancing bilateral cooperation, including in terms of the HADR, in 
Japan–Taiwan relations due to Taiwan’s unrecognised status. This status requires the 
nation to rely on semi-institutionalised informal communication channels and civilian 
exchanges in the absence of official communication channels.  
4.3.1 Japan’s less committed yet incrementally significant security policy for 
Taiwan 
Taiwan’s ambiguous status in the Japanese concept of CSD is manifested in Japan’s 
 
lack of commitment to Taiwan’s security. Japan has long avoided shouldering any 
explicit security responsibilities for Taiwan in view of pacifying the PRC and conducts 
the regional great power management in accordance with ESIR theory. However, 
according to Sasaki (2010), following the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the stronger 
Japan–US alliance became the most significant factor for raising the threat perception 
regarding Japan-related security issues for the PRC. Further, the Taiwan factor within 
the Japan–US alliance became the most significant perceived threat for the PRC. The 
stronger Japan–Taiwan relations under Prime Minister Abe and President Tsai have 
been viewed with strong suspicion by the PRC.  
4.3.2 Japan’s non-engagement in arms sales to Taiwan 
A Japan–Taiwan security cooperation that is potentially more robust is likely to create 
difficulties with the PRC. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is up to Japan to decide 
what it is willing to do and what it is unwilling to do, meaning any defence exchange 
with Taiwan that may excessively antagonise the PRC is not seriously considered by 
Japan. For example, at least two of the academics writing about Taiwan – Cole (2016) 
and Dreyer (2016) – expressed a desire for technological access to build indigenous 
submarines in Japan in the face of the US’s apparent unwillingness to sell such high-
profile military assets to Taiwan and the US’s non-production of diesel submarines. 
However, Japan will not sell high-profile naval assets to Taiwan since this may have 
the obvious consequence of ruining the fragile Sino-Japanese relationship within the 
regional great power management.  
Importantly, Monma (2017b) pointed out that it is considered illegal for Japan to sell or 
provide any form of military equipment or technology to Taiwan in the absence of a 
relevant defence agreement between the two nations. However, he also admitted the 
 
possibility of Taiwan secretly approaching Japanese military technicians. In fact, Japan 
is legally allowed to jointly develop defence equipment, defence provisions, and 
defence transfers only with countries that have signed the ACSA with Japan, and is 
extremely unlikely to sign such a high-profile defence agreement with Taiwan (Monma 
2017b). Furthermore, as Monma (2017b) highlighted, Japan and Taiwan have not even 
signed the GSOMIA, which would institutionalise intelligence sharing. Therefore, 
while informal exchanges of opinions between Japanese and Taiwanese officials may 
be possible, Taiwan’s desire to acquire the technology used in Japanese submarines 
cannot be realised.  
4.3.3 Japan’s CSD in Asia Pacific and Taiwan 
Shuhenjitaihou’s geographical application did not specifically include Taiwan in its 
language; rather, it ensured the potential applicability vis-à-vis the Taiwan Strait was 
‘situational’, clearly contributing to the deterrence for Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC’s 
potential aggression. The security bill enacted in 2015 expanded both the geographical 
and the situational limits of Japan’s international security contribution, including in 
terms of Taiwan. The former de facto Japanese director in Japan-Taiwan Exchange 
Association in Taipei, Makoto Ogata, stated that Japan can now, in theory, defend the 
US military during any contingency in the Taiwan Strait, thereby offering Taiwan 
further protection vis-à-vis the PRC (Ogata, 2016). In addition, Japan’s maritime forces 
can now defend the US navy, even during peacetime operations (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). 
This has further strengthened American military primacy in the Asia Pacific region, 
including in terms of deterrence measures against potential Chinese aggression towards 
Taiwan. From this perspective, it is fair to say that Japan’s incremental shouldering of 
regional security leadership responsibilities in the US-led regional order in the Asia 
Pacific region has informally yet significantly contributed to creating a stable regional 
 
security environment for Taiwan. This was necessary for the development of a vibrant 
democracy in Taiwan, especially given that the military threat from the PRC became 
more serious before and during the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 
1996. Ogasawara (2012b) pointed out that without conducting a military takeover of 
Taiwan, it is unlikely that the PRC could enter into a realistic military conflict with 
Japan over the Senkaku Islands. In addition, as Ogata (2013) highlighted, Taiwan has 
been communicating the strategic message to Washington that it is also playing a role 
in the US’s rebalancing by enhancing its defence and deterrence capabilities.  
4.3.4 Political risks of high-profile defence cooperation 
Taiwan has been long aware of the risks of having explicit security ties with Japan. For 
example, even when Taiwan was under the Chen administration, which called on Japan 
to take on a larger regional security leadership role and called for non-materialised 
Japan–Taiwan–US trilateral security ties, the US requested not to allow Japanese 
observers to attend the annual Han Kuang military drill in Taiwan in 2006 (Wikileaks, 
2006). In 2007, Taiwan’s then defence minister, Lee, expressed his desire for the US to 
facilitate explicit Japan–Taiwan–US military cooperation (Wikileaks, 2006). The then 
director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Stephen Young, expressed his appreciation 
for the ROCMND’s decision to not invite nine Japanese observers – seven of whom 
were retired general officers or retired flag officers – to observe the military drill 
(Wikileaks, 2006). Such strategic compromises arose from Taiwan’s communication 
with the PACOM regarding the Japanese participation, but Young expressed 
reservations for the subsequent year’s Japanese observation participation (Wikileaks, 
2006).  
The prevention of cross-strait espionage by the PRC – as manifested in the cases of the 
 
former ROC army major general, Hsu Nai-chuan, and the former air force colonel, Liu 
Chi-ju – must be strictly ensured if Taiwan is to attain Japan’s political and strategic 
trust. Sharp (YouTube, 2016) discussed the view expressed by the former deputy 
defence minister, Lin Chong-pin, that the major motive behind Chinese espionage 
attempts that involved collaborators from Taiwan was to discredit Taiwan as an 
untrustworthy security partner to the US. Furthermore, upon retirement from his 
position as a de facto Japanese director in Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei, 
Ogata (2016) stated that even though the numerous espionage cases in Taiwan have 
been ruining the political trust of Japan and the US toward the former, Taiwan has not 
undertaken effective measures to combat them.  
Certainly, Japan has no political control over cross-strait espionage cases. Nonetheless, 
certain potential grassroots confidence-building measures may be considered. For 
example, if Japan delivers significant political capital, the defence education exchange 
between Japan and Taiwan may be an area for consideration (Sahashi, 2014). Here, 
Ogata (2013) pointed out that Japan–Taiwan relations constitute an unofficial 
substantive partnership as opposed to an alliance relationship, which excludes defence 
education exchanges. In 2017, 21 international students graduated from the National 
Defence Academy of Japan, and their countries of origin included Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia, Cambodia, and East Timor but not Taiwan 
(Sankei News, 2017).  
4.3.5 Japan remains ambiguous in its defence commitment to Taiwan while 
providing it with greater deterrence   
For these reasons, a Japanese version of the TRA is yet to materialise, while it is highly 
possible that it will in the future, with the nation perhaps not openly committed to the 
military security aspects of its relations with Taiwan, as Dreyer (2016) pointed out. 
 
However, Japan has been, albeit incrementally, providing space for Taiwan to expand 
its regional security contributions to its neighbour’s security. The IIPS, a prominent 
Japanese think tank that, allegedly, has some influence on the Abe administration’s 
strategic thinking, stated soon after President Trump’s inauguration that ‘a triangular 
framework consisting of Japan, the United States, and Taiwan should also be 
constructed’ (IIPS, 2017)  
While the question of how Taiwan fits into the Japanese concept of CSD remains 
ambiguous, Japan does provide deterrence for Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC through its 
incremental accommodation of its neighbour into international society in defence terms. 
The Japan–China naval and para-military standoff has been providing the PLA and the 
Chinese Coast Guard with de facto battle experience in military and paramilitary 
aspects in the East China Sea (geographically just north of Taipei and Keelung). These 
battle experiences would no doubt prove useful in the case of a Taiwan contingency 
(Mazza, 2014). If the PRC succeeds in capturing the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan will risk 
facing the regular naval presence of both the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard 
there. As such, Taiwan will have to expand its own limited defence capabilities to 
defend its northern flank, complicating potential Japanese military intervention options. 
As will be discussed in the fisheries agreement chapter, the PRC claims that Taiwan is 
a part of China and that the Senkaku Islands are a part of Taiwan. This is the PRC’s 
strategic rationale for claiming that the PRC is the ‘true defender’ of Taiwan’s practical 
interests, such as its fishing rights, vis-à-vis Japan. This rational was discredited after 
Taiwan signed a fisheries agreement with Japan. It is in Taiwan’s national security 
interests to distinguish itself from the PRC vis-à-vis the issue of the East China Sea lest 
it risks being isolated from both Japan and the US. 
 
Meanwhile, Japan’s military deployments indicate its interest in keeping Taiwan as a 
security asset in the regional security environment. Regarding the Ma administration’s 
attempt to reconcile with the PRC and Japan’s military deployment on Yonaguni, Lai 
L-Chung, the director of foreign policy studies at a Taiwan think tank, stated in 2009 
that ‘[a]s a result of the government moving closer to China, distancing itself from the 
US and opposing Japan’, Taiwan has gone from being ‘a friend that cooperates with the 
US and Japan to a country that the two allies must defend themselves against. The 
stationing of troops on Yonaguni will be the first step in this change’ (Taipei Times, 
2009). Regarding this development, Japanese Vice Admiral Umio Otsuka explicitly 
admitted that the main purpose of deploying the SDF on Yonaguni was not simply to 
conduct a military defence of the Senkaku Islands but also providing deterrence for 
Taiwan (Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2016). Taipei did not publicly protest the military 
activities at Yonaguni, such as the building of a radar station or the deployment of SDF 
troops, even though the island is only 67 miles from Taiwan and 93 miles from the 
Senkaku Islands (Leaf, 2014).  
Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama of the Ishigaki island announced that the island would 
accept the deployment of 500 to 600 GSDF soldiers equipped with surface-to-air-
missiles and surface-to-ship-missiles in the face of the threat of Chinese intrusion in the 
East China Sea and North Korean ballistic missile launches (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). 
These forces are expected to engage in a naval and aerial blockade of the Nansei Islands 
during any contingency involving PLA invasion. In addition, Calvo (2013b) pointed 
out that Taiwan will monitor the development of Japan’s amphibious capabilities 
(including its mobile anti-ship cruise missiles), which will require Japan to adopt a more 
integrated approach to military organisation. It has been suggested that surface-to-air 
missiles, which are more mobile and survivable and can challenge the PLA’s superiority 
 
in air defence more effectively, can offer a reasonable alternative to expensive fighter 
jets, which Taiwan has not been able to purchase for a long time (Defense News, 2016). 
Furthermore, in January 2017, Japan engaged in a military simulation drill involving 
Taiwan and the PRC amid rising cross-strait tensions. Now that Japan can, in theory, 
engage in CSD operations, it is attempting to determine what kind of logistical support 
it can provide during any Taiwan contingency with US observer participation (Japan 
Times, 2017). Again, in theory, the Japanese SDF can now rescue Japanese nationals 
and can provide military support for any US intervention. According to Reuters (2017), 
rescue missions for Japanese civilians living in Taiwan and the naval protection of the 
US Navy were included in the simulation drill conducted by the SDF in 2017, which 
greatly annoyed the PRC.  
Japan’s military consolidation of the Nansei Islands would lead to a potential naval 
blockade against the PLA Navy’s attempt to cross the first island chains in order to 
advance into the wider Asia Pacific region. In addition, the Hard ROC’s mine warfare 
and anti-ship cruise missiles will be crucial to keeping PLA aggression in check. The 
fact that Japan’s national security strategy has become more aligned with the US’s 
military intervention strategy for any contingency in Taiwan will indirectly yet 
significantly help Japan’s own efforts to achieve military fortification of the Nansei 
Islands. The Hard ROC strategy is aimed at inflicting maximum costs on the PLA 
through a protracted war, meaning the US would likely come to the conclusion that 
Taiwan is worth defending, while Japan would provide safe maritime and air routes 
through its naval and air defence capabilities for US reinforcements. This would both 
help increase Taiwan’s strategic survivability and enhance Japan’s security. Under the 
Tsai administration, the military stance on enhancing Taiwan’s asymmetric capability 
to contain Chinese aggression by increasing its military capabilities and inflicting 
 
maximum kinetic and non-kinetic damage on the PLA is clear. Taiwan’s 2017 QDR 
emphasises a ‘multi-deterrence strategy’ that uses asymmetrical methods to force 
invading PLA forces into ‘multi-dilemmas’. Taiwan’s military has admitted to 
possessing a certain strike capability in relation to the Chinese mainland, while 
Taiwan’s defence minister, Feng Shih-kuan, revealed that the PRC has deployed a new 
type of medium-range ballistic missile that is capable of hitting Taiwan and other target 
locations in the first island chains, including the Philippines, Okinawa, and mainland 
Japan (Focus Taiwan, 2017).  
4.3.6 Okinotorishima 
Chiou I-jen, a high-profile figure in the National Security Council, became a 
representative of the East Asian Council, an avenue for Taiwan to diplomatically 
communicate with Japan under Tsai administration. Chiou was present during Taiwan’s 
maritime talks with Japan, indicating the strategic emphasis the Tsai administration 
places on its efforts to boost the nation’s ties with Japan (Nojima, 2016). Here, Ma Ying-
Jeou attempted to dispute the legal status of Okinotorishima in terms of Taiwan’s 
‘fishing rights’ even though the island is strategically essential for both Japan and 
Taiwan. If cross-strait war breaks out and the US decides to send in reinforcements, the 
Japanese MSDF will have to conduct undersea warfare to secure safe passage for the 
US Navy (Kotani Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016). Geographically located 
between Guam and Taiwan, Okinotorishima is legally defined as an island in UNCLOS 
legislature and has strategic value for Japan since the vast seas that surround it consist 
of routes the US navy can use in the case of a Taiwan contingency. In such a scenario, 
the Japanese MSDF will have to destroy any adversarial submarines and sea mines 
(Kotani Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016). According to Kotani, if Taiwan 
disputes the legal status of Okinotorishima by engaging in the ‘freedom of navigation’, 
 
this will benefit the PRC’s anti-access and area-denial strategy for complicating US 
intervention efforts during a Taiwan contingency (Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative, 2016). Meanwhile, if Okinotorishima loses its status as an island, and Japan 
subsequently loses 200 nautical miles of the EEZ, then Chinese government ships will 
be able to engage in scientific surveys of the EEZ zones claimed by Japan in the seas 
around Okinotorishima without Japan’s consent. These surveys will benefit China’s 
naval warfare capability, including in terms of its anti-access and area-denial strategies, 
and will help streamline the PLA’s naval ability to counter US intervention during a 
Taiwan contingency (Kotani Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016). Fortunately, 
the Okinotorishima issue was politically shelved after the Tsai administration decided 
to wait for arbitration by the UNCLOS (Lin Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 
2016b).  
Since Taiwan is not even a member of the UNCLOS, it is impossible for Taiwan to 
resolve the issue. This is a beneficial phenomenon for Japan wherein the absence of 
Taiwan’s statehood, which is a requirement for membership in international maritime 
security efforts, functions to enhance Japan’s superior position over subordinate Taiwan 
in international society.  
4.4 Taiwan’s Strategic Need to be an Asset for Japan 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Taiwan must regularly obtain approval from Japan 
due to its unique status and its ontological security stance, which regards Japan as a 
‘positive other’. As such, Taiwan must regularly prove its worth as a defence asset to 
Japan in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship, and it is up to Japan to decide 
whether Taiwan is a valuable asset within international society. For certain, Taiwan 
remains a component of the Sino-Japanese regional balance of power. However, a non-
 
sovereign community such as Taiwan can be a component of the balance of power 
within the ESIR paradigm but not in that of the mechanistic school of realist power 
politics as argued by Waltz (1979). In terms of the former, a non-state actor such as 
Taiwan can be instrumentalised for Japan’s security vis-à-vis the regional balance of 
power with the PRC, as discussed below. 
4.4.1 Taiwan’s defence contribution to Japan’s security  
The PLA’s navy and air force have been crossing the Miyako Strait and the Bashi 
Channel on an increasingly frequent basis in order to advance into the Western Pacific 
areas, including the east coast of Taiwan. This is making both the Japanese and 
Taiwanese militaries nervous (Panda, 2017). On this point, Hideaki Kaneda (2016), a 
former Japanese vice admiral, stated that Taiwan is the most important country for 
Japan’s security and, as such, Japan can no longer afford to exclude Taiwan from its 
political, diplomatic, and defence engagements, especially given the geographical 
connectivity between the East and South China Seas and the mutually reinforcing 
security threats, including the salami slicing tactics, posed by the PRC. Kaneda (2016) 
pointed out that even though the Nansei Islands can be heavily defended by the Japanese 
SDF, the Bashi Channel, which is located south of Taiwan, may be comparatively weak. 
This may enable the PLA’s nuclear and diesel submarines, combat ships, and bombers 
to easily cross into the Western Pacific. Furthermore, currently, Taiwan only possess 
four submarines, while the PRC has 60, which heavily tilts the military balance of 
power in favour of the PRC. Therefore, Kaneda (2016) suggested that while the US was 
able to monitor the geopolitical developments in the Bashi Channel until just recently, 
it is becoming difficult for the country to sustain its military primacy, which means that 
Japan needs to enhance its security ties with Taiwan, the Philippines, and the US to 
enhance ISR activities for the defence of the Bashi Channel.  
 
Considering the PLA’s traditional weakness in the ASW (Goldstein, 2011), Taiwan’s 
acquisition of P3Cs from the US has helped consolidate its defence of the Bashi 
Channel. The former president, Ma, mentioned the importance of conducting maritime 
patrols around Taiwan’s vast maritime areas by the P3Cs, including the overlapping 
maritime boundaries with Japan and the Philippines (Focus Taiwan, 2013). Koda Yoji 
(2017), a retired vice admiral, argued that Japan can block the Bashi Channel using its 
naval capabilities because Japan and the US have the upper hand in securing 
geographical choke points. Therefore, Taiwan should use its aforementioned 
capabilities to supplement Japan’s deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis the PLA’s navy in 
the Bashi Channel. In addition, the Japan–US led ‘Fish Hook Undersea Defence Line’ 
– which connects various undersea intelligence network systems across key 
chokepoints from Japan to Southeast Asia, including Okinawa, Guam and Taiwan – is 
crucial to detecting any PLA’s submarine movements in the first island chains (Singh 
2016). Allegedly, this undersea intelligence system also covers the Bashi Channel.  
In February 2017, Taiwan deployed PAC3 surface-to-air missiles to expand its air 
defence in its south-eastern airspace after the PLA’s air force conducted several military 
drills (Taipei Times, 2017). Taiwan’s ADIZ is missing a corner in the southeast due to 
the 1959 agreement with the US that allowed American fighter jets to fly from Okinawa 
to the Philippines. Taiwan’s deployment of PAC3 surface-to-air missiles could offset 
this preparedness deficit (Taipei Times, 2017). Meanwhile, Chen Wei-han stated the 
following: 
Japan, South Korea and Vietnam are also armed with supersonic anti-ship 
missiles with ranges of more than 150km, and Taipei should explore the 
possibility of cooperating with neighbouring nations to create a defence network 
 
that extends to major bodies of water within the first island chain (Taipei Times, 
2017).  
It would appear that Taiwan is enthusiastic about demonstrating its intelligence 
capabilities to Japan and becoming a potential security asset for its powerful neighbour 
in view of the balance of power with the PRC.  
In December 2016, Liaoning, the PRC’s aircraft carrier, sailed through the Miyako 
Strait and then into the Bashi Channel to advance into the South China Sea (The 
Independent, 2017). Following this geopolitical development, Japan’s MSDF 
submarines also crossed the Bashi Channel to advance into the South China Sea to 
enhance the nation’s strategic ties with Vietnam and the Philippines and to send a 
strategic message to the PRC regarding the illegally occupied and militarised Chinese 
artificial islands (Sankei News, 2016). Following this, Japan’s Izumo class helicopter 
carrier sailed in the South China Sea from Yokosuka in May 2017 to engage in a naval 
drill with India and the US in the Indian Ocean in July 2017. This required its helicopter 
carrier to cross the Bashi Channel, which is geographically located to the south of 
Taiwan and to the north of Luzon in the Philippines (Reuters, 2017).  
4.4.2 Taiwan as an intelligence provider for Japan’ military security  
The extent to which Taiwan’s intelligence-sharing cooperation with Japan’s military has 
been institutionalised is unclear, despite the unambiguous evidence that Taiwan 
provided the military intelligence for a PLA nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japanese 
territorial waters in 2003 and for a North Korean missile launch in 2012. In 1999, retired 
Japanese SDF officers and diplomats frequently visited Taiwan to provide political and 
military advice and tours in Japanese military bases (Dreyer, 2016). The geopolitical 
development necessitating Japan’s enhancement of its intelligence exchanges with 
 
Taiwan involved how Japan lacked independent military threat assessment capabilities 
in relation to Taiwan during the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait during the period of 
1995 to 1996, as will be discussed in the chapter on the ICAO. In 2003, Japan 
dispatched Nagano Youichi, a retired Japanese military officer, as its first de facto 
defence attaché in Japan’s de facto embassy in Taipei (Yang, 2009). According to the 
Washington Post (2006), Nagao engaged in talks with the Taiwanese government and 
military officers and frequently communicated military information and reports back to 
Japan. Yang (2009) argued that the dispatch was an indication that Japan had enhanced 
its semi-official ties with Taiwan and a symbolic recognition of the emphasis the 
Japanese government placed on cross-strait issues and Japan–Taiwan security relations. 
Japan’s acknowledgement of Taiwan as an intelligence-sharing partner for Japan’s SDF 
was also symbolic. 
Uchida (2006), the former de facto Japanese ambassador to Taipei, admitted that Japan–
Taiwan relations involve the intelligence and information sharing that is significant for 
Japan’s national security. Meanwhile, Uchida (2006) also admitted to the existence of 
intelligence sharing related to situational analysis and individual information sharing in 
Japan–Taiwan relations. According to Uchida (2006), Taiwan immediately notified 
Japan of the intrusion of a PLA submarine into Japan’s territorial waters in November 
2003. While Uchida (2006) was not certain whether this was the first piece of 
intelligence Japan received regarding the intrusion, he believed that such intelligence 
sharing can be critical if both Japan’s and the US’s intelligence fail.  
Chinese elites in the PRC have expressed some concern over Taiwan’s provision of 
military intelligence to Japan. For example, Liu (2006), the deputy director at the 
Department of International Relations at the prestigious Tsinghua University, pointed 
 
out, in reference to Taiwan’s Zhongguo-Shibao, that Taiwan’s ST anti-submarine 
aircraft immediately detected a Chinese nuclear submarine and sent this vital 
intelligence to Japan and the US in November 2004. Meanwhile, Sahashi (2014) 
pointed out that while Japan and Taiwan would both benefit from regular intelligence 
exchange arrangements, this would require Japan to make difficult political decisions. 
In addition, Uchida (2006) discussed the importance of military information sharing to 
avoid accidents both at the naval and aerial levels. Taiwan and Japan especially need to 
develop a good mechanism for prior notifications in designated seas. Through this 
mechanism, Japan could be informed of any Taiwanese naval drills beforehand, 
especially when the drills are being conducted in international waters (Uchida, 2006). 
Without this knowledge, Japanese civilian ships and fishing vessels may be put at risk 
(Uchida, 2006). Uchida (2006) also discussed the importance of intelligence sharing for 
air forces on a bilateral level, which will be discussed in the chapter on the ICAO.  
With heightened tensions in the East and South China Seas, it is possible that the US 
and Japan will include Taiwan in their regional military intelligence cooperation. For 
example, Chen cited the RAND report in stating the following:  
China could trigger deeper military partnerships between its neighbours and a 
stronger US presence in the region, with Taiwan reportedly establishing a 
cooperation with the US and Japan that allows the three nations’ military aircraft 
to be identified as friendly by radar (Taipei Times, 2017).  
Taiwan has placed an early warning radar surveillance system at the top of Le Shan 
Mountain, which can monitor, detect, and track incoming flying objects such as ballistic 
and cruise missiles, military aircrafts, and stealth fighters at a range of more than 3,000 
miles, giving Taiwan time to make an immediate response through competent military 
 
intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities. While the system is expected to be 
upgraded by 2018 (Military Aerospace Electronics, 2016), at present it can conduct ISR 
activities from the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea, especially in terms of 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Military Aerospace Electronics, 2016). 
Furthermore, during the symposium hosted in Taipei on 14 December 2016, Taiwan’s 
National Security Council’s deputy secretary-general, Tseng Ho-jen, disclosed that 
Taiwan was sharing military intelligence with the United States and argued that the 
PLA’s military activities constituted a threat to Taiwan, Japan, and the US. The council 
also confirmed that Taiwan is equipped with the capabilities and confidence to deal with 
such a threat (Focus Taiwan, 2016). Clearly, Taiwan wants to use ISR capabilities to 
prove that it can be a defence asset to Japan and an important component in the Japan–
US alliance.  
4.4.3 Taiwan as a potential regional cybersecurity contributor for Japan  
There exists the potential for cybersecurity cooperation between Japan and Taiwan. 
While Japan’s National Information Security Centre has its own ‘cybersecurity 
strategy’, which emphasises the importance of engaging in policy coordination dialogue 
with the US and other like-minded regional states regarding bilateral cybersecurity 
cooperation, Taiwan is completely excluded from the strategy (Cunico, Nien-chung, 
Uchimura at CSIS 14 January 2015). Taiwan is a major springboard for the PLA to test 
its cyberattack capabilities given the shared language for crime purposes and military 
operations, which includes massive cyberattacks intended to cripple Taiwan’s command, 
control, and logistics during a cross-strait contingency (Cunico, Nien-chung, Uchimura 
at CSIS 14 January 2015). Informal, ad hoc anti-cybercrime cooperation may exist 
between Japan, Taiwan, and the US, and Japanese and Taiwanese firms may engage in 
informal cyber-security discussions, but what has not been addressed is that Japan and 
 
Taiwan have a low-key yet ‘official’ cybersecurity cooperation arrangement based on 
the APEC.  
The APEC is one of the few multilateral mechanisms that allow Taiwan to fully engage 
as an economic entity and to engage in security relationships with other countries, 
including with Japan on low-key grassroots yet ‘official’ levels. For example, in 2010, 
Taiwan’s National Communications Commission hosted 18 APEC economies, 
including Japan, in a discussion on ICT developments related to, for example, 
information and cybersecurity. Similar events were hosted in both 1996 and 2003 
(National Communication Commission, 30 June 2010). During the 2010 event, Taiwan 
proposed the ‘Deployment of Disaster Information Distribution System and Service 
Model by NGO Exemplar Platforms’ (National Communication Commission, 2010) 
and obtained co-sponsorship from Japan. According to the event, an estimated 
US$50,000 would be invested to study how best to combine cloud computing, open 
resources, online community websites, and various governmental and private resources 
for the effective response to disasters and the subsequent necessary reconstruction 
projects (National Communication Commission, 2010). In the absence of formal 
diplomatic channels, Taiwan’s grassroots yet official security channels with Japan, such 
as the APEC, are a vital component of Japan–Taiwan security relations. In fact, this is 
an underappreciated component of the regional security environment and includes 
operations such as cybersecurity vis-à-vis HADR cooperation.  
 
Whether this form of security cooperation can affect the regional power politics in 
Japan’s geopolitical calculous remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it does have symbolic 
value in relation to Taiwan’s contribution to regional security. In addition, Matsuda 
(YouTube, 2017) pointed out that while Taiwan’s guest membership in the ICAO was 
 
rejected due to the PRC’s sanctions, the nation continued to be represented by the APEC. 
An APEC event in Taiwan also discussed the nation’s potential for law enforcement 
cooperation for cybersecurity operations with other countries, including Japan, which 
will be discussed in the chapter on the ICAO.  
4.4.4 Japan’s renegotiation of Taiwan as a security dialogue partner 
As discussed in the previous chapter, for Taiwan, track 2 diplomacy is significantly 
different in nature from the track 2 diplomacy pursued by de jure states. For example, 
according to the Taipei Times, Edwin Feulner, the founder of the Washington-based 
Heritage Foundation, played a key role in the first Tsai–Trump phone call (Taipei Times, 
2016b). Japan has been accommodating ‘semi-official’ track 2 diplomacy with Taiwan 
in relation to Japan’s security and has incrementally expanded the ‘official’ side of its 
unofficial security dialogue channels with Taiwan. Japan renegotiated Taiwan’s 
membership as a security dialogue partner in international society without explicitly 
recognising its officiality. In addition, much like in the US, as the former de facto 
director Ogata in Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei (2013) pointed out, 
those who are working at prominent think tanks and universities in terms of the track 2 
diplomacy in Taiwan can be easily deployed in the central political decision-making 
body if there is a change in administration. However, the concept of track 2 and track 2 
diplomacy is ambiguous in Japan–Taiwan security dialogues, necessitating the creation 
of unique semi-institutionalised communication channels.  
In September 2011, Abe attended a track 2 security dialogue as a high-profile political 
figure from the opposition party with former prime ministerial experience and argued 
that Taiwan was an important partner for Japan, one that shared its universal values of 
democracy, freedom, and peace (Nihon Ritouki-No-Kai in Aichi Branch, 2015). 
 
However, the fact that he attended the dialogue as the leader of the opposition party 
may have diminished the symbolic political importance of his argument to a great 
degree (Nihon Ritouki No Kai in Aichi Branch, 2015). At the same time, it can be 
argued that the fact that Abe attended the dialogue at all is significant within the context 
of the reassessment of the strategic value of Taiwan’s track 2 diplomacy in its security 
communications with Japan. Here, Yang (2009) pointed out that the shared perception 
of the threat the PRC poses for both nations’ national security played a significant role 
in facilitating security talks between Japan and Taiwan. The track 2 security dialogue 
was instrumentalised to put political pressure on Taiwan to diffuse any maritime 
security tensions with Japan amid other maritime tensions in the East China Sea 
resulting from the perceived cross-strait united front against Japan before the 
conclusion of the fisheries agreement. For example, at the Heritage Foundation’s 
conference in Washington that was held in early 2013, the former US deputy assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian affairs, Randy Schriver – while clearly indicating that 
the US prioritised its alliance with Japan over the TRA – stated that ‘Japan is arguably 
Taiwan’s second-most important security partner’ and added that ‘[i]f Taiwan 
undertakes activities that cause problems with Tokyo, that will cause problems with the 
United States and that should be avoided’ (Taipei Times, 2013). Furthermore, Su Tseng-
chang, the former director of the Executive Yuan, who competed with Tsai for the 
presidential nomination, also visited the LDP’s think tank in Tokyo to exchange views 
with Japanese legislators regarding the negotiations on the impending fisheries 
agreement and insisted that Taiwan enhance its diplomacy based on its shared values 
with Japan, the US, and South Korea for stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia 
(Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association, 2013). Here, Ishihara (Japan–Taiwan Exchange 
Association, 2013) pointed out that the DPP was conscious of Abe’s value-based 
 
diplomacy and expressed a keen sense of rivalry with a PRC that does not share its 
political values. Regarding this visit, the Taipei Times (2013) reported the following 
events:  
[t]he senator — the brother of Japanese PM Abe — said that Ishiba did not 
propose to ‘include Taiwan in the US-Japan Security Treaty’, but underlined 
that policymakers and countries should get to understand Taiwan better before 
assessing Asia-Pacific security situations, and Taiwan should not be ignored or 
excluded from any security plans. 
While at this time the DPP was an opposition party, and it was the KMT that ultimately 
concluded the fisheries agreement with Japan, the political heavyweights in both the 
KMT and the DPP were clearly conveying a strategic message about enhancing 
Taiwan’s ties with the Japan–US alliance through ‘track 2 diplomacy’ with the LDP’s 
think tank in Tokyo. The conclusion of the fisheries agreement provided symbolic 
leverage for Taiwan to strategically align with the alliance.  
Such a security dialogue was instrumentalised to encourage Taiwan to improve its self-
defence capabilities and to become an asset within the Japan–US alliance. For example, 
at the conference organised by Project 2049 in December 2016, Schriver insisted that 
Taiwan must develop its self-defence capabilities to deter the PLA from invading the 
nation (Project 2049, 2016). Meanwhile, Matsumura (2010 page123) insisted that, in 
partnership with the US, the Japanese government communicates its strategic message 
through ‘unofficial’ security talks to convince Taiwan to acquire military assets and to 
maintain a cross-strait balance of power amid the rapid development of the PLA’s 
capabilities. Elsewhere, Matsumura (2010 page123) argued that Japan should welcome 
the professionalisation of the Taiwanese military, including in terms of the abolition of 
 
the conscription system, and should allocate more financial resources to the acquisition 
of US-made weapons. Matsumura (2010) also insisted that Japan and the US jointly 
encourage Taiwan to develop self-defence capabilities qualitatively through track 2 
security dialogues. Regarding Taiwan’s acquisition of the P3Cs, President Ma argued 
in 2013 that the P3Cs acquired by Taiwan were qualitatively equal to the US’s P3Cs 
(Focus Taiwan, 2013). This qualitative upgrade of Taiwan’s military hardware clearly 
boosted the country’s military morale. Meanwhile, Ogata (2016) further pointed out 
that rather than acquire second-hand military hardware, Taiwan acquired the upgraded 
version of its F16A/Bs. In addition, the P3Cs and Patriot PAC3s boosted Taiwan’s air 
defence capabilities, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and missile defence 
capabilities. In fact, these are still used by Japan and the US in terms of frontline defence, 
which has, in turn, increased Taiwan’s confidence in its self-defence capabilities.  
Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called on Japan to open a security dialogue mechanism 
between Japan and Taiwan in his interview with Sankei Shimbun in 2018. If Japan 
encourages more communication with Taiwanese think tanks, the Tokyo MOD’s think 
tank, NIDS, may or may not engage with its Taiwanese counterpart in the future. An 
informal exchange of ideas through the publication of informal reports can shape 
policy-making decisions related to Japan–Taiwan relations. For example, NIDS 
published its China Security Report on Taiwan–China relations, stating the following:  
[i]t is possible that if Taiwan devotes less of its efforts to self-defense, China’s 
actions will become even more expansionistic. In that sense, Taiwan’s attention 
to improving its self-defense capabilities may influence the stability of the 
region as a whole. Further, maritime affairs also become important since Taiwan 
lies at the nexus of international channels of navigation tying together the East 
 
China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. As geographical 
confrontation in East Asia takes on new dimensions, the strategic importance of 
Taiwan will likely increase as well (NIDS China Security Report, 2017, p. 80). 
As discussed, Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities cannot be underestimated in their 
ability to supplement the military balance of power for Japan in terms of the issues of 
the East and South China Seas, the Bashi Channel, and the wider Pacific regions and in 
terms of preventing the PLA Navy’s advancements. Russel Hsiao, the executive director 
of the Global Taiwan Institute – the only Washington-based think tank that solely 
focuses on issues related to Taiwan (Brooking Institution, 2017) – indicated that the 
informal reports published by NIDS on Taiwan–China relations are important for 
Taiwan’s policy-making elites in terms of understanding Japan’s strategic thinking and 
making better decisions regarding issues pertaining to the Taiwan Strait. 
Furthermore, based on track 2 diplomacy, where high-profile figures are represented, 
Taiwan’s attempt at regional strategic adjustment in accordance with the shift in the 
regional security environment is significant. For example, the former Indian defence 
minister, George Fernandes, attended a conference entitled ‘India–Japan–Taiwan 
Trialogue: Prospects for Democratic Cooperation’ that was hosted by a Taiwan think 
tank in Taipei (Taipei Times, 2004). Reportedly, this informal conference aimed to 
promote the awareness of potential areas of tripartite cooperation involving India, Japan, 
and Taiwan in the areas of economic growth and trade, high-tech industry, and 
democratic development, as well as other inter-regional issues that are of vital interest 
to these nations (Taipei Times, 2004). As will be discussed in the chapter on the ICAO, 
the issue of how to reduce Taiwan’s excessive economic dependence on the PRC is one 
component of the regional security environment. Under the current Tsai administration, 
 
as one of its foreign policy priorities, Taiwan is shifting its diplomatic focus toward 
Southeast Asia and India to address the issue of economic security (Taiwan News, 2017). 
Importantly, under the Modi administration, India is not interested in being bound by 
the One-China policy in the absence of the PRC’s One-India policy (Taiwan News, 
2017). Ogata (2016) expressed the view that under the New Southbound Policy initiated 
by the Tsai administration, Taiwan will seek multi-dimensional relations with both the 
ASEAN states and India. This will require Taiwan to reject unification with China while 
placing pivotal emphasis on its ties with Japan and the US in view of deepening its 
relationships with regional states other than the PRC. In addition, the brochure 
distributed in September 2016 by the New Delhi-based India Foundation at the Shangri-
La Hotel in Singapore – where it functioned as a co-host with Nanyang University’s 
RSIS – pointed out that, along with participant member states that discussed the ties 
between India and the ASEAN states, a Taiwanese representative, Hung Mao-tien – 
president and board chairman of the institute for National Policy Research in Taiwan – 
somewhat surprisingly gave a talk on maritime security at the pre-conference comity 
workshop (Cordner, 2016). According to Cordner (2016), high-profile pro-Taiwan 
Japanese figures such as Kishi Nobuo, minister of state for foreign affairs, were present. 
Clearly, Taiwan is not excluded from the strategic cooperation between Japan and India 
in the Indo–Pacific Region.  
 
4.5 Japan–Taiwan Non-Traditional Security Cooperation: Japan–
Taiwan Coast Guard Relations 
It is difficult for the PRC to sanction Japan-Taiwan non-traditional security cooperation 
at constabulary levels since coastguard exchanges are considered less-coercive and 
 
more normative. Bateman (2003) argued that the coastguard is suitable for facilitating 
regional maritime security cooperation given its confidence-building effects, the less 
escalatory nature of maritime policing, and the importance of protecting the marine 
environment. Furthermore, if Japan–Taiwan security interactions are conducted at the 
constabulary level, it is harder for the PRC to oppose to it than military cooperation, 
while the constabulary cooperation between Japan and Taiwan helps the latter to align 
itself more with the former within the context of Japan–China–Taiwan relations. As 
such, the coastguard cooperation between Taiwan and Japan has positive effects in 
terms of regional peace and stability, while the One-China policy remains unbreached 
within the context of Sino-Japanese regional great power management. Thus, Japan is 
instrumentalising Taiwan as a maritime constabulary asset for non-traditional security 
efforts within the context of Japan’s One-China policy. However, this cooperation will 
be discussed in more detail in the chapters on CSD and the fisheries agreement since 
any Chinese maritime intrusions of the East China Sea are largely conducted by white 
hulls, and Japan is more concerned about grey zone contingency.  
Taiwan cannot be represented in the ReCAAP or the Information Sharing Centre due to 
the sanctions imposed on it by the PRC, which have prevented the nation from gaining 
access to intelligence on regional maritime piracy and crimes and from communicating 
its own maritime piracy issues in its neighbouring seas (Glaser, 2015). However, it is 
precisely because Taiwan cannot be included in multilateral maritime security 
cooperation in the region that its bilateral coastguard cooperation with Japan and other 
countries, such as the Philippines, is even more critical for maritime peace and stability 
in the East and South China Seas and the Bashi Strait. In short, Japan can enhance its 
non-traditional maritime security cooperation with Taiwan bilaterally through these 
coastguard exchanges.  
 
According to Glaser (2015), Taiwan engages in coastguard cooperation with other states, 
which, in addition to Japan and the Philippines, includes Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Vietnam, in relation to maritime anti-human trafficking and maritime anti-drug 
smuggling. The author also pointed out that Japan engages with Taiwan for annual 
mutual visits and working-level meetings for limited coastguard cooperation (Glaser, 
2015). Furthermore, according to an interview with Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (Taipei 
Times, 2019), Taiwan has signed a coastguard agreement with the Marshall Islands, and 
President Tsai plans to sign coastguard agreements with Palau and Nauru during official 
visits to these countries – which still have official ties with Taiwan – to provide them 
with patrol vessels in the future. Reportedly, the new sea patrol cooperation pact 
concluded between Taiwan and Palau enables Taiwan to conduct training, exchange 
patrol personnel, fight maritime cross-border crimes, protect Palau’s fishing vessels, 
and engage in a joint maritime rescue drill in the seas around Palau using Taiwan’s 
1,800-tonne patrol frigate (Focus Taiwan, 2019). In fact, Wu (Taipei Times, 2019) 
pointed out that despite the vast oceans surrounding these island states, their coastguard 
capabilities are limited, and Japan, Australia, and the US have thus already provided 
them with patrol vessels. Clearly, Taiwan can supplement Japan’s maritime law 
enforcement capacity-building efforts for Palau in the South Pacific, which are a part 
of Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy. 
4.5.1 Japanese constabulary asset sales to Taiwan 
It is unknown whether the Japanese government or a non-state actor in Japan was 
responsible for maritime constabulary asset sales such as the export of a coastguard 
patrol ship to Taiwan despite the One-China policy. Even after the Japanese de-
recognition of the ROC, Japan’s maritime security activities, including constabulary 
asset sales to Taiwan, continued. To understand Japan’s maritime capacity-building 
 
efforts for Taiwan’s maritime law enforcement, the Taiwan Coast Guard’s main 
missions must be discussed. Here, Morris (2017) explained that the three main missions 
of the coastguard are: (i) the regulation of coastal zones under national jurisdiction, (ii) 
the inspection of cargo entering and exiting ports, and iii) the investigation and seizure 
of smuggling operations and illegal vessels or people entering or exiting the country. 
Other important missions include search and rescue, intelligence gathering, and support 
for maritime research and development (Morris, 2017). 
The Japan-made coastguard patrol ship that is officially named Dexinguang was 
produced in Japan’s shipyard in 1977 and participated in Taiwan’s maritime law 
enforcement activities for 37 years, with its security missions including anti-drug 
smuggling and search-and-rescue missions in Taiwan’s waters (CNA, 2015). 
Reportedly, the Dexinguang succeeded in conducting an anti-drug smuggling mission 
in the ocean in the south of Taiwan, while it also engaged in escort missions to ensure 
the safety of fishing vessels during the Taiwan–Philippines maritime tensions that 
stemmed from the tragic killing of a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippines Coast 
Guard in 2013 (CNA, 2015). Clearly then, the Dexinguang was utilised for operations 
involving both Taiwan and the Philippines, both of which are considered to be Japan’s 
security partners. 
4.5.2 Potential for Japan–Taiwan coastguard relations 
Sahashi (2014) noted that coastguard exchanges have the potential for growth if Japan 
allocates political capital to enhancing Japan–Taiwan relations. Regarding this point, in 
an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun (2016), President Tsai discussed Taiwan’s 
intentions to enhance its maritime search-and-rescue cooperation, to resolve any 
fisheries issues, and to enhance its marine scientific cooperation with Japan through 
 
maritime cooperation dialogue. In fact, President Tsai expressed her strong political 
interest in improving the bilateral ties with Japan for regional stability and stated that 
‘from Taiwan’s perspective, PM Abe is someone we [have been] quite familiar with 
over a long period of time. We also understand that he has goodwill toward Taiwan’ 
(Reuters, 2016). On examining this non-traditional maritime security cooperation 
between Japan and Taiwan, Kotani argued that both nations can engage in a dialogue 
on regional maritime security issues such as maritime piracy and marine environmental 
protection (Global Taiwan Institute, 2016). Coastguard exchanges should be also 
enhanced via maritime cooperation dialogue. In terms of the Taiwanese perspective, the 
vice president of the Taiwan Brain Trust, Lin Ting-hui, suggested that the two 
coastguard operations can establish a ‘notification system within the maritime law 
enforcement agencies and a hotline between the competent regulatory authorities on 
marine affairs’ and added that ‘[t]he two sides could even conduct joint maritime rescue 
drills, loan each other equipment to fight marine pollution’ and ‘conduct bilateral 
training and exchanges for law enforcement and marine affairs personnel’ (Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016a).  
4.5.3 Concrete Japan–Taiwan coastguard relations  
As discussed earlier, maritime-related tensions surfaced between Japan and Taiwan 
during the Okinotorishima issue, even though the EEZ around the island is a vital route 
for the defence of Taiwan within the context of Japanese CSD. However, in 2017, the 
two nations signed an MOU agreement over the emergency and rescue operations 
carried out by the coastguards and essentially shelved the legal dispute over 
Okinotorishima (Focus Taiwan, 2017). Monma (2018) admitted that Japan had 
dispatched a coastguard attaché to the Japan–Taiwan Interchange Association and 
hinted at the possibility of close daily communications with the coastguard in Taiwan 
 
while suggesting that this will likely lead to bilateral joint search-and-rescue drills 
between the two coastguards in the near future. In 2018, a Taiwanese fishing vessel was 
rescued by an MSDF helicopter 190 kilometres from Iwojima after the Japanese 
coastguard received a rescue signal from the vessel and subsequently launched an 
aircraft search (Asahi Shimbun, 2018). Thus, the Japanese military and coastguard were 
instrumentalised to rescue a Taiwanese civilian entity in Japan’s maritime domain, and 
interestingly, it appears this incident has not brought about a diplomatic crisis in Sino-
Japanese relations.  
4.5.4 Taiwan’s misinterpretation of Japan’s maritime security ties to the 
Philippines  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the de facto state of Taiwan’s political input has no 
effect on Japan’s security policy given the strong hierarchical relationship, with the 
more powerful Japan able to impose rules and norms on its subordinate Taiwan, which 
is clearly manifested in the Japan–Taiwan–Philippines coastguard ties. According to 
Kotani, Taiwan has expressed concerns over Japan’s maritime law enforcement 
capacity building in relation to the Philippines Coast Guard. This concern is related to 
the fact that Taiwan holds the largest land feature, Itu Aba, in the South China Sea and 
is worried about the Philippines’ potential use of Japan-provided coastguard ships, 
which could weaken Taiwan’s maritime security in the area (Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, 2016). However, while maritime-related tensions between 
Taiwan and Japan or the Philippines do occasionally surface then, the major challenge 
to the Taiwan Coast Guard comes from the PRC (Morris, 2017). In fact, Taiwan’s 
coastguard has engaged in tabletop exercises and other drills with its Philippines 
counterparts (Glaser, 2015). Nonetheless, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines clearly 
require enhanced communication mechanisms to ensure the message regarding the 
 
importance of the Philippines for Japan’s regional security is clearly grasped by Taiwan. 
In short, the Japan-provided coastguard assets will safeguard the Philippines’ interests 
in the South China Sea and will help it to combat maritime crime, piracy, and terrorism 
to defend the liberal maritime order in international society, which will, of course, also 
benefit Taiwan.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the ESIR paradigm, great powers are accorded special 
privileges that smaller states are unable to enjoy. Japan is no exception to this rule 
within the regional context. As a regional great power, Japan can lay down rules and 
norms to compel smaller nations such as Taiwan to behave in accordance with Japan’s 
preferences. Meanwhile, while the Philippines may not be a particularly strong country, 
it does enjoy the legal privileges afforded to a sovereign state. This is not the case for 
Taiwan. As such, if the two nations face maritime tensions, Japan will not side with 
Taiwan because the sovereign state of the Philippines has a higher legal status than the 
de facto state of Taiwan within international society. 
 
4.6 Japan–Taiwan Non-Traditional Security Cooperation in the 
HADR  
It is difficult for the PRC to sanction the development of Japan–Taiwan security 
relations if this involves humanitarian components such as the HADR, despite the Sino-
Japanese great power management of Taiwan. This is due to the fact that such a sanction 
would damage the PRC’s reputation within international society. Japan’s CSD operation 
can enhance its regional soft security leadership, including in terms of the HADR, while 
Taiwan can be a supplementary asset for Japan in international society. Miller (2014) 
 
pointed out that Japan’s defence policy that is aligned with the concept of proactive 
contribution to peace will mean the nation remains largely defensive in the East China 
Sea but will be more proactive in soft security affairs such as the HADR. This became 
clear when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013. In East Asia, where natural 
disasters have resulted in huge numbers of causalities, the HADR has become an 
essential component of regional security affairs. Japan and Taiwan are both natural 
disaster-prone areas in the region, which means both have expertise in this non-
traditional security field. If the Japan–Taiwan HADR-based cooperation is enhanced, 
this will improve the crisis management capabilities of the two actors, which could then 
subsequently be applied to other contingencies. In fact, non-traditional security 
cooperation has special symbolic importance for Taiwan given that non-controversial 
humanitarian international soft security cooperation involving, for example, the HADR 
and non-military medical cooperation have significant political implications, as 
indicated by the improvement of Japan’s perception of Taiwan after the latter donated 
generously and provided emotional support to the former during the triple disasters of 
2011. Importantly, Japan can accommodate Taiwan into international society by 
cooperating in HADR activities with Taiwan on humanitarian grounds, while Taiwan 
can enhance its HADR cooperation with Japan to help increase its importance in the 
Japan–US alliance and to counter the PRC’s attempts to exclude Taiwan from it. This 
will also help to further tip the Sino-Japanese regional balance of power in Japan’s 
favour.  
4.6.1 Taiwan’s HADR capabilities and the PRC’s sanctions 
With the endorsement of the US, the Taiwanese Air Force transported relief supplies 
using a C-130 transport plane and used US military bases for refuelling and repairs to 
help Haiti during the massive earthquake of 2010 (Guilloux, 2016). Furthermore, 
 
Taiwan’s air force and navy provided both official and private relief supplies using the 
C-130 transport plane and a landing ship-tank for HADR operations during Typhoon 
Haiyan in 2013 (Guilloux, 2016). These activities demonstrate Taiwan’s contributions 
to supplementing Japan’s HADR activities both regionally and globally. However, 
given the PRC’s sanctions, Taiwan has been severely restricted in carrying out HADR 
missions on either an international or regional scale. For example, in 2015, the PRC 
pressured the Nepalese government into refusing to accept an emergency response 
search-and-rescue team from Taiwan following the huge earthquake in Nepal, while the 
Nepalese government did accept medical help from Taiwan (New York Times, 2015). In 
fact, Taiwan has significant HADR capabilities, as manifested in its replenishment ships, 
which include the AOE 532 Panshih that forms part of the ROC navy. This provides 
Taiwan with naval and aerial re-supply capabilities with state-of-the-art medical 
facilities, even when it is physically away from its port (Strategic Review, 2015). In 
addition, on the grassroots level, Taiwan’s massive donations and emotional support for 
Japan during the 3/11 triple disasters in the Tohoku region increased the awareness 
among the Japanese of Taiwan’s potential to carry out HADR cooperation, as will be 
examined in the chapter on the fisheries agreement. In fact, the Ma administration cited 
humanitarian work as one of the major components of Taiwan’s second line of defence, 
one that clearly enhances Taiwan’s international development contribution (Glaser, 
2015). These geopolitical developments have ensured that Japan–Taiwan HADR 
cooperation are critical given that the sheer scale of the damage resulting from natural 
disasters such as the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the 2011 triple disaster in Japan, 
and 2013’s Typhoon Haiyan calls for major transnational efforts.  
 
 
4.6.2 Japan’s instrumentalisation of the HADR to enhance its security ties with 
Taiwan 
The MOFA in Tokyo immediately announced the dispatch of a specialised search-and-
rescue team following the massive earthquake in eastern Taiwan in 2018 (MOFA, 2018). 
Abe offered his condolences, displaying a picture of his calligraphy on Facebook 
(Taipei Times, 2018). Reportedly, the specialised search-and-rescue team members 
consisted of the MOFA, the JICA, the Tokyo Fire Department, the Tokyo Police 
Department, and the Japan Coast Guard’s Tokyo branch, while specialised HADR 
equipment was also dispatched (Taipei Times, 2018). Clearly then, Japan had chosen to 
openly dispatch the necessary relevant personnel and soft security equipment. 
Furthermore, in 2018, Abe used Twitter to express his gratitude to Taiwan in Mandarin 
Chinese in response to President Tsai’s Twitter message expressing (in Japanese) her 
condolences and readiness to provide support for the natural disaster that occurred in 
western Japan (Yahoo Qima Xinwen, 2018). 
In addition, according to the then mayor of Tainan City, Lai – who was known for 
having a strong background in foreign affairs and who later became a premier – Japan’s 
investigation team arrived in Tainan’s earthquake-stricken region to determine what 
support was needed by the local citizens following the huge earthquake of 2016 (Japan 
National Press Club, 2017). This development was appreciated by both Lai and the 
locals, especially given that other countries had been sending goods to Tainan without 
any consideration for the local needs (Japan National Press Club, 2017). This proves 
that the Japanese understand the importance of information gathering and intelligence 
analysis for effective HADR missions and demonstrates the significance of grassroots 
exchanges in times of natural disasters for Japan–Taiwan security relations. In fact, 
following the 1999 earthquake in Taizhong, the Japanese rescue team arrived in Taiwan 
 
before those of any other country. In short, since both Japan and Taiwan face the risk of 
natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, enhanced technical and personnel 
cooperation will undoubtedly increase the regional security.  
The NGO Peace Winds visited Japan and Taiwan for disaster preparedness coordination 
in April 2017, bringing Japan, Taiwan, the US, and the Philippines together to improve 
the regional capacity and collaboration in disaster relief activity (Peace Winds, 2017). 
Based on previous Japan–Philippines–US and Japan–Korea–US trilateral preparedness 
initiatives, Taiwan is a natural partner for such initiatives due to its vulnerability to 
diverse natural disasters, its geography, and its strong interest in regional cooperation 
(Peace Winds, 2017). The dialogue for the Peace Winds initiative included participants 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, various other 
government stakeholders, a number of NGOs, and various private sectors from both 
Japan and Taiwan (Peace Winds, 2017). This initiative was aimed at making Taiwan a 
natural partner and improving its HADR cooperation with Japan, the US, the 
Philippines, and various other countries. 
Japan also instrumentalises the APEC as an avenue to cooperate with Taiwan for 
regional security matters such as the HADR. Glaser (2015) pointed out that a large 
majority of Taiwan’s HADR cooperation relates to participation in the APEC’s 
Emergency Preparation Working Group, which is authorised to enhance emergency 
preparedness for natural disasters in the region. The Taiwanese Li Wei Sen is co-chair 
of the group alongside Kyoshi Natori (Glaser, 2015).  
4.6.3 Taiwan’s HADR contribution to Japan’s regional soft security leadership and 
soft power projection in international society 
Taiwan’s air force and navy engaged in huge HADR operations during Typhoon Haiyan, 
 
which severely affected the Philippines in 2013 (Glaser, 2015). If Japan’s large 
deployment of the SDF in the post-war period during Typhoon Haiyan was a major 
component in enhancing the nation’s soft power in the Philippines, then Taiwan’s 
HADR missions certainly supplemented Japan’s HADR operations, albeit indirectly, 
which is in sharp contrast to the PRC’s delayed dispatch of one hospital ship and its 
provision of severely limited financial support, despite domestic and international 
criticism (Reuters, 2013).  
Thus, the HADR is deemed to be a non-politicised political soft power contributor for 
Japan in the regional security environment. Taiwan can potentially play a 
supplementary role in Japan’s regional soft security leadership and can enhance its 
regional soft power in partnership. According to the Philippines’s National Security 
Policy implemented between 2011 and 2016, natural disasters were regarded as one of 
the main national security priorities for the Philippines (Philippines Government 
National Security Policy 2011–2016). Clearly, Japan–Taiwan HADR cooperation has 
relevant regional security implications for the Philippines and a number of other 
Southeast Asian member states. In fact, Japan participated in an anti-disaster drill with 
Malaysia and Australia in Taipei in March 2019 (Taiwan Today, 2019).  
Japan’s JICA undertook the training of Taiwanese HADR experts during the 2000s. 
Here, Japanese disaster relief team members trained with their Taiwanese, Singaporean, 
and Filipino counterparts to improve their knowledge and rescue skills for overseas 
disasters (Japan JICA, 2005). Following the huge landslide caused by the typhoon that 
hit Kaoshiung in 2010, Japan and Taiwan signed a mutual help agreement to improve 
sand control, with the two nations engaging in mutual exchanges involving anti-disaster 
experts and academics to improve sand control technology and minimise the risk of 
 
landslides (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Tokyo, 2016). Currently, 
Taiwan is proposing that it cooperates with Japan in providing anti-disaster and post-
disaster models to Southeast Asian countries to help them improve their capacity 
building and better handle the effects of climate change (Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Tokyo, 2016). In fact, the tiny Pacific Islands state of Palau – which has 
official ties with Taiwan – called for anti-drought support from Japan and Taiwan after 
it imposed a state of emergency due to a lack of drinkable and useable water (AFP, 
2016), with climate change cited as the reason for the drought. Here, Japan may have 
agreed with Taiwan’s views on the security of Palau as an anomalous case, while Palau 
diplomatically recognises Taiwan as a de jure state. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
international society is biased in favour of sovereign states, which can be somewhat 
detrimental to non-sovereign political communities. Therefore, Taiwan can enjoy some 
equality in its relations with Palau in international society as a sovereign state, which 
increases Taiwan’s political importance in the South Pacific and in relation to Japan’s 
Indo-Pacific strategy. 
4.6.4 HADR cooperation with Taiwan as a strategic shield for Japan’s normative 
power in the Sino-US rivalry 
The PRC may instrumentalise the HADR as leverage to lure Taiwan away from the 
Japan–US alliance and towards a cross-strait united front strategy. In other words, 
Japan’s enhancement of its HADR cooperation with Taiwan can be viewed as a strategic 
asset used to firmly lock Taiwan into the Japan–US alliance. A similar view was 
expressed in Shang-Su Wu’s 2016 research on the HADR in Taiwan. Here, Wu (2016) 
discussed the possibility of the PLA utilising the natural disasters that may strike Taiwan 
as a justification – on humanitarian grounds – for the deployment of the PLA on 
Taiwan’s soil to ‘safely’ and ‘legitimately’ invade Taiwan. According to unclassified 
 
documents from the US’s de facto embassy obtained from Wikileaks, during Typhoon 
Morakot, Ma’s incompetence in effectively handling the damage inflicted by the 
typhoon was heavily criticised. The PRC could have attempted to exploit this fact to 
dispatch its military and land on Taiwan’s soil (Wikileaks, 2011).  
In addition, the typhoon was a turning point in terms of reducing the number of black 
hawk helicopters in favour of heavy lift helicopters for HADR operations in Taiwan. 
This was welcome news to the PLA (Wikileaks, 2011) since it could easily disrupt the 
regional military balance in the Taiwan Strait (hitherto sustained by the Japan–US 
alliance; Wikileaks 2011). However, both US C-130 aircraft and naval vessels arrived 
in Taiwan to lead massive HADR operations. Meanwhile, for unspecified reasons, 
Japan’s MSDF vessel’s port call was declined (Wikileaks, 2011). Had things turned out 
differently, Japan–China–US relations over Taiwan may have been negatively affected 
due to the Taiwanese leadership’s lack of judgment and mismanagement (Wu, 2016). 
Clearly, the geopolitical developments surrounding Typhoon Morakot in Taiwan have 
increased the strategic need for Japan to enhance its HADR cooperation with Taiwan 
as well as its normative power in the Sino-US rivalry.  
4.7 Summary 
Japan is navigating Taiwan’s ambiguous status in the Japanese concept of CSD while 
instrumentalising Taiwan for its own security. Meanwhile, Taiwan is benefiting from 
Japan’s greater deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis the PRC. Taiwan’s self-defence 
capabilities are also an indirect military asset for Japan in reducing Chinese military 
pressure on Japan’s southern flank. Japan–Taiwan security relations may develop 
further in the field of non-kinetic military cooperation – including in terms of 
intelligence sharing – and in the field of non-traditional security, including track 2 
 
security dialogue, coastguard exchanges, and the HADR. If Japan enhances non-
traditional security ties with Taiwan in ways that are regarded as normative, 
humanitarian and non-coercive, such as the coast guard exchanges, and the HADR, 
Japan can still appease its One China Policy. Furthermore, Japan can tilt Sino-Japanese 
power-political relations in its favour by instrumentalising Taiwan in terms of non-
kinetic defence security and a non-traditional security asset. This will, in turn, enhance 
Japan’s standing vis-à-vis the PRC within the context of the One-China policy. 
Meanwhile, Japan will continue to navigate the ambiguities of the regional great power 
management with the PRC. Finally, regardless of whether Japan adheres to the Yoshida 
Doctrine or shifts toward the Abe Doctrine with regard to its external security policy, 
the nation’s security ties with Taiwan will continue to make incremental progress. The 
next chapter examines how Japan can socialise Taiwan through compliance with norms 
and rules generated in international security agencies, the membership to which requires 
statehood, such that Japan can enable Taiwan to contribute to Japan’s security through 
aviation participation.  
 
Chapter 5. International Civil Aviation Organization  
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we examine how Japan has gradually accommodated Taiwan as a 
normative aviation security asset into the regional aviation security environment. This 
has allowed Taiwan to contribute to Japan’s security by modifying the balance of power 
in relation to the PRC, while Japan continues to navigate the ambiguities of the regional 
great power management with the PRC within the context of the One-China policy. 
Taiwan can never become a full-fledged member of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) since the organisation requires statehood for membership, but 
Japan can enhance Taiwan’s ‘as if’ membership, thereby allowing Taiwan to fill the 
void in Japan’s international aviation security efforts. While Taiwan is attempting to 
prove itself as a valuable aviation security asset for Japan, according to the ESIR, this 
is, in fact, consolidating Japan’s superior position in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan 
relationship. This chapter also elucidates on how Japan can socialise Taiwan through 
compliance with international security norms and rules without affording it explicit 
membership; rather, Taiwan will be given an alternative opportunity to enable the nation 
to behave as if it is a member of international security efforts. Here, we adopt the area 
of aviation security as a case study.  
First, we discuss what the ICAO is and how Taiwan has been a marginalised entity 
within the organisation in the absence of its membership, which requires statehood, 
even though Taiwan has ample expertise and resources to contribute to international 
aviation security, including in terms of Japan. Second, we discuss how Taiwan’s 
marginalisation with regard to the ICAO affects Japan’s aviation security through 
conceptualising what Japan can do to instrumentalise Taiwan in terms of international 
 
aviation security efforts. Third, we examine the implications of Japan’s enhancement 
of its aviation security ties with Taiwan within the context of the ICAO. Fourth, using 
an Open Skies agreement as a case study, we examine the geopolitical implications of 
this agreement and how Japan instrumentalises Taiwan as an economic security asset 
in the power politics related to Sino-Japanese relations. Fifth, we examine the PRC’s 
non-normative Air Defence Identification Zone and how it negatively affects the 
regional legal order in aviation terms, while we also discuss how the role of Taiwan as 
an autonomous stakeholder in the ADIZ issue fits into the regional aviation security. 
Lastly, we examine Japan–Taiwan anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational 
organised crime cooperation to illuminate how Japan can enable Taiwan to behave as if 
it is a member of the ICAO, despite the lack of official membership in the absence of 
statehood.  
5.2 What is the ICAO and what does it mean for Taiwan?  
5.2.1 The main agenda of the ICAO 
The ICAO is a UN-specialised agency that was established in 1944 by member states 
to manage the administration and governance of international civil aviation based on 
the Chicago Convention, where the member states and industry groups arrive at a 
consensus on the rules and norms of international civil aviation, and the recommended 
practices, policies for safety, efficiency, economic sustainability, and environmental 
responsibility in civil aviation. Furthermore, ICAO member states attempt to ensure 
that their national civil aviation practices and regulations conform to international 
norms. This allows global civil flights to operate safely. The ICAO also attempts to 
support the coordination of aviation capacity building for states to pursue multilateral 
progress in air safety and navigation, maintain air transport standards, and audit civil 
aviation capabilities for the air safety and security of the member states (ICAO, n.d.). 
 
Clearly, since aviation is closely linked to airspace/airport management, the air force, 
law enforcement, air safety, aerial economy, and air transport, the ICAO is essential to 
the security of both Japan and Taiwan.  
5.2.2 Taiwan as a marginalised entity in the ICAO  
The ICAO restricts its membership to states that are members of the UN according to 
Article 93 of the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 2006 p. 42). Taiwan was formally 
excluded from the ICAO after it was expelled from the UN and the PRC replaced the 
ROC within the organisation. Taiwan’s legally unrecognised statehood complicates its 
participation in international organisations. President Barack Obama’s explicit 
statement regarding Taiwan’s non-representation at the ICAO in 2013 illustrates how 
non-statehood becomes a hindrance to accessing international organisations that require 
statehood for membership: 
[t]oday I have signed into law H.R. 1151, an Act concerning participation of 
Taiwan in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The United 
States fully supports Taiwan’s membership in international organisations 
where statehood is not a requirement for membership and encourages Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation, as appropriate, in organisations where its 
membership is not possible. My Administration has publicly supported 
Taiwan’s participation at the ICAO and will continue to do so. Consistent with 
my constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs, my Administration shall 
construe the Act to be consistent with the ‘One-China’ policy of the United 
States, which remains unchanged, and shall determine the measures best suited 
to advance the overall goal of Taiwan’s participation in the ICAO (The White 
House, 12 July 2013) 
 
Clearly, the US has to consider the One-China policy before supporting Taiwan’s 
participation in the ICAO. For Taiwan to be represented in the ICAO, both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait would have to make certain compromises. In fact, a compromise on 
Taiwan’s statehood and the PRC’s One-China principle was negotiated in the ICAO. 
The US supported Taiwan’s bid for observer-ship in its negotiations with the PRC, but 
the PRC opposed the US and instead sought a way to subordinate Taiwan within the 
context of the policy (Taipei Times, 2013). In the US’s domestic politics, the issue of 
how Taiwan can be represented in the ICAO, which honours the TRA and would not 
overtly breach the US’s stance on the One-China policy, became a decidedly political 
one (Kan and Morrison, 2014).  
Meanwhile, Taiwan recommenced its bid to regain observer-ship in the ICAO in 2009 
under the Ma administration, despite its lack of member status in the UN, which, as 
noted, is a requirement for membership in the ICAO (Glaser, 2013). While Taiwan 
consistently attempted to regain its ‘observer’ status despite the lack of international 
recognition regarding its sovereignty, it was ultimately up to Sino-US negotiations to 
determine how Taiwan’s creative representation in the ICAO would be achieved. 
Regarding Taiwan’s limited success in achieving restricted representation in the ICAO, 
Glaser (2013, pp. 18–19) pointed out that Jean Shen – the director general of Taiwan’s 
Civil Aeronautics Administration – led a delegation at the ICAO triennial meeting as a 
guest and stated that Taiwan would continue its efforts to obtain observer-ship for 
‘professional, pragmatic, dignified and meaningful’ participation in the ICAO.  
The above approach has created significant difficulties for Taiwan. Here, Glaser (2013) 
highlighted that while Taiwan’s guest participation was meant to upgrade Taiwan’s 
Flight Information Region to the ICAO standard, the guest-status was only applicable 
 
as a one-time access pass to the Triennial ICAO assembly. In short, Taiwan’s attendance 
at the technical meeting was not secured, and a new invitation was required for Taiwan 
to have its guest-status renewed such that it could attend the next assembly in 2016. 
These conditions are similar to those related to Taiwan’s limited participation in the 
WHO. Meanwhile, the PRC can prevent Taiwan from participating in the ICAO if the 
DPP comes to power. To achieve some form of limited participation, Taiwan will have 
to downgrade itself to a local entity in the context of the One-China policy (Taipei Times, 
2013). The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s spokesman stated the following:  
[t]he way that the Chinese Taipei CAA was invited by the ICAO council 
president as his guest reflects our goodwill to our Taiwanese compatriots and 
our sincerity to maintain the momentum of the peaceful development of cross-
strait relations (Taipei Times, 2013).  
Taiwan is concerned that China’s growing influence in global governance vis-à-vis 
international organisations may affect its international space in negative terms. Since 
the incumbent secretary general of the ICAO is a PRC national with a background in 
air safety issues and a prior position in the General Administration of Civil Aviation of 
China, collective anxiety surfaced in Taiwan regarding the sanctions imposed by the 
PRC against Taiwan’s limited participation in the ICAO (Focus Taiwan, 2016b). During 
the ICAO triennial, after the exclusion of Taiwan as a guest became public, Taiwanese 
journalists were barred from attending the triennial assembly (The China Post, 2016). 
This development led the Reporters Without Borders organisation to issue the following 
statement denouncing the ICAO: ‘[j]ournalists should not be prohibited from covering 
events because of their nationality or the nationality of the media they are affiliated with’ 
(The China Post, 2016). Reportedly, a Paraguayan officer in the ICAO revealed that the 
 
secretary general of the ICAO, Fang Liu, who was from the PRC, warned that if 
representatives from other countries attempted to speak up for Taiwan, their 
microphones would be muted (Zhongyang Tongji She, 2016).  
5.2.3 Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan into international aviation security  
Taiwan was prohibited from attending the triennial assembly in the ICAO in 2016, and 
the nation reportedly expressed its political will to ask Japan and the US for help (China 
Post 2016). Frank Hsieh, the current de facto ambassador for Taiwan in Tokyo, 
requested support for Taiwan’s participation in the triennial assembly in 2016 from the 
Japanese general public and from the Government of Japan in an article published in 
Asahi Shimbun (2016). These developments suggest that Taiwan considers Japan to be 
a critical ally for international aviation security in the ICAO vis-à-vis the PRC’s 
sanctions. Nevertheless, Japan’s attempt to enhance Taiwan’s international security 
profile will inevitably conflict with the PRC’s aim to downplay Taiwan as a domestic 
issue in the context of the One-China principle. Japan thus needs to navigate its Sino-
Japanese great power management regarding Taiwan and must instrumentalise Taiwan 
in terms of aviation security in accordance with the primary institutions in international 
society.  
Taiwan does not possess the latest database provided by the ICAO that contains the 
most up-to-date international aviation security and safety intelligence and information 
since it is not represented in the organisation. This has put Taiwan’s civil aviation in 
jeopardy due to the discrepancies in aviation safety and security standards and rules 
between Taiwan and the international community. Crucially, the exclusion of Taiwan 
conflicts with the current No Country Left Behind campaign proposed by the ICAO. 
This campaign assists member states of the ICAO, especially those from developing 
countries, to improve their capacity building and to harmonise international civil 
 
aviation security and safety standards (ICAO, 2014).  
 
5.2.4 Taiwan as a missing link in international aviation security: its implications 
for Japan’s security 
Since Taiwan is a highly developed democratic polity, its lack of access to the latest 
aviation security and safety database in the ICAO is unquestionably an anomaly. In fact, 
Taiwan is indispensable to international aviation activity. For example, the nation 
manages 18,000 nautical miles in its flight information region (FIR) and borders four 
other FIRs (Kao, 2016). Shen, the former de facto Taiwanese ambassador in 
Washington, pointed out that Taiwan’s FIR is seven times larger than its own territory 
(YouTube, 2015). In fact, Taiwan’s CAA handled a total of more than 1.5 million air 
traffic control services and 58 million air travellers in 2015 alone (Kao, 2016). From 
Japan’s aviation and economic security perspectives, Taiwan’s missing link in 
international aviation security is detrimental since Japan and Taiwan operate more than 
700 direct flights on a weekly basis, which is numerically equal to the number of cross-
strait flights (Hsieh, 2016). Crucially, even the Palestinian Liberation Organization was 
granted observer status in the ICAO in 1977 despite the fact it does not have a single 
aviation facility (Glaser, 2013). 
Clearly, the Japanese government understands that the geopolitical implications of the 
PRC’s sanctions on Taiwan in the ICAO negatively affect Japan’s own aviation security. 
This is due to the risks posed to the air lines of communication between Japan and 
Taiwan and the sheer scale of the aviation-related economic activities between the two 
actors. The PRC sanctioned Taiwan’s participation in the ICAO when it participated as 
a guest under the Tsai administration in September 2016 (Nikkei Shimbun, 2016). Here, 
the PRC shifted the blame to the Tsai administration in the DPP by stating that Taiwan 
 
is merely a province of China and does not have the right to attend the ICAO (Nikkei 
Shimbun, 2016). Regarding this development, the chief cabinet secretary in the Abe 
administration, Suga Yoshihide, stated that ‘it is desirable for Taiwan to participate in it 
[the ICAO] in one way or another’, adding that Japan and Taiwan operate numerous 
regular direct flights and that Japan should ensure the safe and stable development of 
international civil aviation (Nikkei Shimbun, 2016). These comments clearly suggest 
that the Japanese government considers the absence of Taiwan in the ICAO to be 
detrimental both to international aviation security and Japan’s security. This makes 
Japan’s aviation security engagement with Taiwan even more critical.  
5.2.5 Taiwan as an aviation security asset for Japan’s security and beyond  
It is essential that Taiwan maximises its aviation security ties with Japan and other 
countries to enhance its own aviation security and safety capabilities and to open up 
alternative revenues for Taiwan to obtain the most up-to-date aviation intelligence and 
information. As the Malaysian government’s behaviour vis-à-vis the search-and-rescue 
operation for Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 (most of the passengers were from the 
PRC) indicates (Reuters, 2015), updated airspace management and aviation security 
intelligence capabilities for each ICAO member, including Taiwan and China, is 
essential for international security. Indeed, this will have positive implications for 
Japan’s aviation security. Japan has legitimate security interests vis-a-vis Taiwan’s 
quasi-participation in the ICAO. Even if Taiwan’s lack of statehood makes it difficult 
for it to engage in a high-profile security relationship with Japan, this does not mean 
that Taiwan cannot contribute to Japan’s security or to international security, including 
in the East China Sea. In fact, one of the main contributions Taiwan can make to 
regional security relates to the field of intelligence. Non-traditional, transnational, and 
multi-dimensional aviation security do not depend on the concept of sovereignty, but 
 
do depend on international cooperation to mitigate any issues. It is here that the 
exclusion of Taiwan from international aviation security cooperation and networking 
simply does not make sense. The Aviation Intelligence Report of 2015 stated the 
following:  
[i]n short, tackling global issues will require global cooperation and the ability 
to move faster than the current regulatory process. If we are to be effective in 
combating these new kinds of threats, sovereignty will need to be left at the 
door and a new level of collaboration between countries, agencies and all 
industry stakeholders will be essential (Brooks, 2015, p. 4) 
This quote applies to Taiwan, which is marginalised from international security efforts 
despite the strong capability, affluent resources, know-how, and technical knowledge it 
possesses. We can look at what ensued with Taiwan’s HADR cooperation vis-a-vis 
Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 to understand the consequences of excluding Taiwan 
from international aviation security efforts. According to Glaser (2015), while Taiwan’s 
air force and navy were immediately dispatched to Malaysia following the tragic 
disappearance of the civilian aircraft in 2014, the PRC pressured the Malaysian 
authorities to send them back. Thus, Taiwan’s aerial and naval HADR missions were 
eventually withdrawn (Glaser, 2015, p.31).  
As a potential contribution by Taiwan’s intelligence to international aviation security in 
the ICAO, Kuang-shih Yeh, the minister of transportation and communication, pointed 
out that Taiwan was the first polity that brought a communications, navigation, and 
surveillance air traffic management system into service in 2011. In fact, the ICAO had 





5.3 Japan’s Instrumentalisation of Taiwan as an Aviation Security 
Asset in relation to the Sino-Japanese Balance of Power 
Japan’s instrumentalisation of Taiwan as an aviation security asset generates an 
alternative narrative regarding Taiwan in face of the conventional narrative that Taiwan 
is a geopolitical source of tension or pawn in great power politics. The latter narrative 
was manifested in ‘the abandonment of Taiwan theory’ in Sino-US relations. Here, Fan 
(VOA Chinese, 2016) argued that if Taiwan has no value for the US, it is possible that 
it would abandon Taiwan, as was the case in the 1970s. Therefore, Taiwan must 
emphasise its shared democratic values and strategic importance in handling the US’s 
relations with the PRC (Fan VOA Chinese, 2016). The Japan–Taiwan aviation security 
cooperation will help to improve the geostrategic value of Taiwan in the eyes of the US 
in aviation security terms.  
If bilateral Japan–Taiwan relations help improve international aviation security, Taiwan 
will become an aviation security asset for international security as opposed to merely 
being the subject of the ‘Taiwan issue’ in Sino-US and Sino-Japanese tensions, despite 
its status as a de facto state. Furthermore, Taiwan can diversify its strategic narratives 
for Japan’s security beyond the excessively emphasised narrative of Taiwan’s 
geographical importance for its neighbour’s defence of its sea lines of communication. 
Furthermore, greater aviation security and safety cooperation between Japan and 
Taiwan would help to mitigate Japan’s concerns regarding Taiwan’s strategic alignment 
with the PRC on regional aviation security issues, especially in terms of the East China 
 
Sea. Japan can instrumentalise Taiwan as an aviation security asset vis-à-vis the PRC 
to affect the regional balance of power – even though Taiwan is a non-state actor – in 
accordance with the primary institutions in international society related to the ESIR.  
5.3.1 Risks posed by Taiwan’s inability to receive aviation intelligence and 
information: Implications for Japan 
Regarding the exclusion of Taiwan from the ICAO’s triennial assembly, the de facto 
incumbent Taiwanese ambassador in Washington, Stanley Kao, stated the following:  
[a]s aviation safety knows no boundaries and requires close cooperation of 
countries around the world, keeping Taiwan out for political reasons does not 
serve ICAO’s mission, and has left the global aviation security system 
incomplete’ (Washington Times, 2016b).  
Taiwan has been obtaining ICAO data through informal diplomacy by engaging with 
ICAO member states, but this has proven to be costly in terms of both budget and time. 
According to Julie Yu Wen Chen (2013), Taiwan relied on receiving ICAO’s air security 
intelligence and information from the US’s FAA. However, due to certain US aviation 
security policy changes, this intelligence and information may have been Americanised 
and thus different from what the ICAO was expecting the member states to provide 
(Julie, 2013). In some cases, such a delay and disadvantage in obtaining aviation data 
jeopardised the aviation security in Taiwan’s airspace and airport-related facilities 
despite the criticality of Taiwan’s airspace. Taiwan was often not even aware of the 
technical and regional meetings conducted by the ICAO due to its lack of ICAO 
membership (ROC MOFA, 2011). For example, according to the ROC’s MOFA, in 
2006, the new security rules imposed by the ICAO regarding liquids, aerosols, and gels 
in cabin luggage was not relayed to Taiwan in a timely manner. In fact, the rules were 
implemented in 2007 without Taiwanese authorities being informed. Taiwan was not 
 
even aware of this policy change until its aviation authority was asked for its comments 
on the matter, which led to massive confusion in Taiwan’s aviation security and safety 
(ROC MOFA, 2011). The issue of incompatibility was also discussed (ROC MOFA, 
2011). Given that Taiwan depended on the US’s FAA for aviation safety information 
(Chen, 2013), and given that this information was often Americanised, it was generally 
not aligned with the ICAO’s security policy. This, in turn, created the issue of 
incompatibility in the audit system (which was reported by the US’s FAA). In short, it 
was difficult for Taiwan’s FIR to adjust to the ICAO’s standards (ROC MOFA ,2011). 
Furthermore, most of the ICAO member states underwent a universal safety program 
to improve their audit systems but, given Taiwan’s exclusion, the credibility of its audit 
system was frequently questioned (ROC MOFA, 2011). In addition, Taiwan’s 
information and intelligence sharing with ICAO member states was severely limited 
due to its non-representation (ROC MOFA, 2011).  
The issue of the compliance of Taiwan’s aviation rules and regulations with 
international standards and norms has direct implications for international civil aviation 
security and safety. For example, the fatigue issue among pilots is significant for 
Taiwan’s aviation safety, as was manifested in Trans Asia’s ground collision with 
urbanised areas in 2015 (Aerotime News, 2016). In a more recent case, China Airline, 
the largest airline in Taiwan, experienced its first major strike by its pilots, which was 
partly due to the fatigue issue (Japan Times, 2016). The strike affected air transport 
routes such as those between Taipei and Fukuoka. Clearly then, the fatigue issue in 
Taiwan’s civil and commercial airlines that fly over the airspace between Taiwan and 
Japan must be addressed in compliance with the international standards and rules of the 
ICAO. This may have direct implications for aviation security and safety, as well as for 
the economic security of Japan and Taiwan. From this perspective, Taiwan must be 
 
accommodated into international civil aviation security and safety networks by Japan. 
 
5.3.2 Japan’s socialisation of Taiwan through international aviation security 
norms for Taiwan’s as if membership  
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, for the PRC and the ICAO, Taiwan is considered neither 
a state nor an international organisation, and the PRC is extremely sensitive to any 
political gestures that may imply Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, the PRC opposes any 
foreign intervention in this matter, and it was incensed by the US’s overt ties with 
Taiwan. While Japan’s signing of an Open Skies agreement with Taiwan was considered 
provocative from the standpoint of Taiwan’s legal status and led to some discomfort in 
the PRC, Japan’s low-key, less visible yet significant approach to upgrading Taiwan’s 
air safety and security is certainly a creative one. Furthermore, even if the role Japan 
plays in cross-strait relations is low-key in comparison with the role played by the US 
due to the absence of a Japanese version of the TRA, Japan still provides Taiwan with 
a quasi-platform to enable the latter to behave as if it is a semi-legitimate aviation 
security actor, thus contributing to international aviation security. As such, Taiwan 
probably better meets the required criteria for potential future membership in the ICAO. 
Of course, while whether Taiwan can arrange with the PRC to obtain representation in 
the ICAO is not a matter for Japan to decide, Japan can still provide alternative 
representation options to Taiwan.  
5.3.3 Japan’s utilisation of the ICAO’s regulations to improve Taiwan’s aviation 
security contributions  
The ICAO lacks a formal international aviation dispute resolution mechanism to deal 
with high-profile contentious aviation security issues, such as the Air Defence 
Identification Zone (ADIZ). Meanwhile, the ICAO is still the representative authority 
 
on normative developments in international civil aviation security. The Chicago 
Convention regulates international civil aviation rules and standards, and the ICAO 
provides the most authoritative data available on civil aviation issues, including security 
and safety issues, to signatory member states. Taiwan’s reincorporation into the ICAO 
would be a symbolic recognition of the nation’s international aviation security 
contributions. In fact, Japan has used ICAO recognition to evaluate the strategic 
reliability of other state aviation actors. For example, only after the ICAO 
acknowledged that the Philippines had cleared certain aviation security and safety 
standard issues did Japan lift restrictions on international flights to the Philippines and 
sign an Open Skies agreement with it in 2013 (Rappler, 2013).  
The ICAO also does not have a mechanism to carry out legal punishments against non-
normative aviation actors. For example, even after the coercive ADIZ was unilaterally 
established by the PRC to regulate the airspace in the East China Sea in 2013, the legal 
clarification of the controversial ADIZ remains ambiguous, as will be examined in the 
ADIZ section. Nonetheless, the ICAO does have the normative authority to create 
international norms for international aviation security and safety, which defines certain 
aviation behaviours as unacceptable in accordance with international norms on aviation 
security. For example, Parameswaran (The Diplomat, 2015) pointed out that Thailand 
was downgraded to a category 2 nation by the ICAO in 2015. This means that Thailand 
was red flagged for deficiencies in several areas following an audit. As will be examined 
in the ADIZ section, if certain aviation behaviours are regarded as more normatively 
progressive and can be emulated within international society, then more peaceful and 
amicable Japan–Taiwan aviation security relations will be regarded as more normative 
in the ICAO in relation to the PRC’s coercive aviation behaviours.  
 
Japan may not have the authority to influence Taiwan’s representation in the ICAO, but 
the sheer scale of Japan–Taiwan aviation relations requires Taiwan to be an aviation 
security asset. This helps contribute to peace and stability in terms of regional aviation 
security. It is within this context that Japan’s engagement with Taiwan plays an 
incremental and low-key yet significant, substantive, and symbolic role in ensuring 
Taiwan attains ‘as if’ membership in international society, including in terms of aviation 
security and safety in the ICAO. Much like Japan used the UN’s mandate as an avenue 
to overcome domestic constraints and incrementally enhance its international security 
in the post-Cold War era (Singh, 2013d), the nation has been utilising various bilateral 
political measures and concluding aviation security relevant agreements with Taiwan 
to afford its neighbour opportunities to behave like a semi-legitimate non-state actor in 
aviation security in accordance with the ICAO’s standards.  
5.4 The implications of Japan’s enhancement of aviation security ties 
with Taiwan in the context of the ICAO 
5.4.1 Japan’s civil aviation security strategy and Taiwan 
The development of civil aviation is essential for Japan’s national security strategy. 
Regarding the centrality of the aviation development in Japan, which includes the 
Japanese commercial aviation that occupies the centrality of the third arrow in 
Abenomics, Cronin (2013) argued that Japanese civil aviation is a great indicator of 
whether the third arrow will be successful. Within the context of Sino-Japanese 
relations, Japan is currently competing with China to develop its own commercial jets, 
and will attempt to internationally promote them as an alternative civil aviation option 
for strategic use in view of the established Western commercial jets. This indicates the 
civil aviation’s cruciality for Japan’s global strategic and economic agendas (Forbes, 
2015). Meanwhile, amid the rising tensions in the East and South China Seas, the 
 
strategic importance of aviation is becoming ever more critical. These developments in 
Japan’s aviation mean aviation security is becoming essential to Japan’s overall security. 
Here, Japan cannot afford to have Taiwan as a missing link when shaping the emerging 
regional aviation security environment for its own security vis-à-vis the PRC.  
The US is directly responsible for enhancing the international space of Taiwan based 
on the TRA (American Institute in Taiwan, 1979). The Government of Japan did not 
issue an explicit official statement regarding Taiwan similar to Obama’s 2013 bill on 
Taiwan’s ICAO participation. This indicates that Japan prefers a low-key approach in 
contrast to the US’s TRA, given the lack of a solid domestic legal and institutional 
framework defining Japan–Taiwan relations. Therefore, Japan’s usual trade-off with the 
US in terms of the opportunity to play a high-profile role in diplomatic leadership in 
return for obtaining maximum national security for Japan can be implicitly observed in 
the form of Japan’s indirect support to Taiwan for expanding Taiwan’s international 
security profile. This support was manifested in terms of Taiwan’s de facto greater 
representation in the area of international aviation security.  
Japan has utilised Taiwan’s potential civil aviation security capabilities by concluding 
a number of high-profile agreements, if not state-centric treaties, with Taiwan, such as 
an Open Skies agreement. Japan has helped Taiwan become part of the regional Open 
Skies regime in East Asia, ensuring Taiwan is an alternative independent aviation 
security asset to the PRC. Finally, Japan has incorporated Taiwan within anti-global 
terror and anti-transnational organised crime networks.  
5.4.2 Japan–Taiwan aviation-related law enforcement cooperation and its 
geopolitical implications  
As noted, Taiwan has been excluded from international organisations that require 
 
statehood for membership. Following the PRC’s sanctions against its guest participation 
in the ICAO, Taiwan has expressed even greater strategic interest in participating in 
other international security agencies such as Interpol (Taipei Times, 2016). Interestingly, 
while Taiwan lost its official seat in the UN in 1971, it remained a member of Interpol 
until 1984 (Glaser, YouTube, 2015). This indicates the importance of Taiwan’s 
participation in international policing efforts. In fact, it is not unfeasible that excluding 
Taiwan will make it a potential loophole for international terrorist and transnational 
crime organisations.  
From this perspective, Japan’s civil aviation security cooperation with Taiwan– 
including in terms of international anti-terrorism and anti-transnational crime, airport 
security, and border and immigration security – benefits Japan’s own security situation. 
Crucially, Japan and Taiwan concluded three bilateral law enforcement agreements that 
are essential for deterring anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational organised 
crime. The first was an agreement related to anti-terrorism financing through money 
laundering, while the second was an agreement over intelligence sharing for border and 
immigration security (Interchange Association Archive, 2014) and the third was a 
customs enforcement agreement for combating smuggling and enhancing the clearance 
system via information sharing and expertise (Taiwan Today, 2017), all of which serve 
to enhance Japan’s international security. Regarding the importance of intelligence and 
information sharing for regional law enforcement efforts, including in financial terms, 
in recent years, Taiwan’s neighbours with sizeable Islamic populations in Southeast 
Asia have been receiving unfettered access to financial support from Wahhabi 
foundations in Saudi Arabia to promote a less tolerant interpretation of Islam (Nikkei 
Asian Review, 2016). Furthermore, according to Lai L Chung, in 2006, North Korean 
ships frequented the port in Kaohsiung in Southern Taiwan largely because Taiwan is 
 
an essential sea line of communication for North Korean shipping. Here, Chung 
recommended that Taiwan import stronger military warning radar intelligence 
capabilities from the US to initiate air defence intelligence sharing with Japan (Taipei 
Times, 2006). In fact, using the US’s secret intelligence, Taiwan detained a North 
Korean ship and confiscated 150 barrels of chemical rocket fuel in 2003 (Glaser, 
YouTube, 2015). This suggests that Taiwan’s security cooperation with other countries, 
including Japan, is not only essential for bilateral Japan–Taiwan law enforcement 
cooperation but that it also has huge geopolitical implications for international and 
regional strategic-security issues such as the non-proliferation of WMDs in the Korean 
Peninsula.  
5.4.3 Taiwan’s exclusion: its negative implications for aviation security, and 
Taiwan’s potential role in aviation security for Japan  
The former UN secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon (2016), stated in his ICAO address that 
no member state can be left behind as a specialised agency in the UN for the sake of 
global aviation safety and security. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Taiwan had been 
excluded from the ICAO until it gained inclusion in late 2013. However, the nation was 
again excluded from the ICAO’s triennial in 2016 despite the fact that its airspace 
presented a highly critical flight route for civil aviation and its lack of representation in 
the ICAO may have put the global and regional civil aviation field at risk due to the 
lack of up-to-date aviation safety and security intelligence and information provided by 
the ICAO. Regarding the re-exclusion of Taiwan from the ICAO and its negative 
security implications for international security, Nigel Evans – a member of the UK’s 
House of Commons and co-chair of the British–Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary 
Group, who was a part of the visiting British delegation in Taiwan – asked what the big 
difference was between 2013 and 2016 (Focus Taiwan, 2016). The answer was that ‘far 
 
more aircraft and passengers’ are flying in Taiwan’s airspace, meaning ‘it is more 
important today than it was three years ago that Taiwan participates in this aviation 
conference’ (Focus Taiwan, 2016).  
In addition, as was discussed in the literature review, Taiwan is essential for a stable 
balance of power and the enhancement of the legal order regarding regional maritime 
security issues in the East China Sea and beyond. The same applies to the defence of 
airspace. For example, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence revealed that a powerful early 
warning radar that was newly deployed by the military in Hsinchu county in Taiwan in 
2012 detected and monitored missiles launched by North Korea (Focus Taiwan, 2012). 
Here, a ministry official stated how ‘[o]ur long-range early warning radar system 
detected the North Korean rocket flying over waters some 200 kilometers east of 
Taiwan’ and added that ‘the first and second stages of the rocket crashed into the waters 
off South Korea and the Philippines, respectively’. Furthermore, the Taipei Times 
described Taiwan’s powerful air defence radar as ‘the most powerful EWR installation 
on the face of the planet’ one that can ‘simultaneously track as many as 1,000 airborne 
targets the size of a golf ball within a range of 3,000km’ (Taipei Times, 2012).  
At least one former de facto Japanese ambassador and one former director in Japan-
Taiwan Exchange Association have acknowledged the criticality of instrumentalising 
Taiwan’s intelligence capability for Japan’s security. For his part, the former de facto 
ambassador of Japan in Taiwan, Uchida (2006), stated that Japan and Taiwan need to 
have more consolidated security dialogue mechanisms and pointed out that inadequate 
information and intelligence sharing between the two actors regarding military aviation 
may increase the risk of air incidents. Here, Uchida (2006) revealed that once Taiwan 
falls into the hands of the PRC, missiles initially directed at Taiwan from mainland 
 
China may be easily re-directed at Japan. Meanwhile, in 2013, a former director at the 
Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, Ogata, who has a high-profile military 
background as the former director of the J1 Joint Staff Office MODA, suggested that, 
in addition to cooperating for non-military maritime security and the HADR, Japan and 
Taiwan should cooperate to implement guidelines for an aviation contingency in the 
geographically connected airspaces between the two nations (Ogata, 2013).  
5.4.4 Japan’s position on Taiwan’s restricted international space  
As discussed in the CSD chapter, if Japan’s security ties with Taiwan are considered 
humanitarian in nature, as is the case with the HADR, it will be normatively difficult 
for the PRC to sanction them. According to Matsuda (2012), Japan would not accept 
the One-China policy in the PRC’s favour if a global security issue stemming from 
Taiwan’s exclusion was considered a humanitarian issue or had the potential to 
negatively affect Japan’s public health issues. Japan will navigate the ambiguities of the 
regional great power management with the PRC if the security issue in question is 
considered humanitarian by international society within the context of Japan’s One-
China policy.  
Taiwan was excluded from WHO until the Ma administration came to power. 
Nonetheless, Japan, under the Koizumi administration, explicitly supported Taiwan’s 
representation in WHO in ways that would satisfy all the stakeholders (Matsuda, 2012). 
In fact, even the PRC was losing the moral high ground in resisting Taiwan’s 
participation in WHO for humanitarian reasons. Domestically, the lack of access to 
essential medical intelligence and information in Taiwan, which were necessary to 
effectively minimise the outbreak of SARS in the nation, led to outrage among the 
Taiwanese population (Shen, YouTube, 2015). Furthermore, according to Shen, the 
former de facto Taiwanese ambassador in Washington, since Taiwan was the second 
 
largest state affected by the outbreak of SARS, despite the fact that the virus was first 
transmitted from the PRC to Taiwan, international society was convinced to 
accommodate Taiwan (Shen, YouTube 2015). Along with the US and the EU, Japan 
supported Taiwan diplomatically in a high-profile manner. Meanwhile, while the PRC 
attempted to subordinate Taiwan into the One-China policy framework, much like in 
the case of the ICAO, the PRC’s attempt to encourage WHO to reject Taiwan was a 
failure (Matsuda, 2012). Consequently, Taiwan was granted observer status in the World 
Health Agency, a major organ of WHO. 
5.4.5 Japan’s low-key stance vis-à-vis Taiwan in 2013 and high-profile stance vis-
à-vis Taiwan in 2016 in the ICAO 
Unlike the US and the EU, Japan did not take a strong stance regarding Taiwan’s guest 
representation in the ICAO in 2013. More than 80 MEPs from the EU called upon 
Raymond Benjamin, the former secretary general of the ICAO. Among them was 
Charles Tannock – a MEP from the UK and chairman of the EP–Taiwan Friendship 
Group – who stated that ‘[t]he Taipei FIR plays a critical role in this area’, adding that 
‘[i]t is clear that it would be of significant benefit, both to Taiwan and to the ICAO, to 
allow Taiwan to participate in the organisation as an observer’ (European Business 
Review, 2013). Meanwhile, as was discussed earlier, Obama signed a bill explicitly 
supporting Taiwan’s representation in the ICAO.  
Interestingly, unlike in 2013, Japan decided to take a stronger stance against Taiwan’s 
ostracisation by the PRC regarding the ICAO in 2016. Suga Yoshihide, a part of the 
Abe administration, expressed some displeasure about the ostracisation (Nikkei 
Shimbun, 2016). Furthermore, in an official statement, the ROC’s MOFA (2011) 
referenced the Japanese government’s public support for Taiwan’s aspiration to be 
represented in the ICAO. While the reason behind the change of stance by the Japanese 
 
government requires further research, one interesting development is that the grassroots 
support for Taiwan in Japan has become ever more consolidated in recent years. 
For example, around 130 pro-Taiwan councillors from across Japan and from 
delegations in Taiwan cities (headed by Hsieh) gathered in Wakayama City and created 
the so-called Wakayama Statement. According to the statement, since the number of 
Japan–Taiwan annual personnel exchanges had already reached six million, the 
delegation supported Taiwan’s participation in the ICAO and other international 
organisations (Taipei Times, 2016c). Furthermore, Japan’s public reacted to Taiwan’s 
exclusion from the ICAO, with Yomiuri Shimbun’s (2016) editorial arguing that instead 
of intimidating Taiwan, China should enhance its economic activities and conduct 
dialogues with it. Even the liberal-leaning Asahi Shimbun’s (2016) editorial argued that 
the pressure China had put on the ICAO to exclude Taiwan had put aviation security at 
risk. 
5.5 The Bilateral Japan–Taiwan Open Skies Agreement  
5.5.1 What is the Open Skies agreement? 
The EU has been attempting to harmonise safety regulatory standards by implementing 
consistent safety and security rules for different aircraft and operations based on 
potential risk assessments in accordance with the ICAO. Here, the union has effectively 
created one sky over the airspace of Europe, which has become known as a ‘cabotage’ 
(Shimoi, 2010). The EU’s ‘open skies’ model inspired ASEAN states in the 1990s to 
create an integrated aviation market for aviation security and safety (European 
Commission Press Release Database, 2014).  
The bilateral Japan–Taiwan Open Skies agreement symbolically accommodated 
Taiwan as an independent aviation security asset. Crucially, the agreement 
 
institutionalised the deregulation of the amount of air traffic between Japan and Taiwan 
and allowed an unlimited number of scheduled flights to be operated between the two 
nations (China Post, 2011). Tokyo was initially exempted from these effects but was 
soon also subjected to a greater number of flights, as is examined below. Furthermore, 
the agreement gave both sides so-called ‘beyond rights’, allowing both Japanese and 
Taiwanese airlines to transport passengers to a second country from Japan or Taiwan 
and from that country to a third country, and so on (China Post, 2011).  
Meanwhile, Shimoi (2010) argued for an East Asian regional open skies regime given 
that the East Asian region is the fastest growing commercial aviation market, faster even 
than the EU or North American markets. The bilateral Japan–Taiwan Open Skies 
agreement followed this global trend. The agreement itself aimed for greater 
commercial aviation activities between Japan and Taiwan. The fact that Japan 
negotiated and concluded such an agreement with Taiwan itself is a de facto recognition 
of Taiwan as an important regional aviation entity in the East China Sea, one that is 
independent from the PRC in the regional aviation security environment.  
5.5.2 The Open Skies agreement’s geopolitical implication from a historical 
perspective  
The geopolitical implications of the Open Skies agreement become clear through an 
examination of the history of Japan–US aviation relations. Following the surrender of 
Imperial Japan in 1945, the GHQ ordered a ban on Japanese civil aviation. However, 
after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the ban was lifted (Cronin, 2013). 
Subsequently, the US and Japan signed an agreement in 1952 that granted them carrier 
rights to increase or decrease their weekly number of flights without prior notification. 
This was, in essence, the beginning of the historical process for the Japan–US Open 
Skies agreement concluded in 2010 (Cronin, 2013). The US considered a ban on Japan’s 
 
civil aviation to be strategically beneficial to its interests in that it wanted to ensure that 
Japan would not revive its air force after WWII and become a threat again. However, 
with the intensification of the Cold War and the breakout of war in the Korean Peninsula, 
a political need emerged to revive Japan’s aviation sector and airspace for geo-strategic 
reasons. Cronin (2013) pointed out that the treaty on aviation signed with Japan in 1952 
during the Korean War granted US carriers unlimited beyond rights to utilise Japan’s 
airspace and airports as a hub to other destinations in the rest of Asia.  
In the case of the UK, regarding the strategic, sovereign, and national security 
implications of the Open Skies agreement, Dodds and Adey (2014) stated the following:  
[w]e might be reminded of their historical evolution in this context, as Paul K. 
Saint Amour’s alerts us to a 1955 summit held in Geneva when President 
Eisenhower proposed an open skies agreement with the Soviet Union, France 
and Britain, that would permit aerial reconnaissance into each other’s territory 
for ‘photographic reassurance’ of each country’s weapons arsenal. The Soviet’s 
refusal would lead to the deployment of high-altitude spy planes like the U2.  
5.5.3 Japan-Taiwan Open Skies agreement: Geopolitical Implications for Taiwan’s 
airspace 
The fact that Taiwan signed the Open Skies agreement with Japan is geopolitically 
critical. Following Japan’s termination of the diplomatic recognition of the ROC, the 
most salient issue the country faced in terms of maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan 
related to bilateral civil aviation (Kiyomizu, 2009). Japan signed a bilateral Open Skies 
agreement with Taiwan that is commercial in nature yet requires Japan to exercise 
significant political decisions. This indicates that Japan recognised Taiwan’s de facto 
independent airspace as separate from the PRC since it was Taipei that Japan negotiated 
 
the agreement with and not Beijing. According to Matsuda (YouTube, 2014), Japan’s 
conclusion of the agreement with Taiwan certainly increased the PRC’s ire. 
Nevertheless, the Open Skies agreement is cited as evidence of peaceful bilateral 
Japan–Taiwan relations in Taiwan’s official online archive of the bilateral Japan–
Taiwan fisheries agreement (ROC MOFA, 2013, p. 2). The Open Skies agreement 
symbolises the mutual political trust that binds Japan and Taiwan while the former 
navigates the ambiguities of the One-China policy in relation to the regional great 
power management in Sino-Japanese relations. 
The UK and Russia instrumentalised the Open Skies agreement for a ‘confidence-
building measure’. This allowed the two sides to conduct de facto unarmed intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance activities using civilian aircraft within mutual airspace 
and aviation facilities, including aerial military facilities (UK Defence Journal, 2016). 
Following the conclusion of their bilateral Open Skies agreement, Japan and Taiwan 
were able to enhance their aviation security and safety-related procedures in equal 
measure. Defining it as one component of their commercial naval aviation activities, 
Japan and Taiwan also signed an agreement for naval aviation search-and-rescue 
cooperation (Focus Taiwan, 2013). This had positive effects in the East China Sea in 
terms of non-traditional security and safety. According to the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office (2013) in the US, the function of this agreement is as 
follows:  
[u]nder the agreement on sea search-and-rescue, the Taipei Mission Control 
Center and Tokyo Rescue Control Center will closely cooperate and coordinate 
their actions in aviation accidents, and arrange visits, training sessions and other 
activities on a regular basis to enhance capabilities.  
 
5.5.4 Economic balance of power and Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan into the 
regional commercial aviation regime  
Unlike with the PRC, which from time to time boycotts Japanese products, stops 
inbound Chinese tourists from entering Japan, or even conducts violent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations, Japan’s tourist ties with Taiwan are far less influenced by geopolitical 
risks; rather, they serve as an economic security instrument vis-à-vis the PRC’s 
economic coercion. Taiwan has long considered Japan to be an economic balancer as 
Taiwan’s economic reliance on mainland China continued to expand (Ogasawara, 2014). 
If economic security is a component of the balance of power theory in the ESIR, Japan, 
as the second largest trading partner of Taiwan, is essential for maintaining the cross-
strait balance of power in Taiwan’s favour. Furthermore, the fact that Japan and Taiwan 
signed an Open Skies agreement to streamline and expand civilian flights without 
governmental intervention can not only be understood within the context of greater 
economic security and commercial benefits but can also be interpreted as a 
consolidation of Taiwan’s de facto airspace independence. The PRC cannot interfere 
with civilian flight routes between Japan and Taiwan since neither Japanese nor 
Taiwanese airlines are affected by governmental intervention. Thus, thanks to Japan’s 
political and economic leadership, Taiwan is being incorporated into a growing regional 
aviation regime.  
For Taiwan, the diversification of economic partners is a major component in the issue 
of the Taiwan Strait vis-à-vis Taiwan’s survival in the face of the PRC’s economic 
coercion. The question of how Taiwan can enhance this in creative terms in relation to 
Japan is an important component of the emerging regional security environment in East 
Asia, including in terms of the cross-strait issue. A Taiwan that is economically less 
reliant on the PRC may find it easier to strategically contribute to Japan’s security in 
 
the Japan–China–Taiwan power politics relationship. Crucially, economic power is an 
important component of the balance of power in primary institutions in international 
society according to ESIR theory, which means the Japan–Taiwan Open Skies 
agreement can help to tilt the Sino-Japanese and Sino-Taiwanese balance of power in 
Japan’s favour.  
 
5.5.5 The Open Skies agreement: Increased Japan-Taiwan tourism  
Greater Japan–Taiwan bilateral civil aviation cooperation has been a critical factor in 
increasing the number of Taiwanese tourists visiting Japan after the triple disasters in 
the Tohoku Region in 2011, which has been achieved by institutionalising a greater 
number of airlines to connect Japan to Taiwan at various regional airports via the Open 
Skies agreement (Ikegami, 2015). For example, Haneda and Songshan airports 
commenced regular international flights following the opening of a new terminal at the 
former (Ikegami, 2015). According to Nikkei Business, the Open Skies agreement 
encouraged a greater number of low-cost carrier operators to fly between Taiwan and 
Naha. From March 2013 to March 2014, a record 627,000 international inbound tourists 
visited Okinawa, a 64% increase on the previous year. Meanwhile, Taiwan witnessed 
slightly more than 40% in international inbound tourist traffic and accounted for the 
largest nationality group of foreign tourists in Okinawa (Nikkei Business, 2014). 
Ikegami (2015) noted that the Open Skies agreement between Japan and Taiwan made 
it possible for local airports in both nations to open new flight routes between each 
nation, which served to remove restrictions on airlines that operate regular flights, to 
abolish restrictions on local destination airports besides Haneda and Narita, to start an 
unlimited number of flights, to remove restrictions on charter flights, non-regular flights, 
and cargo flights, and allowed free openings of new flights between Japan and Taiwan 
 
in the local airports of each nation. 
5.5.6 The PRC’s instrumentalisation of economic coercion against Japan, Taiwan, 
and others    
According to Guo (Taipei Times, 2016), China has been instrumentalising economic 
measures to coerce other states in recent years, most notably Japan, the Philippines, and 
Taiwan. When rare earth metal exports to Japan were suspended after a Chinese fishing 
vessel that had rammed into a Japanese coastguard vessel was detained in 2010, Japan 
suffered due to its over-reliance on the PRC for the supply of such metals, which are 
essential to the nation’s high-tech industry (Hiranuma, 2016). According to Guo (Taipei 
Times, 2016), this coercive use of economic measures often backfires, in this case 
potentially encouraging the PRC to stop using them. Japan cooperated with the US and 
the EU to bring a lawsuit in the WTO against the PRC, and the PRC defence was lost 
(Taipei Times, 2016).  
Furthermore, the PRC instrumentalised a reduction in the number of Chinese inbound 
tourists visiting Taiwan. For example, Guo pointed out, to force the Tsai administration 
to accept the 92 consensus or to admit that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to 
‘One China’, the PRC restricted the number of inbound Chinese tourists visiting the 
nation (Taipei Times, 2016). A number of travel agencies in the PRC began to promote 
Chinese inbound tourism in terms of eight cities and counties, where voters chose the 
KMT camps as the best option for weeklong holidays for the Chinese (Taipei Times, 
2016a). Meanwhile, the PRC authorities expressed their support for establishing a 
liaison centre in China to promote tourism in these eight cities and counties in Taiwan 
as well as various areas in China (Taipei Times, 2016a). In comparison with August 
2015, the number of inbound Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan decreased by 30% 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016).  
 
Regarding this development, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council issued the following 
statement through its vice chairman, Chiu Chui-cheng: ‘[t]he government’s policy of 
welcoming Chinese tourists remains unchanged, but we do not welcome (Beijing’s) 
political arrangement of Chinese tourist schedules in Taiwan’ (Focus Taiwan, 2016). 
President Tsai expressed her concerns over the over-reliance on China for Taiwan’s 
economic security and expressed her willingness to explore the economic opportunities 
offered by the ASEAN and South Asian regions in partnership with Japan in her 
interviews with the Yomiuri Shimbun (2016). For example, China Airlines, Taiwan’s 
largest airline, announced it would add another direct flight to Palau to boost Taiwanese 
tourism there. In fact, since 2017, Palau has been going through a crisis due to China’s 
travel ban, which was implemented after Palau expressed its diplomatic recognition of 
Taiwan (Travel and Tour World, 2019). This development in Taiwan–Palau aviation ties 
can potentially contribute to Japan’s Indo–Pacific strategy in the South Pacific if Taiwan 
can provide Palau with a sustainable supply of tourists. 
5.5.7 The Japan–Taiwan Open Skies agreement: sustainable Japan-Taiwan 
tourism and commercial security vis-à-vis the PRC’s economic coercion 
Stable commercial ties with diverse economic partners will make Taiwan less reliant on 
the PRC. For example, the DPP administration led by Tsai Ing-Wen saw the decreasing 
number of Chinese inbound tourists visiting Taiwan as a form of economic coercion, 
one that was instrumentalised by the PRC. However, this was countered by increasing 
the number of visitors from Japan and South Korea (Taipei Times, 2016f; Dong Wang, 
2016). As the aforementioned open skies model of the EU indicates, the Open Skies 
agreement between Japan and Taiwan aims to harmonise the bilateral aviation system, 
rules, and norms between the two actors, but it also requires Taiwan to implement more 
reforms in its aviation sector and airspace management in view of greater profit-making 
 
in accordance with the international aviation norms of the ICAO. For example, the 
TransAsia airline in Taiwan opened new flight routes between Taiwan and Narita 
Airport following the bilateral Japan–Taiwan Open Skies agreement 
(Naritayakuwarigenjo, 2013). From January to June 2016, the number of Taiwanese 
tourists to Japan amounted to more than 2.15 million, the third largest inbound tourist 
group after Chinese and Korean tourists, with the rise of low-cost carriers between 
Japan and Taiwan the main factor behind the increase (Focus Taiwan, 2016).  
The ROC’s Ministry of Transportation and Communications also recognised the 
strategic importance of instrumentalising Japanese inbound tourism as a 
countermeasure to the PRC’s use of tourism as a method of economic coercion. After 
the Tsai administration came to power in 2016, the ministry announced its intention to 
increase the number of Japanese inbound tourists to two million, stating that it would 
give out free tickets to one Japanese passenger from a Japanese tourist group that 
consisted of four people flying in from big cities in Japan (Focus Taiwan, 2016a). Japan 
and Taiwan can largely contribute to each other’s sustainable economic development 
through reciprocal tourism and the bridging of regional aviation networks via the Open 
Skies agreement to mitigate the effects of PRC’s coercive instrumentalisation of 
Chinese tourists.  
5.6 The PRC’s Non-Normative use of the ADIZ 
This section first examines what the air defence identification zone (ADIZ) is and how 
the PRC’s ADIZ issue affects Japan’s aviation security in the regional security 
environment. In addition, it also examines how the PRC’s ADIZ compares in relation 
to the normative use of the ADIZ in accordance with international law and norms. It 
then examines the PRC’s recent hostile military aviation behaviours before it scrutinises 
 
the role of Taiwan as an aviation security asset for Japan vis-à-vis the PRC’s ADIZ issue 
in the regional aviation security environment. It finally elucidates how Japan 
instrumentalises Taiwan as an aviation security asset vis-à-vis the PRC’s ADIZ to 
enhance Japan’s security. 
5.6.1 What is the ADIZ for? 
Regarding the function of the ADIZ and its historical development, Welch (2013) stated 
the following:  
[a]n ADIZ is a publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in 
which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, 
intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace. The 
concept is a product of the Cold War: in the 1950s, the United States declared 
the world’s first ADIZs to reduce the risk of a surprise attack from the Soviet 
Union. 
It would appear that the PRC is not an exception to utilising the ADIZ to achieve its 
own security in terms of the defence of its airspace. Regarding the normative functions 
of the ADIZ, Welch (2013) pointed out that if utilised properly, an ADIZ functions to 
reduce mid-air collisions, combat illicit narcotic trafficking, assist in search-and-rescue 
missions, and reduce the need for sorties in fighter jets for visual inspections. The last 
function is the most critical in increasing the transparency for stable aerial interceptions 
and improving the certainty in air defence.  
As such, the ADIZ’s normative function is to enhance the security of coastal states and 
protect their airspace against suspicious aircraft. If used properly, this would not present 
a geopolitical risk that would increase regional aviation security tensions. The 
normative practice of the ADIZ is conducted with the necessary aviation 
 
communication tools, which include radio frequencies and transponders, and by 
engaging in communication with incoming aircraft to ensure aviation and airspace 
safety (Rinehart and Elias, 2015). Such communication applies to any aircraft that 
intends to fly over or through the national airspace of one state (but not to civilian 
aircrafts), as opposed to the state aircrafts that only intend to fly over or through the 
international airspace over one state's exclusive economic zone. These practices are 
shared by the US, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Australia, and various other nations 
(Welch, 2013). Furthermore, the Chicago Convention does not illegalise ADIZs, which 
allowed the PRC to claim that its ADIZ is not a violation of international laws and 
norms.  
In the following subsections, the question of how the PRC’s ADIZ has increased 
tensions over the airspace in the East China Sea is addressed. While the Chicago 
Convention does not have an explicit clause prohibiting the use of an ADIZ (Rinehart 
and Elias, 2015), the PRC’s unilateral ADIZ has detrimental effects on international 
norms and regional aviation security.  
5.6.2 Japan’s defence minister’s view of the PRC’s non-normative ADIZ  
Regarding the PRC’s use of the ADIZ, the former defence minister, Tomomi Inada, 
stated at the CSIS in Washington that ‘in November 2013, China announced the East 
China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone or ADIZ’, adding that ‘this ADIZ was 
declared over the large swath of international airspace over the East China Sea’. The 
Chinese announcement was also made in a way that suggested the airspace over the 
Senkaku Islands was a part of China’s territorial airspace. According to China’s 
announcement, any aircraft flying in China’s ADIZ must abide by the rules imposed by 
China’s defence ministry. If an aircraft did not follow China’s instruction, Chinese 
armed forces would respond by taking emergency defensive measures. This presents a 
 
serious infringement of the freedom of flight in international airspace. The Japanese 
government strictly protested against China and demanded that China revoke these 
measures. In fact, Japan remains steadfast in both word and deed (Inada, 2016). 
5.6.3 The tension between the PRC’s ADIZ and normative ADIZ 
Only the Chicago Convention currently contains comprehensive rules and norms based 
on the framework of international law for defining how an airspace should be legally 
governed (Dutton, 2009). Here, Dutton (2009, p.692) pointed out that the Chicago 
Convention regulates civil aviation rules and practices adopted by the ICAO; however, 
crucially, the convention distinguishes between civil aircraft and state aircraft such as 
military, customs, and constabulary aircraft, while the convention lays down detailed 
rules pertaining to civil aircraft only.  
The PRC deviates from international norms and practices in its ADIZ interpretation and 
practice. In fact, the nation has cited domestic law such as the PRC National Defence 
Law, the PRC Civil Aviation Law, and the PRC Flight Regulations as legal grounds to 
justify its unilateral ADIZ (Rinehart and Elias, 2015). This suggests that the PRC 
applies national law to aviation security and safety in international airspaces.  
Dutton (2009) also noted the normative practice of state aircraft paying due regard to 
the safety of civil aircraft in accordance with the Chicago Convention. Since 1998, 
somewhat controversially perhaps, state aircraft cannot resort to the use of force against 
civil aircraft during flight or risk the lives and safety of people on board during an 
interception. Despite this, the PRC’s ADIZ continues to threaten international aviation 
security. In short, the PRC does not distinguish between the state aircraft and civil 
aircraft that fly over or through the PRC’s claimed exclusive economic zone in the East 
China Sea. The disputed exclusive economic zones in these seas deliberately overlap 
 
with other claimants such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Pilger US–China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016). Furthermore, the PRC has 
threatened to use defensive emergency measures against any aircraft that does not 
comply with the PRC’s unilateral ADIZ (Pilger US–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 2016). In addition, the PRC’s ADIZ requires both types of aircraft, 
civil and state, to maintain close communication with aviation authorities in the PRC, 
even if they have no intention of flying over or through PRC’s national airspace (Pilger 
US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016). A few days after the 
PRC’s announcement of the ADIZ, as a sign of defiance, Japan, South Korea, and the 
US flew their military aircraft over the PRC’s airspace to signal their non-recognition 
of the ADIZ (Pilger US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016).  
There is no provision in either the ICAO or UNCLOS that stipulates that the use of 
ADIZ gives one sovereign state authority to exercise a stronger sovereign claim over 
contested territories or seas. However, the PRC’s ADIZ closely resembles the PRC’s 
claimed exclusive economic zone that encompasses the Senkaku Islands (Kotani, 2014), 
thus creating the perception that the PRC intends to assert its sovereign claim over the 
islands. In addition, the PRC did not notify Japan, the US, South Korea, or Taiwan about 
its ADIZ even though the ADIZ overlaps with all of these states’ own ADIZs. This 
created tensions with regard to regional security, as suggested by Inada’s statement. As 
discussed earlier, the ADIZ does not give the PRC stronger sovereign claim over the 
Senkaku Islands due to the absence of clauses allowing this in the Chicago Convention-
based ICAO and UNCLOS. However, it does pose a threat to regional aviation security 
in the East China Sea given the restrictive effects on the freedom of flight in the airspace 
over this area. Furthermore, Japan has avoided having its ADIZ cover the airspaces in 
Takeshima and the northern territories out of diplomatic consideration for the other 
 
claimants to these territories (Hirakawa, 2013). From a geopolitical perspective, as 
Inada (2016) asserted, the PRC’s unilateral announcement of the ADIZ coverage of the 
airspaces over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea is unquestionably provocative. 
The US disappointed Japan when it announced that American commercial aircraft 
would notify its flight plans to Chinese aviation authorities in compliance with the 
PRC’s ADIZ, even when the aircraft did not intend to fly over or through the PRC’s 
national airspace. This created some discord in the aviation security policy coordination 
in the Japan–US alliance (Rinehart and Elias, 2015). Martin Dempsey, a former general 
of the US army, answered a question on this topic from Gideon Rose, the editor of 
Foreign Affairs, in June 2016 (Dempsey and Rose, 2016) by stating that the US needed 
to admonish the PRC through both diplomatic and military channels, but the Chinese 
insisted that the current international rules and norms were created at a time when it did 
not play a major role in global politics and now that it was stronger, it wanted to 
renegotiate these rules and norms. The US was somewhat successful in reinforcing the 
international rules of maritime behaviours with the PRC, but it has not made much 
progress in terms of aerial behaviour norms (Dempsey and Rose, 2016). Clearly, the 
US military recognises the importance of defending the rules-based aviation security 
order vis-à-vis the PRC, but needs to make more effort to ensure international aviation 
security norms prevail. 
5.6.4 The PLA’s coercive military aviation behaviours 
Following the unilateral announcement of the ADIZ in the East China Sea by the PRC, 
a PLA military ship harassed the US Navy’s aviation activity in 2013 in the South China 
Sea (Kawamura, 2014). Subsequently, from March 2014 to May 2014, PLA military 
aircraft approached US aircraft and maintained excessively close proximity, which is, 
of course, regarded as dangerous (Kawamura, 2014). Furthermore, in July 2014, the 
 
PLA Navy unilaterally dispatched military spy ships to the RIMPAC in Hawaii (within 
the US’s EEZ) for military intelligence gathering during a high-profile US-led 
multilateral naval exercise. This led the US to believe that similar intelligence-gathering 
activities conducted by their own agencies were acceptable to the PRC (Kawamura, 
2014). However, the US Navy’s P-8A aircraft was continuously harassed by the PLA’s 
fighters in the South China Sea in August 2014. Finally, the PRC commenced the 
construction of an air force base on the artificial islands of the Paracel Islands in the 
South China Sea (Kawamura, 2014).  
In recent years, the PLA’s aviation behaviours have been causing Sino-Japanese 
tensions. For example, in 2014 and 2015, Japan’s ASDF scrambled its fighter planes 
943 and 873 times, respectively, which is numerically equivalent to the final stage of 
the Cold War era. A large bulk of the scrambling was conducted against PLA aircraft 
(Hokazono, 2016). Meanwhile, PLA pilots engaged in dangerous aviation manoeuvres 
during joint military drills conducted by the PRC and Russia in the East China Sea and 
a Japanese aircraft engaged in legitimate intelligence gathering was threatened by PLA 
aircraft manoeuvring in very close proximity. This behaviour deviated from the Chicago 
Convention’s aerial rules defined in the ICAO (Hokazono, 2016). 
In addition, as the recent high-profile case of the PLA’s coercive aviation behaviours in 
the East China Sea suggests, the PLA’s bombers and jet fighters flew over the Miyako 
Strait to advance into the Pacific Ocean in a formation involving 40 military aircraft, 
with the ostensible aim of conducting ‘routine missions’ in September 2016 (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2016). According to the Asahi Shimbun, the PLA’s formation included H-6K 
strategic bombers and Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets to improve reconnaissance, combat, 
aerial refuelling, and other capabilities, making this, according to the MOD, the first 
 
time that Chinese fighter jets were detected in the Miyako Strait. This clearly sent a 
strategic signal to Tokyo (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). Furthermore, the PRC conducted its 
first military aviation exercise in the Western Pacific, flying over the airspace in the 
strategically vital Bashi Channel (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). Interestingly, the Japan-based 
US air force undertook its own military aviation activity, which was interpreted as a 
countermeasure to the PLA’s military drill in the Bashi Channel. Clearly, the PRC 
regards the airspaces in the East and South China Seas as geographically essential choke 
points. 
  
5.6.5 The role of Taiwan for Japan’s security vis-à-vis the PRC’s ADIZ issue and 
the Japan–Taiwan ADIZ issue  
Here, we examine how Taiwan is attempting to become an aviation security asset for 
Japan vis-à-vis the PRC’s ADIZ. The PRC has not declared an ADIZ over the airspace 
of the main island of Taiwan. According to Mark Stokes (2015), a retired Chinese 
general from the PLA suggested the Taiwan issue is a domestic one, meaning the PRC 
is not required to declare an ADIZ over Taiwan. However, despite the low visibility in 
the regional security environment, Taiwan is also a stakeholder. Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Suga Yoshihide deplored Taiwan’s exclusion from the ICAO in 2016 and stated that 
one of the reasons Taiwan should be included in the ICAO is that Japan and Taiwan 
operate numerous direct flights. According to Michael Cole (2013), following the 
announcement of the ADIZ, Taiwan was forced to use 100 transponders per day to 
communicate its civilian flight charts to the PRC’s military authorities. Furthermore, in 
2010, aviation security tensions between Japan and Taiwan surfaced regarding the 
former’s expansion of the ADIZ over the airspace west of Yonaguni Island in the East 
China Sea (Taipei Times, 2010). Clearly, despite its unrecognised status, Taiwan is a 
 
quasi-independent regional stakeholder in the ADIZ issue in the East China Sea, and 
Japan clearly views Taiwan as an aviation security asset.  
Regarding the above expansion, the retired JSDFA general, Toshimichi Nagaiwa (2014), 
complained that Taiwan’s attitude toward Japan was more aggressive than Taiwan’s 
more discreet attitude under the Ma administration toward the PRC’s ADIZ. Meanwhile, 
Singh (2013c, p87) pointed out that the Japanese were concerned about potential PLA 
aggression towards the Yaeyama Islands during a Taiwan contingency. Here, Singh 
(2013c, p87) noted Japan’s lack of independent threat assessment capability during the 
Taiwan Missile Crisis of 1995 to 1996. According to Sakashi (2014), Japan’s expansion 
of the ADIZ over Yonaguni in 2010 was intended to enhance intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance based on the concept of dynamic defence and joint military training 
as well as the joint use of military facilities as a part of the Japan–US alliance. 
Furthermore, Sakashi (2014) argued that the lack of strong communication channels 
between the foreign and defence ministries of Japan and Taiwan was highlighted by the 
former’s expansion of the ADIZ over the airspace west of Yonaguni Island. Japan is 
aware of the strategic need to communicate with Taiwan on matters of air defence and 
air security for the defence of the Nansei Islands. The military defence of air control in 
Taiwan and the Nansei Islands is strategically interlinked from the perspective of 
Japan’s security in terms of both civil and military aviation. 
Despite the initial restrained attitude of the former Ma administration vis-à-vis the 
PRC’s ADIZ over the airspaces in the East China Sea, Taiwan conducted a large military 
drill involving the air force in the new ADIZ areas in 2014 (Focus Taiwan, 2014). While 
it cannot be confirmed whether Taiwan had a clear resolve to align itself strategically 
with Japan and the US during this military drill, Taiwan did intend to demonstrate its 
 
independent diplomatic stance in relation to the PRC’s ADIZ. Regarding this military 
drill, Focus Taiwan (2014) reported the following:  
[s]ailors who joined the mission said it showed that Taiwan was not scared away 
by China’s announcement in November 2013 of an ADIZ spanning a large part 
of the East China Sea that was seen as an attempt to assert territorial claims in 
the region. 
In addition, following the unilateral announcement of the PRC’s ADIZ, the Taiwan Air 
Force increased its air patrols within Taiwan’s ADIZ (Schreer, 2014). If Japan is afraid 
of a potential cross-strait united front against it in the event of a contingency in the East 
China Sea, Taiwan’s independent stance vis-à-vis the PRC’s ADIZ may have tilted the 
balance of power in Japan’s favour.  
Crucially, the airspace over the East China Sea will be a strategically important air 
defence line against the PLA Air Force during a Taiwan contingency or a contingency 
in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, the Senkaku Islands 
are geographically located just north of Taipei, which means it makes strategic sense 
that the Taiwanese military pays close attention to the aerial and maritime behaviours 
of the PLA in the East China Sea. Stokes (2014) argued that depending on the 
geographical boundaries of a potential future South China Sea ADIZ declared by the 
PRC, it will be possible for the PLA to geographically and militarily isolate Taiwan 
from other strategically vital first-island chains. As discussed in the CSD chapter, 
Taiwan appreciates the more solidified Japanese military presence in and around 
Taiwan since this indicates that both Japan and the US are willing to provide greater, if 
unstated, deterrence for Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC. Tellingly, during the military drill in 
the Bashi Strait close to the northwest Philippines that was conducted by the PRC’s 
 
military, US military aircraft, including the F/A 18C of the marine corps, landed in 
southern Taiwan’s Tainan airport (Stars and Stripes, 2015). The aircraft landed in 
Taiwan after departing from the Japan-based US military base in Misawa on 31 March 
2015 to repair ‘some mechanical issues’ on its way to Singapore, where they were to 
participate in a military exercise (Stars and Stripes, 2015).  
Uchida (2006) warned that Taiwan’s Air Force and Japan’s ASDF need to have greater 
awareness of the geographical boundaries on each side of the ADIZ between Japan and 
Taiwan, especially if Taiwanese military aircraft accidentally trespass into the Japanese 
side of the ADIZ. In such a scenario, Japanese military aircraft may scramble or use a 
laser beam against the intruder, resulting in panic among the Taiwanese aircrew and 
subsequently leading to a dangerous situation. The lack of bilateral strategic 
communication channels between Japan and Taiwan regarding regional aviation 
security issues was one of the factors that led to harsh protests by Taiwan against Japan 
in 2010. At the time, Japan had slightly expanded its own ADIZ over Yonaguni Island 
in Okinawa Prefecture (Taipei Times, 2010; Sakashi, 2014). As discussed earlier, one 
of the disadvantages of Taiwan’s non-representation in the ICAO is its limited number 
of aviation security exchanges with contracting member states of the organisation. If 
Taiwan was better represented in the ICAO, it could create more solid communication 
channels with Japan to resolve regional aviation security issues, including the sensitive 
issue of airspace security management. Furthermore, following the unilateral 
announcement of the PRC’s ADIZ over the East China Sea, the US and Japan officially 
submitted a letter to the ICAO asking whether a state has a right to dictate to or restrict 
commercial and civil aircraft over skies that are geographically out of the state’s 
jurisdictional regions via the civilian air traffic controllers (Rinehart and Elias, 2015). 
Elsewhere, Yasuda (2016) argued that Taiwan’s participation in the ICAO would be 
 
meaningful given the regional aviation security developments related to the issue of the 
ADIZ. In fact, it would be even more critical to examine the PRC’s expansion and 
reorganisation of its sphere of influence over aerial domains to maintain peace and 
stability in the airspace in the Taiwan Strait and its periphery.  
As a concrete counter-measure against the PRC’s ADIZ, Japan convened a Japan–
ASEAN summit on the freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety in Tokyo in 2014 
without explicitly admonishing the PRC in reputational terms in relation to international 
law originating from the ICAO and UNCLOS (Rinehart and Elias, 2015). In addition, 
after Taiwan was allowed representation in the ICAO as a ‘guest’, the nation took the 
opportunity to protest against the PRC’s coercive aviation measures. This included, for 
example, the PRC unilaterally announcing the use of civilian routes for commercial 
airlines in 2015, routes that are very close to Taiwan’s FIR in the middle of the Taiwan 
Strait, which Taiwan saw as a coercive measure against it (Focus Taiwan, 2015).  
5.7 Japan–Taiwan Anti-International Terrorism and Anti-
Transnational Crime Cooperation  
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Chicago Convention was reviewed to prevent 
such attacks from occurring again (IATA, 2001). At the same time, many states 
strengthened their anti-terror measures and established inter-state cooperation to 
combat terrorism. Here, the ADIZ issue discussed in the previous section remerged in 
the ICAO’s national security discourse (Dutton, 2009). However, a lesser known fact is 
that both Japan and Taiwan conducted anti-terror measures after 9/11 (Uchida, 2006) to 
meet the new challenges that arose with regard to aviation security and safety according 
to the standards of the ICAO. According to Yang (2009), Japan’s departure from the 
One-China policy of 1972 is clear from the fact that Japan and Taiwan conducted semi-
 
official security policy cooperation and coordination bilaterally and established a 
bilateral anti-terror security policy. This bilateral or multilateral law enforcement 
cooperation with Taiwan was not limited to international policing issues; rather, it was 
deemed as a significant political activity that required Japan to exercise political capital 
for its own security.  
 
Japan has been instrumentalising Taiwan as a normative security asset to combat 
international terrorism and engaging in law enforcement cooperation for combating 
anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational crime activities. As discussed in the 
literature review, a de facto state often becomes a loophole for international terrorism 
and transnational crime activities. Here, Kawamoto (2016) argued that Japan must have 
the capability to deal with the threats of international terrorism and transnational crime, 
even during peacetime. In fact, Japan must also contribute to preventing states from 
becoming fragile and vulnerable to incubating violent threats. It requires further study 
to elucidate why the PRC appears to grudgingly acquiesce Japan-Taiwan constabulary 
cooperation. As in the case of the CSD, non-military policing cooperation appears not 
to cross the redline for the PRC in the context of Japan’s One China policy. Japan–
Taiwan anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational organised crime cooperation 
presents a suitable case study for elucidating how Japan has been enhancing Taiwan’s 
as if membership in anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational crime efforts in 
accordance with the international security norms of the ICAO. 
5.7.1 Geopolitical importance of airport security  
Airports play a geopolitical role as a gateway for international travellers entering and 
leaving a country. They facilitate the free movement of people and must account for the 
consequences of unintentionally offering better mobility to international terrorists and 
 
transnational crime organisations. Airport security has become one of the most critical 
components of the war on terror, or the anti-terror efforts. Regarding the importance of 
airport security, Dodds and Adey (2014) stated the following:  
[f]or one thing, as others have noted, the airport has been a key site for 
investigating how and with what consequences the war on terror has manifested 
itself in terms of security and surveillance with ever greater attention given to 
monitoring and evaluating the body and behaviour. 
The ICAO regards airport security as an integral part of the global fight against 
international terrorism, and in 2018, ICAO Secretary General, Fang Liu, and Assistant 
Secretary-General and Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive 
Directorate, Michèle Coninsx, signed an agreement to enhance cooperation between the 
two agencies in terms of intelligence sharing on border control, aviation security, and 
counter-terrorism. Here, Liu stated that ‘[i]t [the agreement] also recognises our shared 
emphasis on prioritising more sustainable travel facilitation solutions’, adding that this 
included ‘travel document security, citizen identity management, and the international 
standardisation of passenger data exchange’ (The ICAO, 2018).  
5.7.2 Japan–Taiwan airport security cooperation 
Clearly, Taiwan is being ignored by the ICAO and UNCTED’s cooperative initiative 
due to its ostracisation by the PRC. However, on closer examination, it would appear 
that Japan has been enhancing Taiwan’s ‘as if membership’ in international 
counterterrorism and anti-transnational crime efforts. In 2004, the ROC’s Executive 
Yuan ratified a bilateral immigration control agreement based on the mutual decisions 
made by Japan’s semi-official interchange association, Japan’s de facto embassy in 
Taiwan, and Taiwan’s East Asia Relations Commission (Yang, 2009). Both Yang 
 
(2009) and the Mainichi Shimbun (Shijienian Jian, 2005) pointed out that this semi-
official bilateral agreement between Japan and Taiwan enabled the staff in charge of 
immigration control and restriction issues from both countries to visit each other’s 
airports when the security need arose and made it possible to screen visas and passports 
beforehand to detect and prevent suspicious figures such as potential terrorists and 
criminals from entering either nation. Elsewhere, Mainichi Shimbun (2004) noted that 
the immigration office in Japan considers such anti-terror efforts at airports to be 
efficient measures to minimise the security risks stemming from overseas terrorists 
entering Japan. For example, from 2002 to 2003, Al-Qaeda’s high-ranking members 
clandestinely entered Japan via Singapore using forged passports. 
Japan and Taiwan signed an agreement over intelligence and information sharing and 
law enforcement cooperation in terms of border and immigration security on 20 
November 2014 (Interchange Association 2014). Due to this agreement, the two actors 
have been able to comprehensively cooperate on border and immigration security issues 
through the Ministry of Justice in Japan and the Ministry of Interior in Taiwan. For 
example, immigration officers from each side can now collaborate, conduct annual 
consultations, conduct functional exchanges on an ad hoc basis in times of need, can 
engage in data sharing on immigration issues and information sharing for technological 
cooperation to strengthen the border security on both sides, and can carry out 
emergency communication and coordination to prevent the use of forged passports and 
forged documents and the illegal entry of aliens within the legal boundaries of the 
relevant divisions of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior. If a change 
occurs within any division, immediate notification is now required (Interchange 
Association 2014). Furthermore, an anti-terror financing and anti-money laundering 
agreement was signed between Japan and Taiwan in 2012. This is essential for 
 
intelligence and information sharing and the effective implementation of bilateral law 
enforcement and security cooperation as well as for conducting bilateral economic 
activities for Japan–Taiwan relations (Interchange Association, 2012). In 2017, Japan 
and Taiwan concluded an agreement on customs enforcement that enabled the two sides 
to combat smuggling and to streamline clearance procedures via information and 
expertise sharing (Taiwan Today, 2017). Taiwanese nationals travelling to Japan have 
been subject to possible Japanese immigration and customs screening processes 
through the pre-clearance system at Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport since the 
middle of 2017 (Taipei Times, 2016).  
5.7.3 The issues with airport security in Taiwan: Implications for Japan’s security  
Cost-effective aviation has facilitated the movement of criminals and illegal goods on 
a global scale, including in Taiwan. Certain airport security issues can be major and 
may potentially affect Japan’s security with regard to the proliferation of both light and 
heavy arms. For example, in 2012, a Taiwanese-American woman and her children who 
were travelling with a handgun and bullets were caught by the aviation police in 
Taiwan’s Taoyuan Airport (Taipei Times, 2012). The woman and her children were 
flying from John F Kennedy Airport to Osaka, Japan, and then to Taipei, Taiwan. The 
security checks at these three airports could not detect the weapons, which called into 
question the robustness of airport security. Furthermore, in 2014, during a security 
check, the aviation police held up a China Airlines aircraft at Taiwan’s Taoyuan Airport 
after it was found to be transporting the components of 36 AIM missile warheads 
(Taipei Times, 2014). Here, the Ministry of National Defence had to intervene to clarify 
that these weapons were intended to be secretly transported to the US for free repairs 
(Taipei Times, 2014). The poor secrecy management and lack of communication 
between the aviation police and the Ministry of National Defence was highlighted in 
 
this case, raising widespread alarm regarding hypothetical situations in which such 
high-profile weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists (Taipei Times, 2014). On a 
positive note, it was proven that the aviation police in Taiwan are able to detect high-
profile military components for missiles (Taipei Times, 2014).  
 
The issue of corruption must be tackled if the reliability of airport security is to be 
improved. For example, the ‘Honey Trap’ case of 2016 revealed the extent of corruption 
among aviation police. Here, a female Chinese spy seduced a high-ranking Taiwanese 
aviation officer into procuring Chinese-manufactured X-ray security equipment by 
falsely claiming that the equipment was produced in Japan (Taipei Times, 2016).  
5.7.4 Japan–Taiwan airport and port security intelligence sharing and multilateral 
efforts  
Japan and Taiwan engage in intelligence and information-sharing cooperation in 
relation to anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational crime as well as 
contingencies that involve airport security and port security. Ito (2016) described how 
eels caught by Taiwanese fishermen – which are prohibited from being exported to 
Japan by the Japanese government – are shipped to Hong Kong and legally re-exported 
to the Japanese market using aerial and maritime transport. Tackling such cases of 
smuggling will require aviation security cooperation and transnational intelligence 
sharing among Japan, Taiwan, and various other countries. 
During an interview done by Konno, the former head of the fisheries development 
foundation in the Taiwan region, Ling, expressed some dissatisfaction with the 
Japanese government’s policy on legally importing eels from Hong Kong and suggested 
that Japan amend its laws that ban the import of such goods from Taiwan. In fact, Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the PRC have been conferring over the measures needed to 
 
resolve this smuggling-related problem. Huang Hong-yen, who serves in the fisheries 
division of the agricultural committee of the Executive Yuan in Taiwan, stated in an 
interview that since 2012, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and China have been 
conducting informal consultations to achieve multilateral cooperation for data sharing 
on the smuggling of eels. Based on the multilaterally shared data, they voluntarily 
restricted the fishing of eels (Konno, 2016). However, Huang revealed his long-term 
desire to make this cooperation legally binding (Konno, 2016). Crucially, in certain 
cases, such as the eel smuggling case, Taiwan and the PRC have agreed to conduct 
transnational policing cooperation despite their adversarial relationship. 
According to the Joint Statement of the Bureau of Fisheries of People’s Republic of 
China, the Fisheries Agency of Japan, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the 
Republic of Korea and the Fisheries Agency of Chinese Taipei on International 
Cooperation for Conservation and Management of Japanese Eel Stock and Other 
Relevant Eel Species (2014 17 September), the Fisheries Agency in Chinse Taipei is 
represented as a “participant” due to its position as an “economic entity” in the APEC 
together with the PRC, Japan and South Korea. Chinese Taipei engages in intelligence 
and information sharing with the counterparts from those nations on this security issue.  
Regarding the sensitive multilateral intelligence cooperation between political and 
military adversaries, Naim (2012) noted the low-trust issues among national police 
agencies (including Interpol), especially those in adversarial or unreliable states. While 
national law enforcement agencies go to great lengths to ensure the confidentiality of 
their intelligence, they generally remain wary of excessive sharing. Given this context, 
the Japan–China–Taiwan–Korea informal multilateral intelligence-sharing cooperation 
vis-à-vis the eel smuggling case is significant.  
 
5.7.5 Travel documents, border security, and identity management   
While Japan and Taiwan have no extradition agreement, de facto bilateral or even 
multilateral law enforcement cooperation between them in terms of aviation security is 
still possible. In 2011, the ICAO’s regional seminar that was held in Singapore 
discussed the critical nature of biometric and border security as follows:  
[a] key finding from the 9/11 Commission Report was that ‘for terrorists, travel 
documents are as important as weapons.’ The issuance and integrity of travel 
documents, border security and identity management remain an integral part of 
global counter-terrorism capacity-building efforts in furthering the objectives of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (The ICAO, 2011).  
Japan, Taiwan, and other countries in the region are cooperating to share intelligence 
related to travel documents, the identities of suspicious figures, and border security in 
accordance with the principles of the ICAO.  
Japan’s National Police Agency’s white paper of 2012 described a transnational crime 
investigation case that involved examining travel documents, the identity of the 
criminal, and the border security for transnational policing efforts operating in 
accordance with the ICAO’s practices involving biometric security technology. The 
paper stated the following:  
[t]here was a South Korean national that committed the robbery of a luxury ring 
by using a false identity as a Japanese female in Tokyo, then proceeded to 
commit a similar robbery of a ring in Taipei, Taiwan. Nevertheless, he was 
identified through the security cameras and the manner in which the crime was 
committed was found to be similar to the case in Japan. By the time he entered 
 
his next destination, which was South Korea, his passport was recorded as that 
of a robber because Japan–Taiwan–South Korea’s relevant law enforcement 
agencies declared a transnational emergency and conducted speedy intelligence 
and information sharing regarding his transnational movements. The security 
camera image was shared among the three parties, and the South Korean Police 
investigated the transnational crime activities of the criminal and arrested him 
for the robberies he committed in Japan and Taiwan (Japan National Policy 
Agency, 2012).  
Furthermore, the white paper confirmed that Japan and Taiwan cooperated in terms of 
sharing intelligence on the facial image, fingerprints, and transnational movements of 
the criminal. The stolen passport used when the criminal entered South Korea was on 
record with the police in Taiwan, and the confession made by the criminal’s contacts 
led to the identification of the criminal. Clearly, Japan and Taiwan are cooperating in 
the form of making bilateral or multilateral law enforcement efforts in intelligence 
sharing.  
Japan and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) agreed to 
cooperate to facilitate the capacity building of airport security, including in terms of the 
introduction of the latest facial recognition systems and explosive detection techniques 
in Southeast Asian states in view of combatting international terrorism (Mainichi 
Shimbun, 2016a). Taiwan’s Southeast Asian neighbours may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation and terrorism due to the regional diffusion of ISIS. As such, the UNODC 
conduct the training of airport crews and introduced the latest security devices 
developed by Japan (Mainichi Shimbun, 2016a). For certain, ISIS is utilising the porous 
borders of ungoverned de facto states in Southeast Asia as safe havens for conducting 
 
international terrorism (Kurlantzick, 2016).  
Reportedly, 69 Taiwanese nationals are listed as ISIS targets (Taipei Times, 2016e). 
Foreign Minister David Lee stated that his ministry received intelligence from the 
Taipei Representative Office in the UK in June 2016 and from London’s Metropolitan 
Police Service Counter Terrorism Command (Taipei Times, 2016e). During the era of 
White Terror, the corrupt KMT regime of the ROC under Chiang Kai Shek had a 
criminalised economy (The Economist, 2014). Even after Taiwan’s democratisation, the 
PRC supported pro-PRC political forces in Taiwan. For example, it supported the 
Bamboo Union, whose ‘spiritual leader’, Chang An-lo, was suspected of being a triad 
leader in Taiwan and spent 17 years in the PRC as a fugitive. However, the PRC denied 
this (The Economist, 2014). A crucial incident for Japan’s security came in the form of 
Chiang An-lo’s meeting with the local Okinawan mafia groups that were allegedly 
conducting narcotic trafficking in Okinawa (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2016). Considering 
Taiwan’s importance to Japan’s security, and given the upcoming Olympics event in 
Tokyo in 2020,6  ensuring Japan–Taiwan intelligence sharing on travel documents, 
border security, and identity management while facilitating Taiwan’s ‘as if membership’  
in the ICAO’s anti-terrorism and anti-transnational crime efforts will be crucial. 
5.7.6 The airport security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan: Implications 
for the contingencies in Taiwan and the East China Sea  
Law-enforcement cooperation for anti-international terrorism and anti-transnational 
crimes at airports or ports between Japan and Taiwan presents a crucial countermeasure 
to any potential PRC invasion of Taiwan and the Nansei Islands in Japan. One of the 
characteristics of the grey zone scenarios is the greater use of non-traditional armed 
 
6 The games were subsequently postponed until 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
groups such as maritime militia, spies, and insurgents, which do not fit into the 
traditional definition of hard power. According to Sato, the former director general of 
the Japan Coast Guard, in the process of becoming a ‘maritime power’, the PRC has 
been utilising non-military tactics (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016). For example, Mochida 
(2014), the former chief of staff of the GSDF Western Army 7th Brigade Field 
Operation Bureau, argued that, as the case of Crimea shows, the hybrid nature of 
warfare can involve a greater use of unofficial militia. Here, the Japanese SDF or the 
Taiwanese military would confront non-traditional adversary forces, including armed 
non-military militia, and this hostile militia may attempt to occupy airports or naval 
ports to disrupt any logistical advantages during a contingency. Mochida (2014) went 
on to argue that Japan–Taiwan–US militaries should conduct contingency analyses and 
consolidate the information and intelligence sharing regarding the results of the 
analyses among the three actors. After studies were conducted on the needs of the 
various police forces by the NSC and the relevant security organs in Taiwan, since May 
2019, Taiwanese airport police have been equipped with submachineguns to better deal 
with terrorist threats (Taiwan News, 2019). Scott W. Harold (2016), the associate 
director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, noted the importance of fortifying 
airfields and aviation-related facilities to improve the survivability of critical air assets 
during a contingency.  
5.7.7 Taiwan’s as if membership in international security and the hierarchical 
Japan–Taiwan relations 
Interestingly, the PRC has not openly condemned this Japan–Taiwan anti-terror airport 
security cooperation. It is not implausible to assume that the PRC would react 
negatively to any Japan–Taiwan semi-official security cooperation as a violation of the 
One-China policy, especially if the cooperation was commenced under the Koizumi 
 
and Chen administrations, both of which were perceived as hostile to the PRC. However, 
the aforementioned case of the smuggling of marine products such as eels suggests that 
China is willing to collaborate with Taiwan – albeit informally – when the need arises. 
Given this scenario, if any Japan–Taiwan security cooperation is conducted at a 
constabulary level, the PRC may begrudgingly acquiesce to it within the context of 
Sino-Japanese regional power management. Therefore, the issue of whether Japan can 
enhance Taiwan’s as if membership in anti-international terrorism networks in 
accordance with the ICAO’s security norms depends on how Japan navigates its One-
China policy while securing a space for Taiwan to enhance its contribution to Japan’s 
security. It is up to Japan to determine what form of security contributions Taiwan is 
permitted to make, provided Japan continues to instrumentalise Taiwan as an aviation 
security asset while pacifying the PRC by appropriately navigating the One-China 
policy. This hierarchical relationship grants Japan an influential moral authority to 
determine the normative security behaviours that Taiwan must adhere to. As discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3, to be accommodated into the Eurocentric club of elite powers, 
‘non-civilised’ peoples must meet Western civilisation standards and must be 
recognised as equals by the ‘civilised’ Europeans. However, according to the ESIR, this 
merely serves to consolidate the Eurocentric hierarchical global order within 
international society. Similarly, to meet the expectations set by the regional great power 
Japan, Taiwan needs to make an effort to meet its neighbour’s security preferences. 
Taiwan’s compliance with Japan’s security expectations and its attempts to obtain 
recognition from Japan are consolidating the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship. 
Japan rewards Taiwan through new bilateral agreements related to anti-terror efforts 
provided the latter meets the former’s security requirements or if the international 
security environment requires Japan to conduct new anti-terror efforts. Japan cannot 
 
leave Taiwan to fend for itself within the context of international security despite the 
latter’s lack of international recognition. In short, Japan expects Taiwan to complement 
its own security priorities by regulating and structuring its security behaviours in 
accordance with the international security norms of the ICAO. Thus, Japan may give 
Taiwan an alternative avenue to improve Taiwan’s international standing by enhancing 
Taiwan’s as if membership in international security efforts. However, this may also 
force Taiwan into becoming, if not a disposable geopolitical pawn, a permanent 
international security policy instrument for maintaining Japan’s balance of power in 
relation to the PRC.  
Kawashima (2016) argued that since Japan–Taiwan relations improved under Ma Ying 
Jeou, who sought closer ties with the PRC, the PRC tolerated the stronger Japan–
Taiwan relations until the DPP came to power in 2016 under Tsai. However, during the 
administration of Chen, who experienced more tensions with the PRC than the Ma 
administration, Japan and Taiwan engaged in more frequent high-profile contact 
(Nojima, 2016). Lee Teng Hui admitted that high-profile secret strategic security 
dialogues were conducted among Japan, Taiwan, and the US on a frequent basis, in 
which Tsai participated twice (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). In the written communication 
involving the author of this dissertation and Hideaki Kaneda – a former vice admiral of 
Japan’s Defence Force – Kaneda expressed that, as a frequent participant in Japan–
Taiwan security talks, he had a difficult time under Ma Ying Jeou. The PRC may attempt 
to hinder the development under Abe and Tsai of stronger Japan–Taiwan ties that 
enhance the security of both nations. In fact, it has already sanctioned Taiwan’s 
international space, including in terms of its guest membership in the ICAO. That is 
precisely why Japan–Taiwan aviation security ties are essential and why it is worth 
investigating the role of Japan in accommodating Taiwan in its international aviation 
 
security efforts.  
5.8 Summary  
Japan utilised the ICAO’s security and safety regulations to instrumentalise Taiwan for 
its own aviation security. Here, it encouraged Taiwan to behave in accordance with the 
ICAO’s principles regarding the Open Skies agreements, the ADIZs, and law 
enforcement. All of these aspects have significant security implications for Japan’s 
security and the balance of power vis-à-vis the PRC in the East China Sea and beyond. 
Despite Taiwan’s non-access to the ICAO due to the PRC’s sanctions and the absence 
of membership due to its lack of statehood, Japan can socialise Taiwan in terms of 
complying with the ICAO’s international aviation security norms and rules, such that 
the former can enable the latter to contribute to Japan’s aviation security.  
Meanwhile, Japan’s non-traditional aviation security cooperation such as the airport 
security and the international anti-terrorism efforts appear to make the PRC acquiesce 
incrementally growing Japan-Taiwan security cooperation despite the former’s One 
China policy. Clearly, if Japan adheres to security cooperation based on international 
security norms, it is difficult for the PRC to sanction security ties between Japan and 
Taiwan.  
The next chapter examines Japan’s direct intervention that acknowledged Taiwan as a 
de facto stakeholder in the maritime security issues in the East China Sea through the 
fisheries agreement. This agreement propelled Taiwan to an almost equal level to Japan 
and China as a semi-legitimate actor in the issue of the East China Sea, which ensured 
Taiwanese perspectives more appreciated by the Japanese. However, the agreement also 
antagonised the Chinese since it was regarded as a violation of Sino-Japanese great 
power management. It also drove a wedge into the potential cross-strait united front 
 
against Japan, while Taiwan’s subordinate position vis-a-vis its powerful neighbour 
remains unchanged within the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relations in international 
society.   
 
Chapter 6. The Fisheries Agreement 
6.1 Introduction 
Japan’s conclusion of the bilateral fisheries agreement with Taiwan has significant 
geostrategic implications for Japan’s policy on Taiwan–China relations and for 
enhancing Japan’s balance of power in the East China Sea area in relation to the PRC. 
The agreement helped Taiwan assert itself as a quasi-legitimate security actor in the 
East China Sea issue. This case study chapter is different in nature from the other two 
case study chapters since, within this context, Japan has politically acknowledged 
Taiwan as a quasi-legitimate actor. This has created the need for Taiwanese perspectives 
to be further examined, as opposed to CSD and ICAO perspectives, which effectively 
render Taiwanese political inputs nonrelevant in the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan 
relationship. This is because unlike the CSD and ICAO perspectives wherein we 
discussed Japan’s dealings of Taiwan as Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s signing of the 
fisheries agreement with Taiwan acknowledged Taiwan as a semi-independent 
stakeholder in the marine issue in the East China Sea. Thus, this chapter discusses not 
merely Japan’s Taiwan policy as part of its foreign policy, but also bilateral Japan-
Taiwan relations. Moreover, the agreement was regarded as Japan’s attempt to drive a 
wedge into the cross-strait united front and to undermine the PRC’s concept of One 
China (which includes Taiwan). From the PRC’s perspective, the agreement was a 
violation of the One-China policy and a detriment to Sino-Japanese great power 
management. The agreement also enhanced Taiwan’s as if participation in international 
maritime security efforts in terms of law enforcement and economic security. 
Furthermore, Japan concluded the fisheries agreement with Taiwan despite the 
maritime tensions in the East China Sea. We can use this point to elucidate how Japan 
and Taiwan were able to peacefully solve their maritime issues and achieve amicable 
 
Japan–Taiwan relations through the perspective of the ESIR. 
First, it discusses how the fisheries policy has been traditionally conceptualised as part 
of comprehensive security issues without consideration of the power politics in Japan, 
with the exception of the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement. Second, it examines the 
geopolitical implications of Japan’s instrumentalisation of the fisheries agreement with 
Taiwan in relation to Japan–China–Taiwan relations. Third, due to the nature of the 
fisheries issue, it examines how the agreement affected law enforcement and economic 
security for Japan, Taiwan, and Okinawa. Fourth, with reference to the ESIR 
perspective, it examines the normative dynamics behind how Japan and Taiwan aimed 
to create amicable relations and addresses how these dynamics allowed the peaceful 
signing of the fisheries agreement despite the maritime tensions in the East China Sea 
and the fact that the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship remained unchanged.  
6.2 What is the Traditional Fisheries Policy in Japan? Japan’s 
Comprehensive Security and Food Security Policy 
Smith (2015) argues that Japan’s fisheries policy is deeply rooted in the concept of 
comprehensive security, which encompasses the food security of the entire Japanese 
populace. As with all international security issues, Japan must alleviate any uncertainty 
and risks stemming from other state or non-state actors. Regarding how this fisheries 
policy became an important foreign policy for Japan, Smith (2015, p. 5) noted that as 
distant-water fisheries became more critical, the contact among foreign fishermen 
increased. However, this also increased the international friction, which meant the 
international management of fisheries resources became a more urgent issue for the 
Japanese government. In short, this was no longer simply a domestic issue, but an issue 
firmly related to foreign policy.  
 
The international fisheries issue has not involved traditional security concerns for Japan. 
In fact, the nation’s fisheries policy prior to the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement was not regarded as a major strategic instrument in the regional balance of 
power. Regarding the conceptual differences between comprehensive security and 
national security, Smith (2015, p. 5) pointed out that unlike traditional power politics, 
comprehensive security regards the pursuit of reliable trading partners and routes, 
economic security, and stable access to natural resources to be as critical as the 
conventional militarised conception of security.  
As noted, Japan’s fisheries policy has traditionally been conceptualised within the 
context of comprehensive security, especially in terms of the nation’s food security 
policy, as opposed to a strategic instrument for achieving regional maritime peace and 
stability, which would involve enhancing the regional maritime power balance and the 
legal maritime order. However, due to the unique status of Taiwan and the PRC’s 
courting of Taiwan in the issue of the East China Sea to create a cross-strait united front 
vis-à-vis Japan, Japan’s conclusion of the fisheries agreement with Taiwan was utilised 
as a foreign policy instrument to defend Japan’s southern flank in the East China Sea 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands while simultaneously recognising Taiwan as a quasi-
legitimate stakeholder that was (almost) equal to Japan and the PRC in the issue of the 
East China Sea.  
6.3 Japan’s Instrumentalisation of the Fisheries Agreement as a 
Security Asset  
6.3.1 Japan’s geopolitical instrumentalisation of the fisheries agreement with 
Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC 
Japan instrumentalised international law to sign the fisheries agreement with Taiwan as 
 
a hard security asset vis-à-vis the PRC as opposed to in terms of traditional food security 
in comprehensive security domains. The agreement may be viewed as a political 
refutation of the PRC’s claim over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands (Kawashima, 2013). 
Japan’s treatment of Taiwan as a quasi-legitimate actor, one that is quasi-equal to Japan 
and the PRC in the issue of the East China Sea, helped Taiwan assert its ‘statehood’. In 
short, Japan allowed Taiwan’s quasi-official participation in the issue of the East China 
Sea through the fisheries agreement. Unlike the ambiguous status of Taiwan in the CSD 
and the ICAO (both require statehood for membership), Japan’s treatment of Taiwan 
propelled the latter to a quasi-official level in this maritime issue even though Taiwan 
was not involved in the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
This ensured the Taiwanese political input regarding Japan’s security policy was 
considerably more appreciated, albeit that the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship, 
wherein Japan unilaterally affords Taiwan quasi-recognition as a reward for its 
normative behaviour in relation to Japan’s security, remained unchanged. 
The UNCLOS regulates and handles international maritime disputes, and claimant 
states can instrumentalise it for arbitration, with the convention instrumentalised as a 
set of modern international maritime laws in bilateral or multilateral maritime disputes 
when the disputes are considered unresolvable by the claimant states alone. Here, the 
states need to make a request to the International Court of Justice to obtain a legal ruling. 
In the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement, both nations agreed to set aside their 
sovereign disputes over the territories in question and attempted to resolve the issue of 
marine resources and fishing rights in the East China Sea. The Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement is viewed as a geostrategic success for Japan since it bilaterally created a 
dispute and conflict resolution mechanism at both the legal and institutional levels, 
including in terms of the need for legal readjustments on the side of Taiwan. After de 
 
facto Japanese ambassador Masaki Saito retired in 2009, he noted the importance of 
creating a legal and institutional mechanism for the bilateral fisheries issues, stating that 
it was an important unresolved business of his semi-abruptly and semi-forcibly 
terminated ambassadorship (Sahashi, 2014). Now that such a legal and institutional 
mechanism exists, the two sides can initiate an annual fisheries committee to ‘negotiate 
fishing affairs, jointly conduct maritime resource protection, and discuss possible 
cooperation’ (Po and Pei, 2013, p. 13). In fact, the two nations can now take joint legal 
action against the PRC if the PRC’s vessels encroach on Japanese territorial seas around 
the Senkaku Islands. 
The PRC has a different interpretation of the UNCLOS to that within mainstream 
international society, as was manifested in the PRC’s ‘nine dash line’ demarcation in 
the South China Sea. For example, regarding the Philippines’ initiative to bring regional 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea against the PRC to the International Court of 
Justice, the PRC argued that it was impossible to legally settle such disputes if a legal 
solution to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea had not yet been found (Press 
Release at Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016). As such, the Philippines focused its 
arbitration case on maritime rights rather than territorial disputes. The PRC did not 
participate in the hearing, in which the ICJ attributed merits to seven of the 15 
submissions (Press Release at Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016). The Philippines 
arbitration case may not have led to material changes vis-à-vis the tensions in the South 
China Sea, but the Philippines’ legal attempt to resolve the dispute certainly affected 
the PRC’s reputation. In short, it was seen as a bully, one that had resorted to coercive 
measures vis-à-vis smaller states such as the Philippines. Similarly, Japan and Taiwan 
attempted to find a peaceful solution to regional maritime disputes in the East China 
Sea via the UNCLOS. This also resulted in the PRC appearing to be a hostile party, 
 
despite the fact that the nation is a signatory member of the UNCLOS. In contrast, while, 
as we know, Taiwan cannot be a member of any international organisation that requires 
statehood for membership, it attained a reputation as a regional peacemaker.  
To elucidate the difference between the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement and the 
Japan–PRC fisheries agreements in the East China Sea, a brief examination of the 
Japan–ROK fisheries agreement and the Japan–PRC fisheries agreement must be 
conducted. Both cases highlight the non-existence of power balance calculations vis-à-
vis the third-party state, which is not the case with the Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement. The changes in domestic law and the conclusion of the UNCLOS in 1982 
required Japan to renegotiate its fisheries agreements with both the PRC and South 
Korea. New legal zones such as the EEZ expanded Chinese and Korean fisheries 
activities in Japan’s EEZ. Regarding Japan’s need to ratify the UNCLOS, Smith (2015, 
p. 114) stated the following:  
[o]n the basis of earlier bilateral agreements and Japan’s 1977 fisheries law, 
Japanese waters beyond the 12 mile territorial sea remained the high seas for 
Chinese and Korean trawlers, prompting these fishermen to overexploit fish 
stocks in grounds contiguous to the Japanese coast. 
Thus, the increasing number of disputes with fishing vessels operated by Japan’s 
neighbours required a renegotiation of the fisheries agreements among the nations in 
question. Japan ratified the UNCLOS to secure its marine resources and better protect 
its coastal fisheries within its own EEZ. Based on the UNCLOS, Japan signed a 
fisheries agreement with the PRC, and accordingly, both sides provisionally extended 
the EEZ waters. Provisional waters were established, and the EEZ’s boundaries were 
blurred to minimise any conflicting claims. Furthermore, a joint fisheries committee 
 
was established to resolve any fisheries-related issues. Regarding the Japan–South 
Korea fisheries agreement, while negotiations commenced in 1996, it took three years 
to conclude the agreement due to the Takeshima dispute. Both sides had to compromise 
by denoting the waters around Takeshima as ‘middle waters’ and by agreeing to conduct 
joint management of the contested waters (Smith, 2015).  
Meanwhile, the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement was a success for Japan since it 
rendered the twelve nautical miles of territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands as 
exclusively Japanese territory (Japan–Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, 2013). Here, Japan 
and Taiwan agreed to disagree about the legal status of the Senkaku Islands (Japan–
Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, 2013). While both the Japan–PRC and the Japan–South 
Korea fisheries agreements considered different dispute management methods to 
alleviate tensions, neither cases took regional power politics dynamics into 
consideration vis-à-vis the third-party state. Notably, despite the existence of a 
controversy over the issue of fishing rights, it took Japan 17 years to finally conclude 
its fisheries agreement with Taiwan (Japan–Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, 2013). In fact, 
this became possible only after maritime tensions seriously escalated in the East China 
Sea following Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku Islands. From the language used 
in the official document on the Taiwan–Japan fisheries agreement from Taiwan’s 
MOFA, we can clearly observe the geopolitical dimension of the agreement. Here, 
MOFA’s archive includes the following: 
Article 1 of the Taiwan–Japan Fisheries Agreement stipulates that ‘This 
Agreement aims to ensure peace and stability in the East China Sea, promote 
friendly and reciprocal cooperation…’ This stipulation does not appear in 
fisheries agreements of other countries such as the Japan–Korea and the 
 
Japan–mainland China fisheries agreements. It is included in the Taiwan–
Japan agreement due to Japan’s positive response to President Ma’s East China 
Sea Peace initiative (The Taiwan–Japan Fisheries Agreement Archive, 2013, 
p. 2). 
6.3.2 Taiwan and Sino-Japanese regional great power management 
If Taiwan remains under the shadow of the PRC, any international agreements it signs 
with Japan that may infringe on the strict interpretation of the One-China policy will be 
viewed negatively by the PRC. For example, soon after Japan and the PRC signed their 
fisheries agreement, the ‘Taiwan factor’ became an inevitable issue due to China–
Taiwan tensions (Tseng and Ou, 2010), which needed to be resolved for future Japan–
Taiwan and Sino-Taiwanese relations. As a claimant of the Senkaku Islands, depending 
on how it behaves, Taiwan can either contribute to increasing or alleviating regional 
maritime tensions in the East China Sea (Jakobson, 2013). Therefore, a non-traditional 
security instrument such as the fisheries agreement has geopolitical implications for the 
sovereignty factor in Taiwan–China relations. In short, it is likely that the PRC regarded 
Japan’s conclusion of the fisheries agreement with Taiwan as a unilateral change in the 
status quo.  
Any security arrangements that accommodate Taiwan need to help the nation 
consolidate its position as an autonomous player. Japan’s engagement with Taiwan will 
increase the chances of Taiwan’s strategic survival and its international legitimacy by 
helping improve its record on human rights, democracy, economic liberalism, and the 
environment. All the normative concepts that Taiwan embraces are shared by Japan, 
and the latter’s human rights record and socio-economic development have presented a 
model for Taiwan to emulate since the post-war period. The CCP considers ‘universal 
values’ to be irrelevant to the national conditions of China and has enacted laws that 
 
regard such values as a threat to national security (The PRC’s Guojia Anquan Fa, 2015). 
Crucially, these laws claim to judicially encompass Taiwan and regard the ‘Taiwan 
Independence Force’ as China’s gravest national security threat (The PRC’s Guojia 
Anquan Fa, 2015). Taiwan has its own constitution and domestic laws, which are 
independent of the PRC. A number of academics in Taiwan have described the PRC’s 
the enactment of the aforementioned law  as a legal annexation (Brooking’s Institution, 
2015). Here, China’s final goal vis-à-vis Taiwan – as manifested in its non-interference 
policy and anti-secession law, which legalises the use of force against Taiwan if Taiwan 
moves for de jure independence (Fan Guojia Fenlie Fa, 2005) – clashes with Japan’s 
acknowledgement of Taiwan as a quasi-legitimate security actor in the issue of the East 
China Sea. Therefore, from the PRC’s perspective, Japan’s signing of the fisheries 
agreement was regarded as a violation of both the Sino-Japanese regional great power 
management and the One-China policy. The PRC subsequently retaliated by informally 
disputing Okinawa’s status (New York Times, 2013).  
Taiwan appears to be less rigid regarding the sovereignty issue since it could potentially 
serve Taiwan’s consolidation of its de facto independence. Provided Japan has the 
political will, this consolidation will benefit its instrumentalisation of international law 
vis-à-vis the PRC. For example, following Japan’s derecognition of the ROC in 1972, 
Taiwan could only use the private-based Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural and Economic 
Association to handle any bilateral ties. The ROC government was outraged when the 
US returned Okinawa to Japan without consulting it (Taipei Times, 2006). Reportedly, 
in 2006, Taiwan admitted that Okinawa was a part of Japan in return for upgrading the 
private association to the quasi-diplomatic office in Okinawa in 2006 (Taipei Times, 
2006). However, in a personal written communication with the current author, a former 
state minister, Furuya Keiji (2019), pointed out that the upgrade of the consular-like 
 
entity was carried out based on Taiwan’s voluntary behaviour. Meanwhile, the PRC is 
yet to establish a diplomatic consular there (Zhonghua Renmin Gonhuguo Riben Guo 
Dashiguan, 2015).  
Japan accommodated Taiwan into its regional oceanic governance in the East China 
Sea by instrumentalising international law, namely the UNCLOS, albeit in a private 
manner. This is significant given that Taiwan has not signed any high-profile fisheries 
agreements other than that signed with Japan in relation to the East China Sea. The 
fisheries agreement is viewed as Japan’s foreign policy instrument for elevating Taiwan 
to a quasi-equal stakeholder alongside Japan and China in the issue of the East China 
Sea, despite the nation’s vulnerable position and its limited material ability to contribute 
to Japan–China–Taiwan relations. The fisheries agreement made the PRC look like a 
bully alongside the more genial Taiwan. Through the fisheries agreement, Japan 
ensured its security in terms of the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan in relation to the PRC 
by enhancing Taiwan’s as if membership in international maritime security efforts. 
Meanwhile, it would appear from the discussions on the Senkaku issue conducted in 
the PRC that the mere existence of the East China Sea Peace Initiative proposed by Ma 
Ying Jeou frustrated the PRC. Ma’s initiative indicated that Taiwan was not interested 
in cooperating with the PRC and was pursuing its own diplomatic tactics to ensure it 
remained an independent security actor (Hickey, 2014).  
6.3.3 Taiwan and the East China Sea 
Given the semi-enclosed nature of the East China Sea, conflicts and disputes over 
fisheries rights among stakeholders such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China are 
inevitable (Yeh et al., 2014). Many claims over EEZ demarcations in this area 
geographically overlap. There have thus been numerous cases where the Japan Coast 
Guard detained or even sank Taiwanese fishing vessels amid the absence of a bilateral 
 
fisheries agreement. This led to a diplomatic standoff between the nations’ respective 
governments in 2008, according to Ikeda, a former de facto Japanese ambassador  in 
Taipei (Ikeda, 2010). Here, Executive Chairman Liu Zhaoxuan was questioned by a 
lawmaker in the Legislative Yuan regarding the possibility of deploying force against 
Japan, and he answered ‘Buxiyizhan’, which literally means ‘do not hesitate to use 
force’. This shocked Japan (Ikeda, 2010), and the tension was only alleviated when the 
Japanese government apologised to Taiwan. The Ma administration then officially 
designated Japan as a special partner to Taiwan and highlighted the strategic importance 
the nation attaches to its relationship with its neighbour (Ikeda, 2010; Ogasawara, 2014). 
This bilateral maritime crisis between Japan and Taiwan that ensued throughout 2008 
revealed the importance both sides attached to maritime security cooperation. The 
incident could have strained the amicable relationship between the two nations, and, as 
such, it was widely considered as desirable to replace the ad hoc dispute management 
that was in place with a more official bilateral conflict management mechanism to 
manage any maritime crises involving the two nations (Sun, 2013). In fact, at the 
beginning of the Ma administration, it was unclear whether Ma had a good grasp of the 
available diplomatic channels to communicate with Japan and whether he could display 
the leadership skills required to alleviate the attendant maritime crisis (Shimizu, 2009). 
For certain, Ma was not adequately prepared to de-escalate maritime tensions with 
Japan (Shimizu, 2009). The official bilateral conflict management system mentioned 
above was thus formally created after the conclusion of the bilateral fisheries agreement. 
The above crisis also made Japan suspicious of the possibility that the Ma 
administration would render Japan–Taiwan relations somewhat unstable or uncertain 
(Ikeda 2010). At any rate, Ma’s image as an anti-Japanese figure was solidified in Japan.  
While it was unlikely that Taiwan would have sought a cross-strait united front vis-à-
 
vis Japan over the issue of the Senkaku Islands and the PRC – especially given Taiwan’s 
national security policy of maintaining its de facto independence from the PRC – 
Japan’s conclusion of the fisheries agreement with Taiwan effectively erased the Japan’s 
strategic concerns regarding such a front. As examined in the literature review, Taiwan’s 
political input in Japan’s security policy has no influence, and it is up to Japan to 
determine the extent to which Japan–Taiwan security relations evolve as a part of the 
hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship. Japan’s concerns over a cross-strait united front 
was a significant determining factor in its signing of the fisheries agreement.  
In fact, the agreement put an end to the PRC’s strategic desire for a cross-strait united 
front against Japan vis-à-vis the East China Sea issue. Here, Japan secured Taiwan as a 
political friend in East Asia amid the rising tensions between Japan and its neighbours, 
including the PRC, North Korea, and South Korea. This Japan–Taiwan political and 
legal cooperation also helped Taiwan maintain its ties with the Japan–US alliance 
(Ishihara, 2013; Ko, 2013). According to Ogasawara (2014), the international image of 
Ma as an anti-Japanese figure was created after the publication of his famous PhD 
dissertation on the issue of the Senkaku Islands, while this image was also based on his 
proactive involvement in anti-Japanese activities along with other Chinese nationalists 
when he was studying international law at Harvard University. Nevertheless, despite 
his tendencies as a ROC Chinese nationalist, as a pragmatic legal scholar in the field of 
international law, he concluded that Taiwan unquestionably required the political and 
strategic backing of both the US and Japan for its survival. Meanwhile, a cross-strait 
united front with the PRC was out of the question (Ogasawara, 2014). Ogasawara 
(2014) argued that the Ma administration’s East China Sea Peace Initiative was an 
embodiment of Ma’s academic knowledge as a legal scholar and a way for Taiwan to 
maintain strong relations vis-à-vis the Japan–US alliance and, by extension, 
 
international society (Ogasawara, 2014). Thus, Ma decided to seek marine resources 
that were practically accessible for Taiwan through its fisheries agreement with Japan 
while rhetorically continuing to insist on its sovereign claim to the Senkaku Islands. 
For his part, Cole (2015) argued that Taiwan has neither strong territorial ambitions 
regarding the Senkaku Islands within its domestic policy nor the military capability, or 
the intention, to invade the area. On this point, the current author agrees with these two 
authors. Taiwan is heavily reliant on the Japan–US alliance for its own survival and the 
anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan is both weak (include a public opinion survey to 
show this here or earlier in the thesis) and marginal, except among diehard fanatics. 
In short, Taiwan is clearly at the mercy of Japan and the US for its survival given the 
political sanctions placed on it and the spectre of a military invasion by the PRC.  
6.3.4 Implications for the PRC’s claims over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands 
As noted, Japan’s signing of the fisheries agreement with Taiwan seriously antagonised 
the PRC, which continued to make diplomatic overtures to Taiwan to cooperate with it 
against Japan. For example, one Chinese news website described Ma as a ‘sinner 
against the Chinese Race’ due to his rejection of cross-strait cooperation with the PRC 
(Duowei Xinwen, 2013) and other CCP newspapers also lambasted the Japan–Taiwan 
fisheries agreement (Global Times 2013). Crucially, the Chinese government was 
displeased, stating (Reuters, 2013) that ‘[w]e are extremely concerned about Japan and 
Taiwan discussing and signing a fishing agreement’. Elsewhere, the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson, Hong Lei, stated at a daily news briefing that ‘[w]e 
hope that Japan earnestly abides by its promises on the Taiwan issue and acts cautiously 
and appropriately’ (Reuters, 2013). The PRC also informally questioned Japan’s 
ownership of Okinawa (New York Times, 2013), claimed that the Senkaku Islands 
belong to Taiwan Province, which is a part of China, and that Japan and Taiwan’s 
 
cooperation on issues involving sovereignty undermined the PRC’s claim to the 
Senkaku Islands. The PRC views ‘Taiwan Province’ as an indivisible part of China, so 
it does not allow Taiwan to conduct inter-state relations with other countries, including 
Japan, as an independent entity (Jakobson, 2013). 
Clearly, the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement touched on both the PRC’s territorial 
claims over the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan and Japan–China–Taiwan relations. Here, 
historical and legal analysis deserves some merit. The Japanese government continues 
to hold the view on the issue of the Senkaku Islands that since the islands were not 
incorporated into Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan’s renouncement of its 
foreign territories under the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not apply to the Senkaku 
Islands (Hickey, 2014). For the PRC, the ROC ceased to exist in 1949 when the 
Nationalists were defeated in the Chinese Civil War and the KMT, which fled to Taiwan, 
is simply a local authority that has no right to exercise statehood (Hickey, 2014). As 
such, the PRC does not recognise the legal validity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
even though the ROC resorts to the treaty as legal evidence to bolster its claims on the 
Senkaku Islands (Hickey, 2014). Since the PRC does not recognise the existence of the 
ROC, it cannot recognise the legal treaties signed between it and Japan, such as the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaties. However, the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement is reasonably estimated to constitute a political and legal refutation of the 
PRC’s claims on both the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan to a degree – even if the PRC 
would never admit this. At any rate, following the conclusion of the fisheries agreement 
with Japan, Taiwan is considered to be a quasi-independent political actor in relation to 
the issue of the East China Sea vis-à-vis the PRC.  
The PRC’s argument that Taiwan exploited the overtures from the PRC for its own 
 
political gain is worthy of some attention. Japanese and Western scholars that focus on 
Taiwan seem to be divided on this issue. Certainly, Taiwan does appear to have behaved 
in a way that confuses Western observers in terms of whether the nation exploited the 
PRC for its own benefit (Hickey, 2014). Crucially, the PRC regarded Taiwan’s signing 
of the fisheries agreement with Japan as a betrayal. The Global Times (2013) stated that 
‘[t]he strong stance from the mainland side in safeguarding the sovereignty of the 
islands has undoubtedly strengthened Taiwan’s status in its negotiations with Japan’. 
Even if Taiwan was interested in resolving the issue peacefully from the beginning, as 
Ogasawara (2013a, 2014) pointed out, a number of Japanese who were paying close 
attention to the Japan–Taiwan tensions were somewhat confused about Ma’s acceptance 
of the fisheries agreement. Here, Hickey (2014) pointed out that while Ma supported 
the 40 or so fishing vessels with Taiwanese activists on board that were escorted by 
eight Taiwanese coastguard ships when they clashed with Japanese coastguard ships 
around the Senkaku Islands on 25 September 2012 – with both sides using water 
cannons against each other – the PRC deployed five patrol boats a mere 12 nautical 
miles away. In effect, this amounted to a de facto policy coordination between Taiwan 
and the PRC (Hickey, 2014). Meanwhile, Ogasawara (2013c) noted that on 24 January 
2013, when Taiwanese coastguard patrol boats escorted a number of civilian vessels 
with Taiwanese activists on board, the PRC’s three coastguard cutters approached. The 
Taiwanese fleet drove them away crying ‘diàoyútái shì zhōnghuá mínguó lǐngtǔ, zhèlǐ 
shì zhōnghuá mínguó diàoyútáihǎiyù, qǐngmǎshànglíkāi (Diaoyutai is the territory of 
the ROC. These are the waters of the Diaoyutai ROC; please leave immediately)’. 
Ogasawara (2014) argued that this was a part of the Taiwanese government’s non-
cooperation policy that it had worked out with the PRC beforehand. While determining 
which Taiwan expert’s observation is correct is beyond the scope of this discussion, if 
 
Ogasawara’s view is indeed correct, it will be linked to the paramilitary balance of 
power by the two respective coastguards regarding Japan–Taiwan maritime security 
cooperation according to the fisheries agreement. Ogasawara (2013c) pointed out that 
immediately before Taiwan dispatched its fleet in the 24 January 2013 case, the Ma 
administration had insisted it had no authorisation to prevent civilian ships from 
approaching the Senkaku Islands. Taiwan had informed the Japanese side about this 
beforehand, enabling Japanese coastguards to identify the location of the fleet and 
deploy Japanese patrol boats against it effectively.  
However, the loudest vocal minority of Taiwanese activists was right to be concerned 
about the fisheries rights to secure their immediate jobs and employment opportunities. 
Ogasawara (2013b) expressed some concern about the possibility of the Japanese 
coastguard having to deal with Taiwanese protest ships and fishing vessels 
simultaneously with the PRC’s government ships if Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
negotiations failed. This could have led to a cross-strait united front vis-à-vis Japan. In 
addition, while Taiwan is not a member of the UNCLOS, it has internalised the 
convention’s norms and has sought peaceful resolutions to conflicts. This was 
recognised by Japan when it signed the fisheries agreement. Japan’s engagement with 
Taiwan encouraged the latter to behave peacefully as if it was officially participating in 
international maritime security efforts. The former de facto Taiwanese ambassador to 
Japan, Fu-Chen Lo, argued that territorial disputes must be resolved based on 
international law and consultations. However, China resorted to the use of force and 
intimidation. Therefore, if Taiwan cooperates with China, this will not only negatively 
affect Taiwan’s international image but will also prove disadvantageous to Japan 
(Ishihara, 2013). Taiwan’s appreciation of international legitimacy and norms is clearly 
manifested in the statements made by the former ambassador. From this perspective, 
 
the PRC generates uncertainty and risk in the international legal order.  
Japan expressed reservations about the Ma administration’s East China Sea Peace 
Initiative on the grounds that some of the ‘Implementation Guidelines’ were not 
acceptable (Taipei Times, 2012). In the current author’s personal written 
communication with Furuya Keiji, a former state minister, Keiji stated that while he 
was aware of Taiwan’s unique ideas regarding the East China Peace Initiative proposed 
by Ma, it is clear that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan from a historical and 
international legal perspective. Japan owns these islands in actuality, which means the 
issue of territorial rights is not open for discussion. Meanwhile, while Japan has not 
explicitly explained what was unacceptable about the ‘Implementation Guidelines’, 
Cabestan (2014) argued that it was concerned about the proposal for the creation of a 
code of conduct and about trilateral negotiations between Japan, China, and Taiwan 
regarding the issue of the East China Sea. Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Yoshihide Suga rejected the Ma administration’s calls for trilateral talks involving the 
three nations (Japan Times, 2013). Cabestan (2014, p. 7) outlined three factors behind 
why the East and South China Sea Peace Initiative would not be effective, namely, there 
was ‘[a] piecemeal endorsement of international law and UNCLOS by some of the 
claimants, particularly China’, there was ‘a lack of common political values among the 
region’s countries, some being authoritarian, others democratic’ and there was ‘a rise 
of nationalism in most of them’. 
As will be discussed in the economic security section below, the fisheries agreement 
expanded the zones of access for Taiwanese fishermen to engage in fishing operations. 
This was considered a victory for Taiwan’s national interests since it ensured the 
economic security of the nation’s fishermen. As discussed above, unlike in the case of 
 
the Japan–South Korea fisheries agreement – which denoted the territorial waters 
around Takeshima as ‘middle waters’ for joint management by South Korea and Japan 
– Japan effectively retained exclusive jurisdiction over fishing rights around the 
Senkaku Islands for 12 nautical miles through its fisheries agreement with Taiwan. This 
did not affect the territorial claims of either Japan or Taiwan (Japan–Taiwan Fisheries 
Agreement, 2013) and was viewed as a diplomatic victory for Japan, essentially 
maintaining Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands while allowing Taiwan to 
save face regarding its territorial claims.  
Jimbo (2015) argued that Japan and the PRC used ambiguous language regarding the 
issue of the East China Sea. Their mutual face-saving measures made it possible to 
conduct an APEC meeting between Abe and Xi in 2014 where it was stated that Japan 
and China tacitly agreed to shelve the issue of the Senkaku Islands for the future in 
1972. Taiwan and China abided in terms of the 1992 consensus, according to which 
both the PRC and the ROC may claim both sides of the Taiwan Straits and may 
represent ‘China’ to begin the cross-strait negotiations. This was considered to be an 
exemplary case of diplomatic wisdom in that it ensured both sides were dissatisfied 
with the diplomatic outcome. According to Article 4 of the bilateral fisheries agreement, 
the agreement does not affect Japan’s and Taiwan’s territorial positions on the issue of 
the East China Sea. Regarding Taiwan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands, the mainstream 
views on Taiwan’s domestic debates are divided among two main groups, one of which 
believes that Taiwan tacitly endorses Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in 
return for fisheries rights, while the other argues that although Taiwan has certain 
fisheries rights, this does not affect its claim on the Senkaku Islands (Tsai, 2013). These 
opposing views were manifested in the remarks of two former presidents of Taiwan 
regarding the status of the Senkaku Islands. Here, the former president, Lee, argued that 
 
the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan (Tokyo Foreign Press, 2015), while President Ma 
reacted by stating that the Diaoyutai belongs to the ROC (Zhongguo Shibao, 2015). 
Japan’s intentions behind giving Taiwanese fishermen greater oceanic space for their 
fishing activities in the East China Sea despite opposition from the Japan Fisheries 
Agency (which is supported by Okinawan fishermen) deserve some scrutiny. From the 
Japanese strategic perspective, the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement liquidated the 
little remaining leverage the PRC could have instrumentalised to play the role of the 
benevolent protector of the fishermen in Taiwan Province in the face of Japanese 
activity. Regarding this Japanese strategy, the former state minister, Furuya Keiji (2019), 
pointed out in his e-mail communication with the current author that immediately 
before the signing of the fisheries agreement between Japan and Taiwan in February 
2013, the Ma administration revealed its strategy of non-cooperation with the PRC vis-
à-vis the Senkaku Islands. Clearly, this strategy worked out well for Japan’s security.  
6.3.5 Paramilitary balance of power 
Yang, the deputy secretary general of the National Security Council, stated, ‘[i]t is not 
acceptable that mainland China’s fishermen operate in the applicable area. The ROC 
will negotiate with mainland China in this regard if necessary’ (Po and Pei, 2013, p. 14). 
This is an essential national security development for Japan since it helps enhance the 
alignment of similar strategic views in bilateral terms, if not the strictly defined 
operational interoperability, between the Japanese and Taiwanese coastguards. 
Meanwhile, in terms of Japan–China–Taiwan paramilitary relations, Alex Calvo 
(Shigeru News Agency, 2013a) stated the following:  
[w]hile Taipei is not renouncing its sovereignty claims, once Japan has agreed 
to let the island’s fishermen operate in these disputed waters, there should be no 
pressing reason for the two countries’ coast guards to clash again. Furthermore, 
 
the agreement provides for the setting up of a joint fisheries committee and 
therefore may lead to increased regular bilateral exchanges between Japan and 
Taiwan. 
This leads to another important point. Once this source of tension between Tokyo and 
Taipei is eliminated, it should become much more difficult for Chinese and Taiwanese 
coastguard units to act, or to be seen as acting, in concert with one another. As discussed 
in the CSD chapter, the coastguard cooperation between Japan and Taiwan has 
improved, leading to a search-and-rescue agreement, and allowing actual operations 
around the Bonin Islands.  
The PRC has been building up its paramilitary forces and strengthening its maritime 
law enforcement, including in terms of obtaining armed fishing vessels with ISR 
capabilities. It has created a nominally integrated coastguard. The PRC has been 
encouraging the gradual escalation of maritime security tensions by sending many of 
these paramilitary or governmental ships into the East China Sea. Furthermore, 
according to The Strategist (2019), on May 2018, the PLAN, the Chinese Coast Guard, 
and the local authorities staged joint patrols for the first time in the Paracel Islands, 
which are under the control of the PRC but are also claimed by both Taiwan and 
Vietnam. Less than two weeks later, China’s coastguard blocked a Taiwanese supply 
ship near Kinmen in the Taiwan Strait and unilaterally cancelled its annually held 
maritime rescue drill with Taiwan. Crucially, the PRC’s unilateral ADIZ, which covers 
the designated areas mentioned in the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement and covers 
Taiwan’s airspace, indicates the PRC’s hostile attitude vis-à-vis the Japan–Taiwan 
bilateral fisheries agreement. The fisheries agreement between Japan and Taiwan 
contributed to the strategic need for a ROC military and for the Taiwan Coast Guard to 
 
cooperate and coordinate the strategy more closely to handle the PRC’s new threat. 
Regarding this point, Po and Pei (2013, p. 15) stated the following:  
[i]t may become a necessity for the Ministry of National Defense and Coast 
Guard Administration to strengthen communication, coordination and 
cooperation in order to develop policies to respond to diverse incidents, and 
especially mainland Chinese provocations, that may occur in the applicable 
area. 
Po and Pei (2013) also noted that the PRC dispatched the PLA South China Fleet, eight 
surveillance ships, and more than 40 fighter jets to the Senkaku Islands on 23 April 
2013. Soon after the conclusion of the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement, the PRC 
made a massive aerial military and naval paramilitary threat aimed at north Taipei and 
the areas in the East China Sea designated by the Japan–Taiwan bilateral fisheries 
agreement. Here, the authors argued that the fisheries agreement created a new national 
security threat to Taiwan from the PRC that stemmed from a combination of military 
and paramilitary forces. In other words, the threat did not just involve direct military 
attacks on Taiwan in view of a Chinese unification effort. However, Taiwan’s political 
activism vis-à-vis the Senkaku Islands was weakened or, rather, disincentivised 
following the conclusion of its fisheries agreement with Japan.  
The Japan–Taiwan bilateral fisheries agreement contributed to further divisions 
between the PRC and Taiwan. The PRC introduced more competent cutters into its law 
enforcement fleet, some of which were transferred from the PLA Navy and were 
immediately deployable (Goldstein, 2013). According to Goldstein (2013), the Chinese 
felt dismayed at the state of their law enforcement ships compared to those of the more 
competent Japanese coastguards around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. A 
 
Japan–Taiwan paramilitary alignment would help to alleviate maritime security threats 
posed by the PRC in relation to the islands. For Japan, this constitutes a grey zone 
scenario, and for Taiwan, it creates a new national security challenge in the northeast 
zone of Taipei stemming from the Sino-Japanese grey zone scenario’s strategic 
implications for Taiwan’s own defence needs. The PLA’s navy, air force and coastguard 
operate near the Senkaku Islands, which are geographically close to northeast Taiwan, 
which includes Taipei and major military ports such as Keelung. This would clearly 
help the Chinese military and paramilitary forces to gain the strategic and operational 
experience that would be essential in the event of a Taiwan contingency.  
China and Taiwan have only a limited and low-key mechanism for dispute resolution. 
However, the two sides enjoy more robust paramilitary cooperation, including in terms 
of coastguard drills (Glaser and Vittelo, 2015). During semi-official negotiations over 
cross-strait issues that were held in 2015, Taiwan and the PRC discussed the maritime 
communication mechanism, the law enforcement mutual judiciary mechanism, and the 
extradition of criminals. These issues remained within the range of the talks and 
appeared to be confined to low-key development (Monma, 2015). Considering the 
‘Sunflower’ movement and the KMT debacle in the municipal election of 2014 (Huang, 
2014), it is unlikely that security cooperation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will 
improve. In 2019, a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol ship fired a stun grenade at Chinese 
fishing vessels on Taiwan’s side of the strait (Taiwan News, 2019). From this 
perspective, regarding the maritime issues and the balance of soft power in the Taiwan 
Strait, it appears that Japan is not necessarily in a disadvantageous position. The Taiwan 
Coast Guard also launched two new 3000-class coastguard cutters in 2015 (Monma, 
2015), and the nation officially proposed to enhance its maritime security cooperation 
with both Japan and the Philippines (Reuters, 2015).  
 
It is unclear whether the supposedly integrated Chinese Coast Guard can conduct 
maritime law enforcement activities in an integrated and holistic manner (The Diplomat, 
2015). Here, Gady quoted the following statement from Ryan D Martinson: ‘[w]ith new 
“China Coast Guard” ships entering service at regular intervals, it is easy to forget that 
the China Coast Guard as an organisation does not yet exist in any complete sense’ 
(Gady, The Diplomat, 2015a). The Chinese have been endeavouring to enhance their 
maritime law enforcement capabilities by building more and larger maritime law 
enforcement cutters, with both the Chinese government and the military believing that 
their law enforcement capability at sea lags behind that of other Pacific maritime states 
(Goldstein, 2013). Furthermore, accidents at sea such as collisions and typhoon-related 
sinking are frequent among Chinese fishing vessels, which raises numerous maritime 
safety issues (Goldstein, 2013). Japan and Taiwan formed a naval aviation search-and-
rescue pact to minimise bilateral safety issues after the conclusion of the fisheries 
agreement (Taiwan Today, 2013). Meanwhile, the Chinese government made efforts to 
enhance its ISR capabilities for both fishing vessels and the satellite communication 
between the fishing boats and the maritime enforcement ships (Goldstein, 2013).  
 
6.4 The Fisheries Agreement with Taiwan as Japan’s Comprehensive 
Security Policy for Law Enforcement and Economic Security 
Japan’s fisheries agreement with Taiwan is in line with Japan’s fisheries policy. The 
policy approaches maritime issues in the East China Sea from multifaceted security 
perspectives, ranging from national security and law enforcement to economic security. 
Taiwan clamours for international recognition, wishing to be seen as a quasi-legitimate 
actor for its own survival and for securing its ontological security. For Taiwan, attaining 
as much international recognition as possible is one of its most important national 
 
security agendas, along with improving its relationships with the US, Japan, and the 
PRC. Japan has supplemented its security with regard to Taiwan through better law 
enforcement and a stable economy. These factors will help contribute to Taiwan’s 
moving away from China and, in turn, will tip the regional balance of power in Japan’s 
favour. Furthermore, stringent law enforcement and sustainable economic security are 
essential factors for measuring how consolidated the international legal order is in the 
East China Sea based on the Japan–Taiwan bilateral fisheries agreement.  
Maritime security is not synonymous with or equal to national security. Indeed, 
generally speaking, national security, law enforcement, and economic security are 
interconnected within the realm of maritime security. That is why the existing literature 
related to the Japanese fisheries policy prior to the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement discusses the matter within the context of comprehensive security without 
considering the issue of geopolitical power politics in relation to international security. 
In view of this, this case study chapter on the fisheries agreement examines the law 
enforcement and economic security implications stemming from the bilateral fisheries 
agreement between Japan and Taiwan.  
In fact, Taiwan, in the absence of statehood, is excluded from participating in 
international and regional institutions related to maritime security affairs, including 
fisheries, marine labour, maritime piracy issues, and so on (Hsu and Southerland, 2015). 
The Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement gives Taiwan a unique opportunity to improve 
Taiwan’s ‘as if membership’ in international maritime security efforts in terms of law 
enforcement and ensures Japan’s economic security. Black (2014) observed that Japan 
has been taking on a role as an international norm entrepreneur for international and 
regional maritime security in international society thanks to its innovative 
 
instrumentalisation of the Japanese coastguard. Similarly, the nation is 
instrumentalising the non-state actor, Taiwan, to enhance maritime security.  
6.4.1 Law enforcement  
Chinese fishermen who are observed to be conducting fishing activities without proper 
legal procedures and permissions in Taiwan’s seas are considered to be operating 
illegally. Taiwan has a tacit de facto middle line with the PRC in the Taiwan Strait that 
geographically divides the ocean in two. Chinese fishermen who illegally engage in 
marine activities such as fishing on the Taiwanese side of the strait are considered 
violators of Taiwanese marine interests. Due to the tacit nature of the line, the Japan–
Taiwan fisheries agreement is considered a de facto acknowledgement of Taiwan as a 
quasi-independent political actor.  
Taiwan’s ability to defend its coastal waters has been jeopardised by the intrusion of 
illegal Chinese boats amid the absence of a fisheries agreement with the PRC. The 
ROC’s Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
Area determines the management of the aforementioned line (Tseng and Ou, 2010). If 
PRC vessels attempt to illegally intrude into the Taiwan side of the water, the Taiwanese 
coastguard will deal with them. The problem is that due to the geographical proximity 
of China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait – with the narrowest point of the strait being 
only 80 miles long – and given the wide availability of economically important species 
of fish within the Taiwanese waters, many illegal Chinese maritime activities are 
conducted on the Taiwanese side (Lin et al., 2013).  
According to the Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (2017), the nation’s 
coastguard encountered 1,376 Chinese fishing vessels that had illegally intruded into 
Taiwan’s waters in 2016 alone. Clearly then, a significant number of illegal Chinese 
 
fishing vessels trespass into the Taiwanese ocean. However, due to the sheer number, 
the Taiwanese coastguard simply cannot deal with all of them (Lin et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, smugglers exploit the short geographical proximity of the two nations to 
transport illegal products that are in short supply in Taiwan, and often bring weapons 
with them, which negatively affects the security on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (Ou 
and Tseng, 2010).  
While Japan and Taiwan have established conflict and dispute management 
mechanisms such as the bilateral fisheries committee, the PRC and Taiwan have not. 
Japan and Taiwan also have an MOU agreement related to anti-human trafficking 
(Focus Taiwan, 2015), while, as discussed in the CSD chapter, the two nations also 
signed a maritime search-and-rescue agreement. Furthermore, intelligence cooperation 
on coastguard exchanges do exist. For example, as Fukuda (2017) noted, the Taiwanese 
coastguard deployed coastguard officers to Taiwan’s representative office in Okinawa 
to cooperate with the Japanese coastguard in view of resolving any fishing conflicts, 
conducting search-and-rescue operations, and engaging in other types of maritime 
security cooperation. Fukuda (2017) also pointed out that the Japanese coastguard 
deployed officers to the Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei.  
Regarding the protection of Taiwanese fishermen’s rights, the Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement states the following:  
ROC fishing vessels are now able to operate within the designated zone 
without interference by Japanese government vessels. They will be overseen 
by the ROC Fisheries Agency in accordance with relevant ROC fisheries laws 
and regulations (The Taiwan–Japan Fisheries Agreement, ROC, 2013).  
 
Before the bilateral fisheries agreement between Japan and Taiwan was concluded, 
Japanese inspection vessels and patrol boats were infamous in Taiwan for their harsh 
treatment of Taiwanese fishermen on the Japanese side of the EEZ (Yeh et al., 2014). 
On 6 June 2005, around 50 Taiwanese fishing vessels staged a marine demonstration in 
the East China Sea against this harsh treatment from the Japanese coastguard. One 
ruling party lawmaker from the DPP even described this an ‘act of piracy’ (Taiwan Info, 
2005), while the famously pro-Japanese figure, Lee Teng Hui, commented on the 
Japanese treatment of the Taiwanese fishermen while discussing the change in Japan’s 
uncompromising attitude towards Taiwan, the China factor, and the huge donations 
Taiwan made to Japan in 2011 immediately after the conclusion of the bilateral fisheries 
agreement (Ishihara, 2013). Reportedly, on 13 September 2013, shortly after the 
conclusion of the fisheries agreement, Japanese fishing boats were being rammed into 
by Taiwanese fishing vessels, at a time when neither side had to worry about 
intervention from the respective coastguards of Japan and Taiwan (Yaeyama Mainichi 
Shimbun, 2013). Clearly, more rules-based fishing activities in the East China Sea are 
critical for the sustainable maintenance of the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement. 
The Sino-Taiwanese fisheries relations lack regulation and management due to the lack 
of a high-profile cross-strait fisheries agreement. In fact, only minor punishments can 
be meted out for illegal Chinese fishing activities conducted on the Taiwanese side of 
the strait (Lin et al., 2013). Illegal Chinese fishermen conduct cost-benefit analyses and 
conclude that these punishments (which include fines and confiscation of the fish) are 
minor in comparison to the greater economic benefits of conducting illegal fishing 
activities in Taiwanese waters (Lin et al., 2013). Often, these illegal fishermen exploit 
the notoriously bad weather in the Taiwan Strait to reduce the risk of being caught and 
even resort to violence against Taiwanese patrol boats (Lin et al., 2013). For example, 
 
The Diplomat (2017) reported how, in January 2017, the captain of an illegal Chinese 
fishing vessel was wounded while resisting inspection by the Taiwanese coastguard, 
and how, in February of the same year, a Chinese fishing vessel intentionally rammed 
a Taiwanese coastguard ship.  
The more stringent the punishments meted out by the Taiwanese coastguard, the more 
the illegal fishermen resist. Some illegal fishermen from the PRC even resort to 
criminally dangerous physical measures such as the use of weapons, while others 
attempt to take patrol crewmembers as hostages (Lin et al., 2013). In August 2015, a 
high-profile maritime case emerged involving illegal Chinese fishermen, who captured 
a number of Taiwanese coastguards after they came onboard for inspection. With the 
hostages onboard, the Chinese fishing vessels attempted to escape to the PRC (Taipei 
Times, 2015). Three Taiwanese patrol boats with specially trained and heavily armed 
coastguard crew members mounted a commando-style rescue operation to save the 
captured Taiwanese crew and arrest the fishermen (Taipei Times, 2015).  
Notwithstanding the significant amount of work it will involve to conduct maritime law 
enforcement with limited personnel, the Taiwanese coastguard must make better use of 
its resources to conduct effective deterrence operations (Lin et al., 2013). Now that the 
Japanese and Taiwanese can engage in joint legal actions and the two nations signed 
the agreement on search and rescue by the respective coastguards, it remains to be seen 
whether this will have a positive impact on enhancing law enforcement in the East 
China Sea. For certain, Japan–Taiwan maritime security cooperation will contribute to 
maintaining the legal order in the area, especially given the fact that Taiwan is interested 
in further coastguard cooperation with Japan and the Philippines (Reuters, 2015).  
While Taiwanese fishermen were concerned about the possibility of more Japanese 
 
crackdowns on non-Japanese fishing activities in the East China Sea (Jakobson, 2013), 
the conclusion of the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement effectively eliminated this 
concern. However, from Okinawa’s perspective, the agreement was biased towards 
Taiwan. For example, since Okinawan fishing boats are smaller both in terms of size 
and the number of crew members on board, this disadvantages Okinawan fishermen 
and forces them to retreat from encounters with Taiwanese fishermen in the East China 
Sea (Jakobson, 2013). According to Takuya Takahashi (Yaeyama Mainichi Shimbun, 
2013), a member of the fishermen’s union from Ishigaki Island in Okinawa, Taiwanese 
fishermen openly engage in longline fishing to the north of Ishigaki Island. This 
negatively affects Okinawan fishermen from Yaeyama Islands. As such, Takahashi 
expected unruly Taiwanese fishermen to trespass into the waters to the south of Ishigaki, 
which are not covered by the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement.  
6.4.2 Economic security for Taiwan and economic insecurity for Okinawa: 
Implications for power politics in Japan–Taiwan–China triangle 
Japan’s bilateral fisheries agreement with Taiwan suggests that it recognises its 
neighbour’s marine economic rights in the East China Sea. This ensures that Taiwan is 
an important economic and fishing actor in the area – albeit at the expense of the 
economic and fishing rights of Okinawan fishermen. As examined in the literature 
review and the ICAO chapters, economic security is an important component of the 
balance of power in the ESIR paradigm.  
From the economic security perspective, the fishing industry has made limited 
contributions to the overall economy of Taiwan, especially in comparison with the 
hydrophone or oil industry in the East China Sea. However, it is essential to secure jobs 
for the fishermen and to stabilise the coastal economy in a sustainable manner. This also 
has political implications since it keeps Diaoyutai political activism to a minimum. The 
 
most vocal of these activists are largely confined to the fishing community in Yilan 
County in Northern Taiwan, which is geographically closer to the Senkaku Islands. 
Local politicians with sympathy for the fishing industry will likely get maximum votes 
in this region (Ogasawara, 2012a). Furthermore, some Diaoyutai activists in Yilan 
County who were onboard the fishing vessels that attempted to get close to the Senkaku 
Islands displayed the following protest slogan: ‘Defend the Fishing Rights to Survive!’ 
(Focus Taiwan, 2012). The Japan–Taiwan bilateral fisheries agreement enhanced the 
economic security of the Taiwanese fishermen and alleviated the risk of a Sino-
Taiwanese united front against Japan regarding the issue of the Senkaku Islands.  
Taiwanese coastguard ships are equipped with reinforced equipment, and they must 
patrol the greater area in the face of the significant presence of illegal Chinese fishing 
vessels. The destructive fishing activities of illegal Chinese fishermen have been posing 
serious threats to Taiwanese marine living resources and making the life of Taiwanese 
fishermen financially and physically more difficult and more dangerous (Lin et al., 
2013). One of the major reasons why many Chinese fishermen trespass into the 
Taiwanese side of the Taiwan Strait is that China’s littoral seas have been experiencing 
a dangerously severe depletion of their overall fish stocks, and Chinese fisheries experts 
are highly pessimistic about the future prospects regarding this issue (Goldstein, 2013). 
If the two zones on the Japanese side of the new demarcation line in the East China Sea 
– which the Taiwanese have long argued is their traditional fishing area – are more 
abundant in fish stocks (Jakobson, 2013), it is quite reasonable for Taiwan to expect 
major commercial benefits from its fisheries deal with Japan. This may have motivated 
the Taiwanese government to negotiate a fisheries agreement with Japan in the first 
place. 
 
However, the fisheries agreement has markedly antagonised the Okinawans. For 
example, Yaeyama Mainichi Shimbun, a local newspaper in the Yaeyama Islands in 
Okinawa (2013), expressed the view that the central government in mainland Japan 
prioritised more than 800 Taiwanese fishing fleets over the dozens of Okinawan fishing 
fleets while ignoring the views of the local Okinawans. This destroyed the traditional 
ties between Taiwan and Okinawa, even though Okinawa was ready to make certain 
concessions to Taiwan considering the geostrategic importance of accommodating 
Taiwan into Japan’s strategy vis-à-vis the PRC over the issue of the East China Sea. 
Ryukyu Shimpo (2013) also expressed the view that while the fisheries agreement 
negatively affected China–Taiwan relations, Okinawa was forced to pay the price.  
One of the Taiwanese negotiators for the fisheries agreement with Japan, Chú xiàn 
chāng – who is First Secretary at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Presentative Office 
in Japan (2013) – argued that among the numerous reasons that it took 17 years to 
conclude a fisheries agreement with Japan, the most important one was the fact that the 
Fisheries Agency had been unable to convince the fishermen in Okinawa of the value 
of the agreement. The Okinawan fishermen had long opposed the signing of a fisheries 
agreement with Taiwan in relation to seas they considered to be their own (Jakobson, 
2013). In fact, the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement gave access to the 
Taiwanese fishermen to the Japanese EEZ, where the Okinawan fishermen had had a 
monopoly on fishing activities and this consequently affected their economic interests 
(Smith, 2013). The local Okinawan authorities and the Okinawan fishermen considered 
the swiftly concluded fisheries agreement between Japan and Taiwan to be an 
unjustifiable act that negatively affected their economic and daily activities in the name 
of diplomatic victory (Smith, 2013). 
 
The former state minister Furuya Keiji (2019) pointed out that Prime Minister Abe 
responded to questions raised in the budgetary committee in the Upper House on 23 
May 2013 as follows:  
[t]he effective signing of the fisheries agreement, which has been a traditional 
irritant in the friendly relations between Japan and Taiwan, will achieve 
significant progress in the regional security environment in Asia. Although we 
must make further efforts to gain understanding from the people in Okinawa, 
Prime Minister Abe recognises it (the fisheries agreement) was a historic 
agreement. Furthermore, prior to the signing of the fisheries agreement in 
February 2013, Taiwan expressed its position of non-cooperation with China 
vis-à-vis the Senkaku Islands. Based on these developments, the signing of the 
fisheries agreement was concluded.  
Keiji (2019) also stated that the Japanese government must make efforts to obtain the 
understanding of Okinawan fishermen, thus, it does not believe that it is more important 
to ensure that China and Taiwan do not jeopardise Japan’s security than to defend the 
interests of Okinawa.  
Nonetheless, the fifth Japan–Taiwan meeting on the fisheries issue in 2016 received 
significant attention from Okinawan fishermen, who wanted the fisheries agreement 
amended. Many of them were dissatisfied with the economic damage inflicted by their 
reduced access to fishing activities in the seas to the north of Yaeyama Islands (Taipei 
Times, 2016d).  
 
6.5 Normative Factors that Facilitated the Japan–Taiwan Fisheries 
Agreement despite the Tensions in the East China Sea  
With reference to the ESIR, this case study chapter now examines four conceptual 
factors, the historical, cultural, democratic, and political dynamics factors, in Japan–
Taiwan relations in international society to explain why the high-profile fisheries 
agreement was concluded despite the increasing tensions. Examining the normative 
factors that contributed to the conclusion of the agreement will help to elucidate the fact 
that Japan–Taiwan bilateral ties are increasingly being governed by the unique 
dynamics of each nation and that both are creating a unique space that will help balance 
the emerging regional security environment in relation to the PRC. The normative 
developments surrounding Japan–Taiwan relations on both the grassroots and 
governmental levels are encouraging both nations to create stronger ties between them 
in view of their respective complicated relationships with the PRC. This is beneficial 
for Japan’s power politics vis-à-vis the PRC in the East China Sea.  
6.5.1 Different historical interpretations of Japanese imperialism  
The different historical interpretations of Japanese imperialism are a contributory factor 
in the significant differences between China and Taiwan’s contemporary ties with Japan 
as well as in Sino-Taiwanese tensions, as was discussed in Chapter 3. However, 
according to the ESIR, the more the post-colonial populations attempt to gain 
recognition from the post-imperialists, the more this consolidates the hierarchical 
relations between the two groups. This also applies to the Japan–Taiwan relationship in 
regional settings.  
In Taiwan, the perspectives regarding the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan are diverse. 
Some groups argue that while Taiwan has suffered from Japan’s colonisation, the nation 
 
has also become more modernised itself. This is why the Taiwanese did not engage in 
high-profile anti-Japanese activities or boycotts in the post-colonial period (Yeh et al., 
2014), which is in sharp contrast to the PRC’s historical antagonism of Japan. As 
discussed in the literature review, Taiwan’s unique post-colonial interpretation of 
Japanese colonial rule will help to improve Japan–Taiwan relations and will help create 
some momentum for the social and political forces in Taiwan that favour amicable 
relations with Japan. While the political links between Japan’s historical legacy and the 
conclusion of the bilateral fisheries agreement are difficult to ascertain in definitive 
terms, Taiwan’s colonial links with Japan is one of the facilitators of the former’s 
attempts to enhance its ties with the latter rather than the PRC. This post-colonial 
positive sentiment vis-à-vis Japan has created a domestic mechanism in Taiwan that has 
consolidated Taiwan’s ideationally subordinate position vis-à-vis ‘the civilised Japan’ 
as opposed to alongside ‘uncivilised others’ such as China in the hierarchical regional 
order. 
After the end of WWII, having witnessed the activities of the violent and corrupt KMT 
oppressors, the Taiwanese were disillusioned with the party’s rule (Dreyer, 2008) and 
did not feel an emotional connection with China. They felt abandoned by the Qing 
Empire (Dreyer, 2008) and a sense of nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule (Dreyer 2008; 
Sun, 2013). It is common for Japanese people to encounter elderly Taiwanese people 
who speak Japanese and have positive memories of the Japanese colonial era in Taiwan. 
In fact, Sun (2013) pointed out that in Tsai Ching-tang’s study, 94.47% of the 205 
elderly Taiwanese participants who had received a Japanese education in the Japanese 
colonial era described their Japanese teachers as either ‘good’ or ‘quite good’.  
Indeed, a politicised Taiwanese imagination of the Japanese as the ‘positive other’ exists 
 
in Taiwanese domestic politics. For example, Wakabayashi (2015) argued that the rise 
of China as the ‘negative other’ functioned, for Taiwanese nationalists, as a political 
restraining factor that minimised the otherness of the Japanese as past occupiers, adding 
that this phenomenon corresponds with the image of Japan as a model advanced country 
that Taiwan should aspire to emulate. It can be stated here that many Taiwanese 
nationalists continue to instrumentalise their internalised Japanese historical and 
cultural influences to reduce Chinese historical and cultural ownership of Taiwan for 
their own political benefit. Taiwanese historical imagination regarding Japanese 
imperialism renders the mainstream Taiwanese indifferent or unsympathetic to the 
greater Chinese nationalism that the PRC instrumentalises to appeal to its Taiwan 
compatriots. In fact, this appeal is, in reality, a political call for a cross-strait united front 
against Japan in the East China Sea.  
6.5.2 Cultural dynamics  
According to the ESIR, an international society that is marked by shared normativity 
and values, including in terms of culture, will likely experience successful consolidation. 
This also applies to Japan–Taiwan relations. The following sections conduct a close 
examination of the cultural dimension of the Japan–Taiwan relations, which helped to 
facilitate the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement. Regarding the inter-relationship 
between cultural exchanges and their effect on diplomacy, Sun (2013, p. 132) stated 
that ‘[c]ultural exchanges can either be applauded for their vibrancy or lamented for 
their irrelevance’.  
As a unique aspect of Japan–Taiwan relations, cultural factors – including both high-
cultural and sub-cultural exchanges – can be critical to enhancing bilateral ties. For 
certain, as noted, the cultural dimension of Japan–Taiwan relations contributed to the 
conclusion of the bilateral Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement. The mutually positive 
 
perceptions of the two nations (MOFA, 2013) that stem from their socio-cultural 
exchanges are essential to enhancing their bilateral ties. For one, they have contributed 
to the strong foundations of their respective societies and effectively prevented Japan–
Taiwan relations from being negatively affected by the tensions in the East China Sea 
following the nationalisation of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government. For 
example, the former Taiwanese de facto ambassador, Shen Ssu-tsun (Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Representative Office, 2012), emphasised Japan–Taiwan high-cultural ties 
such as the performance of the Takarazuka in Taiwan and the artefact exhibition at the 
National Palace Museum in Japan. He also called for the commencement of fisheries-
related negotiations with Japan and for a declaration of Taiwan’s intention of non-
cooperation with the PRC in their conflict with Japan vis-à-vis the issue of the East 
China Sea.  
Both Japan and Taiwan have undertaken numerous measures to enhance the socio-
cultural exchanges between the two sides. This has improved Japan–Taiwan relations 
at the civilian and grassroots levels and ensured the two countries support each other 
during natural disasters (Sakashi, 2014). For example, when the Great East Japan 
Earthquake hit Japan in 2011, Taiwan’s emotional support and huge financial donation 
(the largest in the world on a per capita basis) significantly boosted the positive image 
of Taiwan among the Japanese (Japan MOFA, 2013). However, the Taiwanese rescue 
team was politically pressured into waiting for the arrival of the PRC’s rescue team 
during the initial stages of the disaster, which outraged the Taiwanese population 
(Sakashi, 2014). On the first anniversary of the earthquake, the Japanese government 
did not invite a Taiwanese representative to the commemorative event out of 
consideration for the PRC. The Japanese mass media and public expressed its 
resentment and protested, which subsequently put political pressure on the Noda 
 
administration to change its Taiwan policy (Ogasawara, 2014). The Japanese 
government decided it no longer saw the need to consider the demands of the PRC 
regarding Taiwan given Taiwan’s significant humanitarian contributions to the nation. 
In September 2012, Prime Minister Noda issued an open apology to Taiwan for not 
inviting it to the aforementioned event, while Japan’s de facto embassy in Taipei 
published a half-page thank you note in every major newspaper in Taiwan (Taipei Times, 
2013). A month later, the Emperor of Japan invited Taiwanese representatives to Tokyo 
for the first time (Ogasawara, 2014).  
On the second anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake, a Taiwanese 
representative was invited. The representatives gave flowers and expressed their 
condolences to the victims (Ishihara, 2013). According to Ishihara (2013), Ziyou Shibao 
argued that these representatives attended the ceremony as an official Taiwanese 
delegation that was on an equal footing with the delegations from other countries. This 
antagonised the PRC’s government, which chose to boycott the event (Ishihara, 2013). 
Subsequently, due to the rising tensions in the East China Sea and the presence of a 
Taiwanese representative at the third anniversary of the earthquake, the PRC 
ambassador boycotted the event along with South Korea. Regarding this development, 
the Chinese spokesman at MOFA stated the following:  
[w]e believe that Japan’s behaviour has violated the principles and spirit of the 
China-Japan Joint Statement and the commitments of the Japanese side…We 
urge Japan to match its words and deeds regarding the issue of Taiwan, to 
honour its commitment and not play games (Taipei Times, 2013).  
It is no great leap to presume that the Japanese people detected a sharp contrast between 
Taiwan and the PRC. At the third anniversary event, Prime Minister Abe expressed his 
 
gratitude to Taiwan and asked the Taiwanese representative to present commemorative 
flowers at the event on his personal Facebook page. This Facebook post received the 
largest number of ‘likes’ on record, indicating the Japanese people’s positive perception 
of Taiwan (Ogasawara, 2014).  
According to the Taiwan–Japan fisheries agreement document archived in the ROC 
MOFA website, the emotional and financial support the Taiwanese offered Japan 
contributed to improving Japan–Taiwan relations and facilitated the eventual 
conclusion of the fisheries agreement. According to the document,  
[t]he ROC government sees relations with Japan as a special partnership. The 
two countries enjoy close exchanges at all levels and have built strong trust 
and friendship. Following the massive earthquake that hit eastern Japan on 
March 11, 2011, donations came from all sectors of Taiwan, for which Japan 
remains grateful today. In his congratulatory message on the 40th anniversary 
of the interchange association, Japan, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Fumio Kishida said that Taiwan and Japan are important partners, and a 
valuable and solid friendship exists between the two countries (ROC MOFA: 
The Japan–Taiwan Fisheries Agreement 2013, p. 2). 
Since Japan does not enjoy friendly relations with its immediate neighbours, the PRC, 
South Korea, and North Korea, it is essential that it maintains its amicable relationship 
with Taiwan. Many people in Japan and Taiwan, including both elites and ordinary 
citizens, believe that important Japan–Taiwan sociocultural ties should not be ruined by 
the maritime tensions in the East China Sea. This attitude helped pave the way for the 
bilateral fisheries agreement (Ogasawara, 2014). 
 
However, the grassroots contact between the PRC and Taiwan is not achieving the 
political goals the PRC envisioned in terms of its cross-strait civilian exchanges. In fact, 
the greater the number of cross-strait grassroots and civilian exchanges, the more the 
Taiwanese perceive the socio-cultural and political differences between themselves and 
China. According to Rowen (2014c), Taiwanese citizens were likely to feel more 
alienated by their interactions with PRC citizens after the legal restrictions on cross-
strait tourism were relaxed thanks to Ma’s greater engagement with the PRC. After the 
Ma administration took office in 2008, the expected economic boom due to Chinese 
tourism was meant to change the negative perceptions of Chinese mainlanders and 
create political forces that would favour closer ties between Taiwan and the PRC. 
However, this merely resulted in Taiwanese people realising just how much they 
differed from the Chinese in cultural terms. The huge presence of the Chinese also led 
to a social and cultural sense of alienation among the Taiwanese (Rowen, 2014c). 
Meanwhile, in the PRC, the political views of Taiwanese celebrities are highly 
contested, which often poses a political risk to the celebrities and also further alienates 
the Taiwanese people (Sun, 2013). In fact, Taiwanese celebrities harbouring political 
inclinations that the PRC deems as unacceptable are often ostracised, which leads to 
further resentment among the Taiwanese (Sun, 2013). For example, the 16-year-old 
Taiwanese K-pop singer, Chou Tzu-yu, had to make an online video apologising to the 
Chinese public for waving the ROC flag and the South Korean national flag. This led 
to outrage in Taiwan and caused President-elect Tsai to intervene (New York Times, 
2016). Moreover, soon after Taiwan’s landmark legalisation of the first gay marriage in 
Asia in 2019, Taiwan’s MOFA was infuriated by the People’s Daily, a PRC publication 
for taking credit for Taiwan’s achievement, claiming that the local government of 
Taiwan, China, was the first to legalise same-sex marriage in Asia, which prompted the 
 
ROC MOFA to tweet ‘@PDChina is a commie brainwasher & it sucks’ (Taiwan MOFA 
Twitter, 2019). 
6.5.2.1 Taiwan’s evolving views on Japan and its positive implications for Japan–
Taiwan relations 
Amako (2013) discussed the changing nature of a pro-Japanese Taiwan in relation to 
the issue of the East China Sea before and after the conclusion of the bilateral Japan–
Taiwan fisheries agreement. Elsewhere, Sun (2013) pointed out that while Taiwan is 
the friendliest of Japan’s immediate neighbours, part of this friendliness could perhaps 
be attributed to Taiwan’s partisan politics. Here, we must consider the emerging pro-
Japanese sentiment among young people in Taiwan, who have witnessed unique 
cultural interactions between the two nations (e.g. the mutual support during natural 
disasters) and who have grown up with Japanese popular culture. This pro-Japanese 
sentiment has a historical continuity with the Japanese colonial influence. One critical 
social event in Taiwan that played out in 2014 was a manifestation of its youth’s positive 
sentiments towards Japan and ambivalent feelings towards the PRC. The so-called 
‘Sunflower Movement’ ensued throughout much of 2014, and numerous Taiwanese 
students took to occupying the Legislative Yuan. The Japanese mass media covered the 
event more excessively than any other country apart from Taiwan itself. The students 
were discontented with the perceived overly rapid development of cross-strait 
economic relations and the perceived undemocratic decision-making by the KMT 
regarding the cross-strait service trade agreement with the PRC. These activities had 
been conducted without engaging in appropriate consultations with those who could 
potentially be negatively affected. The students watched a pro-Japanese film entitled 
Kano (2014) on a large screen at the Legislative Yuan to combat the fatigue of their 
long occupation (Taipei Times, 2014). Kano is about Taiwanese and aboriginal 
teenagers who form part of a youth baseball team playing under the supervision of a 
 
Japanese coach and which makes it to the final of the Koshien tournament during the 
Japanese rule of Taiwan. The film is based on historical events and has often been 
described as beautifying Japanese colonial rule – or at least depicting it in positive terms.  
Some of the old KMT mainlanders who fled to Taiwan following their total defeat in 
the civil war against the CCP may harbour anti-Japanese sentiments, as manifested in 
the recent case of the anti-Japanese military parade in Taiwan (Nojima, 2015). However, 
they are a fairly marginal group given their lack of numbers and the fact that they are 
rapidly aging. Furthermore, the KMT has always struggled to obtain international and 
domestic credit for its contribution to the effort against the Japanese invasion of 
mainland China. In fact, the authority has been largely discredited by the PRC, whose 
CCP has monopolised the historical narrative and demonised or ignored the KMT’s 
contributions. Under Japanese rule, Taiwan was mobilised as a part of the Japanese war 
machine. Here, the Taiwanese fought for the Japanese colonisers (Nojima, 2015). 
Nojima (2015) also pointed out that for most Taiwanese people, their conception of an 
anti-Japanese struggle lies in the anti-Japanese colonialist movement in Taiwan, as 
manifested in the internationally acclaimed 2011 Taiwanese movie, Warriors of the 
Rainbow: Seediq Bale. Therefore, the anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan is 
conceptually different from that of the ‘war of resistance against Japanese aggression’ 
sentiment that prevails in the PRC.  
Matsuda (2009) argued that the democratisation of Taiwan resulted in diverse 
perceptions of Japan among the Taiwanese people, which includes both positive and 
negative views of Japan’s historical legacy. In fact, the democratisation complicated 
Japan–Taiwan relations from the 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, Japan is the most 
favoured country among the people in Taiwan (MOFA, 2013) and their shared 
 
democratic values helped enhance their ties and resolve their tensions in peaceful terms. 
To generalise the Taiwanese mainlanders (Waishengren) simply as anti-Japanese may 
risk ignoring the complexity of the issue. Shimizu (2009) stated that even among the 
mainlander groups in Taiwan, the perceptions of Japan are fairly varied due to the 
generational factors. Elsewhere, Yeh (2015) pointed out that even among the 
mainlanders that arrived in Taiwan after 1949, the new generations tended to associate 
themselves with daily life in Taiwan as opposed to the Second Sino-Japanese War. For 
certain, Taiwanese domestic politics has no influence in Japan’s accommodation of 
Taiwan into international society, but the hierarchical relationships between the post-
colonial people of Taiwan and the post-imperialist people of Japan should be closely 
observed in the long term. Taiwan’s domestic cultural development favours external 
policies that facilitate stable ties with Japan, rather than enhance the PRC’s cross-strait 
campaign against Japan.  
6.5.3 Democratic identity and democratic peace theory 
Democracy is now recognised as a vital component of the normative criteria for 
civilisation in international society (Stivachtis, 2015). Taiwan shares this view with 
Japan. As discussed in the previous chapters, obtaining international respect and dignity 
is essential to Taiwan’s national identity since, by extension, this will help the nation 
gain international legitimacy and national security. While the PRC cannot grant Taiwan 
a sense of dignity and respect due to the latter’s democratic structure, Japan certainly 
can. For example, the former Taiwanese de facto ambassador, Shen Ssu-tsun (Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office, 2012), emphasised the value of shared 
democracy, freedom, and human rights with Japan and discussed the Ma 
administration’s intention to recommence negotiations on fisheries rights with Japan to 
improve Japan–Taiwan relations, while he announced Taipei’s intention not to 
 
cooperate with the PRC vis-à-vis the issue of the East China Sea.  
The PRC has limited political imagination, and the best and only political deal it can 
make with Taiwan regarding the final resolution of Taiwan’s status is that of ‘One 
country, two systems’. This deal has been completely rejected by all the political 
spectrums of Taiwanese domestic politics (Sun, 2013). Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement 
and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement were mutually inspiring due to the shared social, 
political, and cultural concerns and fears vis-à-vis Chinese influence over the two 
societies (Rowen, 2014a, 2014b). Thus, it is highly unlikely that the people of Taiwan 
will change their negative perception of the decidedly undemocratic ‘One country, two 
systems’ deal. The aforementioned new national security law of the PRC, which obliges 
Taiwan and Hong Kong to defend the national integrity and national sovereignty of the 
PRC and regards the Taiwan Independence Force as a grave national security threat vis- 
à-vis the PRC, will not help alleviate Taiwanese resentment towards the PRC.  
During the 1980s, the authoritarian regime that ruled Taiwan under the KMT and which 
had a brutal human rights record, was transformed into a democratic regime. This 
helped to change the Japanese perception of Taiwan in a positive way, unlike the 
Tiananmen Massacre in the PRC, which unquestionably shocked the whole of Japan 
(Takagi, 2006). Taiwan also used its democratic identity to forge ties with Japan (Takagi, 
2006; Matsuda, 2009; Sun, 2013). As indicated by pro-Japanese figures such as Lee 
Teng Hui, Taiwan’s democratisation made it possible to revive long-suppressed, yet 
widespread pro-Japanese sentiments under the authoritarian dictatorship of the KMT 
among the Taiwanese populace (Sun, 2013). Following the diplomatic de-recognition 
of the ROC, the Japanese felt a sense of guilt vis-à-vis Taiwan, but the Tiananmen 
Massacre gave the Japanese greater confidence and the political space to enhance ties 
 
with Taiwan (Matsuda, 2009). Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the PRC, Taiwan’s 
democratisation expanded the political support base for Taiwan across the political 
spectrums of Japanese domestic politics; this support was no longer just confined to 
traditional conservative camps (Sun, 2013).  
Regarding the strategic importance of shared democracy for Japan–Taiwan relations 
vis-à-vis the PRC’s brutal human rights record, Sun (2013, p. 139) stated the following:  
[w]hile the security discourse strikes Japanese nerves about the consequences 
of a Chinese invasion, the democratic discourses bring Japan and Taiwan closer 
by highlighting a value-based common identity – that is, Japan is no longer the 
lone democracy in the region but has been joined by a democratic, gracious, and 
friendly Taiwan. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the Sino-Japanese trade volume has long surpassed 
that of Japan and Taiwan, the PRC failed to coerce Japan into capitulating to the PRC’s 
demands on the Taiwan issue. Japan’s strong resistance indicated its increasingly rigid 
attitude vis-à-vis the PRC’s use of its rising material capability and power for coercion 
(Sun, 2013). In the post-Cold War era, with Japan’s normalisation underway, Japan 
began to make a political commitment to promote Western democracy and the Western 
concept of human rights in a more pronounced manner in terms of its own foreign 
policy agenda (Takagi, 2006). The current Abe administration places a strong emphasis 
on ‘upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect of fundamental 
human rights, and the rule of law’ (Japan MOFA Diplomatic Blue Book, 2014). Thus, 
Taiwan’s and Japan’s shared political and democratic values have a more binding effect 
on bilateral Japan–Taiwan relations. The conclusion of the bilateral Japan–Taiwan 
fisheries agreement fits into this geopolitical development within Japan–China–Taiwan 
 
relations. Here, Japan and Taiwan can instrumentalise civilised democratic measures to 
communicate with each other and resolve maritime tensions peacefully, while, the 
undemocratic PRC can only resort to violence, including in terms of violent anti-
Japanese demonstrations.  
Regarding this point, Sun (2013, p. 136) stated the following:  
[t]he Japan–Taiwan case shows that for lesser powers, knowing their place does 
not mean being totally powerless. A shrewd use of soft power factors such as 
identity and culture values may enhance weaker countries’ presences in 
international politics. 
While it is debatable whether Japan is a weaker power given its military and economic 
might, the above statement captures the essence of how Japan–Taiwan relations are 
governed and flourishing under their own dynamics, including the shared democratic 
identities and cultures.  
6.5.4 Political dimension 
Black (2014) pointed out that what is generally less discussed in ESIR is that many non-
great power states must undergo significant domestic reforms in accordance with 
international norms in order to be accommodated into international society. Meanwhile, 
Singh (2013b) argued that in the post-Cold War era, Japan’s domestic political and legal 
decision-making bodies became equipped to effectively tackle regional and 
international security affairs as Japan’s security identity transitioned from that of a 
peace state to an internationalist state. In studying the case of the bilateral fisheries 
agreement, this chapter demonstrated how Japan’s national security decision-making 
body on the Japanese domestic political level has evolved vis-à-vis the issue of the East 
China Sea and how this elevated Japan’s status within international society.  
 
Singh (2013b) pointed out that in the post-Cold War era, the domestic political decision-
making power in terms of foreign and security policy shifted to Prime Minister Kantei 
and the cabinet following Japan’s normalisation from traditional bureaucratic 
approaches. Japan’s contribution to regional and international security affairs faced 
fewer barriers in relation to domestic leadership decision-making. The fisheries 
agreement between Japan and Taiwan reflected these changes in the nature of the 
domestic political leadership structure in Japan.  
Japan needs strong political and decision-making will in its leadership to enhance its 
political, strategic, and security ties with Taiwan while navigating any tensions with the 
PRC. Japan’s conclusion of the bilateral fisheries agreement with Taiwan was deemed 
as signalling a change in the status quo in Japan–China–Taiwan relations by the PRC. 
This change challenged the complicated structure of this triangulated relationship. 
Domestically, despite strong domestic opposition from the Okinawan fishermen and the 
local Okinawan authorities, Abe and his political allies had to make the difficult 
decision to finalise the agreement with Taiwan. In short, Japan’s geo-strategic 
compulsions encouraged it to expedite the conclusion of the bilateral fisheries 
agreement with Taiwan after 17 years of negotiation. Meanwhile, Japan’s major 
economic relations with the PRC did not force the nation into making greater political 
concessions regarding the Taiwan issue (Sun, 2013). This strong leadership is a concrete 
example of the normalisation effect on the Japanese domestic political decision-making 
process. MOFA continues to interact with Taiwan at the Kachou level and has not 
created an independent Taiwan division, with any issues related to Taiwan resolved 
under the supervision of the China division (Sun, 2013). Thus, it was unlikely that 
MOFA would play a leadership role in the conclusion of the bilateral fisheries 
agreement. Both Kawashima (2013) and Sakashi (2014) suggested that there was a high 
 
likelihood that Prime Minister Abe, a pro-Taiwan individual, would take on a leadership 
role within the Kantei diplomacy and would make a final decision regarding the Japan–
Taiwan bilateral fisheries agreement. 
Even under the DPJ-led administration, Japan’s political leadership’s unwillingness to 
yield to the PRC over Taiwan was evident. Following the nationalisation of the Senkaku 
Islands by the Japanese government, the Japan–China–Taiwan triangulated relationship 
experienced certain maritime security tensions. Koichiro Gemba, a former foreign 
minister under the DPJ administration, published a letter to the people of Taiwan on the 
homepage of the Interchange Association in Taipei, which expressed Japan’s desire to 
reopen negotiations on the bilateral fisheries agreement with Taiwan (Interchange 
Association, 2012). From the conclusion of the bilateral fisheries agreement, it is clear 
that regardless of which political party is in power in Japan, Japan will likely favour 
strong ties with Taiwan (Sakashi, 2014). For example, despite the fact that the DPJ had 
fewer Nikka-Kon members in the DPJ-led cabinet compared with 11 ministers from the 
Nikka-Kon in the LDP-led Aso administration, the two incoming chief cabinet 
secretaries in the DPJ administration, Sengoku Yoshito and Edano Yukio – both of 
whom were powerful players in the DPJ – sought to enhance ties with Taiwan (Sakashi, 
2014). In the current author’s personal written communication with former state 
minister Keiji Furuya (2019), Keiji stated that since Japan does not have a formal 
diplomatic relationship with Taiwan as a parliamentary diplomacy, the Nikka-Kon 
played an important role in the signing of the fisheries agreement. Another interesting 
domestic political development in Japan under the DPJ administration was the role of 
high-profile LDP politicians in the opposition party in enhancing Japan–Taiwan 
relations. For example, during the DPJ era, a record number of former Japanese prime 
ministers visited Taiwan (Sakashi, 2014), including Junichiro Koizumi, Aso Taro, and 
 
Shinzo Abe. These politicians ensured that Japan’s interactions with Taiwan continued 
to be robust despite the nation’s change of administration.  
After the fall of the DPJ administration, the Abe administration, with its pro-Taiwan 
political inclinations, took on a political leadership role. Taro Aso became deputy prime 
minister and financial minister, Furuya Keiji, became state minister, while Hakubun 
Shimomura became the minister of education (Sakashi, 2014). Abe’s sympathy for 
Taiwan is famous (his grandfather had ties with the ROC in the post-war period) and 
he rejected Wen Jia Bao’s demand to explicitly oppose Taiwan’s independence in an 
official written document during Wen’s official visit to Japan in 2007 (Shimizu, 2009). 
Evidently, Abe made the final decision on the bilateral fisheries agreement. Abe even 
expressed his gratitude to Taiwan for its support during the triple disasters in Tohoku 
and mentioned the Japan–Taiwan bilateral fisheries agreement on his official Facebook 
page (Ogasawara, 2014). Recognising Abe’s positive sentiments towards Taiwan, the 
ROC MOFA stated the following: 
[a]fter the agreement was signed, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
received Mitsuo Ohashi, chairman of the Interchange Association, Japan, and 
head of the Japanese negotiating team, at the Prime Minister’s Office. Prime 
Minister Abe said that Taiwan is an important partner of Japan and that the 
signing of the fisheries agreement was very positive for both sides. On the day 
the agreement was signed, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said that 
he welcomes such an historic agreement and believes that it will enhance 
regional stability (The Japan–Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, 2013, p. 2). 
6.6 Summary 
Japan instrumentalised Taiwan as a geostrategic asset through the conclusion of the 
 
fisheries agreement to enhance the balance of power in the East China Sea. It was 
motivated by the PRC’s attempt to conduct a cross-strait campaign against it to 
acknowledge Taiwan as a quasi-independent actor in the East China Sea issue. 
Depending on how Japan approaches the One-China policy, Japan can ensure Taiwan 
remains a quasi-independent actor whose perspectives are more appreciated in regional 
security affairs. However, the hierarchical nature of Japan–Taiwan relations remains 
foundationally the same: Japan has an influential authority to grant quasi-recognition 
to an unrecognised Taiwan, and Taiwan remains on the receiving end. However, the 
PRC views this as a violation of the One-China policy within the context of the Sino-
Japanese great power management. Japan and Taiwan enhanced their law enforcement 
and economic security cooperation through the fisheries agreement to the detriment of 
Okinawan interests. Furthermore, the multifaceted normative developments in Japan–
Taiwan relations helped achieve amicable relations between the two actors and helped 
pave the way for the fisheries agreement in accordance with the ESIR paradigm. The 
next chapter now presents the conclusions of this study. 
  
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Overview  
This dissertation elucidated how Japan instrumentalises Taiwan as a foreign policy 
instrument within the context of Japan’s One-China policy. This policy is conducted on 
the basis of how Japan socialises Taiwan to behave ‘as if’ it is a ‘member’ of 
international security efforts, which officially requires statehood. This sheds some light 
on Japan–Taiwan relations within the context of the ESIR paradigm. As demonstrated, 
Japan incrementally accommodates unrecognised Taiwan into the international society 
of states without recognition of Taiwan’s actual statehood in view of Japan’s security 
vis-à-vis the PRC. Due to this international non-recognition of Taiwan, and the PRC’s 
sanctions, members of the international society (including Japan) tend not to treat 
Taiwan as an equal member. As such, Japan’s innovative security policy means the 
nation presents a unique case study due to the way it has instrumentalised unrecognised 
Taiwan as an international security asset for its own security vis-à-vis the rising threat 
of the PRC. Notably, Japan is navigating its One China policy to find out what it is 
willing and unwilling to do in terms of its non-traditional security ties with Taiwan. In 
the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship, it is clear that Japan is both the master and 
the main protagonist and that Taiwan is merely a foreign policy instrument used by its 
more powerful neighbour to improve its security vis-à-vis the PRC.  
 
The study thus partially focused on how Japan has been a central protagonist in 
promoting international security norms and rules in the emerging regional security 
environment through its incremental accommodation of Taiwan into international 
society in relation to its regional power politics vis-à-vis the PRC. This contrasts with 
 
notions of Japan becoming a socialised member of the Eurocentric global order by 
accepting the prevailing Eurocentric norms and rules.  
7.2 Outline of the Argument 
 
Chapter 1 first outlined the research question of this dissertation, which was aimed at 
addressing how the de facto state of Taiwan fits into Japan’s regional security strategy. 
Following this, it discussed the debates surrounding the implications of the status of 
Taiwan from a Japanese perspective and outlined how Taiwan is a non-sovereign 
political community due to the absence of Japan’s recognition within the context of its 
One-China policy. This significantly reduces Taiwan’s foreign policy leverage vis-à-
vis its interactions with Japan and renders the nation a mere foreign policy instrument 
for Japan in its great power struggle with the PRC. Taiwan’s marginal place within 
international society affords a regional great power such as Japan the opportunities to 
exploit Taiwan’s vulnerability for its own national interests. Japan achieves this through 
the accommodation of Taiwan into the regional security environment, which allows the 
former to gain a strategic advantage over emerging major powers such as the PRC. As 
was highlighted, the existing social constructivist approach to Japan’s foreign policy 
lacks the conceptual framework for examining “as if membership in international 
security efforts that require statehood, which is a key concept in understanding Japan’s 
state behaviour vis-à-vis the de facto state of Taiwan. 
Chapter 2 built upon this discussion by tracing the overall reviews of the ESIR and by 
investigating how international society has engaged with de facto states in order to 
demonstrate how Japan has been portrayed as simply a ‘good pupil’ of the Eurocentric 
global order and not a core creator of international society, which was a major focus of 
this study. In addition, this chapter demonstrated how de facto states have been 
 
discussed as troublemakers or the generators of international security issues within the 
existing literature. Here, we showed that despite the volume of studies that deal with 
how international society engages with de facto states, none have as yet discussed the 
role of Japan as a paternalistic accommodator of unrecognised Taiwan within the 
international efforts to enhance the peace and security in international society. 
 
Chapter 3 then outlined the literature related to how Japan has utilised foreign policy 
instruments to enhance its own security via multiple leverages including in terms of its 
defence, non-traditional security means, security networks and pacifist identity. It also 
looked at the literature related to Japan–Taiwan relations in general. These reviews 
were conducted to highlight the general lack of research regarding Japan’s 
instrumentalisation of Taiwan as an international security asset, if not a geopolitical 
pawn, one that could potentially allow it to gain the upper hand in its power politics 
with the PRC within the regional security environment. Especially if Japan’s security 
interactions with Taiwan are deemed normative and less coercive, it is difficult for the 
PRC to sanction Japan-Taiwan non-traditional security ties in view of Japan’s One 
China policy. It is especially the case in non-military policing cooperation. Due to 
Taiwan’s ambiguous status in the Japan–US alliance, the nation’s historical ties with 
Japan, its reliance on Japan for its own security, and its strategic need to gain semi-
recognition from Japan for its normative security behaviours, the hierarchical nature of 
the Japan–Taiwan relationship has been strengthened. These social structures within 
international society afford Japan an influential authority to dictate Taiwan’s 
contributions to Japan’s security. The attendant discussion demonstrated that regardless 
of whether Japan makes radical changes in its security policy or continues to follow an 
incrementalistic approach to international security, its accommodation of Taiwan 
 
unquestionably follows such an incremental approach due to its regional great power 
management with the PRC in the context of Japan’s One-China policy. In the literature 
review related to Japan–Taiwan relations, which was presented in Chapter 3, it was 
observed that a number of studies exist on how Taiwan’s view of Japan affects its policy 
for its interactions with its neighbour. However, the political insignificance of Taiwan’s 
input into Japan’s security policy regarding Taiwan was clearly demonstrated.  
Thus, following the arguments and theories discussed above, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
empirically examined how Japan’s instrumentalisation of Taiwan manifested itself in 
each case study, which related to the areas of CSD, international civil aviation, and the 
fisheries agreements.  
This conclusion highlights the main findings of this study. In doing so, it outlines how 
it is ultimately up to Japan to define the boundaries regarding the progress of Japan–
Taiwan security relations, concluding that Japan will never make Taiwan an equal 
partner within the hierarchical Japan–Taiwan relationship due to the latter’s 
unrecognised status in international society. These social structures are constructed in 
relation to the Sino-Japanese balance of power, the attendant regional great power 
management, and Japan’s enabling of Taiwan to serve as a normative security asset for 
Japan’s security. As was shown in Chapter 4, Japan has granted Taiwan ambiguous 
status in its approach to the CSD due to Taiwan’s unrecognised position. However, 
Taiwan can still benefit from this unequal arrangement while its defence capabilities 
continue to contribute to Japan’s security as a military buffer against the PRC. This 
unequal relationship provides Japan with various opportunities to enhance its non-
traditional security cooperation with Taiwan for its own security and that of the region 
and beyond. In Chapter 5, it was shown that Taiwan is only afforded semi-participation 
in the ICAO due to its absence of international recognition and the PRC’s sanctions. 
 
Nonetheless, Japan has instrumentalised Taiwan to enhance international aviation 
security through enabling the latter to behave as if it is a member in ICAO’s security 
principles. Chapter 6 was somewhat different in nature to the previous chapters since, 
within the maritime context, Japan has acknowledged Taiwan as a semi-legitimate 
participant in the attendant security issues, specifically in the East China Sea. Here, 
Japan conducted matters within a limited space, which created some need for an 
examination of Taiwan’s perspectives, albeit that this was also undertaken in a 
paternalistic manner. For example, the Taiwanese view of Japan as a ‘positive other’ 
and China as a ‘negative other’ in relation to Taiwan’s ontological security created the 
political momentum for Taiwan’s foreign policy preference to enhance its ties with 
Japan rather than the PRC, as was examined in Section 6.3 of the fisheries agreement 
chapter.  
7.3 Contribution to Japanese Studies 
It was demonstrated that Japan has used Taiwan as a foreign policy instrument to 
balance its relationship with the PRC, incrementally enhancing Taiwan’s security 
contribution to Japan’s security while appeasing the PRC within the context of its One-
China policy. Despite Japan’s less visible approach to the issue of the Taiwan Strait – 
and contrary to the prevalent claim (Soeya 2001) that Japan is simply rather meekly 
following the One-China policy by keeping its involvement in the cross-strait relations 
to a minimum – the nation has, in reality, strategically instrumentalised its One-China 
policy and the Taiwan issue to meet its own national interests. In short, Taiwan is more 
than merely one issue in Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan can transform Taiwan into 
a foreign policy instrument in the defence, aviation and maritime security dimensions 
for its own security depending on how this is instrumentalised vis-à-vis the PRC while 
navigating the complexity of the One-China policy. These findings potentially provide 
 
a new perspective on how Japan’s foreign policy has been characterised as largely 
reactive (Funabashi, 1991/1992; Calder 1988, 2003).  
This dissertation elucidated how Japan has been utilising the non-state actor Taiwan to 
enhance its own security and to navigate its power relations with the PRC. If Japan is 
deemed an anomaly in the realist paradigm since the nation is seen as not having 
translated its economic heft into military power and not engaging in power politics, its 
interactions with Taiwan in the context of its One-China policy offers a different picture 
within this scenario. Furthermore, Japan has been using state-centric international law 
to disseminate international security norms to Taiwan for its own security interests. 
This encourages Taiwan to behave as a foreign policy instrument that is being socialised 
through international security norms by Japan. Taiwan has no access to international 
security forum that require statehood for membership, but Japan is making great efforts 
to encourage Taiwan’s as if membership. This helps to eradicate the loophole that stems 
from Taiwan’s absence in international security efforts and ensures Taiwan is a more 
important component of the regional power politics related to Sino-Japanese rivalry in 
view of tilting the balance in Japan’s favour. This demonstrates how a regional great 
power such as Japan can accommodate a non-sovereign political community such as 
Taiwan into international society within a regional setting.  
The way Japan incrementally engages with Taiwan is different from the way the US 
uses Taiwan as a bargaining chip or a geopolitical pawn vis-à-vis the PRC. Furthermore, 
while the China factor remains a major constraint in the enhancement of Japan–Taiwan 
security relations, it was found that Japan skilfully manoeuvres the ambiguity of its 
One-China policy to enhance Taiwan’s contributions to Japan’s security vis-à-vis the 
PRC. Moreover, as the section on political dimensions (Section 6.5.4) in Chapter 6 
demonstrated, the role of Nikkakon and Kantei diplomacy proved the existence of a 
 
strong political leadership that led to the signing of the Japan–Taiwan fisheries 
agreement, which does not correspond to the ineffective domestic decision-making 
system in Japan described by Calder (2003).7  
Despite the increasing amount of literature related to the radical shift in Japan’s security 
policy under Abe, which allegedly renders Japan susceptible to resorting to the use of 
force in order to assist the US’s war effort while weakening the domestic hurdles to 
restrain Japan’s foreign policy behaviours – characterised as the Abe Doctrine by 
Hughes (2017)8 – Japan–Taiwan security relations present the unique aspect of Japan’s 
security policy. As examined, Japan’s security interactions with Taiwan remain, at best, 
incrementalistic. Japan’s security commitment to Taiwan in the face of potential 
invasion by the PRC also remains ambiguous, regardless of whether Japan radically 
alters its pursuance of international security policy or remains incrementalistic in its 
approach. This is due to Taiwan’s ongoing ambiguous status in the Japanese conception 
of CSD due to Taiwan’s lack of statehood and the delicate nature of Japan’s One-China 
policy vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese regional great power management. As such, Taiwan 
presents an under-researched case of how Japan’s security policy is not determined by 
 
7  Funabashi (1991) argued that the shock of the global under-appreciation of Japan’s financial 
contribution to the Gulf War exposed Japan’s structural absence of both the external and internal 
mechanisms to create effective foreign policy initiatives. It also made Japan unwilling to be a rule-maker 
in international society due to its lack of regional strategy, post-war reliance on the asymmetric alliance 
with the US, mercantilist policy, excessive pacifism, and neighbours’ historical distrust of Japan. 
Therefore, in Funabashi’s (1991) view, Japan relied on Gaiatsu to pursue its own diplomacy without 
engaging in healthy policy debates on its foreign policy. 
8  Hughes (2017) argued that despite Abe’s claims regarding the enhanced democratic hurdles to 
collective self-defence and the enhanced deterrence capabilities against potential adversaries, the Abe 
Doctrine is more likely to heighten the possibility for Japan to resort to the use of force to assist the US’s 
war efforts. This is due to factors such as considerations of the Japan–US alliance, the growing 
indivisibility of the US’s national security interests with that of Japan’s, and the weakened domestic 
constraints, including fewer legal, bureaucratic and executive hurdles in decision-making processes in 
Japan. Hughes (2017) also pointed out that the still substantial pacifist public opinions in Japan were 
unable to stop the legal passage of collective self-defence. Furthermore, Hughes (2017) argued that the 
ambiguous nature of the three conditions imposed on collective self-defence would be unlikely to be 
consolidated hurdles. 
 
foreign pressure alone.9 Precisely because Taiwan remains a de facto state, Japan is able 
to enhance unique security interactions between the two nations, most notably in the 
field of the non-kinetic intelligence cooperation and non-traditional security ties, in 
ways that do not excessively breach Japan’s One-China policy. 
Meanwhile, while Japan refuses to explicitly acknowledge any security-related 
commitment to Taiwan, this does not mean that Japan demonstrates no independent 
security behaviour in relation to Taiwan–China relations. Therefore, as was highlighted, 
in terms of an internationally isolated actor such as Taiwan, Japan accommodates it into 
international society and transforms it into an international security asset for its own 
security enhancement. At the same time, it prevents such an internationally isolated 
entity from being brought further into the geopolitical orbit of the PRC, minimising the 
risk of Taiwan being an incendiary issue in Sino-Japanese relations. Finally, as 
examined in Section 3.2.5, in the literature related to the hierarchical relationship 
between Japan and Taiwan, it is often debated whether Taiwan is regarded as an asset 
or an irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. This is precisely the reason why security 
studies on Japan’s instrumentalisation of Taiwan as an international security asset are 
titled toward Japanese studies. This provides the opportunity to engage in an in-depth 
study of Japan’s conception of security via the instrumentalisation of a sensitive issue 
 
9 The widely held claim of Japan always being reactive to Gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, as opposed to 
Japan’s role of enhancing active norm entrepreneurship needs to be reconsidered, at least in the context 
of Japan–China–Taiwan relations. Calder (2003) argued that Japan is a reactive state, which has no 
independent foreign policy. This is due to the constraints imposed on it by its asymmetric alliance with 
the US for security, historical antagonism from China and Korea, and ineffective domestic decision-
making systems, despite Japan’s enormous financial and investment capabilities. Calder (2003) admitted 
that Japan has some room for independent foreign policy initiatives in the field of official development 
assistance, proactive quasi-diplomatic endeavours by local governments and NGOs, and occasional 
major independent foreign policy initiatives when the international environment allows Japan to do so – 
including Koizumi’s visit to North Korea. Finally, Calder (2003) argued that without the international 
shock, especially from the US vis-à-vis its unreliability as an ally, becoming a reality, Japan would not 
produce Japanese foreign policy activism. 
 
such as Taiwan in relation to Sino-Japanese relations, which assists in the enhancement 
of Japan’s security within the emerging regional order. 
7.4 Contribution to the ESIR Paradigm  
The ESIR is known to be Eurocentric, and many of its contributors (e.g. Bull, 1977; 
Watson, 2008; Suzuki, 2014) openly admit such a tendency. For example, Bull and 
Watson (1984, p. 2) stated that ‘it is not our perspective, but the historical record itself 
that can be called Eurocentric’. As examined in the literature related to the English 
School, a number of academics suggest that Japan has responded to the global 
expansion of international society in terms of being a ‘good pupil’ of Eurocentric 
international society. Meanwhile, others such as Suzuki (2008) suggest that both Japan 
and China have remained frustrated great powers within international society amid their 
aspirations to be recognised as equals vis- à-vis the privileged Eurocentric great powers. 
Black (2013) looked at Japan’s innovative foreign policy approaches, including its 
Kakehashi diplomacy, and its innovative maritime security policy approaches, such as 
its coastguard diplomacy (Black, 2014).  
However, as yet, none of the studies working in this area has positioned Japan as a 
central creator of international society, either in the regional setting or beyond. In fact, 
the current study on Japan’s accommodation of Taiwan into international society is the 
first to construct the narrative of Japanese-centric regional order, which places Japan at 
the central core of international society in the regional setting while clearly positioning 
unrecognised Taiwan as a pupil of Japan’s international norms and rules of international 
security vis-à-vis the emerging China. As a regional and global counterweight to the 
PRC, the strategic role of Japan is becoming ever more critical, which means the ESIR 
paradigm, as one of the major disciplines of security studies, requires some adjustment 
in terms of its interpretations of Japan. For example, Suzuki (2014) observed that the 
 
expansion of international society into ‘Asia’ produced contradictory reactions. Here, 
we witnessed Japan’s aspiration to be a legitimate member of international society, one 
on a par with the European states, which was manifested in its attempt to socialise itself 
with the Eurocentric norms and rules. However, as Suzuki (2014) pointed out, Japan 
resented the nominal equality that harboured racist views against the Japanese by the 
‘civilised’ European people, even after Japan emerged as a great power. Japan’s pan-
Asian advocacy also contradicted Japan’s sense of superiority over other Asian peoples, 
meaning that the nation failed to gain the trust of the Asian populations. Nonetheless, 
in the process of the current research, one point became clear: Japan is a leader in 
international society in the regional setting, with Taiwan willing to accept Japan-centric 
security norms regardless of Eurocentric narratives. In other words, the ESIR must 
move beyond the conceptual representation of Japan as a learner of the Eurocentric 
global order and must accordingly place Japan’s regional strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan–
China relations at the central narrative of international society regarding the region. It 
must also leave behind the historical essentialism of European supremacy in its 
conceptual analysis of contemporary Japan’s creation of international society.  
This study of Japan’s instrumentalisation of Taiwan as an international security asset 
elucidates the conceptual and empirical reifications of Japan’s security policy in the 
regional security environment vis-à-vis the emerging challenge of the PRC. Through 
this study, the author demonstrated that it is entirely possible to challenge the narrative 
that describes Japan as simply being a good pupil of Eurocentric international society 
in an attempt to be recognised as an equal member of international society on the global 
stage. In fact, it is entirely possible to conceptualise Japan as a core member of 
international society, one that has the influential authority to incrementally grant semi-
legitimacy via as if membership to state-like entities such as Taiwan as a reward for 
 
their contribution to Japan’s security in the Japan-centric regional setting. Japan may 
have been a latecomer to the global stage, but it was the pioneering actor in the regional 
modernisation process. As such, the author considered why no study exists that 
positions Japan as a centrepiece of international society in the regional setting, which 
set the wheels in motion for this PhD dissertation related to the ESIR.  
7.5 Contribution to Taiwan Studies  
Through the author’s PhD studies on Japan’s utilisation of Taiwan as one of its foreign 
policy instruments for its own security enhancement, it was demonstrated that it is up 
to Japan to decide how far Japan–Taiwan security relations will be developed. As such, 
Taiwanese political input in Japan’s security policy on Taiwan has little influence. 
Equally, Taiwan’s domestic policy on Japan is not considered in Japan’s security 
interactions with its neighbour due to the absence of Taiwan’s foreign policy leverage 
vis-à-vis Japan, as was examined in Chapter 3. Thus, through this research, Taiwan’s 
international marginality has been elucidated in the context of the hierarchical Japan-
Taiwan relations in international society in a regional setting. Taiwanese perspectives 
on international security efforts are ignored in the multilateral security efforts, if these 
efforts require members to have a ‘recognised statehood’. Thus, Taiwanese 
perspectives matter only if great powers including Japan choose to accommodate the 
former’s perspectives in creative ways.  
Furthermore, if Taiwan remains a de facto state, there is no Taiwan without China, and 
Japan–Taiwan relations do not exist without considering the China factor. However, if 
Taiwan falls into the hands of the PRC, this would clearly be detrimental to Japan’s 
security. Therefore, Japan needs to consider what it must do to prevent the risk of the 
US’s abandonment of Taiwan. In this context, it can be argued that Taiwan’s enhanced 
strategic and normative value for Japan’s security is critically important to ensuring the 
 
US continue to engage with Taiwan’s security. On this point, the empirical knowledge 
this study produced could potentially help Japan to avoid the risk of the US’s 
abandonment of Taiwan, that is, Japan could incrementally increase Taiwan’s security 
contribution to its own security. In fact, the empirical knowledge produced in this study 
is essential for scholars working within the field of Taiwan studies in terms of reflecting 
on how Taiwan could be a better national security asset for Japan in view of securing 
its own survival. For certain, a Taiwanese perspective has no place in Japan’s elite 
debates on Japan’s security policy; however, as was demonstrated in the three case 
study chapters, Taiwan can voluntarily enhance its internal reforms and internal 
balancing since it enjoys some internal autonomy as a de facto state, and its efforts may 
ultimately be noted by Japan. The hope is that Taiwan’s internal efforts will be 
accommodated by Japan in its facilitation of Taiwan’s “as if membership in the 
multilateral security efforts as an international security asset for Japan’s security, as 
was examined in the ICAO chapter. As for Taiwan’s international space, if, with 
Japan’s help, the nation behaves as if it is a member of the international organisation 
that require statehood for membership, it will have alternative methods for improving 
its international contributions and some hope for its future entry into the state-centric 
international organisations.  
7.6 Future Research on Japan’s Accommodation of Internationally 
Isolated Actors for International Security 
From this study, one major finding has been clarified: Japan’s innovative 
accommodation of internationally isolated entities, including Taiwan, into the 
international community (and its attempt to discipline them enough to be able to 
maintain their linkage with international society) in ways that contribute to Japan’s 
security is different from how Eurocentric Western international society ostracises non-
 
sovereign political communities in the international society of states. This is significant 
in Japan’s regional security strategy because when the West ostracises a specific state 
or non-sovereign political actor in the Asia Pacific region, it is the PRC that attempts 
to lure such an actor into its own geopolitical sphere of influence, which may 
subsequently reduce Japan’s regional power. Thus, Japan accommodates the 
membership of isolated actors in the region in view of managing any threat from other 
rising powers such as the PRC to enhance its security and to elevate its regional standing. 
As such, Japan’s policy regarding the accommodation of such entities into international 
society in the regional setting requires more scholastic attention. 
Black (2013) argued that Japan’s Kakehashi diplomacy helped Burma maintain ties 
with the West through Japan. In addition, despite the controversial war on drugs that 
Duterte has carried out as his flagship national security policy (at the expense of human 
rights and the erosion of the rule of law in the Philippines that shocked the Eurocentric 
Western great powers), it would appear that Japan is fine to accommodate Duterte’s 
Philippines. For Duterte, Japan presents a great ally in terms of maintaining ties with 
the West, especially the US. Therefore, in the case of an ostracised political entity that 
has significant difficulty in maintaining ties with international society, Japan plays a 
linking role in the process of maintaining any ties. It is essential to state here that both 
Burma and Duterte’s Philippines have been geopolitically pursued by the PRC in ways 
that may undermine the Western influences in the region. In recent years, Japan 
attempted to accommodate Iran vis-à-vis the rising tensions with the US, in which case 
Japan’s accommodation of such entities may have incrementally expanded into the 
global setting. Nonetheless, more research needs to be conducted to determine whether 
or not this is indeed the case. If it is, it could be argued that Japan is transitioning from 
a great regional great power to a global great power. Certainly, Japan has a great deal 
 
of regional expertise and experience in accommodating the internationally isolated 
entities in its region; however, in terms of the global arena, it remains to be seen whether 
Japan can take on a similar, but yet-to-be-explored, global security role to help 
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